Among the many and varied errors of those who live rashly and without reflection, there is almost nothing, my excellent Liberalis, that I would call more disgraceful than this: that we know neither how to give benefits nor how to receive them. For it follows that, badly placed, they are badly owed; and we complain too late that they are not repaid — they were lost in the giving. Nor is it any wonder that among the greatest and most numerous vices none is more common than that of the ungrateful mind.

Inter multos ac varios errores temere inconsulteque viventium nihil propemodum indignius, vir optime Liberalis, dixerim, quam quod beneficia nec dare scimus nec accipere. Sequitur enim, ut male collocata male debeantur; de quibus non redditis sero querimur; ista enim perierunt, cum darentur. Nec mirum est inter plurima maximaque vitia nullum esse frequentius quam ingrati animi.

This comes about, I see, from several causes. The first is that we do not choose worthy men on whom to bestow them. Yet when we are about to lend money, we investigate with care the estate and the manner of life of the debtor; we do not scatter seed on exhausted and barren ground — but our benefits we fling out rather than give, with no discrimination at all.

Id evenire ex causis pluribus video. Prima illa est, quod non eligimus dignos, quibus tribuamus. Sed nomina facturi diligenter in patrimonium et vitam debitoris inquirimus, semina in solum effetum et sterile non spargimus; beneficia sine ullo dilectu magis proicimus quam damus.

And I could not easily say which is the more shameful — to disown a benefit or to demand it back; for this is the kind of loan on which only so much is to be recovered as is repaid of the debtor’s own accord. To default on it is utterly base, and for this very reason: that to discharge the obligation we need no resources but only a will; for a man repays a benefit by owing it. But while the blame lies with those who are not grateful even by confession, it lies with us too.

Nec facile dixerim, utrum turpius sit infitiari an repetere beneficium; id enim genus huius crediti est, ex quo tantum recipiendum sit, quantum ultro refertur. Decoquere vero foedissimum ob hoc ipsum, quia non opus est ad liberandam fidem facultatibus sed animo; reddit enim beneficium, qui debet. Sed cum sit in ipsis crimen, qui ne confessione quidem grati sunt, in nobis quoque est.

We find many ungrateful, and we make more so: at one moment we are harsh in reproach and exaction, at another fickle, repenting of our gift soon after; at another querulous, finding fault with the smallest trifles. We corrupt all gratitude — not only after we have given the benefits, but while we are giving them.

Multos experimur ingratos, plures facimus, quia alias graves exprobratores exactoresque sumus, alias leves et quos paulo post muneris sui paeniteat, alias queruli et minima momenta calumniantes. Gratiam omnem corrumpimus non tantum postquam dedimus beneficia, sed dum damus.

Which of us has been content to be asked lightly, or once only? Who, when he suspected that something was being sought of him, has not knit his brow, turned away his face, feigned engagements, and with long talk that of set purpose found no end deprived the petitioner of his chance to ask, and by various arts eluded a pressing need;

Quis nostrum contentus fuit aut leviter rogari aut semel? Quis non, cum aliquid a se peti suspicatus est, frontem adduxit, vultum avertit, occupationes simulavit, longis sermonibus et de industria non invenientibus exitum occasionem petendi abstulit et variis artibus necessitates properantes elusit;

and when caught in a corner, either put the matter off — that is, refused it timidly — or promised, but grudgingly, with brows drawn down, with mean words that scarcely came out?

in angusto vero comprensus aut distulit, id est timide negavit, aut promisit, sed difficulter, sed subductis superciliis, sed malignis et vix exeuntibus verbis?

But no one gladly owes what he did not receive but extorted. Can anyone be grateful to a man who flung the benefit at him in arrogance, or hurled it in anger, or gave it out of weariness, to be rid of the bother? He is mistaken who hopes for a return from one whom he has worn out with delay and tortured with waiting.

Nemo autem libenter debet, quod non accepit, sed expressit. Gratus adversus eum esse quisquam potest, qui beneficium aut superbe abiecit aut iratus impegit aut fatigatus, ut molestia careret, dedit? Errat, si quis sperat responsurum sibi, quem dilatione lassavit, expectatione torsit.

A benefit is owed in the same spirit in which it is given, and therefore it must not be given carelessly — for each man owes a thing to himself when he has received it from one who did not know he gave it; nor slowly, since, when in every service the giver’s will is most highly prized, he who acted slowly was long unwilling; and above all not insultingly — for since nature has so arranged it that injuries sink deeper than kindnesses, and that the latter swiftly flow away while a tenacious memory keeps guard over the former, what can he expect who gives offense while he obliges? A man is grateful enough toward him if he forgives him his benefit.

Eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur, et ideo non est neclegenter dandum; sibi enim quisque debet, quod a nesciente accepit; ne tarde quidem, quia, cum omni in officio magni aestimetur dantis voluntas, qui tarde fecit, diu noluit; utique non contumeliose; nam eum ita natura comparatum sit, ut altius iniuriae quam merita descendant et illa cito defluant, has tenax memoria custodiat, quid expectat, qui offendit, dum obligat? Satis adversus illum gratus est, si quis beneficio eius ignoscit.

There is no reason why the crowd of the ungrateful should make us slower to do good. For first, as I said, we ourselves swell their number; and next, not even the immortal gods are deterred from this lavish and unceasing bounty by men who rob their temples and neglect them. They use their own nature, and help all things — among them the very men who misread their gifts. Let us follow these as our guides, so far as human weakness allows; let us give benefits, not lend them at interest. He deserves to be cheated who thought of repayment while he gave. — “But it turned out badly.”

Non est autem, quod tardiores faciat ad bene merendum turba ingratorum. Nam primum, ut dixi, nos illam augemus; deinde ne deos quidem immortales ab hac tam effusa nec cessante benignitate sacrilegi neclegentesque eorum deterrent. Utuntur natura sua et cuncta interque illa ipsos munerum suorum malos interpretes iuvant. Hos sequamur duces, quantum humana imbecillitas patitur; demus beneficia, non feneremus. Dignus est decipi, qui de recipiendo cogitavit, cum daret. At male cesserit.

Children too, and wives, have disappointed our hope, yet we rear children and we marry; and we are so stubborn against experience that, beaten, we return to war, and shipwrecked, to the sea. How much more fitting it is to stand firm in giving benefits! For if a man does not give because he has not received, he gave in order to receive, and he makes a good case for the ungrateful, for whom it is base not to repay when they may.

Et liberi et coniuges spem fefellerunt, tamen et educamus et ducimus, adeoque adversus experimenta pertinaces sumus, ut bella victi et naufragi maria repetamus. Quanto magis permanere in dandis beneficiis decet! Quae si quis non dat, quia non recepit, dedit, ut reciperet, bonamque ingratorum facit causam, quibus turpe est non reddere, si licet.

How many are unworthy of the light! Yet the day dawns. How many complain that they were ever born! Yet nature begets new offspring, and suffers even those to exist who would rather they had never been.

Quam multi indigni luce sunt! Tamen dies oritur. Quam multi, quod nati sunt, queruntur! Tamen natura subolem novam gignit ipsosque, qui non fuisse mallent, esse patitur.

This is the mark of a great and a good soul: to pursue not the profit of benefits but the benefits themselves, and to seek the good man even among the bad. What would be grand in helping many, if no one cheated you? As it is, it is a virtue to give benefits that will surely make no return — benefits whose fruit a man of distinction has reaped at once.

Hoc et magni animi et boni proprium est, non fructum beneficiorum sequi, sed ipsa et post malos quoque bonum quaerere. Quid magnifici erat multis prodesse, si nemo deceperit? Nunc est virtus dare beneficia non utique reditura, quorum a viro egregio statim fructus perceptus est.

So far ought this to be from frightening us off and making us more sluggish toward the fairest of deeds, that, were the hope of finding a grateful man cut off from me, I would rather not get my benefits back than not give them; for he who does not give forestalls the fault of the ungrateful man. I will say what I think: he who does not return a benefit sins the more; he who does not give it, the sooner.

Adeo quidem ista res fugare nos et pigriores ad rem pulcherrimam facere non debet, ut, si spes mihi praecidatur gratum hominem reperiendi, malim non recipere beneficia quam non dare, quia, qui non dat, vitium ingrati antecedit. Dicam, quod sentio. Qui beneficium non reddit, magis peccat; qui non dat, citius.

“When you set out to lavish benefits on the crowd, many must be lost, that you may once place one well.”

Beneficia in volgus cum largiri institueris, perdenda sunt multa, ut semel ponas bene.

The thought that follows is striking — that by one benefit well placed it consoles the loss of many thrown away. But see, I beg you, whether this is not both truer and better suited to the greatness of the benefactor: that we urge him to give even if he is to place none well. For that other saying is false — “many must be lost”; none is lost, because he who loses had reckoned on a return.

Sequens sensus mirificus est, qui uno bene posito beneficio multorum amissorum damna solatur. Vide, oro te, ne hoc et verius sit et magnitudini bene facientis aptius, ut illum hortemur ad danda, etiam si nullum bene positurus est. Illud enim falsum est " perdenda sunt multa "; nullum perit, quia, qui perdit, computaverat.

The accounting of benefits is simple: only the outlay is entered. If anything is returned, it is gain; if nothing is returned, it is no loss. I gave it in order to give. No one enters benefits in a ledger, or like a grasping creditor calls them in to the hour and the day. The good man never thinks of them unless reminded by one who repays; otherwise they pass into the form of a loan. To enter a benefit as an expense is base usury.

Beneficiorum simplex ratio est: tantum erogatur; si reddet aliquid, lucrum est, si non reddet, damnum non est. Ego illud dedi, ut darem. Nemo beneficia in calendario scribit nec avarus exactor ad horam et diem appellat. Numquam illa vir bonus cogitat nisi admonitus a reddente; alioqui in formam crediti transeunt. Turpis feneratio est beneficium expensum ferre.

Whatever the outcome of the earlier ones, persevere in conferring them on others; they will lie better even among the ungrateful, whom shame or occasion or imitation may one day make grateful. Do not slacken; finish your work and fill the part of a good man. Help one with substance, another with credit, another with favor, another with counsel, another with wholesome precepts.

Qualiscumque priorum eventus est, persevera in alios conferre; melius apud ingratos iacebunt, quos aut pudor aut occasio aut imitatio aliquando gratos poterit efficere. Ne cessaveris, opus tuum perage et partes boni viri exsequere. Alium re, alium fide, alium gratia, alium consilio, alium praeceptis salubribus adiuva.

Even wild beasts feel kindnesses, and there is no creature so untamable that care does not soften it and turn it to love of its keeper. The mouths of lions are handled by their trainers unharmed; food wins the savagery of elephants down into slavish obedience — so true is it that even what lies beyond the understanding and the reckoning of a benefit is yet won over by the persistence of unrelenting kindness. Is a man ungrateful for one benefit? He will not be for a second. Has he forgotten two? A third will recall to memory even those that had slipped away.

Officia etiam ferae sentiunt, nec ullum tam immansuetum animal est, quod non cura mitiget et in amorem sui vertat. Leonum ora a magistris impune tractantur, elephantorum feritatem usque in servile obsequium demeretur cibus; adeo etiam, quae extra intellectum atque aestimationem beneficii posita sunt, adsiduitas tamen meriti pertinacis evincit. Ingratus est adversus unum beneficium? Adversus alterum non erit. Duorum oblitus est? Tertium etiam in eorum, quae exciderunt, memoriam reducet.

He will lose his benefits who is quick to believe he has lost them; but he who presses on and piles the earlier with those that follow wrings gratitude even from a hard and forgetful breast. Against many gifts the ingrate will not dare to lift his eyes; wherever he turns, fleeing his own memory, let him see you there: hem him in with your benefits.

Is perdet beneficia, qui cito se perdidisse credit; at qui instat et onerat priora sequentibus, etiam ex duro et immemori pectore gratiam extundit. Non audebit adversus multa oculos attollere; quocumque se convertit memoriam suam fugiens, ibi te videat: beneficiis illum tuis cinge.

What their force and what their character is I will tell, if you will first allow me to leap over what does not bear on the matter: why the Graces are three, and why sisters, and why with hands intertwined, and why smiling and young and maidens, in loose and translucent dress.

Quorum quae vis quaeve proprietas sit, dicam, si prius illa, quae ad rem non pertinent, transilire mihi permiseris, quare tres Gratiae et quare sorores sint, et quare manibus implexis, et quare ridentes et iuvenes et virgines solutaque ac perlucida veste.

Some would have it that one of them gives the benefit, another receives it, a third returns it; others, that there are three kinds of benefactors — those who earn, those who repay, and those who at once receive and repay.

Alii quidem videri volunt unam esse, quae det beneficium, alteram, quae accipiat, tertiam, quae reddat; alii tria beneficorum esse genera, promerentium, reddentium, simul accipientium reddentiumque.

But judge either of these true — what does such knowledge profit us? What of that chorus, hand in hand, circling back upon itself? For this reason: that the order of a benefit, passing from hand to hand, nonetheless returns to the giver, and loses the beauty of the whole if it is anywhere broken — fairest, if it holds together and keeps its turns. Yet in it there is still some higher regard for one of them, as for those who first deserve well.

Sed utrumlibet ex istis iudica verum; quid ista nos scientia iuvat? Quid ille consertis manibus in se redeuntium chorus? Ob hoc, quia ordo beneficii per manus transeuntis nihilo minus ad dantem revertitur et totius speciem perdit, si usquam interruptus est, pulcherrimus, si cohaeret et vices servat. In eo est aliqua tamen maioris dignatio, sicut promerentium.

Their faces are cheerful, as the faces of those who give or receive benefits are wont to be; young, because the memory of benefits ought not to grow old; maidens, because they are uncorrupted and pure and holy in all men’s eyes — in whom nothing bound or constrained is fitting; and so they wear ungirt tunics, and translucent ones, because benefits wish to be seen.

Vultus hilari sunt, quales solent esse, qui dant vel accipiunt beneficia; iuvenes, quia non debet beneficiorum memoria senescere; virgines, quia incorrupta sunt et sincera et omnibus sancta; in quibus nihil esse adligati decet nec adstricti; solutis itaque tunicis utuntur; perlucidis autem, quia beneficia conspici volunt.

Let a man be so enslaved to the Greeks as to call these things necessary; still there will be none who judges it to the point what names Hesiod gave them. He called the eldest Aglaia, the middle one Euphrosyne, the third Thalia. Each man bends the meaning of these names as he sees fit, and tries to force them to some system, though Hesiod gave his girls whatever name he pleased.

Sit aliquis usque eo Graecis emancipatus, ut haec dicat necessaria; nemo tamen erit, qui etiam illud ad rem iudicet pertinere, quae nomina illis Hesiodus imposuerit. Aglaien maximam natu appellavit, mediam Euphrosynen, tertiam Thaliam. Horum nominum interpretationem, prout cuique visum est, deflectit et ad rationem aliquam conatur perducere, cum Hesiodus puellis suis, quod voluit, nomen imposuerit.

And so Homer changed one of them, called her Pasithea and promised her in marriage — so that you may know they are no Vestal virgins. I will find another poet in whose pages they are girt and come forth in thick or in fleecy robes. For the same reason Mercury stands beside them: not because reason or eloquence commends benefits, but because so it seemed good to the painter.

Itaque Homerus uni mutavit, Pasithean appellavit et in matrimonium promisit, ut scias non esse illas virgines Vestales. Inveniam alium poetam, apud quem praecingantur et spissis aut Phryxianis prodeant. Ergo et Mercurius una stat, non quia beneficia ratio commendat vel oratio, sed quia pictori ita visum est.

Chrysippus too — that subtle acumen of his, piercing to the very depths of truth, who speaks to get a thing done and uses no more words than suffice for understanding — fills his whole book with these trifles, so that of the actual duty of giving, receiving, and returning a benefit he says very little indeed; and he does not insert fables among these matters, but these matters among his fables.

Chrysippus quoque, penes quem subtile illud acumen est et in imam penetrans veritatem, qui rei agendae causa loquitur et verbis non ultra, quam ad intellectum satis est, utitur, totum librum suum his ineptus replet, ita ut de ipso officio dandi, accipienda reddendi beneficii pauca admodum dicat; nec his fabulas, sed haec fabulis inserit.

For besides what Hecaton copies out, Chrysippus says the three Graces are daughters of Jupiter and Eurynome, younger in age than the Hours, but of somewhat fairer face, and for that reason given to Venus as companions. The mother’s name too he judges to the point: she was called Eurynome, he says, because to distribute benefits belongs to a widely extended estate — as though it were the custom to give a mother her name after her daughters, or as though poets rendered true names!

Nam praeter ista, quae Hecaton transcribit, tres Chrysippus Gratias ait Iovis et Eurynomes filias esse, aetate autem minores quam Horas, sed meliuscula facie et ideo Veneri datas comites. Matris quoque nomen ad rem iudicat pertinere: Eurynomen enim dictam, quia late patentis patrimonii sit beneficia dividere; tamquam matri post filias soleat nomen imponi aut poetae vera nomina reddant!

Just as for the name-caller boldness serves in place of memory, and on whomever he cannot bestow the right name he imposes one, so poets think it beside the point to tell the truth, but, either forced by necessity or seduced by elegance, bid each one be called whatever fits the verse prettily. Nor does it count against them if they have entered a different name on the roll; for the next poet bids the Graces bear his own name. That you may know this is so — behold Thalia, who is just now in question: in Hesiod she is a Grace, in Homer a Muse.

Quemadmodum nomenclatori memoriae loco audacia est et, cuicumque nomen non potest reddere, imponit, ita poetae non putant ad rem pertinere verum dicere, sed aut necessitate coacti aut decore corrupti id quemque vocari iubent, quod belle facit ad versum. Nec illis fraudi est, si aliud in censum detulerunt; proximus enim poeta suum illas ferre nomen iubet. Hoc ut scias ita esse, ecce Thalia, de qua cum maxime agitur, apud Hesiodum Charis est, apud Homerum Musa.

But, that I may not do what I blame, I will leave aside all those matters which are so far outside the subject that they are not even near it. Only do you defend me, if anyone reproaches me for having put Chrysippus in his place — a great man, by Hercules, but a Greek for all that, whose edge, too fine, is blunted and often folds back on itself; even when he seems to be doing something, he pricks, he does not pierce. But here, what edge is there?

Sed ne faciam, quod reprehendo, omnia ista, quae ita extra rem sunt, ut ne circa rem quidem sint, relinquam. Tu modo nos tuere, si quis mihi obiciet, quod Chrysippum in ordinem coegerim, magnum mehercules virum, sed tamen Graecum, cuius acumen nimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur; etiam cum agere aliquid videtur, pungit, non perforat. Hic vero quod acumen est?

We must speak of benefits, and set in order the thing that most binds together human society; a rule of life must be given, lest under the guise of kindness a thoughtless readiness please us, lest this very watchfulness, while it tempers liberality — which ought neither to be lacking nor to overflow — should restrain it.

De beneficiis dicendum est et ordinanda res, quae maxime humanam societatem alligat; danda lex vitae, ne sub specie benignitatis inconsulta facilitas placeat, ne liberalitatem, quam nec deesse oportet nec superfluere, haec ipsa observatio restringat, dum temperat;

Men must be taught to give gladly, to receive gladly, to return gladly, and to set before themselves a great contest: to equal in deed and in spirit, and even to surpass, those to whom they are bound — for he who owes a return of gratitude never catches up unless he has run ahead. The one party must be taught to charge nothing to account; the other, to feel they owe the more.

docendi sunt libenter dare, libenter accipere, libenter reddere et magnum ipsis certamen proponere, eos, quibus obligati sunt, re animoque non tantum aequare sed vincere, quia, qui referre gratiam debet, numquam consequitur, nisi praecessit; hi docendi sunt nihil imputare, illi plus debere.

To this most honorable contest of outdoing benefits with benefits Chrysippus exhorts us thus: he says we must beware lest — since the Graces are Jupiter’s daughters — to behave ungratefully be a sacrilege and an injury done to such pretty girls!

Ad hanc honestissimam contentionem beneficiis beneficia vincendi sic nos adhortatur Chrysippus, ut dicat verendum esse, ne, quia Charites Iovis filiae sunt, parum se grate gerere sacrilegium sit et tam bellis puellis fiat iniuria!

Teach me, rather, something by which I may become more bountiful and more grateful toward those who deserve well of me; by which the souls of those who oblige and those who are obliged may strive together, so that they who have conferred may forget, and the memory of those in debt may hold fast. Let those trifles be left to the poets, whose aim is to please the ear and to weave a sweet tale.

Tu me aliquid eorum doce, per quae beneficentior gratiorque adversus bene merentes fiam, per quae obligantium obligatorumque animi certent, ut, qui praestiterunt, obliviscantur, pertinax sit memoria debentium. Istae vero ineptiae poetis relinquantur, quibus aures oblectare propositum est et dulcem fabulam nectere.

But those who wish to heal men’s characters, to keep faith in human affairs, to press the memory of services upon the soul — let them speak in earnest and act with full force; unless perhaps you think that a most ruinous thing — the wiping-clean of the books of benefits — can be barred by light and fable-like talk and old wives’ arguments.

At qui ingenia sanare et fidem in rebus humanis retinere, memoriam officiorum ingerere animis volunt, serio loquantur et magnis viribus agant; nisi forte existimas levi ac fabuloso sermone et anilibus argumentis prohiberi posse rem perniciosissimam, beneficiorum novas tabulas.

But just as I will run past what is superfluous, so I must set forth that the first thing we must learn is what we owe when we have received a benefit. For one man says he owes the money he received, another a consulship, another a priesthood, another a province.

Sed quemadmodum supervacua transcurram, ita exponam necesse est hoc primum nobis esse discendum, quid accepto beneficio debeamus. Debere enim se ait alius pecuniam, quam accepit, alius consulatum, alius sacerdotium, alius provinciam.

But these are the tokens of services, not the services themselves. A benefit cannot be touched with the hand; the thing is transacted in the mind. There is a great difference between the matter of a benefit and the benefit itself; and so neither gold nor silver nor any of the things taken for the greatest is the benefit, but the very will of the giver. But the unskilled mark only what meets the eye, what is handed over and possessed, while what is dear and precious in the thing they count for little.

Ista autem sunt meritorum signa, non merita. Non potest beneficium manu tangi; res animo geritur. Multum interest inter materiam beneficii et beneficium; itaque nec aurum nec argentum nec quicquam eorum, quae pro maximis accipiuntur, beneficium est, sed ipsa tribuentis voluntas. Imperiti autem id, quod oculis incurrit et quod traditur possideturque, solum notant, cum contra illud, quod in re carum atque pretiosum est, parvi pendunt.

These things that we hold, that we look upon, on which our desire fastens, are perishable; fortune and wrong can take them from us. A benefit endures even when that through which it was given is lost; for it is a right deed, which no force can undo.

Haec, quae tenemus, quae aspicimus, in quibus cupiditas nostra haeret, caduca sunt, auferre nobis et fortuna et iniuria potest. Beneficium etiam amisso eo, per quod datum est, durat; est enim recte factum, quod irritum nulla vis efficit.

I ransomed a friend from pirates; another enemy seized him and shut him in prison — he has taken away not my benefit but the use of my benefit. I gave a man back his children, snatched from shipwreck or from fire; disease or some chance injury has carried them off — what was given in them remains even without them.

Amicum a piratis redemi, hunc alius hostis excepit et in carcerem condidit; non beneficium, sed usum beneficii mei sustulit. Ex naufragio alicui raptos vel ex incendio liberos reddidi, hos vel morbus vel aliqua fortuita iniuria eripuit; manet etiam sine illis, quod in illis datum est.

And so all things that usurp the false name of benefit are but the instruments through which a friendly will unfolds itself. This happens in other matters too — that the appearance of a thing is in one place, the thing itself in another. A general decorates a man with neck-chains, with the mural and the civic crown.

Omnia itaque, quae falsum beneficii nomen usurpant, ministeria sunt, per quae se voluntas amica explicat. Hoc in aliis quoque rebus evenit, ut aliubi sit species rei, aliubi ipsa res. Imperator aliquem torquibus, murali et civica donat.

What has the crown of worth in itself? What the bordered robe? What the rods? What the tribunal and the chariot? None of these is the honor, but the badge of honor. So too the benefit is not the thing that comes before the eyes, but the trace and the mark of the benefit.

Quid habet per se corona pretiosum? Quid praetexta? Quid fasces? Quid tribunal et currus? Nihil horum honor est, sed honoris insigne. Sic non est beneficium id, quod sub oculos venit, sed beneficii vestigium et nota.

What, then, is a benefit? A benevolent act that gives joy and takes joy in the giving, inclined of itself and freely ready toward what it does. And so it matters not what is done or what is given, but in what spirit; for the benefit consists not in what is done or given, but in the very mind of the giver or doer.

Quid est ergo beneficium? Benevola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque tribuendo in id, quod facit, prona et sponte sua parata. Itaque non, quid fiat aut quid detur, refert, sed qua mente, quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo.

That there is a great distinction between these you may understand even from this: that the benefit is always a good, whereas what is done or given is neither good nor evil. It is the mind that exalts small things, makes the mean illustrious, and dishonors the great and the highly prized; the things sought in themselves have neither nature, neither of good nor of evil; it matters whither the ruler drives them — he by whom their form is given to things.

Magnum autem esse inter ista discrimen vel ex hoc intellegas licet, quod beneficium utique bonum est, id autem, quod fit aut datur, nec bonum nec malum est. Animus est, qui parva extollit, sordida illustrat, magna et in pretio habita dehonestat; ipsa, quae appetuntur, neutram naturam habent, nec boni nec mali; refert, quo illa rector impellat, a quo forma rebus datur.

The benefit is not the thing counted out or handed over — just as, even in the victims, though they be fat and gleam with gold, the gods’ honor does not lie, but in the upright and pious will of the worshippers. And so the good are devout with meal and gruel; the wicked, on the other hand, do not escape impiety, however they have drenched the altars with much blood.

Non est beneficium ipsum, quod numeratur aut traditur, sicut ne in victimis quidem, licet opimae sint auroque praefulgeant, deorum est honor sed recta ac pia voluntate venerantium. Itaque boni etiam farre ac fitilla religiosi sunt; mali rursus non effugiunt impietatem, quamvis aras sanguine multo cruentaverint.

If benefits consisted in things, and not in the very will to do good, they would be the greater the greater the things we receive. But that is false; for sometimes he obliges us more who gave little magnificently, who “matched the wealth of kings in spirit,” who bestowed a trifle but gladly, who forgot his own poverty while he looked to mine, who had not only the will to help but the craving, who thought he received a benefit in the giving of one, who gave as though he would never get it back, and took it back as though he had not given, who both seized and sought the occasion to be of use.

Si beneficia in rebus, non in ipsa benefaciendi voluntate consisterent, eo maiora essent, quo maiora sunt, quae accipimus. Id autem falsum est; non numquam enim magis nos obligat, qui dedit parva magnifice, qui " regum aequavit opes animo," qui exiguum tribuit sed libenter, qui paupertatis suae oblitus est, dum meam respicit, qui non voluntatem tantum iuvandi habuit sed cupiditatem, qui accipere se putavit beneficium, cum daret, qui dedit tamquam numquam1 recepturus, recepit, tamquam non dedisset, qui occasionem, qua prodesset, et occupavit et quaesiit.

On the other hand, as I said, those gifts are thankless — however great in substance and show they seem — that are either wrung from the giver or let fall; and far more welcome comes what is given with an easy than with a full hand.

Contra ingrata sunt, ut dixi, licet re ac specie magna videantur, quae danti aut extorquentur aut excidunt, multoque gratius venit, quod facili quam quod plena manu datur.

“It is little that he conferred on me, but he could do no more”; whereas this man — what he gave is great, but he hesitated, but he put it off, but he groaned in the giving, but he gave it haughtily, but he paraded it about and wished to please not the man he served but the bystanders; he gave to his own ambition, not to me.

Exiguum est, quod in me contulit, sed amplius non potuit; at hic quod dedit, magnum est, sed dubitavit, sed distulit, sed, cum daret, gemuit, sed superbe dedit, sed circumtulit et placere non ei, cui praestabat, voluit; ambitioni dedit, non mihi.

When all were offering Socrates much, each according to his means, Aeschines, a poor student, said: “I find nothing worthy of you that I can give you, and in this one way alone do I feel that I am poor. And so I give you the one thing I have — myself. This gift, such as it is, I beg you take in good part, and reflect that the others, though they gave you much, left more for themselves.” To whom Socrates:

Socrati cum multa pro suis quisque facultatibus offerrent, Aeschines, pauper auditor: " Nihil," inquit, " dignum te, quod dare tibi possim, invenio et hoc uno modo pauperem esse me sentio. Itaque dono tibi, quod unum habeo, me ipsum. Hoc munus rogo, qualecumque est, boni consulas cogitesque alios, cum multum tibi darent, plus sibi reliquisse." Cui Socrates:

“How should you not,” he said, “have given me a great gift — unless perhaps you value yourself at little? So I will make it my care to give you back to yourself a better man than I received.” By this gift Aeschines outdid the spirit of Alcibiades, a match for riches, and all the munificence of the wealthy young men.

" Quidni tu," inquit, " magnum munus mihi dederis, nisi forte te parvo aestimas? Habebo itaque curae, ut te meliorem tibi reddam, quam accepi." Vicit Aeschines hoc munere Alcibiadis parem divitiis animum et omnem iuvenum opulentorum munificentiam.

You see how the spirit finds matter for liberality even amid straits. He seems to me to have said: “You have accomplished nothing, Fortune, in willing me to be poor; I will get this man a gift worthy of him none the less, and since I cannot give from yours, I will give from my own.” Nor is there reason to think he held himself cheap: he made himself his own price. An ingenious youth found how to give Socrates to himself. We must look not at how great each thing is, but from what kind of person it has proceeded.

Vides, quomodo animus inveniat liberalitatis materiam etiam inter angustias. Videtur mihi dixisse: " Nihil egisti, fortuna, quod me pauperem esse voluisti; expediam dignum nihilo minus huic viro munus, et quia de tuo non possum, de meo dabo." Neque est, quod existimes illum vilem sibi fuisse: pretium se sui fecit. Ingeniosus adulescens invenit, quemadmodum Socraten sibi daret. Non quanta quaeque sint, sed a quali profecta, prospiciendum.

The cunning man offers no hard approach to those who crave beyond measure, and, though he will help them with nothing in deed, warms their wicked hopes with words; but worse is his repute who, harsh of tongue, grave of face, lays out his fortune with ill will. For men court and curse the fortunate, and, ready to do the same things were they able, they hate the man who does them.

Callidus non difficilem aditum praebuit immodica cupientibus spesque improbas nihil re adiuturus verbis fovit; at peior opinio, si lingua asper, vultu gravis cum invidia fortunam suam explicuit. Colunt enim detestanturque felicem et, si potuerint, eadem facturi odere facientem.

Other men’s wives they make a mockery of — not even secretly but openly — and their own they have handed over to others. A boor, an uncivil fellow of bad manners and, among the matrons, an abominable match, is the man who has forbidden his wife to sit on display and be carried about in public, visible from every side to gazers freely admitted.

Coniugibus alienis ne clam quidem sed aperte ludibrio habitis suas aliis permisere. Rusticus, inhumanus ac mali moris et inter matronas abominanda condicio est, si quis coniugem suam in sella prostare vetuit et vulgo admissis inspectoribus vehi perspicuam undique.

If a man has made himself conspicuous by no mistress, and pays no yearly allowance to another’s wife, the matrons call him low, of sordid lust, a chaser of maidservants. And so the most decent kind of betrothal is adultery, and by common consent widowhood means celibacy, since no one has taken a wife but the man who took her away.

Si quis nulla se amica fecit insignem nec alienae uxori annuum praestat, hunc matronae humilem et sordidae libidinis et ancillariolum vocant. Inde decentissimum sponsaliorum genus est adulterium et in consensu vidui caelibatus, quoniam nemo uxorem duxit, nisi qui abduxit.

Now they vie to scatter what they have seized, and with fierce and keen greed to gather up again what they have scattered; to hold nothing of weight, to despise another’s poverty and to dread their own more than any other evil, to trouble peace with wrongs, to crush the weaker by force and fear. That provinces are plundered, and that the money-bench, the bids of both sides heard, is knocked down to one of them — no wonder, since it is the law of nations to sell what you have bought!

Iam rapta spargere, sparsa fera et acri avaritia recolligere certant; nihil pensi habere, paupertatem alienam contemnere, suam magis quam ullum aliud vereri malum, pacem iniuriis perturbare, imbecilliores vi ac metu premere. Nam provincias spoliari et nummarium tribunal audita utrimque licitatione alteri addici non mirum, quoniam, quae emeris, vendere gentium ius est!

But the impulse carries us too far, the matter provoking it; so let us make an end here, lest the fault settle upon our own age. This our forefathers complained of, this we complain of, this our descendants will complain of — that morals are overthrown, that wickedness reigns, that human affairs slide into the worse and into every abomination. But these things stand in the same place, and will stand, moved only a little this way or that, like waves that the incoming tide carries farther out, and the ebbing holds within a narrower print of the shore.

Sed longius nos impetus evehit provocante materia; itaque sic finiamus, ne in nostro saeculo culpa subsidat. Hoc maiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri nostri querentur, eversos mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res humanas et omne nefas labi. At ista eodem stant loco stabuntque, paulum dumtaxat ultra aut citra mota, ut fluctus, quos aestus accedens longius extulit, recedens interiore litorum vestigio tenuit.

Now sin will run to adultery more than to other vices, and chastity will burst its reins; now the frenzy of banquets will flourish, and the kitchen — that foulest ruin of estates; now excessive grooming of the body and a care for looks that betrays a deformity of soul; now ill-governed liberty will break out into insolence and recklessness; now men will go on to cruelty private and public and to the madness of civil wars, by which all that is holy and sacred is profaned; one day honor will be paid to drunkenness, and to have downed the most wine will be counted a virtue.

Nunc in adulteria magis quam in alia peccabitur, abrumpetque frenos pudicitia; nunc conviviorum vigebit furor et foedissimum patrimoniorum exitium, culina; nunc cultus corporum nimius et formae cura prae se ferens animi deformitatem; nunc in petulantiam et audaciam erumpet male dispensata libertas; nunc in crudelitatem privatam ac publicam ibitur bellorumque civilium insaniam, qua omne sanctum ac sacrum profanetur; habebitur aliquando ebrietati honor, et plurimum meri cepisse virtus erit.

Vices do not keep to one place; they are restless, at odds with one another, in tumult, driving each other out and being put to flight in turn. But of ourselves we shall always have to pronounce the same verdict: that we are bad, that we have been bad, and — I will add it against my will — that we shall be bad.

Non expectant uno loco vitia, sed mobilia et inter se dissidentia tumultuantur, pellunt in vicem fuganturque; ceterum idem semper de nobis pronuntiare debebimus, malos esse nos, malos fuisse, — invitus adiciam, et futuros esse.

There will be murderers, tyrants, thieves, adulterers, ravishers, temple-robbers, traitors; below all these is the ingrate — unless it be that all these spring from the ingrate, without whom hardly any great crime has grown. Guard against committing this as the greatest of crimes; pardon it as the lightest, if it has been committed. For this is the whole sum of the wrong: you have lost a benefit. The best of it is safe for you out of that: you gave.

Erunt homicidae, tyranni, fures, adulteri, raptores, sacrilegi, proditores; infra omnia ista ingratus est, nisi quod omnia ista ab ingrato sunt, sine quo vix ullum magnum facinus adcrevit. Hoc tu cave tamquam maximum crimen ne admittas; ignosce tamquam levissime, si admissum est. Haec est enim iniuriae summa: beneficium perdidisti. Salvum est enim tibi ex illo, quod est optimum: dedisti.

But just as we must take care to confer benefits above all on those who will answer them with gratitude, so there are some that we shall do and bestow even where the hope of those men is poor — not only if we judge they will be ungrateful, but if we know they have been. For instance, if I can restore his children to a man, freed from great peril at no risk to myself, I shall not hesitate. I shall defend even one worthy of the spending of my blood, and come in for a share of the danger; if I can snatch even an unworthy man from robbers by raising a cry, I shall not grudge to utter the saving word.

Quemadmodum autem curandum est, ut in eos potissimum beneficia conferamus, qui grate responsuri erunt, ita quaedam, etiam si male de illis sperabitur, faciemus tribuemusque, non solum si iudicabimus ingratos fore, sed si sciemus fuisse. Tamquam si filios alicui restituere potero magno periculo liberatos sine ullo meo, non dubitabo. Dignum etiam impendio sanguinis mei tuebor et in partem discriminis veniam; indignum si eripere latronibus potero clamore sublato, salutarem vocem homini non pigebit emittere.

It follows that we should say what benefits are to be given, and how. First let us give what is necessary, then what is useful, then what is pleasant — and above all what will last. But we must begin with the necessary; for what sustains life reaches the soul in one way, what adorns or equips it in another. A man may be a fastidious appraiser of a thing he can easily do without, of which he may say: “Take it back, I do not want it; I am content with my own.” Sometimes one wishes not merely to return what one has received but to fling it away.

Sequitur, ut dicamus, quae beneficia danda sint et quemadmodum. Primum demus necessaria, deinde utilia, deinde iucunda, utique mansura. Incipiendum est autem a necessariis; aliter enim ad animum pervenit, quod vitam continet, aliter, quod exornat aut instruit. Potest in eo aliquis fastidiosus esse aestimator, quo facile cariturus est, de quo dicere licet: " Recipe, non desidero; meo contentus sum." Interim non reddere tantum libet, quod acceperis, sed abicere.

Of the things that are necessary, some hold the first rank — those without which we cannot live; some the second — those without which we ought not to live; some the third — those without which we are unwilling to live.

Ex his, quae necessaria sunt, quaedam primum obtinent locum, sine quibus non possumus vivere, quaedam secundum, sine quibus non debemus, quaedam tertium, sine quibus nolumus.

Of the first stamp are these: to be snatched from the hands of enemies, from a tyrant’s wrath, from proscription, and from the other perils that, varied and uncertain, beset human life. Whichever of these we have dispelled, the greater and more terrible it is, the greater the gratitude we shall earn; for the thought steals in of how great the evils were from which they were freed, and the fear that went before is a charm upon the gift. And yet we ought not for that reason to save a man more slowly than we can, so that fear may add weight to our gift.

Prima huius notae sunt: hostium manibus eripi et tyrannicae irae et proscriptioni et aliis periculis, quae varia et incerta humanam vitam obsident. Quidquid horum discusserimus, quo maius ac terribilius erit, hoc maiorem inibimus gratiam; subit enim cogitatio, quantis sint liberati malis, et lenocinium est muneris antecedens metus. Nec tamen ideo debemus tardius quemquam servare, quam possumus, ut muneri nostro timor imponat pondus.

Next to these are the things without which we can indeed live, but so that death would be preferable — such as liberty, chastity, and a sound mind. After these we shall reckon the things made dear to us by kinship and blood and use and long habit, such as children, wives, household gods, and the rest that the soul has so attached to itself that it counts being torn from them heavier than being torn from life.

Proxima ab his sunt, sine quibus possumus quidem vivere, sed ut mors potior sit, tamquam libertas et pudicitia et mens bona. Post haec habebimus coniunctione ac sanguine usuque et consuetudine longa cara, ut liberos, coniuges, penates, cetera, quae usque eo animus sibi applicuit, ut ab illis quam vita divelli gravius existimet.

Then come the useful things, whose matter is various and broad. Here will be money — not overflowing, but provided to a sound measure of having; here office, and the advancement of those who aim at higher things — for nothing is more useful than to become useful to oneself. The rest comes of abundance, and will make men soft. In these we shall aim that they be welcome by their timeliness, that they be no common things — such as few have possessed, or few within this age, or in this fashion — things that, even if not precious by nature, become so by their time or place.

Subsecuntur utilia, quorum varia et lata materia est; hic erit pecunia non superfluens sed ad sanum modum habendi parata; hic erit honor et processus ad altiora tendentium; nec enim utilius quicquam est quam sibi utilem fieri. Iam cetera ex abundanti veniunt delicatos factura. In his sequemur, ut opportunitate grata sint, ut non vulgaria, quaeque aut pauci habuerint aut pauci intra hanc aetatem aut hoc modo, quae, etiam si natura pretiosa non sunt, tempore aut loco fiant.

Let us consider what, when offered, will give the most pleasure; what will come often before its possessor, so that it may be with us as often as it is with him. Above all we shall beware of sending superfluous gifts — hunting-gear to a woman or an old man, books to a peasant, nets to a man given to study and letters. And on the contrary we shall look about, lest, while we mean to send what is welcome, we send what will reproach each man with his own failing — wine to a drunkard, medicines to an invalid. For it begins to be a curse, not a gift, in which the recipient’s vice is recognized.

Videamus, quid oblatum maxime voluptati futurum sit, quid frequenter occursurum habenti, ut totiens nobiscum quotiens cum illo sit. Utique cavebimus, ne munera supervacua mittamus, ut feminae aut seni arma venatoria, ut rustico libros, ut studiis ac litteris dedito retia. Aeque ex contrario circumspiciemus, ne, dum grata mittere volumus, suum cuique morbum exprobratura mittamus, sicut ebrioso vina et valetudinario medicamenta. Maledictum enim incipit esse, non munus, in quo vitium accipientis adgnoscitur.

If the choice of giving rests with us, we shall seek above all things that will last, that the gift may be as little perishable as may be. For few are so grateful as to think of what they have received even when they do not see it. The memory rushes back, even upon the ungrateful, together with the gift itself, when it is before their eyes and does not let them forget it, but presses and stamps its author upon them. All the more let us seek lasting things, because we ought never to remind: let the thing itself rouse the fading memory.

Si arbitrium dandi penes nos est, praecipue mansura quaeremus, ut quam minime mortale munus sit. Pauci enim sunt tam grati, ut, quid acceperint, etiam si non vident, cogitent. Ingratos quoque memoria cum ipso munere incurrit, ubi ante oculos est et oblivisci sui non sinit, sed auctorem suum ingerit et inculcat. Eo quidem magis duratura quaeramus, quia numquam admonere debemus; ipsa res evanescentem memoriam excitet.

I shall more gladly give wrought silver than coined, statues rather than clothing and what brief use wears away. With few men does gratitude outlast the thing; there are more in whose minds gifts last no longer than in the using. I, if it can be, do not want my gift consumed: let it stand, let it cleave to my friend, let it live with him.

Libentius donabo argentum factum quam signatum; libentius statuas quam vestem et quod usus brevis deterat. Apud paucos post rem manet gratia; plures sunt, apud quos non diutius in animo sunt donata, quam in usu. Ego, si fieri potest, consumi munus meum nolo; extet, haereat amico meo, convivat.

No one is so foolish as to need warning not to send a man gladiators or a beast-hunt when the show is already given, or summer clothing in midwinter, winter clothing at the solstice. Let there be common sense in a benefit; let it observe time, place, and persons, since by such moments some things become welcome and others unwelcome. How much more acceptable it is if we give what a man does not have, rather than what he has in plenty; what he long seeks and does not find, rather than what he will see everywhere!

Nemo tam stultus est, ut monendus sit, ne cui gladiatores aut venationem iam munere edito mittat et vestimenta aestiva bruma, hiberna solstitio. Sit in beneficio sensus communis; tempus, locum observet, personas, quia momentis quaedam grata et ingrata sunt. Quanto acceptius est, si id damus, quod quis non habet, quam cuius copia abundat, quod diu quaerit nec invenit, quam quod ubique visurus est!

Let gifts be not so much costly as rare and choice — such as make a place for themselves even with a rich man, just as common fruits too, soon to pass into disdain within a few days, delight us if they have come earlier than their season. And those things too will not be without honor which either no one else has given to him, or we to no one else.

Munera non tam pretiosa quam rara et exquisita sint, quae etiam apud divitem sui locum faciant, sicut gregalia quoque poma et post paucos dies itura in fastidium delectant, si provenere maturius. Illa quoque non erunt sine honore, quae aut nemo illis alius dedit aut nos nulli alii.

When Alexander of Macedon, conqueror of the East, was lifting his spirit above all that is human, the Corinthians congratulated him by an embassy and presented him with citizenship of their state. When Alexander had laughed at this kind of compliment, one of the envoys said: “We have given citizenship to no one ever but you and Hercules.”

Alexandro Macedoni, cum victor Orientis animos supra humana tolleret. Corinthii per legatos gratulati sunt et civitate illum sua donaverunt. Cum risisset hoc Alexander officii genus, unus ex legatis: " Nulli," inquit, " civitatem umquam dedimus alii quam tibi et Herculi."

Gladly he accepted the undiluted honor, and, attending the envoys with an invitation and other courtesy, reflected not on who gave him the citizenship but on whom they had given it to along with him; and the man, given over to glory — whose nature and whose measure he did not know — following the footsteps of Hercules and Liber, and not halting even where these had failed, looked from the givers to the partner of his honor, as though he held the heaven that his most empty mind embraced, because he was being made equal to Hercules!

Libens accepit non dilutum honorem et legatos invitatione aliaque humanitate prosecutus cogitavit, non qui sibi civitatem darent, sed cui dedissent; et homo gloriae deditus, cuius nec naturam nec modum noverat. Herculis Liberique vestigia sequens ac ne ibi quidem resistens, ubi illa defecerant, ad socium honoris sui respexit a dantibus, tamquam caelum, quod mente vanissima complectebatur, teneret, quia Herculi aequabatur!

For what likeness to him had that frenzied youth, whose virtue was lucky rashness? Hercules conquered nothing for himself; he crossed the world not by coveting but by judging what to subdue — an enemy of the wicked, a champion of the good, a bringer of peace to land and sea. But this man, from boyhood a brigand and a ravager of nations, the bane of foes and friends alike, who counted it the highest good to be a terror to all mortals — forgetting that not the fiercest only but the most cowardly creatures too are feared for their evil venom.

Quid enim illi simile habebat vesanus adulescens, cui pro virtute erat felix temeritas? Hercules nihil sibi vicit; orbem terrarum transivit non concupiscendo, sed iudicando, quid vinceret, malorum hostis, bonorum vindex, terrarum marisque pacator. At hic a pueritia latro gentiumque vastator, tam hostium pernicies quam amicorum, qui summum bonum duceret terrori esse cunctis mortalibus, oblitus non ferocissima tantum, sed ignavissima quoque animalia timeri ob malum virus.

Now let us return to our subject. If a man gives a benefit to anyone at all, it is welcome to none; no one judges himself the guest of an innkeeper or a tavern-keeper, nor a fellow-diner of the man who gives a public feast, where it can be said: “For what did he confer on me? Why, only this, which he conferred on that man too, scarcely well known to him, and on that other, an enemy even, and a most disgraceful fellow. Did he judge me worthy of it? He indulged his own disease!” Whatever you would have be welcome, make rare; anyone bears to have it put to his own account.

Ad propositum nunc revertamur. Beneficium si qui quibuslibet dat, nulli gratum est; nemo se stabularii aut cauponis hospitem iudicat nec convivam dantis epulum, ubi dici potest: " Quid enim in me contulit? Nempe hoc, quod et in illum vix bene notum sibi et in illum etiam inimicum ac turpissimum hominem. Numquid enim me dignum iudicavit? Morbo suo morem gessit! " Quod voles gratum esse, rarum effice; quivis patitur sibi imputari.

Let no one so interpret this as though I would draw liberality back and check it with a tighter rein; let it go forth indeed as far as it pleases — but let it go, not stray. One may give in such a way that each man, even though he received along with many, does not think himself one of a crowd.

Nemo haec ita interpretetur, tamquam reducam liberalitatem et frenis artioribus reprimam; illa vero, in quantum libet, exeat, sed eat, non erret. Licet ita largiri, ut unusquisque, etiam si cum multis accepit, in populo se esse non putet.

Let no one fail to have some mark of intimacy by which he may hope he was admitted closer. Let him say: “I received the same as that man, but unasked. I received what he did, but I within a short time, while he had long deserved it. There are those who have the same, but not given in the same words, nor with the same kindness in the giver. That man received it when he had asked; I had not asked. That man received it, but as one who would readily repay, whose old age and free childlessness promised much; to me he gave the more, though he gave the same, because he gave without hope of return.”

Nemo non habeat aliquam familiarem notam, per quam speret se propius admissum. Dicat: " Accepi idem, quod ille, sed ultro. Accepi, quod ille, sed ego intra breve tempus, cum ille diu meruisset. Sunt, qui idem habeant, sed non eisdem verbis datum, non eadem comitate tribuentis. Ille accepit, cum rogasset; ego non rogaram. Ille accepit, sed facile redditurus, sed cuius senectus et libera orbitas magna promittebat; mihi plus dedit, quamvis idem dederit, quia sine spe recipiendi dedit."

As a courtesan will so divide herself among many that no one fails to carry away some token of an intimate regard, so he who wishes his benefits to be loved will contrive how both many may be obliged and yet each have something by which to set himself before the rest.

Quemadmodum meretrix ita inter multos se dividet, ut nemo non aliquod signum familiaris animi ferat, ita, qui beneficia sua amabilia esse vult, excogitet, quomodo et multi obligentur et tamen singuli habeant aliquid, quo se ceteris praeferant.

I, for my part, put no delays in the way of benefits; the more and the greater they are, the more praise they will bring. But let there be judgment; for things given by chance and at random can be dear to no one.

Ego vero beneficiis non obicio moras; quo plura maioraque fuerint, plus adferent laudis. At sit iudicium; neque enim cordi esse cuiquam possunt forte ac temere data.

And so, if anyone thinks that we, in laying down these rules, are drawing the bounds of kindness inward and opening it a less generous frontier, he has heard our admonitions amiss. For what virtue do we revere more? To which do we add more spurs? To whom does this exhortation so well belong as to us, who hallow the fellowship of the human race?

Quare si quis existimat nos, cum ista praecipimus, benignitatis fines introrsus referre et illi minus laxum limitem aperire, ne perperam monitiones nostras exaudivit. Quam enim virtutem magis veneramur? Cui magis stimulos addimus? Quibusve tam convenit haec adhortatio quam nobis societatem generis humani sancientibus?

What then? Since no force of the soul is honorable — even though it began from a right will — unless measure has made it a virtue, I forbid liberality to be squandered. Then it is a joy to have received a benefit, and with upturned hands at that, when reason brings it to the worthy, and not a chance impulse, in need of counsel, carries it off wherever it will — a benefit one is glad to display and to inscribe to one’s own credit.

Quid ergo est? Cum sit nulla honesta vis animi, etiam si a recta voluntate incepit, nisi quam virtutem modus fecit, veto liberalitatem nepotari. Tunc iuvat accepisse beneficium et supinis quidem manibus, ubi illud ratio ad dignos perducit, non quolibet casus et consilii indigens impetus defert; quod ostentare libet et inscribere sibi.

Do you call those benefits whose author one is ashamed to confess? But how much more welcome are those, how much deeper they sink into the inmost part of the soul, never to depart, when they please the man who reflects more on from whom than on what he has received?

Beneficia tu vocas, quorum auctorem fateri pudet? At illa quanto gratiora sunt quantoque in partem interiorem animi numquam exitura descendunt, cum delectant cogitantem magis a quo, quam quid acceperis?

Crispus Passienus used to say that from some men he would rather have their judgment than their benefit, from others their benefit than their judgment, and he would add examples. “I would rather,” he said, “have the deified Augustus’s judgment, and Claudius’s benefit.” But I think no man’s benefit worth seeking whose judgment is cheap.

Crispus Passienus solebat dicere quorundam se iudicium malle quam beneficium, quorundam beneficium malle quam iudicium, et subiciebat exempla. " Malo," aiebat, " divi Augusti iudicium, malo Claudii beneficium." Ego vero nullius puto expetendum esse beneficium, cuius vile iudicium est.

What then? Was what Claudius gave not to be accepted? It was — but as from Fortune, which you knew might at once turn bad. Why do we sunder these things that are mingled together? It is no benefit if its best part is wanting — that it was given with judgment; otherwise a vast sum of money, if it was not bestowed with reason and a right will, is no more a benefit than a hoard. There are many things, however, which one ought to accept and yet not owe. BOOK II

Quid ergo? Non erat accipiendum a Claudio, quod dabatur? Erat, sed sicut a fortuna, quam scires posse statim malam fieri. Quid ista inter se mixta dividimus? Non est beneficium, cui deest pars optima, datum esse iudicio: alioqui pecunia ingens, si non ratione nec recta voluntate donata est, non magis beneficium est quam thesaurus. Multa sunt autem, quae oportet accipere nec debere.

Let us examine, Liberalis, best of men, what still remains from the earlier part: how a benefit ought to be given. And I think I am about to show the readiest road to it — let us give as we should wish to receive.

Inspiciamus, Liberalis virorum optime, id quod ex priore parte adhuc superest, quemadmodum dandum sit beneficium; cuius rei expeditissimam videor monstraturus viam: sic demus, quomodo vellemus accipere.

Before all, gladly, quickly, without any hesitation. Thankless is the benefit that has stuck long between the giver’s hands, that a man has seemed to let go of with reluctance and to give as though he were robbing himself. Even if some delay intervenes, let us avoid by every means seeming to have deliberated; he who hesitated comes next to refusing, and has earned no gratitude. For since in a benefit the giver’s will is the most pleasing thing, by his very lingering he has testified that he gave unwillingly — he did not give, but ill withheld it against one who drew it from him; and there are many whom a weakness of brow makes generous.

Ante omnia libenter, cito, sine ulla dubitatione. Ingratum est beneficium, quod diu inter dantis manus haesit, quod quis aegre dimittere visus est et sic dare, tamquam sibi eriperet. Etiam si quid intervenit morae, evitemus omni modo, ne deliberasse videamur; proximus est a negante, qui dubitavit, nullamque iniit gratiam. Nam eum in beneficio iucundissima sit tribuentis voluntas, quia nolentem se tribuisse ipsa cunctatione testatus est, non dedit sed adversus ducentem male retinuit; multi autem sunt, quos liberales facit frontis infirmitas.

Most welcome are benefits that are ready, easy, coming to meet us, where there was no delay but in the receiver’s modesty. It is best to anticipate each man’s desire, next best to follow it. The better course is to forestall before we are asked, because, since for an honest man the mouth grows tight at the asking and the blush spreads, he who spares him this torment multiplies his gift.

Gratissima sunt beneficia parata, facilia, occurrentia, ubi nulla mora fuit nisi in accipientis verecundia. Optimum est antecedere desiderium cuiusque, proximum sequi. Illud melius, occupare ante quam rogemur, quia, cum homini probo ad rogandum os concurrat et suffundatur rubor, qui hoc tormentum remittit, multiplicat munus suum.

He has not got it for nothing who received it after asking, since indeed, as it seemed to our forefathers, the gravest of men, nothing costs more dear than what is bought with prayers. Men would make their vows more sparingly if they had to make them openly; so true is it that even the gods, to whom we most honorably pray, we would rather entreat in silence and within ourselves.

Non tulit gratis, qui, cum rogasset, accepit, quoniam quidem, ut maioribus nostris gravissimis viris visum est, nulla res carius constat, quam quae precibus empta est. Vota homines parcius facerent, si palam facienda essent; adeo etiam deos, quibus honestissime supplicamus, tacite malumus et intra nosmet ipsos precari.

“I ask” is a troublesome word, a heavy one, to be spoken with downcast face. From this one must spare a friend, and anyone you mean to make a friend by deserving well of him. Let him hasten as he will, he gave his benefit too late who gave it to one who asked. And so each man’s wish must be divined, and, once understood, freed from the most grievous necessity of asking; that benefit, you may be sure, will live pleasant in the soul which came to meet us.

Molestum verbum est, onerosum, demisso vultu dicendum, rogo. Huius facienda est gratia amico et quemcumque amicum sis promerendo facturus; properet licet, sero beneficium dedit, qui roganti dedit. Ideo divinanda cuiusque voluntas et, cum intellecta est, necessitate gravissima rogandi liberanda est; illud beneficium iucundum victurum in animo scias, quod obviam venit.

If it has not fallen to us to forestall, let us cut short the petitioner’s many words; that we may seem not asked but informed, let us promise at once, and prove by our very haste that we will do it even before we are interrupted. As with the sick the timeliness of food is health-giving, and water given in season takes the place of a remedy, so a benefit, however slight and common, if it was at hand, if it lost no nearest hour, adds much to itself and outdoes the gratitude won by a costly but slow and long-pondered gift. He who acts so readily — there is no doubt he acts gladly; and so he acts with joy and puts on the look of his own feeling.

Si non contigit praevenire, plura rogantis verba intercidamus; ne rogati videamur sed certiores facti, statim promittamus facturosque nos, etiam antequam interpellemur, ipsa festinatione approbemus. Quemadmodum in aegris opportunitas cibi salutaris est et aqua tempestive data remedii locum obtinuit, ita, quamvis leve et vulgare beneficium est, si praesto fuit, si proximam quamque horam non perdidit, multum sibi adicit gratiamque pretiosi sed lenti et diu cogitati muneris vincit. Qui tam parate facit, non est dubium, quin libenter faciat; itaque laetus facit et induit sibi animi sui vultum.

The huge benefits of some men a silence, or a slowness of speech aping dignity and gravity, has spoiled, since they promised with the face of men refusing. How much better to add good words to good deeds, and to commend what you bestow by a kindly and humane proclaiming of it!

Ingentia quorundam beneficia silentium aut loquendi tarditas imitata gravitatem et tristitiam corrupit, cum promitterent vultu negantium. Quanto melius adicere bona verba rebus bonis et praedicatione humana benignaque commendare, quae praestes!

That he may chide himself for having been slow to ask, you may add a friendly complaint: “I am angry with you, that when you wanted something you did not long ago wish me to know it; that you asked so carefully; that you brought in a third party. For my part I congratulate myself that it pleased you to test my goodwill; hereafter, whatever you want, you shall claim by your own right; this once your bashfulness is forgiven.”

Ut ille se castiget, quod tardior in rogando fuit, adicias licet familiarem querellam: " Irascor tibi, quod, cum aliquid desiderasses, non olim scire me voluisti, quod tam diligenter rogasti, quod quemquam adhibuisti. Ego vero gratulor mihi, quod experiri animum meum libuit; postea, quidquid desiderabis, tuo iure exiges; semel rusticitati tuae ignoscitur."

So you will bring it about that he values your spirit more than that thing, whatever it was, that he had come to ask for. Then is the giver’s virtue at its height, then his kindness, when the man who departs will say to himself: “I have made a great gain today; I would rather have found him such a man than if this thing I spoke of had reached me many times over by another road; to this spirit of his I shall never repay an equal gratitude.”

Sic efficies, ut animum tuum pluris aestimet quam illud, quidquid est, ad quod petendum venerat. Tune est summa virtus tribuentis, tunc benignitas, ubi ille, qui discessit, dicet sibi: " Magnum hodie lucrum feci; malo, quod illum talem inveni, quam si multiplicatum hoc ad me, de quo loquebar, alia via pervenisset; huic eius animo numquam parem gratiam referam."

But most men bring their benefits into hatred by harshness of words and a haughty brow, using such talk, such arrogance, that one repents of having got what one sought. Then come other delays after the thing is promised; and nothing is more bitter than when even what you have obtained must still be begged for.

At plerique sunt, qui beneficia asperitate verborum et supercilio in odium adducunt eo sermone usi, ea superbia, ut impetrasse paeniteat. Aliae deinde post rem promissam secuntur morae; nihil autem est acerbius, quam ubi quoque, quod impetrasti, rogandum est.

Benefits should be paid down on the spot — for from some men it is harder to receive than to obtain. This one must be begged to give the reminder, that one to complete it; so a single gift is worn away through the hands of many, and of the gratitude very little remains for the one who promised, since whoever must be asked after him detracts from the author.

Repraesentanda sunt beneficia, quae a quibusdam accipere difficilius est quam impetrare. Hic rogandus est, ut admoneat, ille, ut consummet; sic unum munus per multorum manus teritur, ex quo gratiae minimum apud promittentem remanet, quia auctori detrahit, quisquis post illum rogandus est.

This therefore you will make your care, if you wish what you bestow to be gratefully reckoned: that your benefits reach those to whom they are promised untouched, entire, without any deduction, as they say. Let no one intercept them, let no one hold them back; no one can make a favor of his own in what you are to give without lessening yours.

Hoc itaque curae habebis, si grate aestimari, quae praestabis, voles, ut beneficia tua inlibata, ut integra ad eos, quibus promissa sunt, perveniant, sine ulla, quod aiunt, deductione. Nemo illa intercipiat, nemo detineat; nemo in eo, quod daturus es, gratiam suam facere potest, ut non tuam minuat.

Nothing is so bitter as to hang long in suspense; some bear with more even temper the cutting-off of their hope than its dragging out. But most men have this vice, of putting off their promises through a perverse ambition, lest the crowd of suitors grow smaller — like the ministers of royal power, who delight in the long parade of their own pride, and judge that they can do less unless they have shown each man at length and often what they can do. They do nothing on the spot, nothing once for all; their injuries are headlong, their benefits slow.

Nihil aeque amarum quam diu pendere; aequiore quidam animo ferunt praecidi spem suam quam trahi. Plerisque autem hoc vitium est ambitione prava differendi promissa, ne minor sit rogantium turba, quales regiae potentiae ministri sunt, quos delectat superbiae suae longum spectaculum, minusque se iudicant posse, nisi diu multumque singulis, quid possint, ostenderint. Nihil confestim, nihil semel faciunt; iniuriae illorum praecipites, lenta beneficia sunt.

“What? Do you not see that you take from the gratitude just so much as you add of delay?”

Quid? tu non intellegis tantum te gratiae demere, quantum morae adicis?

As the bitterest cruelty is that which draws out the punishment, and it is a kind of mercy to kill quickly — because the final torment brings its own end with it, and the time that goes before is the largest part of the punishment to come — so the gratitude for a gift is the greater the less long it has hung in doubt. For even of good things the awaiting is anxious; and since most benefits bring the remedy of some trouble, he who suffers a man to be tortured longer when he could free him at once, or to rejoice later, does violence to his own benefit.

Quemadmodum acerbissima crudelitas est, quae trahit poenam, et misericordiae genus est cito occidere, quia tormentum ultimum finem sui secum adfert, quod antecedit tempus, maxima venturi supplicii pars est, ita maior est muneris gratia, quo minus diu pependit. Est enim etiam bonarum rerum sollicita expectatio, et eum plurima beneficia remedium alicuius rei adferant, qui aut diutius torqueri patitur, quem protinus potest liberare, aut tardius gaudere, beneficio suo manus adfert.

All kindness makes haste, and it is the mark of one who acts gladly to act quickly; he who helped slowly, dragging it out day after day, did not act from the heart. So he has lost the two greatest things — time, and the proof of a friendly will; to be willing slowly is the part of the unwilling.

Omnis benignitas properat, et proprium est libenter facientis cito facere; qui tarde et diem de die extrahens profuit, non ex animo fecit. Ita duas res maximas perdidit, et tempus et argumentum amicae voluntatis; tarde velle nolentis est.

In every transaction, Liberalis, it is no small part how each thing is either said or done. Speed has added much, delay has taken much away. As in weapons the force of the iron is the same, but it makes an infinite difference whether they are hurled with the arm flung back or slip from a slack hand; as the same sword both grazes and runs through, and it matters with how tight a grip it has come — so it is the same thing that is given, but it matters how it is given.

In omni negotio. Liberalis, non minima portio est, quomodo quidque aut dicatur aut fiat. Multum celeritas adiecit, multum abstulit mora. Sicut in telis eadem ferri vis est, sed infinitum interest, utrum excusso lacerto torqueantur an remissa manu effluant, gladius idem et stringit et transforat, quam presso articulo venerit, refert, ita idem est, quod datur, sed interest, quomodo detur.

How sweet, how precious it is, when the giver has not suffered thanks to be given him, when in the giving he has forgotten that he gave! For to rebuke a man at the very moment you are bestowing something on him is madness, and to graft an insult upon a service. And so benefits must not be made galling, nor anything grievous mingled with them. Even if there be something of which you would warn him, choose another time.

Quam dulce, quam pretiosum est, si gratias sibi agi non est passus, qui dedit, si dedisse, dum dat, oblitus est! Nam corripere eum, cui cum maxime aliquid praestes, dementia est et inserere contumeliam meritis. Itaque non sunt exasperanda beneficia nec quicquam illis triste miscendum. Etiam si quid erit, de quo velis admonere, aliud tempus eligite.

Fabius Verrucosus used to call a benefit given by a hard and harsh man “gritty bread,” which a starving man must take, but is bitter to eat.

Fabius Verrucosus beneficium ab homine dure aspere datum panem lapidosum vocabat, quem esurienti accipere necessarium sit, esse acerbum.

Tiberius Caesar, asked by Marius Nepos, a man of praetorian rank, to relieve his debt, bade him hand over the names of his creditors; this is not to make a gift but to summon the creditors together. When they had been listed, he wrote to Nepos that he had ordered the money to be paid, with an insulting admonition added. He brought it about that Nepos had neither debt nor benefit; he freed him from his creditors, but did not bind him to himself. Tiberius had something in view:

Ti. Caesar rogatus a Nepote Mario praetorio, ut aeri alieno eius succurreret, edere illum sibi nomina creditorum iussit; hoc non est donare sed creditores convocare. Cum edita essent, scripsit Nepoti iussisse se pecuniam solvi adiecta contumeliosa admonitione. Effecit, ut Nepos nec aes alienum haberet nec benefidum; liberavit illum a creditoribus, sibi non obligavit. Aliquid Tiberius secutus est;

he did not wish, I suppose, that more should flock to ask the same. That may perhaps have been an effective method for checking men’s shameless cravings by shame; but for one giving a benefit a wholly different road is to be followed. By every means, whatever you give, it must be dressed so as to be the more acceptable. But this is not to give a benefit — it is to catch a man out.

puto, noluit plures esse, qui idem rogaturi concurrerent. Ista fortasse efficax ratio fuerit ad hominum improbas cupiditates pudore reprimendas, beneficium vero danti tota alia sequenda est via. Omni genere, quod des, quo sit acceptatius, adornandum est. Hoc vero non est beneficium dare, deprehendere est.

And, to say in passing what I think on this point too — not even for a prince is it seemly to give for the sake of disgracing. “Yet,” someone says, “not even thus could Tiberius escape what he was avoiding; for some while after, others were found to ask the same, and he ordered them all to declare in the Senate the reasons for their debts, and so gave them fixed sums.” That is not liberality — it is censorship.

Et ut in transitu de hac quoque parte dicam, quid sentiam, ne principi quidem satis decorum est donare ignominiae causa. " Tamen," inquit, " effugere Tiberius ne hoc quidem modo, quod vitabat, potuit; nam aliquot postea, qui idem rogarent, inventi sunt, quos omnes iussit reddere in senatu aeris alieni causas, et ita illis certas summas dedit." Non est illud liberalitas, censura est.

It is a relief, it is an imperial subsidy; it is no benefit that I cannot recall without a blush. I was sent before a judge; to obtain it, I had to plead my case.

Auxilium est, principale tributum est; beneficium non est, cuius sine rubore meminisse non possum. Ad iudicem missus sum; ut impetrarem, causam dixi.

And so all the masters of wisdom teach that some benefits are to be given openly, some in secret. Openly, those it is glorious to obtain — such as military decorations, offices, and whatever else is made fairer by being known;

Praecipiunt itaque omnes auctores sapientiae quaedam beneficia palam danda, quaedam secreto. Palam, quae consequi gloriosum, ut militaria dona, ut honores et quidquid aliud notitia pulchrius fit;

on the other hand, those that do not advance a man nor make him more honored, but succor weakness, want, disgrace, are to be given silently, so as to be known only to those they help.

rursus, quae non producunt nec honestiorem faciunt, sed succurrunt infirmitate egestati, ignominiae, tacite danda sunt, ut nota sint solis, quibus prosunt.

Sometimes even the man who is helped must be deceived, so that he may have without knowing from whom he received. They say that Arcesilaus, when a poor friend who hid his poverty fell sick and did not even confess that he lacked the means for his necessary expenses, judged that he must be helped secretly: he slipped a little purse under the pillow of the unknowing man, so that one needlessly bashful might find rather than receive what he wanted.

Interdum etiam ipse, qui iuvatur, vel fallendus est, ut habeat nec, a quo acceperit, sciat. Arcesilan aiunt amico pauperi et paupertatem suam dissimulanti, aegro autem et ne hoc quidem confitenti deesse sibi in sumptum ad necessarios usus, clam succurrendum iudicasse; pulvino eius ignorantis sacculum subiecit, ut homo inutiliter verecundus, quod desiderabat, inveniret potius quam acciperet.

“What then? Will he not know from whom he received it?” First, let him not know, if this very thing is part of the benefit; next, I shall do many other things, bestow many gifts, by which he may understand the author of this one too; finally, he will not know that he received, but I shall know that I gave. “That is too little,” you say. Too little, if you are thinking of lending at interest; but if of giving, you will give in the way that will most help the receiver. You will be content with yourself as witness; otherwise it is not doing good that delights you, but being seen to have done good.

" Quid ergo? ille nesciet, a quo acceperit? " Primum nesciat, si hoc ipsum beneficii pars est; deinde multa alia faciam, multa tribuam, per quae intellegat et illius auctorem; denique ille nesciet accepisse se, ego sciam me dedisse. " Parum est," inquis. Parum, si fenerare cogitas; sed si dare, quo genere accipienti maxime profuturum erit, dabis. Contentus eris te teste; alioqui non bene facere delectat sed videri bene fecisse.

“I want him to know, at all events.” You are looking for a debtor. “I want him to know, at all events.” What? If it is more useful for him not to know, more honorable, more pleasing, will you not turn the other way? “I want him to know.” So you will not save a man in the dark?

" Volo utique sciat." Debitorem quaeris. " Volo utique sciat." Quid? si illi utilius est nescire, si honestius, si gratius, non in aliam partem abibis? " Volo sciat." Ita tu hominem non servabis in tenebris?

I do not deny that, whenever the case allows, we should have regard for the joy that comes from the receiver’s goodwill; but if he both needs help and is ashamed of it, if what we bestow gives offense unless it is hidden, I do not enter the benefit on the public record. Why not? I am not going to let him know that I gave, since it is among the first and most necessary of precepts never to reproach a man — nay, never even to remind him. For this is the law of a benefit between two: the one ought at once to forget that he gave, the other never that he received.

Non nego, quotiens patitur res, respiciendum gaudium ex accipientis voluntate; sin adiuvari illum et oportet et pudet, si, quod praestamus, offendit, nisi absconditur, beneficium in acta non mitto. Quidni? ego illi non sum iudicaturus me dedisse, cum inter prima praecepta ac maxime necessaria sit, ne umquam exprobrem, immo ne admoneam quidem. Haec enim beneficii inter duos lex est: alter statim oblivisci debet dati, alter accepti numquam.

The frequent rehearsal of services tears and weighs upon the soul. One longs to cry out what that man cried — saved in the triumviral proscription by one of Caesar’s friends — when he could not bear his arrogance: “Give me back to Caesar!” How long will you say, “I saved you, I snatched you from death”? That, if I remember it by my own will, is life; if by yours, it is death. I owe you nothing, if you saved me to have someone to show off. How long do you parade me about? How long do you not let me forget my fortune? Once I should have been led in a triumph! We must not say what we have bestowed;

Lacerat animum et premit frequens meritorum commemoratio. Libet exclamare, quod ille triumvirali proscriptione servatus a quodam Caesaris amico exclamavit, cum superbiam eius ferre non posset: " Redde me Caesari! " Quousque dices: " Ego te servavi, ego eripui morti "? Istud, si meo arbitrio memini, vita est; si tuo, mors est. Nihil tibi debeo, si me servasti, ut haberes, quem ostenderes. Quousque me circumducis? Quousque oblivisci fortunae meae non sinis? Semel in triumpho ductus essem! Non est dicendum, quid tribuerimus;

he who reminds, demands it back. We must not press, must not renew the memory, except by giving something else to recall the earlier. We ought not even to tell others; let him who gave a benefit be silent, let him who received it tell. For else it will be said of us what was said to that man who everywhere flaunted his benefit: “You will not deny,” he said, “that you have been repaid”; and when the other answered, “When?” “Often indeed,” said he, “and in many places — that is, as often and wherever you have told the tale.”

qui admonet, repetit. Non est instandum, non est memoria renovanda, nisi ut aliud dando prioris admoneas. Ne aliis quidem narrare debemus; qui dedit beneficium, taceat, narret, qui accepit. Dicetur enim, quod illi ubique iactanti beneficium suum. " Non negabis," inquit, " te recepisse "; et cum respondisset: " Quando? " " Saepe quidem," inquit, " et multis locis, id est, quotiens et ubicumque narrasti."

What need to speak it out, to usurp another’s office? There is one who could do that more becomingly, and by his telling this too will be praised — that you do not tell it yourself. Do you judge me ungrateful, if no one is to know it unless you are silent? So far is this from being permitted that, even if someone tells it in our presence, we must answer: “He is most worthy indeed of greater benefits, but I know that I wish to give him everything rather than that I have given anything yet”; and this itself not slavishly, nor in the manner of those who put aside what they really wish to draw the more toward themselves.

Quid opus est eloqui, quid alienum occupare officium? Est, qui istud facere honestius possit, quo narrante et hoc laudabitur, quod ipse non narras. Ingratum me iudicas, si istud te tacente nemo sciturus est! Quod adeo non est committendum, ut etiam, si quis coram nobis narrabit, respondendum sit: " Dignissimus quidem ille est maioribus beneficiis, sed ego magis velle me scio omnia illi praestare quam adhuc praestitisse "; et haec ipsa non verniliter nec ea figura, qua quidam reiciunt, quae magis ad se volunt adtrahere.

Then all kindness must be added. The farmer will lose what he scattered if he abandons his toil at the sowing; only by much care are crops brought to harvest; nothing comes to fruit that an equal tending does not attend from first to last. The same is the case with benefits.

Deinde adicienda omnis humanitas. Perdet agricola, quod sparsit, si labores suos destituit in semine; multa cura sata perducuntur ad segetem; nihil in fructum pervenit, quod non a primo usque ad extremum aequalis cultura prosequitur. Eadem beneficiorum condicio est.

Can any be greater than those fathers confer on children? Yet these are in vain, if they are deserted in infancy, unless a long devotion nurses its own gift. The same is the case with the rest of benefits: unless you sustain them, you will lose them; it is too little to have given — they must be cherished. If you would have those you oblige grateful, you must not only give benefits but love. Above all, as I said, let us obey men’s ears: reminding breeds weariness, reproach breeds hatred.

Numquid ulla maiora possunt esse, quam quae in liberos patres conferunt? Haec tamen irrita sunt, si in infantia deserantur, nisi longa pietas munus suum nutrit. Eadem ceterorum beneficiorum condicio est: nisi illa adiuveris, perdes; parum est dedisse, fovenda sunt. Si gratos vis habere, quos obligas, non tantum des oportet beneficia, sed ames. Praecipue, ut dixi, pareamus auribus; admonitio taedium facit, exprobratio odium.

Nothing in the giving of a benefit is so much to be avoided as pride. What need of an arrogant face, what of swollen words? The thing itself exalts you. Vain boasting must be stripped away; the deeds will speak for us while we are silent. A benefit given proudly is not only thankless but hateful.

Nihil aeque in beneficio dando vitandum est quam superbia. Quid opus arrogantia vultus, quid tumore verborum? Ipsa res te extollit. Detrahenda est inanis iactatio; res loquentur nobis tacentibus. Non tantum ingratum, sed invisum est beneficium superbe datum.

Gaius Caesar gave Pompeius Pennus his life — if he gives who does not take it away; then, when the man was acquitted and was giving thanks, he held out his left foot to be kissed. Those who excuse it and deny it was done out of insolence say he wished to show off his gilded — nay, golden — slipper, set with pearls. Just so: what is there insulting in it, if a man of consular rank kissed gold and pearls, since otherwise he would have chosen no part of that body purer to kiss?

C. Caesar dedit vitam Pompeio Penno, si dat, qui non aufert; deinde absoluto et agenti gratias porrexit osculandum sinistrum pedem. Qui excusant et negant id insolentiae causa factum, aiunt socculum auratum, immo aureum, margaritis distinctum ostendere eum voluisse. Ita prorsus: quid hic contumeliosum est, si vir consularis aurum et margaritas osculatus est alioquin nullam partem in corpore eius electurus, quam purius oscularetur?

A man born for this — to change the manners of a free state for Persian slavery — judged it too little that a senator, an old man, who had held the highest offices, should lie before him a suppliant in the sight of the leading men, in the posture in which conquered enemies have lain before their enemies; he found something below the knees to which he might thrust down liberty! Is this not to trample the commonwealth underfoot — and, though some may think it beside the point, with the left foot? For he had been too little foully and madly insolent, hearing a consular’s capital case in his slippers, had not the emperor thrust his shoe-straps into a senator’s face!

Homo natus in hoc, ut mores liberae civitatis Persica servitute mutaret, parum iudicavit, si senator, senex, summis usus honoribus in conspectu principum supplex sibi eo more iacuisset, quo hostes victi hostibus iacuere; invenit aliquid infra genua, quo libertatem detruderet! Non hoc est rem publicam calcare, et quidem, licet id aliquis non putet ad rem pertinere, sinistro pede? Parum enim foede furioseque insolens fuerat, qui de capite consularis viri soccatus audiebat, nisi in os senatoris ingessisset imperator epigros suos!

O pride, the most foolish evil of great fortune! How it spoils all joy in receiving anything from you! How you turn every benefit into an injury! How all things ill become you! And the higher you have lifted yourself, the lower you are, and you show that it has not been given you to recognize those goods on which you so puff yourself up; whatever you give, you corrupt.

O superbia, magnae fortunae stultissimum malum! Ut a te nihil accipere iuvat! Ut omne beneficium in iniuriam convertis! Ut te omnia dedecent! Quoque altius te sublevasti, hoc depressior es ostendisque tibi non datum adgnoscere ista bona, quibus tantum inflaris; quidquid das, corrumpis.

And so one would like to ask why he throws himself back so mightily, why he distorts the look and bearing of his face, so that he would rather have a mask than a face. Pleasing are the things bestowed with a human brow, or at least a mild and gentle one — when a superior, in giving to me, did not exult above me, but was as kindly as he could be, and came down to my level and stripped his gift of pomp, and so watched for a fitting time that he came to my rescue in my need rather than merely seized an occasion.

Libet itaque interrogare, quid se tanto opere resupinet, quid vultum habitumque oris pervertat, ut malit personam habere quam faciem? Iucunda sunt, quae humana fronte, certe leni placidaque tribuuntur, quae cum daret mihi superior, non exultavit supra me, sed quam potuit benignissimus fuit descenditque in aequum et detraxit muneri suo pompam, sic observavit idoneum tempus, ut in occasione potius emam in necessitate succurreret.

In one way only shall we persuade such men not to lose their benefits by insolence: if we show that gifts do not seem greater because they were given more tumultuously; that not even the givers themselves can on that account seem greater to anyone; that the grandeur of pride is empty, and leads even what is lovable into hatred.

Uno modo istis persuadebimus, ne beneficia sua insolentia perdant, si ostenderimus non ideo videri maiora, quod tumultuosius data sunt; ne ipsos quidem ob id cuiquam posse maiores videri; vanam esse superbiae magnitudinem et quae in odium etiam amanda perducat.

There are some things that will harm those who obtain them, which it is a benefit not to give but to refuse; and so we shall weigh the advantage rather than the wish of the petitioners. For we often crave what is harmful, and cannot discern how ruinous it is, because passion interrupts judgment; but when the craving has settled, when that impulse of the burning mind that routs counsel has fallen, we curse the authors of those ruinous, evil gifts.

Sunt quaedam nocitura impetrantibus, quae non dare sed negare beneficium est; aestimabimus itaque utilitatem potius quam voluntatem petentium. Saepe enim noxia concupiscimus, nec dispicere, quam perniciosa sunt, licet, quia iudicium interpellat adfectus; sed cum subsedit cupiditas, cum impetus ille flagrantis animi, qui consilium fugat, cecidit, detestamur perniciosos malorum munerum auctores.

As we refuse cold water to the sick, and the sword to mourners and to men angry with themselves, and to madmen whatever their frenzy seeks to use against themselves, so in general, to those who beg for things that will harm them — earnestly and humbly, sometimes even piteously — we shall persist in not giving. It becomes us to look both at the beginnings of our benefits and also at their ends, and to give what it will delight a man not only to receive but to have received. There are many who say:

Ut frigidam aegris negamus et lugentibus ac sibi iratis ferrum, ut amentibus, quidquid contra se usurus ardor petit, sic omnino, quae nocitura sunt, impense ac summisse,non numquam etiam miserabiliter rogantibus perseverabimus non dare. Cum initia beneficiorum suorum spectare tum etiam exitus decet et ea dare, quae non tantum accipere, sed etiam accepisse delectet. Multi sunt, qui dicant:

“I know this will not profit him, but what am I to do? He asks; I cannot withstand his entreaties; let him look to it — he will complain of himself, not of me.” False: rather, of you, and deservedly; when he has returned to a sound mind, when that fit which inflamed his spirit has slackened, why should he not hate the man by whom he was helped to his own loss and danger?

" Scio hoc illi non profuturum, sed quid faciam? Rogat, resistere precibus eius non possum; viderit: de se, non de me queretur." Falsum est: immo de te et merito quidem; cum ad mentem bonam redierit, cum accessio illa, quae animum inflammabat, remiserit, quidni eum oderit, a quo in damnum ac periculum suum adiutus est?

To be won over to the ruin of those who ask is a savage kindness. As it is a most beautiful work to save men even against their will, so to lavish deadly things on those who beg is a fawning and affable hatred. Let us give a benefit that pleases more and more in the using, that never turns to evil. I will not give money I know a man will count out to an adulteress, nor be found a partner in a base deed or design; if I can, I will call him back; if not, I will not help his crime.

Exorari in perniciem rogantium saeva bonitas est. Quemadmodum pulcherrimum opus est etiam invitos nolentesque servare, ita rogantibus pestifera largiri blandum et adfabile odium est. Beneficium demus, quod in usu magis ac magis placeat, quod numquam in malum vertat. Pecuniam non dabo, quam numeraturum adulterae sciam, nec in societate turpis facti aut consilii inveniar; si potero, revocabo, si minus, non adiuvabo scelus.

Whether anger drives him where he ought not, or the heat of ambition leads him from safety, I will not suffer him to draw strength for any evil from me, nor bring it about that he can one day say: “He killed me by loving me.” Often there is no difference between the gifts of friends and the prayers of enemies; whatever the latter wish may befall him, to that the untimely indulgence of the former drives and equips him. And what is baser than what happens most often — that there is no difference between hatred and a benefit?

Sive illum ira, quo non debebit, impellet, sive ambitionis calor abducet a tutis, in nullum malum vires a me sumere ipso1 patiar nec committam, ut possit quandoque dicere: " Ille amando me occidit." Saepe nihil interest inter amicorum munera et hostium vota; quidquid illi accidere optant, in id horum intempestiva indulgentia impellit atque instruit. Quid autem turpius quam quod evenit frequentissime, ut nihil intersit inter odium et beneficium?

Let us bestow only what will never come back to our own disgrace. Since the height of friendship is to make a friend one’s equal, we must take thought for both at once. I will give to the needy, but so that I myself come not to need; I will rescue the perishing, but so that I myself do not perish — unless I am to be the price of a great man or a great cause.

Numquam in turpitudinem nostram reditura tribuamus. Cum summa amicitiae sit amicum sibi aequare, utrique simul consulendum est. Dabo egenti, sed ut ipse non egeam; succurram perituro, sed ut ipse non peream, nisi si futurus ero magni hominis aut magnae rei merces.

I will give no benefit that I would be ashamed to ask for. I will neither inflate a small one nor suffer great things to be taken as small; for as he who charges up what he gave destroys the gratitude, so he who shows how much he gives commends his gift, not reproaches it.

Nullum beneficium dabo, quod turpiter peterem. Nec exiguum dilatabo nec magna pro parvis accipi patiar; nam ut qui, quod dedit, imputat, gratiam destruit, ita qui, quantum det, ostendit, munus suum commendat, non exprobrat.

Each man must look to his own means and strength, that we bestow neither more than we can nor less. The standing of the one to whom we give must be weighed; for some things are too small to come from great men, some too great for the receiver. And so set the standing of each beside the other, and weigh between them the very thing you will give: whether it is to the giver either burdensome or too slight, and whether again the one who is to receive will either disdain it or cannot hold it.

Respiciendae sunt cuique facultates suae viresque, ne aut plus praestemus, quam possumus, aut minus. Aestimanda est eius persona, cui damus; quaedam enim minora sunt, quam ut exire a magnis viris debeant, quaedam accipiente maiora sunt. Utriusque itaque personam confer et ipsum inter illas, quod donabis, examina, numquid aut danti grave sit aut parum, numquid rursus, qui accepturus est, aut fastidiat aut non capiat.

Alexander was giving someone a city — that madman who could conceive nothing in his mind but the grand. When the man to whom it was given, taking his own measure, shrank from the ill will of so great a gift, saying it did not suit his fortune, “I do not ask,” said Alexander, “what it becomes you to receive, but what it becomes me to give.” The saying seems spirited and kingly, when it is most foolish. For nothing in itself becomes anyone; it matters who gives, to whom, when, why, where, and the rest, without which the reckoning of the deed will not stand.

Urbem cuidam Alexander donabat, vesanus et qui nihil animo nisi grande conciperet. Cum ille, cui donabatur, se ipse mensus tanti muneris invidiam refugisset dicens non convenire fortunae suae: " Non quaero," inquit, " quid te accipere deceat, sed quid me dare." Animosa vox videtur et regia, cum sit stultissima. Nihil enim per se quemquam decet; refert, qui det, cui, quando, quare, ubi, et cetera, sine quibus facti ratio non constabit.

Most swollen of creatures! If it does not become him to receive this, neither does it become you to give it; the proportion of persons and dignities is observed, and, since virtue is everywhere a mean, that which exceeds sins as much as that which falls short. Grant that this is permitted you, and that fortune has lifted you so high that your largesses are cities (how much greater of spirit it would have been not to take them than to scatter them!): there is still someone too small to have a state stowed in his lap!

Tumidissimum animal! Si illum accipere hoc non decet, nec te dare; habetur personarum ac dignitatium portio et, cum sit ubique virtus modus, aeque peccat, quod excedit, quam quod deficit. Liceat istud sane tibi et te in tantum fortuna sustulerit, ut congiaria tua urbes sint (quas quanto maioris animi fuit non capere quam spargere!): est tamen aliquis minor, quam in sinu eius condenda sit civitas!

A Cynic asked Antigonus for a talent; he answered that it was more than a Cynic ought to ask. Rebuffed, he asked for a denarius; he answered that it was less than it became a king to give. “A quibble of this kind is most shameful; he found how to give neither. In the denarius he had regard to the king, in the talent to the Cynic, when he could have given both the denarius as to a Cynic and the talent as to a king. Granted there be something too great for a Cynic to receive, nothing is so small that a king’s kindness cannot honorably bestow it.”

Ab Antigono Cynicus petit talentum; respondit plus esse, quam quod Cynicus petere deberet. Repulsus petit denarium; respondit minus esse, quam quod regem deceret dare. " Turpissima eiusmodi cavillatio est; invenit, quomodo neutrum daret. In denario regem, in talento Cynicum respexit, eum posset et denarium tamquam Cynico dare et talentum tamquam rex. Ut sit aliquid maius, quam quod Cynicus accipiat, nihil tam exiguum est, quod non honeste regis humanitas tribuat."

If you ask me, I approve; for it is an intolerable thing to beg for coins and despise them. You have proclaimed a hatred of money; this you have professed, this character you have put on: you must play it out. It is most unfair that you should acquire money under the glory of poverty. And so each man’s own character must be looked at no less than that of the one he is thinking of helping.

Si me interrogas, probo; est enim intolerabilis res poscere nummos et contemnere. Indixisti pecuniae odium; hoc professus es, hanc personam induisti: agenda est. Iniquissimum est te pecuniam sub gloria egestatis adquirere. Adspicienda ergo non minus sua cuique persona est quam eius, de quo iuvando quis cogitat.

I would use our Chrysippus’s likeness from the game of ball, which beyond doubt falls either by the fault of the thrower or of the catcher; it keeps its course only when, between the hands of both, it is fitly thrown and caught by each. But a good player must throw it one way to a tall fellow-player, another way to a short one. The same is the reckoning of a benefit. Unless it is fitted to both persons, the giver’s and the receiver’s, it will neither leave the one nor reach the other as it should.

Volo Chrysippi nostri uti similitudine de pilae lusu, quam cadere non est dubium aut mittentis vitio aut excipientis; tum cursum suum servat, ubi inter manus utriusque apte ab utroque et iactata et excepta versatur. Necesse est autem lusor bonus aliter illam conlusori longo, aliter brevi mittat. Eadem beneficii ratio est. Nisi utrique personae, dantis et accipientis, aptatur, nec ab hoc exibit nec ad illum perveniet, ut debet.

If we have to do with a trained and skilled man, we shall throw the ball more boldly; for however it comes, a ready and nimble hand will strike it back; if with a novice and an unskilled, we shall not meet it so stiffly nor so hard-flung, but more gently, aiming straight at his very hand and slackening our return. The same must be done in benefits: let us teach some, and judge it enough if they try, if they dare, if they are willing.

Si cum exercitato et docto negotium est, audacius pilam mittemus; utcumque enim venerit, manus illam expedita et agilis repercutiet; si cum tirone et indocto, non tam rigide nec tam excusse sed languidius et in ipsam eius derigentes manum remisse occurremus. Idem faciendum est in beneficiis; quosdam doceamus et satis iudicemus, si conantur, si audent, si volunt.

But for the most part we make men ungrateful, and we favor their being so, as though our benefits were great only when no gratitude could be returned for them; like spiteful players whose aim is to show up a fellow-player, to the ruin, of course, of the very game, which cannot be drawn out unless there is agreement.

Facimus autem plerumque ingratos et, ut sint, favemus, tamquam ita demum magna sint beneficia nostra, si gratia illis referri non potuit; ut malignis lusoribus propositum est conlusorem traducere, cum damno scilicet ipsius lusus, qui non potest, nisi consentitur, extendi.

Many are of so crooked a nature that they would rather lose what they bestowed than seem to have been repaid — proud men, and chargers-up of accounts. How much better, how much more humane, to act so that their parts too may stand for them, and to favor it, that gratitude can be returned to oneself; to interpret everything kindly, to hear the man who gives thanks no otherwise than if he were making return, to show oneself easy to this end — that one whom you have obliged should even wish to be discharged!

Multi sunt tam pravae naturae, ut malint perdere, quae praestiterunt, quam videri recepisse, superbi et imputatores. Quanto melius quantoque humanius id agere, ut illis quoque partes suae constent, et favere, ut gratia sibi referri possit, benigne omnia interpretari, gratias agentem non aliter, quam si referat, audire, praebere se facilem ad hoc, ut, quem obligavit, etiam exsolvi velit!

A moneylender is ill spoken of if he exacts harshly, and equally if, slow and difficult in accepting payment, he seeks delays. A benefit is as much to be received as not exacted. Best is the man who gave easily, never exacted, rejoiced to be repaid, in good faith forgot what he had bestowed, and received it in the spirit of one accepting.

Male audire solet fenerator, si acerbe exigit, aeque, si in recipiendo tardus ac difficilis moras quaerit. Beneficium tam recipiendum est quam non exigendum. Optimus ille, qui facile dedit, numquam exegit, reddi gavisus est, bona fide, quid praestitisset, oblitus, qui accipientis animo recepit.

Some men not only give benefits proudly but receive them so too, which must not be allowed. For let us now pass to the other part, to treat how men ought to bear themselves in receiving benefits. Whatever duty consists of two parties demands just as much from each. When you have looked at what a father ought to be, you will know that no less labor remains there to make out what kind of son he ought to be; there are some parts of the husband, but no smaller ones of the wife.

Quidam non tantum dant beneficia superbe, sed etiam accipiunt, quod non est committendum. Iam enim transeamus ad alteram partem tractaturi, quomodo se gerere homines in accipiendis beneficiis debeant. Quodcumque ex duobus constat officium, tantundem ab utroque exigit. Qualis pater esse debeat, eum inspexeris, scies non minus operis illic superesse, ut dispicias, qualem esse oporteat filium; sunt aliquae partes mariti, sed non minores uxoris.

These render in turn as much as they demand, and call for an equal rule, which, as Hecaton says, is hard; for everything honorable lies on a steep height, even what is near to the honorable; for it must not only be done, but done by reason. With reason as guide one must go through the whole of life, ordering the least and the greatest by her counsel; as she advises, so we must give. And she will first judge this — that one must not receive from all. From whom, then, shall we receive? To answer you briefly: from those to whom we would have given.

In vicem ista, quantum exigunt, praestant et parem desiderant regulam, quae, ut ait Hecaton, difficilis est; omne enim honestum in arduo est, etiam quod vicinum honesto est; non enim tantum fieri debet, sed ratione fieri. Hac duce per totam vitam eundum est, minima maximaque ex huius consilio gerenda; quomodo haec suaserit, dandum. Haec autem hoc primum censebit non ab omnibus accipiendum. A quibus ergo accipiemus? Ut breviter tibi respondeam: ab his, quibus dedissemus.

Let us see whether the man to whom we are to be indebted must be sought with even greater care than the man on whom we bestow. For though no troubles should follow (yet very many do), it is still a heavy torment to owe a debt to one you would not; whereas it is most pleasant to have received a benefit from one you can love even after an injury, where the cause has made an otherwise pleasant friendship also a just one. But this is most wretched for a modest and honest man — if he must love one who does not please him.

Videamus, num etiam maiore dilectu quaerendus est, cui debeamus, quam cui praestemus. Nam ut non sequantur ulla incommoda (secuntur autem plurima), grave tamen tormentum est debere, cui nolis; contra iucundissimum ab eo accepisse beneficium, quem amare etiam post iniuriam possis, ubi amicitiam alioqui iucundam causa fecit et iustam. Illud vero homini verecundo et probo miserrimum est, si eum amare oportet, quem non iuvat.

I must warn you so often that I am not speaking of the wise, whom whatever is fitting also pleases, who have their mind in their power and lay down for themselves the law they wish, and keep the law they have laid down, but of imperfect men who wish to follow the honorable road, whose passions often obey stubbornly. And so I must choose from whom I receive a benefit;

Totiens admoneam necesse est non loqui me de sapientibus, quos, quidquid oportet, et iuvat, qui animum in potestate habent et legem sibi, quam volunt, dicunt, quam dixerunt, servant, sed de imperfectis hominibus honestam viam sequi volentibus, quorum adfectus saepe contumaciter parent. Itaque eligendum est, a quo beneficium accipiam;

and indeed a creditor of a benefit must be sought more carefully than a creditor of money. For to the latter I must repay as much as I received, and, if I have repaid, I am released and free; but to the former I must pay more, and none the less, even when the gratitude is returned, we cling together; for when I have repaid I must begin again, and the friendship endures; and as I would not admit an unworthy man into friendship, so neither into that most sacred bond of benefits, from which friendship springs.

et quidem diligentius quaerendus beneficii quam pecuniae creditor. Huic enim reddendum est, quantum accepi, et, si reddidi, solutus sum ac liber; at illi et plus solvendum est, et nihilo minus etiam relata gratia cohaeremus; debeo enim, cum reddidi, rursus incipere, manetque amicitia; et ut in amicitiam non reciperem indignum, sic ne in beneficiorum quidem sacratissimum ius, ex quo amicitia oritur.

“It is not always permitted me,” he says, “to say ‘I will not’; sometimes a benefit must be received even against one’s will. A cruel and irascible tyrant gives, who will judge it an injury that you scorn his gift: shall I not receive it? Put in the same place the brigand, the pirate, the king who has the soul of a brigand and a pirate. What am I to do? Is he too little worthy that I should be indebted to him?”

" Non semper," inquit, " mihi licet dicere: ’ nolo ’; aliquando beneficium accipiendum est et invito. Dat tyrannus crudelis et iracundus, qui munus suum fastidire te iniuriam iudicaturus est: non accipiam? Eodem loco latronem pone, piratam, regem animum latronis ac piratae habentem. Quid faciam? Parum dignus est, cui debeam?

When I say one must choose to whom you owe a debt, I make exception of overpowering force and fear, under which choice perishes. If it is free to you, if it lies in your judgment whether you will or not, you will weigh this with yourself; if necessity takes away the judgment, you will know that you do not receive but obey. No one is bound by receiving what he was not permitted to refuse; if you wish to know whether I am willing, bring it about that I can be unwilling. “Yet he gave you your life!”

" Cum eligendum dico, cui debeas, vim maiorem et metum excipio, quibus adhibitis electio perit. Si liberum est tibi, si arbitrii tui est, utrum velis an non, id apud te ipse perpendes; si necessitas tollit arbitrium, scies te non accipere, sed parere. Nemo id accipiendo obligatur, quod illi repudiare non licuit; si vis scire, an velim, effice, ut possim nolle. " Vitam tamen tibi dedit!

It matters not what the thing is that is given, unless it is given by one willing, to one willing; if you saved me, you are not for that reason my savior. Poison has sometimes served as a remedy; it is not for that counted among wholesome things. Some things help without obliging. A man with a sword split a tyrant’s tumor — one who had come to kill him; the tyrant did not for that thank him, because by meaning to harm he healed a thing the hands of the physicians had shrunk from.

" Non refert, quid sit, quod datur, nisi a volente, nisi volenti datur; si servasti me, non ideo servator es. Venenum aliquando pro remedio fuit; non ideo numeratur inter salubria. Quaedam prosunt nec obligant. Tuber quidam tyranni gladio divisit, qui ad occidendum eum venerat; non ideo illi tyrannus gratias egit. quod rem, quam medicorum manus reformidaverant, nocendo sanavit.

You see that there is no great weight in the thing itself, since he is not held to have given a benefit who has helped from an evil intent; for then the benefit is chance, and the man’s part an injury. We have watched a lion in the amphitheater who, recognizing one of the beast-fighters — once his keeper — shielded him from the onset of the beasts. Is the help of a wild beast, then, a benefit? By no means, because it neither willed to do it nor did it with intent to do it.

Vides non esse magnum in ipsa re momentum, quoniam non videtur dedisse beneficium, qui a malo animo profuit; casus enim beneficium est, hominis iniuria. Leonem in amphitheatro spectavimus, qui unum e bestiariis agnitum, cum quondam eius fuisset magister, protexit ab impetu bestiarum. Num ergo beneficium est ferae auxilium? Minime, quia nec voluit facere nec faciendi animo fecit.

Where I have set the beast, set the tyrant; both this one gave life and that one, yet neither this nor that a benefit. Because it is no benefit to be compelled to receive, it is no benefit to owe a debt to one you would not. First you must give me the disposal of myself, then the benefit.

Quo loco feram posui, tyrannum pone; et hic vitam dedit et illa, nec hic nec illa beneficium. Quia non est beneficium accipere cogi, non est beneficium debere, cui nolis. Ante des oportet mihi arbitrium mei, deinde beneficium.

It is commonly disputed about Marcus Brutus whether he ought to have accepted his life from the deified Julius, when he judged that he must be killed.

Disputari de M. Bruto solet, an debuerit accipere ab divo Iulio vitam, cum occidendum eum iudicaret.

What reasoning he followed in the killing I shall treat elsewhere; for to me, though he was a great man in other things, in this matter he seems to have erred grievously, and not to have acted by the Stoic rule. He either dreaded the name of king — though the best condition of a state is under a just king — or hoped that liberty would survive there where the reward both of ruling and of serving was so great, or thought the state could be recalled to its former shape when its old character was lost, and that there would be equality of civil right and that the laws would stand in their place, where he had seen so many thousands of men fighting, not over whether they should be slaves, but which master they should serve! How great a forgetfulness of the nature of things, or of his own city, held him, who believed that, with one slain, another would not be found who wished the same — when a Tarquin had been found, after so many kings cut down by sword and lightning!

Quam rationem in occidendo secutus sit, alias tractabimus; mihi enim, cum vir magnus in aliis fuerit, in hac re videtur vehementer errasse nec ex institutione Stoica se egisse. Qui aut regis nomen extimuit, cum optimus civitatis status sub rege iusto sit, aut ibi speravit libertatem futuram, ubi tam magnum praemium erat et imperandi et serviendi, aut existimavit civitatem in priorem formam posse revocari amissis pristinis moribus futuramque ibi aequalitatem civilis iuris et staturas suo loco leges, ubi viderat tot milia hominum pugnantia, non an servirent, sed utri! Quanta vero illum aut rerum naturae aut urbis suae tenuit oblivio, qui uno interempto defuturum credidit alium, qui idem vellet, eum Tarquinius esset inventus post tot reges ferro ac fulminibus occisos!

But he ought to have accepted his life — yet for all that not to have held the other in a father’s place, because it was by a wrong that he had come into the right of giving a benefit; for he did not save who did not kill, nor did he give a benefit, but a reprieve.

Sed vitam accipere debuit, ob hoc tamen non habere illum parentis loco, quia in ius dandi beneficii iniuria venerat; non enim servavit is, qui non interfecit, nec beneficium dedit, sed missionem.

This may rather come into some dispute: what a captive should do, to whom a man of prostituted body and infamous mouth promises the price of his ransom. Shall I suffer myself to be saved by a foul man? And once saved, what gratitude shall I return him? Shall I live with an obscene fellow? Shall I not live with my ransomer? I will say, then, what seems best.

Illud magis venire in aliquam disputationem potest, quid faciendum sit captivo, cui redemptionis pretium homo prostituti corporis et infamis ore promittit. Patiar me ab impuro servari? Servatus deinde quam illi gratiam referam? Vivam cum obsceno? Non vivam cum redemptore? Quid ergo placeat, dicam.

Even from such a man I will accept the money I am to pay for my life, but I will accept it as a loan, not as a benefit; I will pay him back the money, and, if there be occasion to save him in peril, I will save him; into the friendship that joins like to like I will not descend, nor count him as a savior but as a moneylender, to whom I know I must repay what I received.

Etiam a tali accipiam pecuniam, quam pro capite dependam, accipiam autem tamquam creditum, non tamquam beneficium; solvam illi pecuniam et, si occasio fuerit servandi periclitantem, servabo; in amicitiam, quae similes iungit, non descendam, nec servatoris illum loco numerabo sed feneratoris, cui sciam reddendum, quod accepi.

There is one worthy of my receiving a benefit from him, but it will harm the giver; for that reason I will not accept, because he is ready to help me with loss or even danger to himself. He is about to defend me on trial, but by that advocacy to make the king his enemy; I am his enemy, if, when he is willing to risk himself for me, I do not do the easier thing — to be in peril without him.

Est aliquis dignus, a quo beneficium accipiam, sed danti nociturum est; ideo non accipiam, quia ille paratus est mihi cum incommodo aut etiam periculo suo prodesse. Defensurus est me reum, sed illo patrocinio regem sibi facturus inimicum; inimicus sum, si, cum ille pro me periclitari velit, ego, quod facilius est, non facio, ut sine illo pericliter.

Hecaton sets down this silly and frivolous example of Arcesilaus, who, he says, would not accept money brought him by a son still under his father’s authority, lest he offend the stingy father. What did he do worthy of praise — that he did not take stolen goods, that he preferred not to accept rather than to give back? For what self-restraint is it not to accept what is another’s?

Ineptum et frivolum hoc Hecaton ponit exemplum Arcesilai, quem ait a filio familiae adlatam pecuniam non accepisse, ne ille patrem sordidum offenderet. Quid fecit laude dignum, quod furtum non recepit, quod maluit non accipere quam reddere? Quae est enim alienam rem non accipere moderatio?

If we need an example of great spirit, let us use Julius Graecinus, an excellent man, whom Gaius Caesar killed for this one thing — that he was a better man than it suits a tyrant for anyone to be. When he was receiving from his friends, who contributed, money toward the expense of his games, he would not accept a great sum sent by Fabius Persicus; and when those who weigh not the senders but the things sent chid him for having refused it, he said: “Shall I accept a benefit from a man from whom I would not accept a toast?”

Si exemplo magni animi opus est, utamur Graecini Iulii, viri egregii, quem C. Caesar occidit ob hoc unum, quod melior vir erat, quam esse quemquam tyranno expedit. Is cum ab amicis conferentibus ad impensam ludorum pecunias acciperet, magnam pecuniam a Fabio Persico missam non accepit et obiurgantibus iis, qui non aestimant mittentes, sed missa, quod repudiasset: " Ego," inquit, " ab eo beneficium accipiam, a quo propinationem accepturus non sum? "

When Rebilus, a man of consular rank and of the same ill fame, had sent him a larger sum and pressed him to order it accepted, he said: “I beg you, forgive me; I did not accept from Persicus either.” Is this to accept gifts, or to enroll a senate?

Cum illi Rebilus consularis, homo eiusdem infamiae, maiorem summam misisset instaretque, ut accipi iuberet: " Rogo," inquit, " ignoscas; et a Persico non accepi." Utrum hoc munera accipere est an senatum legere?

When we have judged that we must accept, let us accept cheerfully, declaring our joy, and let it be plain to the giver, that he may take a present reward; for it is a just cause of gladness to see a friend glad, juster to have made him so. Let us show by outpoured feeling how gratefully it has reached us — feeling we should witness not only in his own hearing but everywhere. He who accepts a benefit gratefully pays its first installment.

Cum accipiendum iudicaverimus, hilares accipiamus profitentes gaudium, et id danti manifestum sit, ut fructum praesentem capiat; iusta enim causa laetitiae est laetum amicum videre, iustior fecisse. Quam grate ad nos pervenisse indicemus effusis adfectibus, quos non ipso tantum audiente sed ubique testemur. Qui grate beneficium accipit, primam eius pensionem solvit.

There are some who will accept only in secret; they shun a witness and confidant of the benefit — men, you may be sure, who mean ill. As the giver should spread the report of his gift only so far as will please the one to whom it is given, so the receiver should call an assembly to it; what you are ashamed to owe, do not accept. Some give thanks furtively, in a corner, and into the ear;

Sunt quidam, qui nolint nisi secreto accipere; testem beneficii et conscium vitant; quos scias licet male cogitare. Quomodo danti in tantum producenda notitia est muneris sui, in quantum delectatura est, cui datur, ita accipienti adhibenda contio est; quod pudet debere, ne acceperis. Quidam furtive gratias agunt et in angulo et ad aurem;

that is not modesty but a kind of disowning; he is ungrateful who gives thanks with the witnesses removed. Some do not want the loan entered in their name, nor brokers brought in, nor signatories called, nor to give a bond. The same do those who take pains that a benefit conferred on them be as little known as possible.

non est ista verecundia, sed infitiandi genus; ingratus est, qui remotis arbitris agit gratias. Quidam nolunt nomina secum fieri nec interponi pararios nec signatores advocari, chirographum dare. Idem faciunt, qui dant operam, ut beneficium in ipsos conlatum quam ignotissimum sit.

They fear to bear it openly, that they may be said to have attained it by their own virtue rather than by another’s aid; they are rarer in their attentions to those to whom they owe life or rank, and, while they fear the reputation of clients, they take on the graver one of the ungrateful.

Verentur palam ferre, ut sua potius virtute quam alieno adiutorio consecuti dicantur; rariores in eorum officiis sunt, quibus vitam aut dignitatem debent, et, dum opinionem clientium timent, graviorem subeunt ingratorum.

Others speak most ill of those who have deserved best of them. It is safer to offend some men than to oblige them; for they seek, in hatred, a proof that they owe nothing. And yet nothing is more to be ensured than that the memory of services cling to us, a memory to be refreshed again and again, since neither can he return gratitude who does not remember, and he who remembers, returns it.

Alii pessime locuntur de optime meritis. Tutius est quosdam offendere quam demeruisse; argumentum enim nihil debentium odio quaerunt. Atqui nihil magis praestandum est, quam ut memoria nobis meritorum haereat, quae subinde reficienda est, quia nec referre potest gratiam, nisi qui meminit, et, qui meminit, eam refert.

We must accept neither daintily nor abjectly and humbly; for he who is careless in accepting, when every benefit lies fresh and open, what will he do when its first pleasure has cooled? Another accepts disdainfully, as one who would say:

Nec delicate accipiendum est nec summisse et humiliter; nam qui neclegens est in accipiendo, cum omne beneficium recens pateat, quid faciat, cum prima eius voluptas refrixit? Alius accipit fastidiose, tamquam qui dicat:

“I have no need of it, to be sure, but since you so strongly wish it, I will give you the disposal of me”; another so listlessly that he leaves the giver in doubt whether he noticed; another barely parts his lips, and was more ungrateful than if he had kept silent.

" Non quidem mihi opus est, sed quia tam valde vis, faciam tibi mei potestatem "; alius supine, ut dubium praestanti relinquat, an senserit; alius vix labra diduxit et ingratior, quam si tacuisset, fuit.

We must speak the more earnestly, in proportion to the greatness of the thing, and add such words as: “You have obliged more men than you think” (for everyone rejoices that his benefit reaches more widely); “you do not know what you have bestowed on me — but you ought to know how much more it is than you suppose” (he is grateful at once who burdens himself); “I shall never be able to return you gratitude; this at least I shall not cease to confess everywhere — that I cannot return it.”

Loquendum est pro magnitudine rei impensius et illa adicienda: " Plures, quam putas, obligasti " (nemo enim non gaudet beneficium suum latius patere); " nescis, quid mihi praestiteris, sed scire te oportet, quanto plus sit, quam existimas " (statim gratus est, qui se onerat); " numquam tibi referre gratiam potero; illud certe non desinam ubique confiteri me referre non posse."

By nothing did Furnius more oblige Caesar Augustus, and make him easy toward granting other requests, than that, when he had obtained pardon for his father, who had followed Antony’s party, he said: “This one injury, Caesar, I have from you: you have brought it about that I both live and die ungrateful.” What is so much the mark of a grateful spirit as in no way to satisfy oneself, as never to come even to the hope of matching the benefit?

Nullo magis Caesarem Augustum demeruit et ad alia impetranda facilem sibi reddidit Furnius, quam quod, cum patri Antonianas partes secuto veniam impetrasset, dixit: " Hanc unam. Caesar, habeo iniuriam tuam: effecisti, ut et viverem et morerer ingratus." Quid est tam grati animi, quam nullo modo sibi satis facere, quam ne ad spem quidem exaequandi umquam beneficii accedere?

By these and such words let us bring it about that our goodwill does not lie hidden, but is opened and shines forth. Though words be lacking — if we are affected as we ought to be, our consciousness will stand out in our face.

His atque eiusmodi vocibus id agamus, ut voluntas nostra non lateat, sed aperiatur et luceat. Verba cessent licet: si, quemadmodum debemus, adfecti sumus, conscientia eminebit in vultu.

He who is to be grateful should, at once, while he receives, think of repaying. Chrysippus indeed says that he ought, like a runner set for the race and shut in the starting-gate, to await his own time, at which, as at a given signal, he may dart forth; and indeed he needs great effort, great speed, to catch the one ahead.

Qui gratus futurus est, statim, dum accipit, de reddendo cogitet. Chrysippus quidem ait illum velut in certamen cursus compositum et carceribus inclusum opperiri debere tempus suum, ad quod velut dato signo prosiliat; et quidem magna illi contentione opus est, magna celeritate, ut consequatur antecedentem.

Now we must see what most makes men ungrateful. It is made by an excessive regard for oneself, and the vice inborn in mortality of admiring oneself and one’s own, or by greed, or by envy.

Videndum est nunc, quid maxime faciat ingratos. Facit aut nimius sui suspectus et insitum mortalitati vitium se suaque mirandi aut aviditas aut invidia.

Let us begin with the first. Everyone is a kindly judge of himself. Hence it is that he thinks he has deserved everything, and takes it as payment in full, and does not think himself valued at his proper price. “This he gave me — but how late, but after how many toils! How much more could I have attained, had I chosen to court this man or that, rather than him! I had not hoped for this; I was thrown into the crowd. Did he judge me worthy of so little? It had been more honorable to be passed over.”

Incipiamus a primo. Nemo non benignus est sui iudex. Inde est, ut omnia meruisse se existimet et in solutum accipiat nec satis suo pretio se aestimatum putet. " Hoc mihi dedit, sed quam sero, sed post quot labores! Quanto consequi plura potuissem, si illum aut illum aut me colere maluissem! Non hoc speraveram; in turbam coniectus sum. Tam exiguo dignum me iudicavit? Honestius praeteriri fuit."

Gnaeus Lentulus the augur, the greatest example of riches before his freedmen made him poor — this man, who saw four hundred million sesterces his own (I have spoken precisely; for he did nothing more than see it) — was barren of wit, as petty in it as in spirit. Though he was most miserly, he let go his coins sooner than his words: such was his poverty of speech.

Cn. Lentulus augur, divitiarum maximum exemplum, antequam illum libertini pauperem facerent, hic, qui quater milies sestertium suum vidit (proprie dixi; nihil enim amplius quam vidit), ingenii fuit sterilis, tam pusilli quam animi. Cum esset avarissimus, nummos citius emittebat quam verba: tanta illi inopia erat sermonis.

Though he owed all his increase to the deified Augustus, to whom he had brought a poverty laboring under the burden of nobility, now first man of the state in money and in favor, he would now and then complain of Augustus, saying that he had been drawn away from his studies; that nothing had been heaped on him as great as what he had lost by giving up eloquence. Yet among other things the deified Augustus had bestowed this too on him — that he had freed him from derision and fruitless toil!

Hic cum omnia incrementa sua divo Augusto deberet, ad quem attulerat paupertatem sub onere nobilitatis laborantem, princeps iam civitatis et pecunia et gratia subinde de Augusto solebat queri dicens a studiis se abductum; nihil tantum in se congestum esse, quantum perdidisset relicta eloquentia. At illi inter alia hoc quoque divus Augustus praestiterat, quod illum derisu et labore irrito liberaverat!

Greed suffers no one to be grateful; for to a wicked hope what is given is never enough, and we crave the greater the greater that has come; and greed is far more inflamed when it is settled in a heap of great wealth, as the force of flame is endlessly fiercer the greater the fire from which it has leapt.

Non patitur aviditas quemquam esse gratum; numquam enim improbae spei, quod datur, satis est, et maiora cupimus, quo maiora venerunt, multoque concitatior est avaritia in magnarum opum congestu collocata, ut flammae infinite acrior vis est, quo ex maiore incendio emicuit.

Ambition likewise suffers no one to rest in that measure of honors which was once his shameless prayer. No one gives thanks for a tribuneship, but complains that he has not been brought all the way to the praetorship; nor is this welcome, if the consulship is lacking; nor does even this satisfy, if it is but one. Desire stretches beyond itself, and does not understand its own good fortune, because it looks not at whence it has come, but at whither it is bound.

Aeque ambitio non patitur quemquam in ea mensura honorum conquiescere, quae quondam eius fuit impudens votum. Nemo agit de tribunatu gratias, sed queritur, quod non est ad praeturam usque perductus; nec haec grata est, si deest consulatus; ne hic quidem satiat, si unus est. Ultra se cupiditas porrigit et felicitatem suam non intellegit, quia non, unde venerit, respicit, sed quo tendat.

More violent and more troublesome than all these is the evil of envy, which disquiets us by comparing: “This he bestowed on me, but on that man more, on that man sooner”; and then it pleads no one’s cause, but favors itself against all. How much simpler, how much wiser, to enlarge the benefit received — to know that no one is valued by another as highly as by himself!

Omnibus his vehementius et importunius malum est invidia, quae nos inquietat, dum comparat: " Hoc mihi praestitit, sed illi plus, sed illi maturius "; et deinde nullius causam agit, contra omnes sibi favet. Quanto est simplicius, quanto prudentius beneficium acceptum augere, scire neminem tanti ab alio, quanti a se ipso aestimari!

“I ought to have received more, but it was not easy for him to give more; his liberality had to be divided among many; this is a beginning — let us take it in good part, and call forth his goodwill by accepting it gratefully; he did little, but he will do it more often; he preferred that man to me — but me to many; that man is not my equal in virtues nor in services, but he had his own charm; by complaining I shall bring it about not that I am worthy of greater things, but that I am unworthy of what was given. More has been given to those most disgraceful men; what of it? How rarely does fortune judge! Every day we complain that the bad are prosperous;

" Plus accipere debui, sed illi facile non fuit plus dare; in multos dividenda liberalitas erat; hoc initium est, boni consulamus et animum eius grate excipiendo evocemus; parum fecit, sed saepius faciet; illum mihi praetulit, et me multis; ille non est mihi par virtutibus nec officiis, sed habuit suam Venerem; querendo non efficiam, ut maioribus dignus sim, sed ut datis indignus. Plura illis hominibus turpissimis data sunt; quid ad rem? Quam raro fortuna iudicat! Cotidie querimur malos esse felices;

often the hail that had passed over the little fields of every worst man has struck the crop of the best; each man bears his lot, in friendships as in all else.”

saepe, quae agellos pessimi cuiusque transierat, optimorum virorum segetem grando percussit; fert sortem suam quisque ut in ceteris rebus ita in amicitiis."

No benefit is so full that malice cannot pluck at it, none so meager that a kindly interpreter cannot enlarge it. Causes for complaint will never be lacking, if you look at benefits from their worse side.

Nullum est tam plenum beneficium, quod non vellicare malignitas possit, nullum tam angustum, quod non bonus interpres extendat. Numquam deerunt causae querendi, si beneficia a deteriore parte spectaveris.

See how unfair are the appraisers of the gods’ gifts — and these men professing wisdom. They complain that we do not match elephants in size of body, stags in speed, birds in lightness, bulls in onset; that the hide of beasts is solid, of fallow deer more comely, of bears thicker, of beavers softer; that dogs surpass us in keenness of nostril, eagles in sharpness of sight, ravens in span of life, many animals in ease of swimming.

Vide, quam iniqui sint divinorum munerum aestimatores et quidem professi sapientiam. Queruntur, quod non magnitudine corporum aequemus elephantos, velocitate cervos, levitate aves, impetu tauros; quod solida sit cutis beluis, decentior dammis, densior ursis, mollior fibris; quod sagacitate nos narium canes vincant, quod acie luminum aquilae, spatio aetatis corvi, multa animalia nandi facilitate.

And though nature does not suffer certain things even to come together in the same creature — such as swiftness of body and strength — they call it an injury, and that the gods are careless of us, that man is not composed of diverse and discordant goods; that there has not been given a good health unconquerable even by vices, nor knowledge of the future. They scarcely hold themselves back from being carried to such a pitch of impudence that they hate nature — because we stand below the gods, because we have not stood on a level with them.

Et cum quaedam ne coire quidem in idem natura patiatur, ut velocitatem corporum et vires, ex diversis ac dissidentibus bonis hominem non esse compositum iniuriam vocant et neclegentes nostri deos, quod non bona valetudo etiam vitiis inexpugnabilis data sit, quod non futuri scientia. Vix sibi temperant, quin eo usque impudentiae provehantur, ut naturam oderint, quod infra deos sumus, quod non in aequo illis stetimus.

How much better to turn back to the contemplation of so many and so great benefits, and to give thanks that they willed us to draw the second lot in this most beautiful dwelling, that they set us over the things of earth! Does anyone compare to us those animals whose power lies in our hands? Whatever has been denied us could not have been given.

Quanto satius est ad contemplationem tot tantorumque beneficiorum reverti et agere gratias, quod nos in hoc pulcherrimo domicilio voluerunt secundas sortiri, quod terrenis praefecerunt! Aliquis ea animalia comparat nobis, quorum potestas penes nos est? Quidquid nobis negatum est, dari non potuit.

Therefore, whoever you are, unfair appraiser of the human lot, consider how much our parent has bestowed on us; how much stronger animals we have put under the yoke, how much swifter we overtake, how nothing mortal is set beyond our stroke.

Proinde, quisquis es iniquus aestimator sortis humanae, cogita, quanta nobis tribuerit parens noster, quanto valentiora animalia sub iugum miserimus, quanto velociora consequamur, quam nihil sit mortale non sub ictu nostro positum.

So many virtues we have received, so many arts, and the mind, finally, to which nothing is not passable in the very instant it is bent there — swifter than the stars, whose courses to come, after many ages, it runs ahead of; so much grain, then, so much wealth, so many things heaped upon things. You may go round all of them, and, because you will find nothing whole that you would rather be, you may pick out single things from all that you would wish given to you; once nature’s indulgence is well weighed, you must confess that you have been her darling. So it is:

Tot virtutes accepimus, tot artes, animum denique, cui nihil non eodem, quo intendit, momento pervium est, sideribus velociorem, quorum post multa saecula futuros cursus antecedit; tantum deinde frugum, tantum opum, tantum rerum aliarum super alias acervatarum. Circumeas licet cuncta et, quia nihil totum invenies, quod esse te malles, ex omnibus singula excerpas, quae tibi dari velles; bene aestimata naturae indulgentia confitearis necesse est in deliciis te illi fuisse. Ita est:

the immortal gods have held us, and hold us, most dear, and — the greatest honor that could be granted — have placed us next to themselves. Great things we have received; greater we could not have held.

carissimos nos habuerunt di immortales habentque, et, qui maximus tribui honos potuit, ab ipsis proximos collocaverunt. Magna accepimus, maiora non cepimus.

These things, my Liberalis, I believed necessary — both because something had to be said of the greatest benefits, while we were speaking of the small, and because from this source the audacity of this detestable vice spreads into the rest. For to whom will he respond gratefully, what gift will he judge either great or to be repaid, who scorns the highest benefits? To whom will he owe his safety, his breath, who denies that he has received from the gods that life which he daily begs of them?

Haec, mi Liberalis, necessaria credidi, et quia loquendum aliquid de maximis beneficiis erat, cum de minutis loqueremur, et quia inde manat etiam in cetera huius detestabilis vitii audacia. Cui enim respondebit grate, quod munus existimabit aut magnum aut reddendum, qui summa beneficia spernit? Cui salutem, cui spiritum debebit, qui vitam accepisse se a dis negat, quam cotidie ab illis petit?

Whoever, then, teaches men to be grateful pleads the cause both of men and of the gods, to whom — though they need nothing and are set beyond all want — we can nonetheless return gratitude. There is no reason why anyone should seek an excuse for an ungrateful mind from his weakness and poverty, and say: “For what am I to do, and how? When shall I return gratitude to my superiors and to the lords of all things?” To return it is easy, if you are greedy, without expense; if idle, without effort. At the very moment you are obliged, if you wish, you have made yourself even with anyone, since he who gladly receives a benefit has repaid it.

Quicumque ergo gratos esse docet, et hominum causam agit et deorum, quibus nullius rei indigentibus, positis extra desiderium, referre nihilo minus gratiam possumus. Non est, quod quisquam excusationem mentis ingratae ab infirmitate atque inopia petat et dicat: " Quid enim faciam et quomodo? Quando superioribus dominisque rerum omnium gratiam referam? " Referre facile est, si avarus es, sine impendio, si iners, sine opera. Eodem quidem momento, quo obligatus es, si vis, cum quolibet paria fecisti, quoniam, qui libenter beneficium accipit, reddidit.

Of the paradoxes of the Stoic school this, in my opinion, is the least to be wondered at or disbelieved: that he who gladly receives has repaid the benefit. For since we refer all things to the mind, each man has done as much as he willed; and since piety, faith, justice — every virtue, in short — is complete within itself, even if it was not permitted him to put forth his hand, a man can be grateful too by his will.

Hoc ex paradoxis Stoicae sectae minime mirabile, ut mea fert opinio, aut incredibile est eum, qui libenter accipit, beneficium reddidisse. Nam eum omnia ad animum referamus, fecit quisque, quantum voluit; et cum pietas, fides, iustitia, omnis denique virtus intra se perfecta sit, etiam si illi manum exserere non licuit, gratus quoque homo esse potest voluntate.

Whenever a man attains what he purposed, he takes the fruit of his work. He who gives a benefit, what does he purpose? To profit the one to whom he gives, and to be a pleasure to him. If he has accomplished what he willed, and his intent has reached me and affected me with mutual joy, he has got what he sought. For he did not wish something returned to him in turn; or else it was no benefit, but a piece of trade.

Quotiens, quod proposuit, quisque consequitur, capit operis sui fructum. Qui beneficium dat, quid proponit? Prodesse ei, cui dat, et voluptati esse. Si, quod voluit, effecit pervenitque ad me animus eius ac mutuo gaudio adfecit, tulit, quod petit. Non enim in vicem aliquid sibi reddi voluit; aut non fuit beneficium, sed negotiatio.

He has sailed well who has held the harbor he made for; the cast of a sure hand has done its duty, if it has struck what it aimed at; he who gives a benefit wishes it received gratefully — he has what he wished, if it was well received. “But he hoped for some profit.” Then it was no benefit, whose own nature it is to think nothing of return.

Bene navigavit, qui quem destinavit portum tenuit; teli iactus certae manus peregit officium, si petita percussit; beneficium qui dat, vult excipi grate; habet, quod voluit, si bene acceptum est. Sed speravit emolumenti aliquid. Non fuit hoc beneficium, cuius proprium est nihil de reditu cogitare.

What I was receiving I received in the spirit in which it was given: I have repaid. Otherwise the best of things is on the worst footing: to be grateful, I am sent to fortune! If, with her unwilling, I cannot make return, the mind suffices for the mind.

Quod accipiebam, eo animo accepi, quo dabatur: reddidi. Alioqui pessima optimae rei condicio est: ut gratus sim, ad fortunam mittor! Si illa invita respondere non possum, sufficit animus animo.

“What then? Shall I not also do whatever I can to repay, and watch for the chance of times and circumstances, and long to fill the lap of him from whom I received something?” Yes — but a benefit is in an ill place, unless even with empty hands one may be grateful!

" Quid ergo? non, quidquid potuero, et faciam, ut reddam, et temporum rerumque occasionem sequar et implere eius sinum cupiam, a quo aliquid accepi? " Sed malo loco beneficium est, nisi et excussis manibus esse grato licet!

“He who has received a benefit,” he says, “though he received it with the kindliest spirit, has not yet completed his duty; for the part of repaying remains; as in the game it is something to catch the ball skillfully and carefully, but he is not called a good player who has not aptly and readily sent back what he caught.”

" Qui accepit," inquit, " beneficium, licet animo benignissimo acceperit, nondum consummavit officium suum; restat enim pars reddendi; sicut in lusu est aliquid pilam scite ac diligenter excipere, sed non dicitur bonus lusor, nisi qui apte et expedite remisit, quam acceperat."

This example is unlike. Why? Because the praise of this thing lies in bodily motion and in agility, not in the mind; and so the whole of it, of which we judge with the eyes, must be played out. And yet I shall not for that reason refuse to call him a good player who caught the ball as he ought, if the delay in sending it back was not through himself.

Exemplum hoc dissimile est; quare? Quia huius rei laus in corporis motu est et in agilitate, non in animo; explicari itaque totum debet, de quo oculis iudicatur. Nec tamen ideo non bonum lusorem dicam, qui pilam, ut oportebat, excepit, si per ipsum mora, quominus remitteret, non fuit.

“But although,” he says, “nothing is wanting to the player’s skill — since he has done his part, but can do the part he has not done — the game itself is incomplete, which is consummated by the turns of throwing and sending back.” I do not wish to refute this at greater length; let us suppose it is so: something is wanting to the game, not to the player; so too in this matter we are disputing, something is wanting to the thing given, for which an equal other thing is owed, but not to the mind, which has found a mind equal to itself and, so far as in it lies, has accomplished what it willed.

" Sed quamvis," inquit, " arti ludentis nihil desit, quia partem quidem fecit, sed partem, quam non fecit, potest facere, lusus ipse imperfectus est, qui consummatur vicibus mittendi ac remittendo" Nolo diutius hoc refellere; existimemus ita esse, desit aliquid lusui, non lusori; sic et in hoc, de quo disputamus, deest aliquid rei datae, cui par alia debetur, non animo, qui animum parem sibi nanctus est et, quantum in illo est, quod voluit, effecit.

He gave me a benefit; I received it no otherwise than he himself wished it received: now he has what he sought, and the one thing he sought; therefore I am grateful. After this there remains the use of me and some advantage from a grateful man; this is not the remaining part of an unfinished duty, but the addition to a finished one. Phidias makes a statue;

Beneficium mihi dedit; accepi non aliter, quam ipse accipi voluit: iam habet, quod petit, et quod unum petit, ergo gratus sum. Post hoc usus mei restat et aliquod ex homine grato commodum; hoc non imperfecti officii reliqua pars est, sed perfecti accessio. Facit Phidias statuam;

the fruit of the art is one thing, of the craft another: it is the art’s to have made what he willed, the craft’s to have made it with profit; Phidias finished his work, even if he did not sell it. The fruit of his work is threefold: one, of consciousness — this he reaps when the work is done; the second, of fame; the third, of usefulness, which favor or sale or some advantage will bring.

alius est fructus artis, alius artificii: artis est fecisse, quod voluit, artificii fecisse cum fructu; perfecit opus suum Phidias, etiam si non vendidit. Triplex illi fructus est operis sui: unus conscientiae; hunc absoluto opere percipit; alter famae; tertius utilitatis, quem allatura est aut gratia aut venditio aut aliqua commoditas.

So the first fruit of a benefit is that of consciousness; this he reaps who has carried his gift where he wished; the second and third are of fame, and of the things that can be rendered in turn. And so when a benefit has been kindly received, the giver has already got the gratitude, but not yet the recompense; I owe, therefore, what is outside the benefit, while the benefit itself I have discharged by receiving it well.

Sic bene ficii fructus primus ille est conscientiae; hunc percipit, qui, quo voluit, munus suum pertulit; secundus et tertius est et famae et eorum, quae praestari in vicem possunt. Itaque cum benigne acceptum est beneficium, qui dedit, gratiam quidem iam recepit, mercedem nondum; debeo itaque, quod extra beneficium est, ipsum quidem bene accipiendo persolvi.

“What then?” he says, “has he returned gratitude who has done nothing?” First, he has done something: with good will he offered good, and — what belongs to friendship — on equal terms. Then, a benefit is discharged one way, a loan another; there is no reason for you to expect that I should show you the payment: the thing is transacted between minds.

" Quid ergo? ", inquit, " rettulit gratiam, qui nihil fecit? " Primum fecit: bono animo bonum obtulit et, quod est amicitiae, ex aequo. Post deinde aliter beneficium, aliter creditum solvitur; non est, quod expectes, ut solutionem tibi ostendam; res inter animos geritur.

What I say will not seem hard, though at first it war against your opinion, if you will lend yourself to me and reflect that there are more things than words. There is a vast store of things without a name, which we mark not by their own appellations but by borrowed and lent ones. We speak of a foot — both our own and a couch’s and a sail’s and a verse’s; we call a dog both a hunting-dog and a sea-dog and a star; because we do not suffice to assign single names to single things, we borrow as often as there is need.

Quod dico, non videbitur durum, quamvis primo contra opinionem tuam pugnet, si te commodaveris mihi et cogitaveris plures esse res quam verba. Ingens copia est rerum sine nomine, quas non propriis appellationibus notamus, sed alienis commodatisque. Pedem et nostrum dicimus et lecti et veli et carminis, canem et venaticum et marinum et sidus; quia non sufficimus, ut singulis singula adsignemus, quotiens opus est, mutuamur.

Courage is the virtue that despises just dangers, or the knowledge of repelling, sustaining, and provoking dangers; yet we call both a gladiator a brave man, and a worthless slave whom rashness has driven into contempt of death.

Fortitudo est virtus pericula iusta contemnens aut scientia periculorum repellendorum, excipiendorum, provocandorum; dicimus tamen et gladiatorem fortem virum et servum nequam, quem in contemptum mortis temeritas impulit.

Thrift is the knowledge of avoiding superfluous expense, or the art of using one’s estate with moderation; yet we call most thrifty a man of petty and pinched spirit, though there is an infinite difference between measure and meanness. These are different in nature, but poverty of speech makes us call both this man and that thrifty, and makes both him called brave who with reason despises chance dangers, and him who without reason runs out into perils.

Parsimonia est scientia vitandi sumptus supervacuos aut ars re familiari moderate utendi; parcissimum tamen hominem vocamus pusilli animi et contracti, cum infinitum intersit inter modum et angustias. Haec alia sunt natura, sed efficit inopia sermonis, ut et hunc et illum parcum vocemus, ut et ille fortis dicatur cum ratione fortuita despiciens et hic sine ratione in pericula excurrens.

So a benefit is both the action, as we said, that does the good, and the very thing that is given through that action — like money, like a house, like the bordered robe; the name for both is one, but the force and the power far other.

Sic beneficium est et actio, ut diximus, benefica et ipsum, quod datur per illam actionem, ut pecunia, ut domus, ut praetexta; unum utrique nomen est, vis quidem ac potestas longe alia.

And so attend: now you understand that I say nothing your opinion shrinks from. To that benefit which the action completes, gratitude has been returned, if we receive it kindly; that other, which is contained in the thing, we have not yet repaid, but we shall wish to repay. To the will we have satisfied with will; the thing we owe to the thing. And so, although we say that he has returned gratitude who gladly receives a benefit, we nonetheless bid him also repay something like what he received.

Itaque attende, iam intellegis nihil me, quod opinio tua refugiat, dicere. Illi beneficio, quod actio perficit, relata gratia est, si illud benevole excipimus; illud alterum, quod re continetur, nondum reddidimus, sed volemus reddere. Voluntati voluntate satis fecimus; rei rem debemus. Itaque, quamvis rettulisse illum gratiam dicamus, qui beneficium libenter accipit, iubemus tamen et simile aliquid ei, quod accepit, reddere.

Some things we say recoil from common usage, then by another road return to it. We deny that the wise man receives an injury, yet he who strikes him with a fist will be condemned for assault; we deny that anything belongs to a fool, and yet we shall condemn for theft the man who has snatched something from a fool; we say all men are mad, yet we do not cure all with hellebore; to these very men we call mad we entrust both the vote and the giving of judgment.

A consuetudine quaedam, quae dicimus, abhorrent, deinde alia via ad consuetudinem redeunt. Negamus iniuriam accipere sapientem, tamen, qui illum pugno percusserit, iniuriarum damnabitur; negamus stulti quidquam esse, et tamen eum, qui rem aliquam stulto surripuit, furti condemnabimus; insanire omnes dicimus, nec omnes curamus elleboro; his ipsis, quos vocamus insanos, et suffragium et iuris dictionem committimus.

So we say that he who receives a benefit with good spirit has returned gratitude, yet none the less we leave him in debt, to return gratitude even when he has returned it. It is an exhortation, not a denial of the benefit, that we may not fear benefits, that we may not, pressed as by an unbearable load, fail in spirit. “Goods have been given me, and my good name defended, my shame removed, my breath preserved, and a liberty better than breath. And how shall I be able to return the gratitude? When will that day come on which I may show him my soul?”

Sic dicimus eum, qui beneficium bono animo accipit, gratiam rettulisse, nihilo minus illum in aere alieno relinquimus gratiam relaturum, etiam cum rettulit. Exhortatio est illa, non infitiatio beneficii, ne beneficia timeamus, ne ut intolerabili sarcina pressi deficiamus animo. " Bona mihi donata sunt et fama defensa, detractae sordes, spiritus servatus et libertas spiritu potior. Et quomodo referre gratiam potero? Quando ille veniet dies, quo illi animum meum ostendam?

This very day is the one on which he showed his! Take the benefit, embrace it, rejoice — not that you receive, but that you may repay and remain a debtor; you will not run the risk of so great a thing, that chance could make you ungrateful. I will set before you no difficulties, that you may not lose heart, that you may not fail at the prospect of toils and of long servitude; I do not put you off — let it be done with present means. You will never be grateful unless you are so at once.

" Hic ipse est, quo ille suum ostendit! Excipe beneficium, amplexare, gaude, non quod accipias, sed quod reddas debiturusque sis; non adibis tam magnae rei periculum, ut casus ingratum facere te possit. Nullas tibi proponam difficultates, ne despondeas animum, ne laborum ac longae servitutis expectatione deficias; non differo te, de praesentibus fiat. Numquam eris gratus, nisi statim es.

What, then, will you do? You need not take up arms — yet perhaps you will. You need not traverse the seas — yet perhaps you will set sail even with the winds threatening. Do you wish to repay a benefit? Receive it kindly; you have returned the gratitude — not that you should think you have discharged it, but that you may owe it more securely. BOOK III

Quid ergo facies? Non arma sumenda sunt: at fortasse erunt. Non maria emetienda: fortasse etiam ventis minantibus solves. Vis reddere beneficium? Benigne accipe; rettulisti gratiam, non ut solvisse te putes, sed ut securior debeas.

Not to return gratitude for benefits is base, and is held so by all, Aebutius Liberalis; therefore even the ungrateful complain of the ungrateful, while meanwhile this thing clings to all that displeases all, and so far do men go to the contrary that we have some as our bitterest enemies not only after benefits but on account of benefits.

Non referre beneficiis gratiam et est turpe et apud omnes habetur, Aebuti Liberalis; ideo de ingratis etiam ingrati queruntur, cum interim hoc omnibus haeret, quod omnibus displicet, adeoque in contrarium itur, ut quosdam habeamus infestissimos non post beneficia tantum sed propter beneficia.

That this happens to some through a crookedness of nature I would not deny, but to more because the interval of time steals away the memory; for what was fresh and strong in them grows stale when a space comes between. I know we have had a debate over these men, when you would call them not ungrateful but forgetful — as though that excused the ungrateful which makes him so, or as though, because this befalls a man, he were not ungrateful, when it befalls none but the ungrateful.

Hoc pravitate naturae accidere quibusdam non negaverim, pluribus, quia memoriam tempus interpositum subducit; nam quae recentia apud illos viguerunt, ea interiecto spatio obsolescunt. De quibus fuisse mihi tecum disputationem scio, cum tu illos non ingratos vocares sed oblitos, tamquam ea res ingratum excuset, quae facit, aut, quia hoc accidit alicui, non sit ingratus, cum hoc non accidat nisi ingrato.

There are many kinds of the ungrateful, as of thieves, as of murderers, whose fault is one, but in whose parts there is great variety. He is ungrateful who denies he has received the benefit he received; ungrateful who dissembles it; ungrateful who does not repay it; most ungrateful of all who has forgotten it.

Multa sunt genera ingratorum, ut furum, ut homicidarum, quorum una culpa est, ceterum in partibus varietas magna. Ingratus est, qui beneficium accepisse se negat, quod accepit; ingratus est, qui dissimulat; ingratus, qui non reddit, ingratissimus omnium, qui oblitus est.

For the others, though they do not pay, yet owe, and there remains in them at least a trace of the services shut up within an evil conscience; sometimes from some cause they can be turned to returning gratitude — if shame has reminded them, if a sudden longing for an honorable deed, such as is wont to rise for a time even in evil breasts, if an easy occasion has invited them; this man can never become grateful, from whom the whole benefit has slipped away. And which do you call the worse — the man in whom the gratitude for the benefit has perished, or the man in whom the very memory of it has?

Illi enim si non solvunt, tamen debent, et extat apud illos vestigium certe meritorum intra malam conscientiam inclusorum; aliquando ad referendam gratiam converti ex aliqua causa possunt, si illos pudor admonuerit, si subita honestae rei cupiditas, qualis solet ad tempus etiam in malis pectoribus exsurgere, si invitaverit facilis occasio; hic numquam fieri gratus potest, cui beneficium totum elapsum est. Et utrum tu peiorem vocas, apud quem gratia beneficii intercidit, an apud quem etiam memoria?

Eyes are diseased that shrink from the light, blind that do not see; and not to love one’s parents is impiety, not to recognize them, madness!

Vitiosi oculi sunt, qui lucem reformidant, caeci, qui non vident; et parentes suos non amare impietas est, non adgnoscere insania!

Who is so ungrateful as the man who has so laid aside and cast off what ought to have been set in the foremost part of the soul, and to be ever before him, that he has turned it into ignorance? It is plain he did not often think of repaying, on whom forgetfulness has crept.

Quis tam ingratus est, quam qui, quod in prima parte animi positum esse debuit et semper occurrere, ita seposuit et abiecit, ut in ignorantiam verteret? Apparet illum non saepe de reddendo cogitasse, cui obrepsit oblivio.

In short, to return gratitude there is need of virtue, and of time, and of means, and of fortune’s favoring breath; he who remembers is grateful enough, without expense. This thing, which demands no effort, no wealth, no good luck, he who does not render has no shelter to hide in; for he never wished to be grateful who flung the benefit so far that he set it beyond his own sight.

Denique ad reddendam gratiam et virtute opus est et tempore et facultate et adspirante fortuna; qui meminit, sat sine impendio gratus est. Hoc, quod non operam exigit, non opes, non felicitatem, qui non praestat, nullum habet, quo lateat, patrocinium; numquam enim voluit gratus esse, qui beneficium tam longe proiecit, ut extra conspectum suum poneret.

As the things that are in use and suffer the hand and touch daily never come into the danger of mold, while those that are not called back to the eyes, but lie outside our dealings as superfluous, gather grime by their very age, so whatever frequent thought exercises and renews is never stolen from the memory, which loses nothing but what it has not often looked back on.

Quemadmodum, quae in usu sunt et manum cotidie tactumque patiuntur, numquam periculum situs adeunt, illa, quae ad oculos non revocantur, sed extra conversationem ut supervacua iacuerunt, sordes ipsa colligunt vetustate, ita, quidquid frequens cogitatio exercet ac renovat, memoriae numquam subducitur, quae nihil perdit, nisi ad quod non saepe respexit.

Besides this cause there are others too that sometimes tear from us the greatest services. First of all and most powerful: that, always taken up with new desires, we look not at what we have but at what we seek; to men intent on what is craved, whatever is at home is cheap.

Praeter hanc causam aliae quoque sunt, quae nobis merita non numquam maxima evellant. Prima omnium ac potentissima, quod novis semper cupiditatibus occupati non, quid habeamus, sed quid petamus, spectamus1; in id, quod adpetitur, intentis, quidquid est domi, vile est.

And it follows that, when the craving for new things has made light what you received, the author of it too is held of no account. We loved someone, and looked up to him, and professed that our standing was founded by him, so long as the things we had attained pleased us; then the admiration of others breaks into the mind, and our impulse is made toward them, as is the way of mortals to crave from great things greater. At once whatever before we called a benefit falls away, and we look not at the things that set us above others, but only at those that the fortune of the men ahead displays.

Sequitur autem, ut, ubi quod acceperis leve novorum cupiditas fecit, auctor quoque eorum non sit in pretio. Amavimus aliquem et suspeximus et fundatum ab illo statum nostrum professi sumus, quamdiu nobis placebant ea, quae consecuti sumus; deinde irrumpit animum aliorum admiratio, et ad ea impetus factus est, uti mortalibus mos est ex magnis maiora cupiendi. Protinus excidit, quidquid ante apud nos beneficium vocabatur, nec ea intuemur, quae nos aliis praeposuere, sed ea sola, quae fortuna praecedentium ostentat.

But no one can both envy and give thanks, because to envy belongs to the complaining and the sorrowful, to give thanks to the rejoicing.

Non potest autem quisquam et invidere et gratias agere, quia invidere querentis et maesti est, gratias agere gaudentis.

Then, because none of us knows any time but the one just now passing, few turn their mind back to things past; so it comes that teachers and their benefits fall away, because we have left all our boyhood behind; so it comes that what was bestowed on our youth perishes, because youth itself is never handled again. No one sets down what has been as in the past, but as in the lost, and so the memory of those who press on toward the future is fleeting.

Deinde quia nemo nostrum novit nisi id tempus, quod cum maxime transit, ad praeterita rari animum retorquent; sic fit, ut praeceptores eorumque beneficia intercidant, quia totam pueritiam reliquimus; sic fit, ut in adulescentiam nostram collata pereant, quia ipsa numquam retractatur. Nemo, quod fuit, tamquam in praeterito sed tamquam in perdito ponit, ideoque caduca memoria est futuro imminentium.

Here we must render testimony to Epicurus, who continually complains that we are ungrateful toward the past, that whatever goods we receive we do not bring back nor number among our pleasures, though no pleasure is surer than that which can no longer be taken away.

Hoc loco reddendum est Epicuro testimonium, qui adsidue queritur, quod adversus praeterita simus ingrati, quod, quaecumque percipimus bona, non reducamus nec inter voluptates numeremus, cum certior nulla sit voluptas, quam quae iam eripi non potest.

Present goods are not yet wholly on solid ground; some chance may fall upon them; future goods hang in doubt and are uncertain; what has passed is laid away among things safe. How can anyone be grateful toward benefits who leaps over his whole life, wholly given to the present and the future? Memory makes a man grateful; he gives least to memory who gives most to hope.

Praesentia bona nondum tota in solido sunt, potest illa casus aliquis incidere; futura pendent et incerta sunt; quod praeteriit, inter tuta sepositum est. Quomodo gratus esse quisquam adversus beneficia potest, qui omnem vitam suam transilit praesentium totus ac futurorum? Memoria gratum facit; memoriae minimum tribuit, quisquis spei plurimum.

As, my Liberalis, some things once grasped stay with us, while for some it is not enough to have learned them, that you may know them (for the knowledge of these falls away unless it is kept up) — I mean geometry, and the course of the heavenly bodies, and whatever else is slippery through its subtlety — so some benefits their greatness will not suffer to slip away, while some, smaller but very many in number and scattered in time, flow off, because, as I said, we do not handle them again and again, nor gladly recall what we owe to each.

Quemadmodum, mi Liberalis, quaedam res semel perceptae haerent, quaedam, ut scias, non est satis didicisse (intercidit enim eorum scientia, nisi continuetur ), geometriam dico et sublimium cursum et si qua alia propter suptilitatem lubrica sunt, ita beneficia quaedam magnitudo non patitur excidere, quaedam minora sed numero plurima et temporibus diversa effluunt, quia, ut dixi, non subinde illa tractamus nec libenter, quid cuique debeamus, recognoscimus.

Hear the voices of suitors. Every one of them has said that the memory will live forever in his soul; every one has professed himself devoted and bound, and any humbler word besides by which he might pledge himself, he has found. After a little time these same men avoid their former words as base and too servile; then they come to the point to which, as I judge, every worst and most ungrateful man comes — to forget. So ungrateful, indeed, is the man who has forgotten, that even he is ungrateful to whose mind a benefit merely happens to occur.

Audi voces petentium. Nemo non victuram semper in animo suo memoriam dixit, nemo non deditum se et devotum professus est, et si quod aliud humilius verbum, quo se oppigneraret, invenit. Post exiguum tempus idem illi verba priora quasi sordida et parum libera evitant; perveniunt deinde eo, quo, ut ego existimo, pessimus quisque atque ingratissimus pervenit, ut obliviscantur. Adeo enim ingratus est, qui oblitus est, ut ingratus sit, cui beneficium in mentem venit.

Whether a vice so hateful ought to go unpunished is asked, and whether this law, which is practiced in the schools, should be set up in the state as well — the law that grants an action against the ungrateful man; a law that seems fair to everyone. "Why not? Since even cities reproach cities with the benefits they have rendered, and exact from later generations what was bestowed on their forebears."

Hoc tam invisum vitium an impunitum esse debeat, quaeritur, et an haec lex, quae in scholis exercetur, etiam in civitate ponenda sit, qua ingrati datur actio; quae videtur aequa omnibus. " Quidni? cum urbes quoque urbibus, quae praestitere, exprobrent et in maiores collata a posteris exigant."

Our ancestors — great men, to be sure — demanded back by suit only what had been seized by enemies; benefits they gave with a great heart, and lost with a great heart. Except among the Macedonian people, no action against the ungrateful man was granted anywhere. And this is strong proof that none should have been granted: that against every other wrongdoing we have reached agreement — for murder, poisoning, parricide, the violation of sacred things, the penalty differs from place to place, but everywhere there is some penalty — yet this most frequent of crimes is nowhere punished, everywhere condemned. We did not acquit it; but since the appraisal of so uncertain a matter would be difficult, we condemned it only to hatred, and left it among the things we send up to the gods to judge.

Nostri maiores, maximi scilicet viri, ab hostibus tantum res repetierunt, beneficia magno animo dabant, magno perdebant; excepta Macedonum gente non est in ulla data adversus ingratum actio. Magnumque hoc argumentum est dandam non fuisse, quia adversus maleficium omne consensimus, et homicidii, veneficii, parricidii, violatarum religionum aliubi atque aliubi diversa poena est, sed ubique aliqua, hoc frequentissimum crimen nusquam punitur, ubique improbatur. Neque absolvimus illud, sed eum difficilis esset incertae rei aestimatio, tantum odio damnavimus et inter ea reliquimus, quae ad iudices deos mittimus.

But many reasons occur to me why this offense should not fall under a law. First of all, the best part of a benefit is lost if an action is granted for it, as for a fixed sum of money, or under a contract of hire and lease. For the finest thing in a benefit is just this: that we gave it though we stood even to lose it, that we left the whole matter to the recipient’s discretion. If I serve notice, if I summon him before a judge, it begins to be not a benefit but a loan.

Rationes autem multae mihi occurrunt, propter quas crimen hoc in legem cadere non debeat. Primum omnium pars optima beneficii periit, si actio sicut certae pecuniae aut ex conducto et locato datur. Hoc enim in illo speciosissimum est, quod dedimus vel perdituri, quod totum permisimus accipientium arbitrio; si appello, si ad iudicem voco, incipit non beneficium esse, sed creditum.

Next, although to return gratitude is the most honorable of acts, it ceases to be honorable once it is compulsory; for no one will praise a grateful man any more than the man who returned a deposit, or paid what he owed without going before a judge.

Deinde cum res honestissima sit referre gratiam, desinit esse honesta, si necessaria est; non magis enim laudabit quisquam gratum hominem, quam eum, qui depositum reddidit aut, quod debebat, citra iudicem solvit.

So we corrupt two things than which nothing in human life is more beautiful: the grateful man and the benefit. For what is splendid in the one, if he does not give a benefit but lends it, or in the other, who repays not because he wishes but because he must? It is no glory to be grateful, unless it was safe to have been ungrateful.

Ita duas res, quibus in vita humana nihil pulchrius est, corrumpimus, gratum hominem et beneficium; quid enim aut in hoc magnificum est, si beneficium non dat, sed commodat, aut in illo, qui reddit, non quia vult, sed quia necesse est? Non est gloriosa res gratum esse, nisi tutum est ingratum fuisse.

Add now that for this one law all the courts would scarcely suffice. Who will there be that does not bring suit? Who, against whom none is brought? Everyone magnifies what is his own; everyone inflates even the smallest things he has conferred on others.

Adice nunc, quod huic uni legi omnia fora vix sufficient. Quis erit, qui non agat? Quis, cum quo non agatur? Omnes sua extollunt, omnes etiam minima, quae in alios contulere, dilatant.

Besides, whatever matters come up for examination can be defined, and do not give the judge unlimited license; and so a good case seems to stand on better footing if it goes to a judge than to an arbiter, because a formula confines the judge and sets fixed limits he may not exceed, whereas the arbiter’s conscience, free and bound by no fetters, can subtract something and add something, and steer its verdict not as law or justice advises but as humanity or pity has prompted. An action against the ungrateful would not have bound the judge but set him on a throne utterly free. For what a benefit is, is not settled; and then, how great it is —

Praeterea, quaecumque in cognitionem cadunt, comprendi possunt et non dare infinitam licentiam iudici; ideo melior videtur condicio causae bonae, si ad iudicem quam si ad arbitrum mittitur, quia illum formula includit et certos, quos non excedat, terminos ponit, huius libera et nullis adstricta vinculis religio et detrahere aliquid potest et adicere et sententiam suam, non prout lex aut iustitia suadet, sed prout humanitas aut misericordia impulit, regere. Ingrati actio non erat iudicem adligatura sed regno liberrimo positura. Quid sit enim beneficium, non constat, deinde, quantum sit;

that depends on how generously the judge interprets it. What an ungrateful man is, no law shows; often the man who has repaid what he received is ungrateful, and the man who has not repaid is grateful.

refert, quam benigne illud interpretetur iudex. Quid sit ingratus, nulla lex monstrat; saepe et qui reddidit, quod accepit, ingratus est, et qui non reddidit, gratus.

On some matters even an unpracticed judge can cast his ballot — where it must be pronounced that a thing was done or not done, where the dispute is removed by producing the bonds, where reason states the law between the disputants. But where the mind’s intention must be guessed at, where a thing of which wisdom alone is the judge falls into dispute, no judge for these things can be drawn from the crowd of the empaneled — a man whom his property rating and an equestrian’s inheritance have placed on the roll.

De quibusdam et imperitus iudex demittere tabellam potest, ubi fecisse aut non fecisse pronuntiandum est, ubi prolatis cautionibus controversia tollitur, ubi inter disputantes ratio ius dicit. Ubi vero animi coniectura capienda est, ubi id, de quo sola sapientia decernit, in controversiam incidit, non potest sumi ad haec iudex ex turba selectorum, quem census in album et equestris hereditas misit.

And so it is not that this matter seemed too unfit to be brought before a judge, but that no judge fit enough for the matter was found — which will not surprise you, if you weigh what difficulty anyone would have had who came out against such a defendant.

Itaque non haec parum idonea res visa est, quae deduceretur ad iudicem, sed nemo huic rei satis idoneus iudex inventus est; quod non admiraberis, si excusseris, quid habiturus fuerit difficultatis, quisquis in eiusmodi reum exisset.

One man has given a large sum — but he was rich, but he would not feel the outlay; another has given, but at the cost of his whole estate. The sum is the same; the benefit is not the same. Add this too: this man paid out money for a debtor adjudged to bondage, but he brought it from his own house; that man gave the same amount, but took it on loan, or begged it, and let himself be put under obligation by an enormous favor. Do you reckon in the same place the man who lavished a benefit out of his abundance, and the man who took on a debt in order to give?

Donavit aliquis magnam pecuniam, sed dives, sed non sensurus impendium; donavit alius, sed toto patrimonio cessurus. Summa eadem est, beneficium idem non est. Etiamnunc adice: hic pecuniam pro addicto dependit, sed cum illam domo protulisset; ille dedit eandem, sed mutuam sumpsit aut rogavit et se obligari ingenti merito passus est. Eodem existimas loco esse illum, qui beneficium ex facili largitus est, et hunc, qui accepit, ut daret?

Some things are made great by their timing, not their size. A benefit is an estate given away, whose fertility could ease the grain supply; a benefit is a single loaf in a famine. A benefit is to give away regions through which great navigable rivers run; a benefit is to point out a spring to men parched with thirst and barely drawing breath through dry throats. Who will compare these with one another? Who will weigh them? The verdict is hard that asks not the thing but the force of the thing. Though the gifts be the same, given otherwise they do not weigh the same.

Tempore quaedam magna fiunt, non summa. Beneficium est donata possessio, cuius fertilitas laxare possit annonam, beneficium est unus in fame panis; beneficium est donare regiones, per quas magna flumina et navigabilia decurrant, beneficium est arentibus siti et vix spiritum per siccas fauces ducentibus monstrare fontem. Quis inter se ista comparabit? Quis expendet? Difficilis est sententia, quae non rem, sed vim rei quaerit; eadem licet sint, aliter data non idem pendent.

This man gave me a benefit — but not gladly, but he complained of having given it, but he looked at me more haughtily than was his habit, but he gave it so slowly that he would have done me a greater service by a quick refusal. How will a judge enter upon the appraisal of these things, when a word, a hesitation, a look can destroy the grace of the service?

Dedit hic mihi beneficium, sed non libenter, sed dedisse se questus est, sed superbius me, quam solebat, adspexit, sed tam tarde dedit, ut plus praestaturus fuerit, si cito negasset. Horum quomodo iudex inibit aestimationem, cum sermo et dubitatio et vultus meriti gratiam destruant?

What of the fact that some things are called benefits because they are too much craved, while some are not of this common stamp but greater, even if they show less?

Quid, quod quaedam beneficia vocantur, quia nimis concupiscuntur, quaedam non sunt ex hac vulgari nota sed maiora, etiam si minus apparent?

You call it a benefit to have given citizenship in a powerful people, to have brought a man into the fourteen rows, to have defended a man on a capital charge. What of having counseled what was useful? Of having held a man back from rushing into crime? Of having struck the sword from one bent on dying? Of having brought back to a will to live, by effective remedies, a man in mourning and eager to follow those he had lost? Of having sat by the sick, and, when his health and very life hung on the moment, seized the fitting times for food, and revived his failing veins with wine, and brought a physician to the dying?

Beneficium vocas dedisse potentis populi civitatem, in quattuordecim deduxisse et defendisse capitis reum. Quid utilia suasisse? Quid retinuisse, ne in scelus rueret? Quid gladium excussisse morituro? Quid efficacibus remediis lugentem et, quos desiderabat. volentem sequi ad vitae consilium reduxisse? Quid adsedisse aegro et, cum valetudo eius ac salus momentis constaret, excepisse idonea cibo tempora et cadentes venas vino refecisse et medicum adduxisse morienti?

Who will appraise these things? Who will order benefits to be weighed against unlike benefits? "I gave you a house." But I foretold that yours was crashing down upon you. "I gave you an estate." But I gave a plank to a drowning man. "I fought for you and took wounds." But I gave you your life by silence. When a benefit is given in one way and repaid in another, it is hard to make them equal.

Haec quis aestimabit? Quis dissimilibus beneficiis iubebit beneficia pensari? " Donavi tibi domum." Sed ego tuam supra te ruere praedixi. " Dedi tibi patrimonium." Sed ego naufrago tabulam. "Pugnavi pro te et vulnera excepi." At ego vitam tibi silentio dedi. Cum aliter beneficium detur, aliter reddatur, paria facere difficile est.

Besides, no day is named for repaying a benefit, as it is for money lent; and so the man who has not yet repaid can still repay. For tell me, within what span of time is the ungrateful man to be caught out?

Dies praeterea beneficio reddendo non dicitur, sicut pecuniae creditae; itaque potest, qui nondum reddidit, reddere. Dic enim, intra quod tempus deprendatur ingratus.

The greatest benefits have no proof; often they lie hidden within the silent knowledge of two men. Are we to bring it to this — that we give no benefits without a witness?

Maxima beneficia probationem non habent, saepe intra tacitam duorum conscientiam latent; an hoc inducimus, ut non demus beneficia sine teste?

And then what penalty do we set for the ungrateful? One penalty for all, though the cases are unequal? An unequal one, larger or smaller in proportion to each benefit? Come then, the assessment will keep within money. But what of the fact that some benefits are life itself, and some greater than life? What penalty is pronounced for these? One smaller than the benefit? That is unjust. One equal to it, and capital? What is more inhuman than that benefits should have bloody endings?

Quam deinde poenam ingratis constituimus? Unam omnibus, cum disparia sint? Inaequalem et pro cuiusque beneficio maiorem, aut minorem? Age, intra pecuniam versabitur taxatio. Quid, quod quaedam vitae beneficia sunt et maiora vita? His quae pronuntiantur poena? Minor beneficio? Iniqua est. Par et capitalis? Quid inhumanius quam cruentos esse beneficiorum exitus?

"Certain privileges," he says, "have been granted to parents; just as their case has been given special standing, so the case of other benefits ought to be reckoned too." We made the standing of parents sacred because it was expedient that children should be raised; men had to be drawn on to this labor who would be entering upon an uncertain fortune. To them it could not be said what is said to those who give benefits: "Choose whom you give to; blame only yourself if you are deceived; help the deserving." In the raising of children nothing is left to the judgment of those who raise them; the whole thing is a matter of hope. And so, to make them approach the gamble with a steadier mind, some power had to be granted them.

"Quaedam," inquit, " privilegia parentibus data sunt; quomodo horum extra ordinem habita ratio est, sic aliorum quoque beneficorum haberi debet." Parentium condicionem sacravimus, quia expediebat liberos tolli; sollicitandi ad hunc laborem erant incertam adituri fortunam. Non poterat illis dici, quod beneficia dantibus dicitur: " Cui des, elige; ipse tecum, si deceptus es, querere; dignum adiuva." In liberis tollendis nihil iudicio tollentium licet, tota res voti est. Itaque, ut aequiore animo adirent aleam, danda aliqua illis potestas fuit.

Next, the case of parents is different: they give the benefits they have already given none the less, and will go on giving them, and there is no danger of their lying about having given. In other cases it must be asked not only whether men have received but whether they have given; the services of parents are admitted on all hands; and because it is useful for the young to be governed, we set over them, as it were, household magistrates, under whose guardianship they might be kept in check.

Deinde alia condicio parentium est, qui beneficia, quibus dederunt, dant nihilo minus daturique sunt, nec est periculum, ne dedisse ipsos mentiantur. In ceteris quaeri debet, non tantum an receperint, sed an dederint, horum in confesso merita sunt, et, quia utile est iuventuti regi, imposuimus illi quasi domesticos magistratus, sub quorum custodia contineretur.

Next, the benefit of all parents was one and the same, and so could be appraised once for all; other benefits are diverse, unlike, separated from one another by infinite intervals — and so they could fall under no single rule, since it was fairer to leave them all alone than to level them all.

Deinde omnium parentium unum erat beneficium, itaque aestimari semel potuit; alia diversa sunt, dissimilia, infinitis inter se intervallis distantia; itaque sub nullam regulam cadere potuerunt, cum aequius esset omnia relinqui quam omnia aequari.

Some things cost the givers dear; some are great to the receivers but cost the bestowers nothing. Some are given to friends, some to strangers; though the same thing be given, it is more if it is given to one whom you begin to know only through your benefit. This man bestows aid, that man honors, that other comfort.

Quaedam magno dantibus constant, quaedam accipientibus magna sunt, sed gratuita tribuentibus. Quaedam amicis data sunt, quaedam ignotis; plus est, quamvis idem detur, si ei datur, quem nosse a beneficio tuo incipis. Hic auxilia tribuit, ille ornamenta, ille solacia.

You will find a man who thinks nothing more pleasant, nothing greater, than to have something on which disaster may come to rest; you will find another who would rather have his standing looked to than his safety; there is one who judges that he owes more to the man through whom he is safer than to the man through whom he is more honored. Accordingly these things will be greater or smaller, as the judge happens to be inclined in mind this way or that.

Invenies, qui nihil putet esse iucundius, nihil maius quam habere, in quo calamitas adquiescat; invenies rursus, qui dignitati suae, quam securitati consuli malit; est, qui plus ei debere se iudicet, per quem tutior est, quam ei, per quem honestior. Proinde ista maiora aut minora erunt, prout fuerit iudex aut huc aut illo inclinatus animo.

Besides, I choose my creditor myself, but a benefit I often receive from one from whom I do not wish it, and sometimes I am put under obligation without knowing it. What will you do? Will you call ungrateful the man on whom a benefit was forced unawares, one which, had he known, he would not have accepted? Will you not call him ungrateful who, however he received it, did not repay it?

Praeterea creditorem mihi ipse eligo, beneficium saepe ab eo accipio, a quo nolo, et aliquando ignorans obligor. Quid facies? Ingratum vocabis eum, cui beneficium inscio et, si scisset, non accepturo impositum est? Non vocabis eum, qui utcumque acceptum non reddidit?

Someone gave me a benefit, but the same man later did me a wrong. Am I bound by the one gift to endure all his wrongs? Or will it be just as if I had returned the favor, because he himself canceled his benefit by the wrong that followed? And then how will you appraise whether what he received is more, or that by which he was injured? The day will fail me if I try to pursue every difficulty.

Aliquis dedit mihi beneficium, sed idem postea fecit iniuriam. Utrum uno munere ad patientiam iniuriarum omnium adstringor, an proinde erit, ac si gratiam rettulerim, quia beneficium suum ipse insequenti iniuria rescidit? Quomodo deinde aestimabis, utrum plus sit, quod accepit, an quo laesus est? Dies me deficiet omnes difficultates persequi temptantem.

"We make men slower to give benefits," he says, "by not avenging those given, nor visiting their deniers with a penalty." But let this too occur to you on the other side: men will be far slower to accept benefits, if they must enter upon the risk of pleading a case, and hold their innocence in a more anxious posture.

" Tardiores," inquit, " ad beneficia danda facimus non vindicando data nec infitiatores eorum adficiendo poena." Sed illud quoque tibi e contrario occurrat multo tardiores futuros ad accipienda beneficia, si periculum causae dicundae aditum erunt et innocentiam sollicitiore habituri loco.

Next, by this very thing we ourselves shall be slower to give too; for no one gives gladly to the unwilling, whereas whoever is drawn to do good by his own goodness and by the very beauty of the act will give the more gladly to men who will owe nothing except what they wish to. For the glory of a service is diminished when careful security has been taken for it.

Deinde erimus per hoc ipsi quoque ad danda tardiores; nemo enim libenter dat invitis, sed quicumque ad bene faciendum bonitate invitatus est et ipsa pulchritudine rei, etiam libentius dabit nihil debituris nisi quod volent. Minuitur enim gloria eius officii, cui diligenter cautum est.

Next, benefits will be fewer, but truer; and what harm is there in checking the rashness of benefits? For this is the very aim of those who set no law for it — that we should give more circumspectly, and choose more circumspectly those on whom our services are conferred. Again and again, consider to whom you give:

Deinde pauciora erunt beneficia, sed veriora; quid autem mali est inhiberi beneficiorum temeritatem? Hoc enim ipsum secuti sunt, qui nullam legem huic constituerunt, ut circumspectius donaremus, circumspectius eligeremus eos, in quos merita conferuntur. Etiam atque etiam, cui des, considera:

there will be no action, no recovery. You are wrong if you think a judge will come to your aid; no law will restore you to your former state — look only to the recipient’s good faith. In this way benefits keep their authority and are magnificent; you defile them if you make them matter for lawsuits.

nulla actio erit, nulla repetitio. Erras, si existimas succursurum tibi iudicem; nulla lex te in integrum restituet, solam accipientis fidem specta. Hoc modo beneficia auctoritatem suam tenent et magnifica sunt; pollues illa, si materiam litium feceris.

There is a most just utterance, one that wears the law of nations on its face: "Pay what you owe." In a benefit this is the basest of all. "Pay back!" What? Will he pay back the life he owes? His standing?

Aequissima vox est et ius gentium prae se ferens: " Redde, quod debes "; haec turpissima est in beneficio. " Redde!’" Quid? Reddet vitam, quam debet? Dignitatem?

His safety? His health? The greatest things of all cannot be paid back. "But in their place," he says, "let him pay something of equal worth." This is what I was saying — that the dignity of so great a thing will perish if we make a benefit into merchandise. The mind must not be provoked to greed, to complaints, to discord; of its own accord it is carried into these. As far as we can, let us resist, and cut away the occasions it seeks.

Securitatem? Sanitatem? Reddi maxima quaeque non possunt. " At pro iis," inquit, " aliquid, quod tanti sit." Hoc est, quod dicebam, interituram tantae rei dignitatem, si beneficium mercem facimus. Non est irritandus animus ad avaritiam, ad querellas, ad discordiam; sua sponte in ista fertur. Quantum possumus, resistamus et quaerenti occasiones amputemus.

Would indeed that we could persuade men to accept repayment of loans only from the willing! Would that no stipulation bound buyer to seller, that bargains and agreements were not guarded by stamped seals, but that good faith rather kept them safe, and a mind that reveres what is fair!

Utinam quidem persuadere possemus, ut pecunias creditas tantum a volentibus acciperent! Utinam nulla stipulatio emptorem venditori obligaret nec pacta commentaque impressis signis custodirentur, fides potius illa servaret et aecum colens animus!

But they have preferred the necessary to the best, and would rather compel good faith than wait for it. Witnesses are brought in by both sides. One man, through his ledgers, makes many men his debtors by interposing brokers; another is not content with a formal questioning unless he has held the defendant by his own hand.

Sed necessaria optimis praetulerunt et cogere fidem quam expectare malunt. Adhibentur ab utraque parte testes. Ille per tabulas plurium nomina interpositis parariis facit; ille non est interrogatione contentus, nisi reum manu sua tenuit.

O shameful confession of the human race’s fraud and public worthlessness! Our seal-rings are trusted more than our souls. To what end have these distinguished men been brought in? To what end do they press their seals? Surely so that the man may not deny receiving what he received! Do you think these incorruptible men, the champions of truth? Yet to these very men money will not be entrusted on the spot on any other terms. So was it not more honorable to have one’s trust betrayed by a few, than for everyone to be feared as treacherous?

O turpem humani generis fraudis ac nequitiae publicae confessionem! Anulis nostris plus quam animis creditur. In quid isti ornati viri adhibiti sunt? In quid imprimunt signa? Nempe ne ille neget accepisse se, quod accepit! Hos incorruptos viros et vindices veritatis existimas? At his ipsis non aliter statim pecuniae committentur. Ita non honestius erat a quibusdam fidem falli, quam ab omnibus perfidiam timeri?

This one thing is wanting to our greed — that we should give no benefits without a surety! It belongs to a generous and magnificent mind to help, to do good; he who gives benefits imitates the gods, he who demands them back, the moneylenders. Why, while we avenge the givers, do we drive them down into that most sordid crowd?

Hoc unum deest avaritiae, ut beneficia sine sponsore non demus! Generosi animi est et magnifici iuvare, prodesse; qui dat beneficia, deos imitatur, qui repetit, feneratores. Quid illos, dum vindicamus, in turbam sordidissimam redigimus?

"More men will be ungrateful," he says, "if no action is granted against the ungrateful." On the contrary, fewer — because benefits will be given with greater discrimination. Next, it is not expedient that it should become known to all how many are ungrateful; for the multitude of offenders will take away the shame of the thing, and a reproach shared by all will cease to count as a disgrace.

" Plures," inquit, " ingrati erunt, si nulla adversus ingratum datur actio." Immo pauciores, quia maiore dilectu dabuntur beneficia. Deinde non expedit notum omnibus fieri, quam multi ingrati sint; pudorem enim rei tollet multitudo peccantium, et desinet esse probri loco commune maledictum.

Does any woman now blush at a divorce, since certain illustrious and noble women reckon their years not by the number of the consuls but of their husbands, and leave home for the sake of marriage, and marry for the sake of divorce? This was feared just so long as it was rare; because no years now pass without a divorce, what they kept hearing of, they learned to do.

Numquid iam ulla repudio erubescit, postquam illustres quaedam ac nobiles feminae non consulum numero sed maritorum annos suos computant et exeunt matrimonii causa, nubunt repudii? Tamdiu istuc timebatur, quamdiu rarum erat; quia nulla sine divortio acta sunt, quod saepe audiebant, facere didicerunt.

Is there now any shame in adultery, since it has come to this — that no woman keeps a husband except to provoke an adulterer? Chastity is now proof of ugliness. What woman will you find so wretched, so mean, that one pair of adulterers is enough for her, unless she has parceled out her hours among them one by one? And the day does not suffice for them all, unless she has been carried in one man’s litter and lodged with another. She is a tasteless old fool who does not know that to have a single adulterer is now called marriage.

Numquid iam ullus adulterii pudor est, postquam eo ventum est, ut nulla virum habeat, nisi ut adulterum irritet? Argumentum est deformitatis pudicitia. Quam invenies tam miseram, tam sordidam, ut illi satis sit unum adulterorum par, nisi singulis divisit horas? Et non sufficit dies omnibus, nisi apud alium gestata est, apud alium mansit. Infrunita et antiqua est, quae nesciat matrimonium vocari unum adulterium.

Just as the shame of these offenses has by now faded, once the thing has roamed more widely abroad, so you will make the ungrateful more numerous and more emboldened, if they begin to count themselves.

Quemadmodum horum delictorum iam evanuit pudor, postquam res latius evagata est, ita ingratos plures efficies et auctiores, si numerare se coeperint.

"What then? Shall the ungrateful man go unpunished?" What then — shall the impious man go unpunished? The malicious? The greedy? The intemperate? The cruel? Do you believe that things which are hated go unpunished, or do you reckon any penalty heavier than public hatred?

"Quid ergo? impunitus erit ingratus?" Quid ergo, impunitus erit impius? Quid malignus? Quid avarus? Quid impotens? Quid crudelis? Impunita tu credis esse, quae invisa sunt, aut ullum supplicium gravius existimas publico odio?

His penalty is that he dares accept a benefit from no one, dares give one to no one, that he is marked out by everyone’s eyes, or judges himself to be marked out, that he has lost the understanding of the best and sweetest of things. Do you call unhappy the man who has lost his sight, whose ears disease has stopped up, and not call wretched the man who has lost the sense of benefits?

Poena est, quod non audet ab ullo beneficium accipere, quod non audet ulli dare, quod omnium designatur oculis aut designari se iudicat, quod intellectum rei optimae ac dulcissimae amisit. An tu infelicem vocas, qui caruit acie, cuius aures morbus obstruxit, non vocas miserum eum, qui sensum beneficiorum amisit?

He fears the gods, the witnesses of all the ungrateful; the consciousness of a benefit waylaid burns and torments him. In short, this penalty is itself great enough — that he does not reap the fruit of what is, as I said, the most pleasant of things. But the man who is glad to have received enjoys an equal and unbroken pleasure, and rejoices in looking at the mind of him from whom he received, not at the thing. A benefit delights the grateful man always, the ungrateful man once.

Testes ingratorum omnium deos metuit, urit illum et angit intercepti beneficii conscientia. Denique satis haec ipsa poena magna est, quod rei, ut dicebam, iucundissimae fructum non percipit. At quem iuvat accepisse, aequali perpetuaque voluptate fruitur et animum eius, a quo accepit, non rem intuens gaudet. Gratum hominem semper beneficium delectat, ingratum semel.

And the lives of the two can be compared: the one gloomy and anxious, as the defaulter and the cheat are wont to be, in whose eyes there is no honor for his parents, to whom he owes it, none for the man who reared him, none for his teachers; the other glad, cheerful, awaiting the chance to return the favor and from this very feeling reaping a great joy, not asking how he may default, but how he may answer more fully and more richly — and not only parents and friends, but humbler persons too. For even if he has received a benefit from his own slave, he weighs not from whom, but what, he received.

Comparari autem potest utriusque vita, cum alter tristis sit et sollicitus, qualis esse infitiator ac fraudulentus solet, apud quem non parentium, qui debet, honor est, non educatoris, non praeceptorum, alter laetus, hilaris, occasionem referendae gratiae expectans et ex hoc ipso adfectu gaudium grande percipiens nec quaerens, quomodo decoquat, sed quemadmodum plenius uberiusque respondeat non solum parentibus et amicis, sed humilioribus quoque personis? Nam etiam si a servo suo beneficium accepit, aestimat, non a quo, sed quid acceperit.

Yet some ask — as Hecaton does — whether a slave can give a benefit to his master. For there are those who draw this distinction: that some things are benefits, some duties, some services; that a benefit is what an outsider gives (an outsider is one who could have left off without reproach); that a duty is the part of a son, of a wife, of those persons whom kinship rouses and bids bring aid; that a service is the part of a slave, whom his condition has placed in such a station that nothing he renders can be charged to the credit of his superior.

Quamquam quaeritur a quibusdam, sicut ab Hecatone, an beneficium dare servus domino possit. Sunt enim, qui ita distinguant, quaedam beneficia esse, quaedam officia, quaedam ministeria; beneficium esse, quod alienus det (alienus est, qui potuit sine reprehensione cessare); officium esse filii, uxoris, earum personarum, quas necessitudo suscitat et ferre opem iubet; ministerium esse servi, quem condicio sua eo loco posuit, ut nihil eorum, quae praestat, imputet superiori.

Besides, whoever denies that a slave can ever give a benefit to his master is ignorant of the law that binds all men; for what counts is the mind of him who renders the service, not his rank. Virtue is barred to no one; she lies open to all, admits all, invites all — the freeborn and the freedmen and the slaves and kings and exiles; she does not pick a house or a fortune, she is content with the bare man. For what safeguard would there be against sudden blows, what great thing could the mind promise itself, if fortune could strip away virtue once made sure?

Praeterea servum qui negat dare aliquando domino beneficium, ignarus est iuris humani; refert enim, cuius animi sit, qui praestat, non cuius status. Nulli praeclusa virtus est; omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, et ingenuos et libertinos et servos et reges et exules; non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine contenta est. Quid enim erat tuti adversus repentina, quid animus magnum promitteret sibi, si certam virtutem fortuna amitteret?

If a slave gives no benefit to his master, then no one gives one to his king, no soldier to his general; for what does it matter under what kind of command a man is held, if he is held under the highest? For if necessity bars the slave from attaining the name of a benefactor, and the fear of suffering the worst, that same thing will bar both the man who has a king and the man who has a general, since under an unequal title equal powers over them are allowed. And yet men do give benefits to their kings, do give them to their commanders; therefore to their masters too.

Si non dat beneficium servus domino, nec regi quisquam suo nec duci suo miles; quid enim interest, quali quis teneatur imperio, si summo tenetur? Nam si servo, quominus in nomen meriti perveniat, necessitas obstat et patiendi ultima timor, idem istuc obstabit et ei, qui regem habet, et ei, qui ducem, quoniam sub dispari titulo paria in illos licent. Atqui dant regibus suis, dant imperatoribus beneficia; ergo et dominis.

A slave can be just, can be brave, can be great of soul; therefore he can give a benefit too, for this also belongs to virtue. Indeed slaves can give benefits to their masters so truly that they have often made their very masters debtors for their benefit.

Potest servus iustus esse, potest fortis, potest magni animi; ergo et beneficium dare potest, nam et hoc virtutis est. Adeo quidem dominis servi beneficia possunt dare, ut ipsos saepe beneficii sui fecerint.

There is no doubt that a slave can give a benefit to anyone at all; why then can he not also give one to his own master? "Because," he says, "he cannot become his master’s creditor by giving him money. Otherwise he would put his master under obligation every day: he follows him on his travels, attends him when sick, tills his land with the hardest labor; yet all these things, which if another rendered them would be called benefits, are services when a slave renders them. For a benefit is what someone has given when it was open to him not to give. But a slave has no power of refusing; and so he does not render a service but obeys, nor does he boast of having done what he could not have left undone."

Non est dubium, quin servus beneficium dare possit cuilibet; quare ergo non et domino suo possit? " Quia non potest," inquit, " creditor domini sui fieri, si pecuniam illi dederit. Alioqui cotidie dominum suum obligat; peregrinantem sequitur, aegro ministrat, rus eius labore summo colit; omnia tamen ista, quae alio praestante beneficia dicerentur, praestante servo ministeria sunt. Beneficium enim id est, quod quis dedit, cum illi liceret et non dare. Servus autem non habet negandi potestatem; ita non praestat, sed paret, nec id se fecisse iactat, quod non facere non potuit."

Even under that very law I shall win, and bring the slave to the point of being free in many things. Meanwhile tell me: if I were to show you a man fighting for his master’s safety without regard for himself, and, pierced through with wounds, still pouring out the last of his blood from his very vitals, and, to give his master time to escape, buying delay with his own death — will you deny that this man gave a benefit, because he is a slave?

Iam sub ista ipsa lege vincam et eo perducam servum, ut in multa liber sit. Interim dic mihi, si tibi ostendere aliquem pro salute domini sui sine respectu sui dimicantem et confossum vulneribus reliquias tamen sanguinis ab ipsis vitalibus fundentem et, ut ille effugiendi tempus habeat, moram sua morte quaerentem, hunc tu negabis beneficium dedisse, quia servus est?

If I show you a man who, when bidden to betray his master’s secrets, was corrupted by no tyrant’s promise, terrified by no threats, overcome by no tortures, but turned aside the suspicions of his questioner as far as he could, and spent his life for his loyalty — will you deny that this man gave a benefit to his master, because he is a slave?

Si tibi ostendero aliquem, ut secreta domini prodat, nulla tyranni pollicitatione corruptum, nullis territum minis, nullis cruciatibus victum avertisse, quantum potuerit, suspiciones quaerentis et impendisse spiritum fidei, hunc tu negabis beneficium domino dedisse, quia servus est?

Consider whether it is not the greater, the rarer such an example of virtue is in slaves; and the more welcome, in that, though commands are generally hateful and all compulsion is heavy, love of the master overcame, in this man, the hatred all slaves share for slavery. So a thing is not no benefit because it came from a slave; rather it is the greater, because not even slavery could deter him from it.

Vide, ne eo maius sit, quo rarius est exemplum virtutis in servis, eoque gratius, quod, cum fere invisa imperia sint et omnis necessitas gravis, commune servitutis odium in aliquo domini caritas vicit. Ita non ideo beneficium non est, quia a servo profectum est, sed ideo maius, quia deterrere ab illo ne servitus quidem potuit.

A man is mistaken who thinks that slavery sinks into the whole man. His better part is exempt. Bodies are liable and made over to masters; the mind, however, is its own master — so free and roving that not even this prison in which it is shut up can hold it back from using its own impulse, doing mighty things, and going out into the infinite, companion to the heavenly bodies.

Errat, si quis existimat servitutem in totum hominem descendere. Pars melior eius excepta est. Corpora obnoxia sunt et adscripta dominis; mens quidem sui iuris, quae adeo libera et vaga est, ut ne ab hoc quidem carcere, cui inclusa est, teneri queat, quominus impetu suo utatur et ingentia agat et in infinitum comes caelestibus exeat.

It is the body, then, that fortune has handed over to the master; this he buys, this he sells; that inner part cannot be conveyed by sale. Whatever comes from it is free; for neither can we command all things, nor are slaves compelled to obey in all things: commands against the state they will not carry out, to no crime will they lend their hands.

Corpus itaque est, quod domino fortuna tradidit; hoc emit, hoc vendit; interior illa pars mancipio dari non potest. Ab hac quidquid venit, liberum est; nec enim aut nos omnia iubere possumus aut in omnia servi parere coguntur; contra rem publicam imperata non facient, nulli sceleri manus commodabunt.

There are some things which the laws neither command nor forbid one to do; in these the slave has the material of a benefit. So long as what is usually exacted of a slave is rendered, it is service; where there is more than is required of a slave, it is a benefit; where it crosses over into the feeling of a friend, it ceases to be called service.

Quaedam sunt, quae leges nec iubent nec vetant facere; in iis servus materiam beneficii habet. Quam diu praestatur, quod a servo exigi solet, ministerium est; ubi plus, quam quod servo necesse est, beneficium est; ubi in adfectum amici transit, desinit vocari ministerium.

There is something the master owes to render to his slave — food, clothing; no one has called this a benefit. But if he has indulged him, brought him up more liberally, handed on the arts in which the freeborn are trained — it is a benefit. The same holds, conversely, in the person of the slave. Whatever exceeds the set form of a slave’s duty, whatever is rendered not from command but from will, is a benefit, provided only it is great enough to have been called so had anyone else rendered it.

Est aliquid, quod dominus praestare servo debeat, ut cibaria, ut vestiarium; nemo hoc dixit beneficium. At indulsit, liberalius educavit, artes, quibus erudiuntur ingenui, tradidit: beneficium est. Idem e contrario fit in persona servi. Quidquid est, quod servilis officii formulam excedit, quod non ex imperio, sed ex voluntate praestatur, beneficium est, si modo tantum est, ut hoc vocari potuerit quolibet alio praestante.

A slave, as Chrysippus holds, is a perpetual hired man. Just as the hired man gives a benefit when he renders more than that for which he hired out his labor, so the slave: when his goodwill toward his master crosses the measure of his lot, and, daring something higher — something that would be an honor even to those more happily born — he outruns his master’s hope, it is a benefit found within the household.

Servus, ut placet Chrysippo, perpetuus mercennarius est. Quemadmodum ille beneficium dat, ubi plus praestat, quam in quod operas locavit, sic servus: ubi benevolentia erga dominum fortunae suae modum transit et altius aliquid ausus, quod etiam felicius natis decori esset, spem domini antecessit, beneficium est intra domum inventum.

Does it seem fair to you that men with whom we are angry if they do less than is owed should get no thanks if they have done more than is owed and customary? Do you wish to know when a thing is not a benefit? When it can be said: "What if he had refused?" But where he rendered what he was free to refuse, the willing is to be praised.

An aecum videtur tibi, quibus, si minus debito faciant, irascimur, non haberi gratiam, si plus debito solitoque fecerint? Vis scire, quando non sit beneficium? Ubi dici potest: " Quid, si nollet? " Ubi vero id praestitit, quod nolle licuit, voluisse laudandum est.

Benefit and injury are contraries; the slave can give a benefit to his master if he can receive an injury from his master. And in fact a magistrate has been appointed to hear of the injuries of masters against slaves, to curb cruelty and lust and the stinginess that shows in providing the necessaries of life. What then? Does a master receive a benefit from a slave?

Inter se contraria sunt beneficium et iniuria; potest dare beneficium domino, si a domino iniuriam accipere. Atqui de iniuriis dominorum in servos qui audiat positus est, qui et saevitiam et libidinem et in praebendis ad victum necessariis avaritiam compescat. Quid ergo? Beneficium dominus a servo accipit?

Nay, a man receives it from a man. In the end, the slave did what was in his power: he gave his master a benefit; that you should not have received one from a slave is in your power. But who is so great that fortune does not compel him to need even the lowliest?

Immo homo ab homine. Denique, quod in illius potestate fuit, fecit: beneficium domino dedit; ne a servo acceperis, in tua potestate est. Quis autem tantus est, quem non fortuna indigere etiam infimis cogat?

I shall now relate many examples of benefits, unlike one another and some of them mutually opposed. One man gave his master life, another death; one saved his master who was about to perish, and — if this is too little — saved him by perishing himself; one helped his master to die, another cheated him of dying.

Multa iam beneficiorum exempla referam et dissimilia et quaedam inter se contraria. Dedit aliquis domino suo vitam, dedit mortem, servavit periturum et, hoc si parum est, pereundo servavit; alius mortem domini adiuvit, alius decepit.

Claudius Quadrigarius relates, in the eighteenth book of his Annals, that when Grumentum was under siege and matters had come to the utmost desperation, two slaves deserted to the enemy and did good service. Then, when the city was taken and the victor was running riot everywhere, they ran ahead by paths they knew to the house in which they had been slaves, and drove their mistress before them; to those who asked who she was, they declared that she was their mistress, and a most cruel one, being led off to punishment by them. Then, having led her out beyond the walls, they hid her with the utmost care, until the enemy’s rage subsided; and then, when the soldiery, glutted, quickly returned to Roman ways, they too returned to theirs, and gave their mistress back to herself.

Claudius Quadrigarius in duodevicensimo annalium tradit, cum obsideretur Grumentum et iam ad summam desperationem ventum esset, duos servos ad hostem transfugisse et operae pretium fecisse. Deinde urbe capta passim discurrente victore illos per nota itinera ad domum, in qua servierant, praecucurrisse et dominam suam ante egisse; quaerentibus, quaenam esset, dominam et quidem crudelissimam ad supplicium ab ipsis duci professes esse. Eductam deinde extra mures summa cura celasse, donec hostilis ira consideret; deinde, ut satiatus miles cito ad Romanos mores rediit, illos quoque ad suos redisse et dominam sibi ipsos dedisse.

She freed them both on the spot, and was not indignant to have received her life from those over whom she had held the power of life and death. She could even congratulate herself the more on this; for, saved any other way, she would have had the gift of a familiar and common mercy, but saved as she was, she became a noble story and an example talked of in two cities.

Manu misit utrumque e vestigio illa nec indignata est ab his se vitam accepisse, in quos vitae necisque potestatem habuisset. Potuit sibi hoc vel magis gratulari; aliter enim servata munus notae et vulgaris clementiae habuisset, sic servata nobilis fabula et exemplum duarum urbium fuit.

In so great a confusion of a captured city, when each man looked to himself, all fled from her except the deserters; but these, to show with what intent that earlier desertion had been made, deserted from the victors to the captive, wearing the mask of parricides; and — what was greatest in that benefit — they reckoned it worth so much, that their mistress might not be killed, to seem to have killed their mistress. Believe me, to have bought a noble deed at the cost of a name for crime is the mark of no slavish — nay, of no mean — soul.

In tanta confusione captae civitatis eum sibi quisque consuleret, omnes ab illa praeter transfugas fugerunt; at hi, ut ostenderent, quo animo facta esset prior illa transitio, a victoribus ad captivam transfugerunt personam parricidarum ferentes; quod in illo beneficio maximum fuit, tanti iudicaverunt, ne domina occideretur, videri dominam occidisse. Non est, mihi crede, non dico servilis, sed vilis animi egregium factum fama sceleris emisse.

Vettius, the praetor of the Marsi, was being led off to the Roman commander; his slave drew the sword of the very soldier by whom he was being dragged, and first killed his master, then said: "It is time to look to myself as well! I have already set my master free," and so ran himself through with a single stroke. Give me anyone who saved his master more splendidly.

Vettius, praetor Marsorum, ducebatur ad Romanum imperatorem; servus eius gladium militi illi ipsi, a quo trahebatur, eduxit et primum dominum occidit, deinde: " Tempus est," inquit, " me et mihi consulere! iam dominum manu misi," atque ita traiecit se uno ictu. Da mihi quemquam, qui magnificentius dominum servaverit.

Caesar was besieging Corfinium; the famous Domitius was hemmed in. He ordered his physician, who was also his slave, to give him poison. Seeing him hang back, he said: "Why do you delay, as though the whole matter were in your power? I ask for death, and I am armed." Then the slave promised, and gave him a harmless draught to drink; and when he had been put to sleep by it, the slave went to his son and said: "Order me to be kept under guard until you learn from the outcome whether I gave your father poison." Domitius lived, and was saved by Caesar; but his slave had saved him first.

Corfinium Caesar obsidebat, tenebatur inclutus Domitius; imperavit medico eidemque servo suo, ut sibi venenum daret. Cum tergiversantem videret: " Quid cunctaris," inquit, " tamquam in tua potestate totum istud sit? Mortem rogo armatus." Tum ille promisit et medicamentum innoxium bibendum illi dedit; quo cum sopitus esset, accessit ad filium eius et: " Iube," inquit, " me adservari, dum ex eventu intellegis, an venenum patri tuo dederim." Vixit Domitius et servatus a Caesare est; prior tamen illum servus servaverat.

In the civil war a slave hid his proscribed master, and, having fitted his master’s rings to himself and put on his clothes, he met the executioners and said that he begged nothing — let them carry out their orders — and then stretched out his neck. How great a man it is, to be willing to die for his master at a time when loyalty enough to be unwilling that one’s master should die was rare! to be found gentle amid public cruelty, faithful amid public treachery! when the rewards of betrayal are held out enormous, to covet death as the reward of fidelity!

Bello civili proscriptum dominum servus abscondit et, cum anulos eius sibi aptasset ac vestem induisset, speculatoribus occurrit nihilque se deprecari, quo minus imperata peragerent, dixit et deinde cervicem porrexit. Quanti viri est pro domino eo tempore mori velle, quo rara erat fides dominum mori nolle! in publica crudelitate mitem inveniri, in publica perfidia fidelem! cum praemia proditionis ingentia ostendantur, praemium fidei mortem concupiscere!

I shall not pass over examples of our own age. Under Tiberius Caesar there was a frequent and almost universal madness for accusing, which wore down the gowned citizenry more grievously than any civil war; the talk of drunkards was caught up, the frankness of jesters; nothing was safe; every occasion for cruelty was welcome, and the outcomes of the accused were no longer awaited, since there was but one. Paulus, a man of praetorian rank, was dining at a certain banquet, wearing a portrait of Tiberius Caesar embossed on a projecting gem.

Nostri saeculi exempla non praeteribo. Sub Tib. Caesare fuit accusandi frequens et paene publica rabies, quae omni civili bello gravius togatam civitatem confecit; excipiebatur ebriorum sermo, simplicitas iocantium; nihil erat tutum; omnis saeviendi placebat occasio, nec iam reorum expectabantur eventus, cum esset unus. Cenabat Paulus praetorius in convivio quodam imaginem Tib. Caesaris habens ectypa et eminente gemma.

I shall do a most foolish thing if I now hunt for words to say how he took up a chamber-pot; this act both Maro, one of the noted informers of that time, marked, and the slave of the man for whom the snare was being woven slipped the ring off his drunken master. And when Maro called the guests to witness that the portrait had been brought near to obscenities, and was already drawing up the indictment, the slave showed the ring on his own hand. If anyone calls this man a slave, he will call the other a fellow-guest.

Rem ineptissimam fecero, si nunc verba quaesiero, quemadmodum dicam illum matellam sumpsisse; quod factum simul et Maro ex notis illius temporis vestigatoribus notavit et servus eius, quoi nectebantur insidiae, ei ebrio anulum extraxit. Et cum Maro convivas testaretur admotam esse imaginem obscenis et iam subscriptionem componeret, ostendit in manu sua servus anulum. Si quis hunc servum vocat, et illum convivam vocabit.

Under the deified Augustus men’s words were not yet dangerous to them, but already troublesome. Rufus, a man of senatorial rank, had wished at dinner that Caesar might not return safe from the journey he was preparing; and he had added that all the bulls and calves wished the same. There were those who listened to this attentively. As soon as it grew light, the slave who had stood at his feet while he dined told him what he had said, drunk, at dinner, and urged him to get ahead of Caesar and inform against himself.

Sub divo Augusto nondum hominibus verba sua periculosa erant, iam molesta. Rufus, vir ordinis senatorii, inter cenam optaverat, ne Caesar salvus rediret ex ea peregrinatione, quam parabat; et adiecerat idem omnes et tauros et vitulos optare. Fuerunt, qui illa diligenter audirent. Ut primum diluxit, servus, qui cenanti ad pedes steterat, narrat, quae inter cenam ebrius dixisset, et hortatur, ut Caesarem occupet atque ipse se deferat.

Taking the advice, he met Caesar as he came down, and, having sworn that he had been out of his right mind the day before, wished that the consequence might fall upon himself and his own children, and begged Caesar to pardon him and return to favor with him.

Usus consilio descendenti Caesari occurrit et, cum malam mentem habuisse se pridie iurasset, id ut in se et in filios suos redderet, optavit et Caesarem, ut ignosceret sibi rediretque in gratiam secum, rogavit.

When Caesar said he would do so, Rufus said: "No one will believe that you have returned to favor with me unless you give me something," and he asked a sum not to be scorned even by one in a favorable mood, and obtained it. Caesar said: "For my own sake I shall take care never to be angry with you!"

Cum dixisset se Caesar facere: " Nemo," inquit, " credet te mecum in gratiam redisse, nisi aliquid mihi donaveris," petitque non fastidiendam etiam a propitio summam et impetravit. Caesar ait: " Mea causa dabo operam, ne umquam tibi irascar!

Caesar acted honorably in pardoning, in adding generosity to mercy. Whoever hears this example must praise Caesar — but only after he has first praised the slave. You do not expect me to tell you that the slave who had done this was set free. And yet not for nothing: Caesar had paid out the money for his liberty.

" Honeste fecit Caesar, quod ignovit, quod liberalitatem clementiae adiecit. Quicumque hoc audierit exemplum, necesse est Caesarem laudet, sed cum servum ante laudaverit. Non expectas, ut tibi narrem manu missum, qui hoc fecerat. Nec tamen gratis: pecuniam pro libertate eius Caesar numeraverat.

After so many examples, is there any doubt that a master sometimes receives a benefit from a slave? Why should the person diminish the act, rather than the act itself ennoble the person? The beginnings of all are the same, and the same the origin; no one is nobler than another, save the man whose nature is more upright and better fitted for good arts.

Post tot exempla num dubium est, quin beneficium aliquando a servo dominus accipiat? Quare potius persona rem minuat, quam personam res ipsa cohonestet? Eadem omnibus principia eademque origo; nemo altero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingenium et artibus bonis aptius.

Those who set out portrait-masks in the atrium, and place the names of their family in a long row, bound up with the many windings of their pedigrees, in the front part of the house — are they not better known than noble? The one parent of all is the universe; whether through splendid steps or sordid ones, each man’s first origin is traced back to it. There is no reason for those men to deceive you who, when they review their ancestors, wherever an illustrious name has failed, stuff a god into the gap.

Qui imagines in atrio exponunt et nomina familiae suae longo ordine ac multis stemmatum inligata flexuris in parte prima aedium collocant, non noti magis quam nobiles sunt? Unus omnium parens mundus est, sive per splendidos sive per sordidos gradus ad hunc prima cuiusque origo perdueitur. Non est, quod te isti decipiant, qui, cum maiores suos recensent, ubicumque nomen inlustre defecit, illo deum infuleiunt.

Despise no one, even if about him the names are faded and helped by a fortune little kindly. Whether freedmen are reckoned among your forebears, or slaves, or men of foreign nations, lift up your spirits boldly and leap over whatever sordid thing lies between; at the summit a great nobility awaits you.

Neminem despexeris, etiam si circa illum obsoleta sunt nomina et parum indulgente adiuta fortuna. Sive libertini ante vos habentur sive servi sive exterarum gentium homines, erigite audacter animos et, quidquid in medio sordidi iacet, transilite; expectat vos in summo magna nobilitas.

Why do we lift ourselves up in pride to such vanity that we disdain to accept benefits from slaves, and look at their lot, forgetting their services? Do you call anyone a slave — you, the slave of lust and gluttony and an adulteress, nay, the common chattel of adulteresses?

Quid superbia in tantam vanitatem attollimur, ut beneficia a servis indignemur accipere et sortem eorum spectemus obliti meritorum? Servum tu quemquam vocas, libidinis et gulae servus et adulterae, immo adulterarum commune mancipium?

Do you call anyone a slave — you? Where, pray, are you being hurried off by those bearers who carry that couch of yours about? Where, by these men got up in cloaks, decked out indeed in no common soldier’s garb — where, I say, do these men bear you off? To the door of some doorkeeper, to the gardens of some man who does not even hold a regular office; and then you deny that a benefit can be given you by your own slave — you, to whom the kiss of another man’s slave is a benefit? What is this great discord in the soul?

Servum vocas quemquam tu? Quo tandem ab istis gerulis raperis cubile istud tuum circumferentibus? Quo te penulati in militum quidem non vulgarem cultum subornati, quo, inquam, te isti efferunt? Ad ostium alicuius ostiarii, ad hortos alicuius, ne ordinarium quidem habentis officium; et deinde negas tibi a servo tuo beneficium dari posse, cui osculum alieni servi beneficium est? Quae est tanta animi discordia?

At one and the same time you despise slaves and court them — domineering and unrestrained within your threshold, abject outside it, and as much despised as you are despising. For none cast down their spirits more than those who shamelessly exalt them, and none are readier to trample others than those who have learned to give insults by receiving them.

Eodem tempore servos despicis et colis, imperiosus intra limen atque impotens, humilis foris et tam contemptus quam contemnens. Neque enim ulli magis abiciunt animos, quam qui improbe tollunt, nullique ad calcandos alios paratiores, quam qui contumelias facere accipiendo didicerunt.

These things had to be said, to crush the insolence of men who hang upon fortune, and to claim the right of giving a benefit for slaves, so that it might be claimed for sons as well. For it is asked whether children can ever give greater benefits to their parents than they have received.

Dicenda haec fuerunt ad contundendam insolentiam hominum ex fortuna pendentium vindicandumque ius beneficii dandi servis, ut filiis quoque vindicaretur. Quaeritur enim, an aliquando, liberi maiora beneficia dare parentibus suis possint, quam acceperint.

This is granted, that many sons have proved greater and more powerful than their parents; and equally that they have been better. And if this stands, it can come about that they bestowed better things, since both their fortune was greater and their will better.

Illud conceditur multos filios maiores potentioresque extitisse quam parentes suos; aeque et illud meliores fuisse. Quod si constat, potest fieri, ut meliora tribuerint, cum et fortuna illis maior esset et melior voluntas.

"Whatever it is," he says, "that a son gives his father, it is in any case less, because he owes to his father this very capacity of giving. So the father is never surpassed by a benefit, when his benefit is the very thing by which he is surpassed." First, some things draw their beginning from others and yet are greater than their beginnings; nor is a thing therefore not greater than that from which it began, merely because it could not have advanced so far had it not begun.

" Quidquid," inquit, " est, quod det patri filius, utique minus est, quia hanc ipsam dandi facultatem patri debet. Ita numquam beneficio vincitur, cuius beneficium est ipsum, quod vincitur." Primum quaedam initium ab aliis trahunt et tamen initiis suis maiora sunt; nec ideo aliquid non est maius eo, quo coepit, quia non potuisset in tantum procedere, nisi coepisset.

There is nothing that does not pass its own beginnings by a great stride. Seeds are the causes of all things, and yet are the smallest parts of the things they beget. Look at the Rhine, look at the Euphrates, look at all the famous rivers. What are they, if you appraise them there, where they flow out? Whatever it is for which they are feared, for which they are named, they acquired in their course.

Nulla non res principia sua magno gradu transit. Semina omnium rerum causae sunt et tamen minimae partes sunt eorum, quae gignunt. Adspice Rhenum, adspice Euphraten, omnes denique inclutos amnes. Quid sunt, si illos illic, unde effluunt, aestimes? Quidquid est, quo timentur, quo nominantur, in processu paraverunt.

Look at the great trees — tallest if you measure their height, broadest spread if you measure their thickness and the reach of their branches. How small is that, compared with these, which the root grasps with a slender fiber! Take away the root: the groves will not rise, nor will mountains so great be clothed. The lofty temples of the city rest on their foundations; yet the stones laid for the support of the whole work lie hidden. The same happens in all else;

Adspice trabes, sive proceritatem aestimes, altissimas, sive crassitudinem spatiumque ramorum, latissime fusas. Quantulum est his comparatum illud, quod radix tenui fibra complectitur! Tolle radicem: nemora non surgent, nec tanti montes vestientur. Innituntur fundamentis suis templa excelsa urbis; tamen, quae in firmamentum totius operis iacta sunt, latent. Idem in ceteris evenit;

the greatness that follows will always bury its own beginnings. I could have attained nothing, had not my parents’ benefit gone before; but not on that account is whatever I have attained less than that without which I should not have attained it.

principia sua semper sequens magnitudo obruet. Non potuissem quicquam consequi, nisi parentum beneficium antecessisset; sed non ideo, quidquid consecutus sum, minus est eo, sine quo consecutus non essem.

Had my nurse not fed me as an infant, I could have done none of the things I now carry out by counsel and hand, nor risen into this brightness of name which I have earned by civil and military industry; yet will you on that account prefer the nurse’s service to my greatest works? But what difference is there, since equally without my father’s benefit and without my nurse’s I could not have advanced to further things? And if I owe whatever I now can do to my beginning, consider that my father is not my beginning, nor even my grandfather; for there will always be something further back, from which the origin of the nearest origin descends. And yet no one will say that I owe more to my unknown forebears, set beyond memory, than to my father; yet I owe more to them, if this very thing — that my father begot me — he owes to his forebears.

Nisi me nutrix aluisset infantem, nihil eorum, quae consilio ac manu gero, facere potuissem nec in hanc emergere nominis claritatem, quam civili ac militari industria merui; numquid tamen ideo maximis operibus praeferes nutricis officium? Atqui quid interest, cum aeque sine patris beneficio quam sine nutricis non potuerim ad ulteriora procedere? Quod si initio meo, quidquid iam possum, debeo, cogita non esse initium mei patrem, ne avum quidem; semper enim erit ulterius aliquid, ex quo originis proximae origo descendat. Atqui nemo dicet me plus debere ignotis et ultra memoriam positis maioribus quam patri; plus autem debeo, si hoc ipsum, quod genuit me pater meus, maioribus debet.

"Whatever I have rendered my father, even if it is great, falls below the appraisal of my father’s gift, because it would not exist if he had not begotten me." At that rate, even if someone has healed my father when sick and about to die, I shall be able to render him nothing that is not less than his benefit; for my father would not have begotten me had he not been healed. But consider whether this is not the truer way to appraise it: whether what I was able to do, and what I did, is my own — of my own strength, of my own will.

" Quidquid praestiti patri, etiam si magnum est, infra aestimationem paterni muneris est, quia non esset, si non genuisset." Isto modo etiam, si quis patrem meum aegrum ac moriturum sanaverit, nihil praestare ei potero, quod non beneficio eius minus sit; non enim genuisset me pater, nisi sanatus esset. Sed vide, ne illud verius sit aestimari, an id, quod potui, et id, quod feci, meum sit, mearum virium, meae voluntatis.

That I was born — look at it in itself, what kind of thing it is: you will notice that it is slight and uncertain, and the common stuff of good and bad alike — without doubt the first step toward everything, but not therefore greater than everything, merely because it is first.

Illud, quod natus sum, per se intuere, quale sit: animadvertis exiguum et incertum et boni malique communem materiam, sine dubio primum ad omnia gradum, sed non ideo maiorem omnibus, quia primus est.

I have saved my father, and raised him to the highest rank, and made him the first man of his city; I have ennobled him not only by the deeds I myself performed, but I have also given him an enormous and easy material for performing deeds of his own — material no less safe than glorious; honors, wealth, whatever draws human minds to itself, I have heaped up; and though I stood above all others, I stood below him. Say now:

Servavi patrem meum et ad summam provexi dignitatem et principem urbis suae feci nec tantum rebus a me gestis nobilitavi, sed ipsi quoque gerendarum ingentem ac facilem nec tutam minus quam gloriosam dedi materiam; honores, opes, quidquid humanos ad se animos rapit, congessi, et eum supra omnes starem, infra illum steti. Die nunc:

"This very thing — that you were able to do these things — is your father’s gift"; I shall answer you: "It is so indeed, if to be born is enough for the doing of them; but if for living well the least part is merely to live, and you bestowed that which I share with the beasts and with certain very small animals, certain even most loathsome ones, do not claim for yourself what does not arise from your benefits, even if it does not arise without them."

" Hoc ipsum, quod ista potuisti, patris munus est "; respondebo tibi: " Est prorsus, si ad ista facienda nasci satis est; sed si ad bene vivendum minima portio est vivere et id tribuisti, quod cum feris mihi et animalibus quibusdam minimis, quibusdam etiam foedissimis commune est, noli tibi adserere, quod non ex tuis beneficiis, etiam si non sine tuis, oritur."

Suppose I have given back life for life. Even so I have surpassed your gift, since I gave it knowingly to one who knew, since I gave you life not for the sake of my own pleasure, or at any rate not through pleasure, since it is as much greater to keep one’s breath than to receive it, as it is lighter to die before the fear of death.

Puta me vitam pro vita reddidisse. Sic quoque munus tuum vici, cum ego dederim sentiente cum sentiens me dare, cum vitam tibi non voluptatis meae causa aut certe per voluptatem dederim, cum tanto maius sit retinere spiritum quam accipere, quanto levius mori ante mortis metum.

I gave life to one who would use it at once, you to one who would not know whether he was alive; I gave life to one who feared death, you gave life so that I might be able to die; I gave you life full-grown, complete, you begot me devoid of reason, a burden on others.

Ego vitam dedi statim illa usuro, tu nescituro, an viveret; ego vitam dedi mortem timenti, tu vitam dedisti, ut mori possem; ego tibi vitam dedi consummatam, perfectam, tu me expertem rationis genuisti, onus alienum.

Do you wish to know how no great benefit it is to give life in that way? You might have exposed me; clearly, then, the begetting was an injury! From which what do I conclude? That the coupling of father and mother is the smallest of benefits, unless other things have been added that follow up this beginning of the gift and ratify it by further services.

Vis scire, quam non sit magnum beneficium vitam sic dare? Exposuisses; nempe iniuria erat genuisse! Quo quid colligo? Minimum esse beneficium patris matrisque concubitum, nisi accesserunt alia, quae prosequerentur hoc initium muneris et aliis officiis ratum facerent.

It is not a good to live, but to live well. But I do live well. Yet I might have lived badly too; so this much only is yours — that I live. If you charge me with life in itself, bare, lacking reason, and boast of it as a great good, consider that you are charging me with the good of flies and worms.

Non est bonum vivere, sed bene vivere. At bene vivo. Sed potui et male; ita hoc tantum est tuum, quod vivo. Si vitam imputas mihi per se, nudam, egentem consilii, et id ut magnum bonum iactas, cogita te mihi imputare muscarum ac vermium bonum.

Then, to say nothing more than that I devoted myself to good arts and steered my course toward the right path of life — in your very benefit you received more than you had given; for you gave me to myself raw and unschooled, I gave you a son such as you would rejoice to have begotten.

Deinde, ut nihil aliud dicam, quam bonis artibus me studuisse et cursum ad rectum iter vitae direxisse, in ipso beneficio tuo maius, quam quod dederas, recepisti; tu enim me mihi rudem, imperitum dedisti, ego tibi filium, qualem genuisse gauderes.

My father fed me. If I render the same, I repay more, because he rejoices not only to be fed but to be fed by a son, and reaps a greater pleasure from my disposition than from the thing itself, whereas his feeding reached only as far as my body. What of this —

Aluit me pater. Si idem praesto, plus reddo, quia non tantum ali se, sed a filio ali gaudet et maiorem ex animo meo quam ex ipsa re percipit voluptatem, illius alimenta ad corpus tantum meum pervenerunt. Quid?

if someone has advanced so far that he becomes known among the nations for eloquence, or for justice, or for deeds of war, and pours an enormous fame around his father too, and scatters with clear light the darkness of his own birth — has he not conferred a benefit beyond all appraisal upon his parents?

si quis in tantum processit, ut aut eloquentia per gentes notesceret aut iustitia aut bellicis rebus et patri quoque ingentem circumfunderet famam tenebrasque natalium suorum clara luce discuteret, non inaestimabile in parentes suos beneficium contulit?

Would anyone know Ariston and Gryllus but for their sons Plato and Xenophon? Socrates does not let Sophroniscus die. To enumerate the rest would take long — men who endure for no other reason than that the surpassing virtue of their children handed them down to posterity.

An quisquam Aristonem et Gryllum nisi propter Xenophontem ac Platonem filios nosset? Sophroniscum Socrates expirare non patitur. Ceteros enumerare longum est, qui durant ob nullam aliam causam, quam quod illos liberorum eximia virtus tradidit posteris.

Did Marcus Agrippa’s father — not known even after Agrippa — give the greater benefit, or did Agrippa give it to his father, Agrippa distinguished by the naval crown, who won that unique honor among military awards, who raised up in the city so many great works that surpassed the magnificence of earlier days and were surpassed by none thereafter?

Utrum maius beneficium dedit M. Agrippae pater ne post Agrippam quidem notus, an patri dedit Agrippa navali corona insignis, unicum adeptus inter dona militaria decus, qui tot in urbe maxima opera excitavit, quae et priorem magnificentiam vincerent et nulla postea vincerentur?

Did Octavius give the greater benefit to his son, or the deified Augustus to his father, although the shadow of his adoptive father hides him? How great a pleasure he would have taken, had he seen his son, after the civil wars were fought to an end, presiding over a secure peace — not recognizing his own good, and scarcely believing, as often as he looked back on himself, that such a man could have been born in his house! Why should I now pursue the rest, men whom oblivion would by now have consumed, had not the glory of their sons dug them out of the darkness and held them still in the light?

Utrum Octavius maius beneficium dedit filio an patri divus Augustus, quamvis illum umbra adoptivi patris abscondit? Quantam cepisset voluptatem, si illum post debellata arma civilia vidisset securae paci praesidentem, non adgnoscens bonum suum nec satis credens, quotiens ad se respexisset, potuisse illum virum in domo sua nasci! Quid nunc ceteros prosequar, quos iam consumpsisset oblivio, nisi illos filiorum gloria e tenebris eruisset et adhuc in luce retineret?

Then, since our question is not which son has returned greater benefits to his father than he had received from his father, but whether anyone can return greater, even if the examples I have related do not yet satisfy, nor outweigh the benefits of their parents, still nature admits what no age has yet brought forth. If single services cannot surpass the greatness of a father’s, many heaped into one will surpass it.

Deinde, cum quaeramus, non quis filius patri maiora beneficia reddiderit, quam a patre acceperat, sed an aliquis possit maiora reddere, etiam si, quae rettuli, exempla nondum satis faciunt nec beneficia parentium suorum superiaciunt, capit tamen hoc natura, quod nondum ulla aetas tulit. Si singula paternorum meritorum magnitudinem exsuperare non possunt, plura in unum congesta superabunt.

Scipio saved his father in battle, and, still wearing the boy’s bordered toga, spurred his horse against the enemy. Is it too little that, to reach his father, he scorned so many dangers that pressed hardest upon the greatest generals, so many difficulties set in his way; that, a raw recruit going out to his first fight, he ran over the bodies of veterans; that he leapt over his own years?

Servavit in proelio patrem Scipio et praetextatus in hostes ecum concitavit. Parum est, quod, ut perveniret ad patrem, tot pericula maximos duces eum maxime prementia contempsit, tot oppositas difficultates, quod ad primam pugnam exiturus tiro per veteranorum corpora cucurrit, quod annos suos transiluit?

Add that the same man defends his father on trial, and snatches him from the conspiracy of powerful enemies; that he heaps upon him a second consulship and a third, and other honors to be coveted even by men of consular rank; that he hands over to him, poor as he was, the wealth seized by the right of war, and — what is most splendid for military men — makes him rich even with the spoils of the enemy.

Adice, ut idem patrem reum defendat et conspirationi inimicorum potentium eripiat, ut alterum illi consulatum ac tertium aliosque honores etiam consularibus concupiscendos congerat, ut pauperi raptas belli iure opes tradat et, quod est militaribus viris speciosissimum, divitem illum spoliis etiam hostilibus faciat.

If this is still too little, add that he holds province after province and extraordinary commands; add that, when the greatest cities have been razed, this man — the defender and founder of a Roman empire without a rival, an empire to reach to the risings and the settings of the sun — adds a greater nobility to a noble man: to be called the father of Scipio! Is there any doubt that surpassing devotion has outdone the common benefit of begetting — a devotion and a virtue bringing to the city itself I know not whether the greater safeguard or the greater glory?

Si adhuc parum est, adice, ut provincias et extraordinaria imperia continuet, adice, ut dirutis maximis urbibus Romani imperii sine aemulo ad ortus occasusque venturi defensor et conditor maiorem nobilitatem nobili viro adiciat, dici Scipionis patrem! Dubium est, quin generandi vulgare beneficium vicerit eximia pietas et virtus ipsi urbi nescio utrum maius praesidium adferens an decus?

Then, if this is too little, imagine someone has beaten off the tortures meant for his father, imagine he has taken them upon himself. You are free to extend the benefits of a son as far as you wish, whereas the father’s gift is both simple and easy and a pleasure to the giver — a gift he must have given to many, even to some he does not know he gave it to, in which he has a partner, in which he looked to the law, to country, to the rewards of fatherhood, to the perpetuity of his house and family — to anything rather than to the one to whom he was giving. What of this —

Deinde, si hoc parum est, finge aliquem tormenta patris discussisse, finge in se transtulisse. Licet tibi, in quantum velis, extendere beneficia filii, cum paternum munus et simplex sit et facile et danti voluptarium, quod necesse est ille multis dederit, etiam quibus dedisse se nescit, in quo consortem habet, in quo spectavit legem, patriam, praemia patrum, domus ac familiae perpetuitatem, omnia potius quam eum, cui dabat. Quid?

if someone, having attained wisdom, has handed it on to his father — shall we still dispute whether he has now given something greater than he had received, when he has given back to his father a happy life, and received only life?

si quis sapientiam consecutus hanc patri tradiderit, etiamnunc disputabimus, an maius aliquid iam dederit, quam acceperat, cum vitam beatam patri reddiderit, acceperit tantum vitam?

"But it is your father’s benefit," he says, "whatever you do, whatever you are able to render him." And it is my teacher’s benefit that I made progress in liberal studies; yet we go beyond the very men who handed those things on, at any rate beyond those who taught us the first elements; and although without them no one could attain anything, still, however much a man has attained, he is not below them. There is a great distance between the first things and the greatest, nor are the first things therefore equal to the greatest, merely because without the first the greatest cannot exist.

" Sed patris," inquit, " beneficium est, quidquid facis, quidquid praestare illi potes." Et praeceptoris mei, quod institutis liberalibus profeci; ipsos tamen, qui tradiderunt illa, transcendimus, utique eos, qui prima elementa docuerunt, et quamvis sine illis nemo quicquam adsequi posset, non tamen, quantumcumque quis adsecutus est, infra illos est. Multum inter prima ac maxima interest, nec ideo prima maximorum instar sunt, quia sine primis maxima esse non possunt.

Now it is time to bring out some coin, so to speak, from our own mint. He who has given that benefit than which something is better can be surpassed. The father gave his son life; but there is something better than life; so the father can be surpassed, because he gave a benefit than which something is better.

Iam tempus est quaedam ex nostra, ut ita dicam, moneta proferre. Qui id beneficium dedit, quo est aliquid melius, potest vinci. Pater dedit filio vitam, est autem aliquid vita melius; ita pater vinci potest, quia dedit beneficium, quo est aliquid melius.

Again, the man who has given someone life, if he has been freed once and a second time from the peril of death, has received a greater benefit than he gave. Now the father gave life; therefore, if he has been freed more than once from the peril of death by his son, he can receive a greater benefit than he gave.

Etiamnunc, qui dedit alicui vitam, si et semel et iterum liberatus est mortis periculo, maius accepit beneficium quam dedit. Pater autem vitam dedit potest ergo, si saepius periculo mortis liberatus a filio fuerit, maius beneficium accipere quam dedit.

He who receives a benefit receives the greater the more he needs it. Now the man who lives needs life more than the man who is not yet born — who cannot even need it at all; therefore the father receives a greater benefit, if he receives life from his son, than the son from his father, in being born.

Qui beneficium accipit, maius accipit, quo magis eo indiget. Magis autem indiget vita, qui vivit, quam qui natus non est, ut qui ne indigere quidem omnino possit; maius ergo beneficium accipit pater, si vitam a filio accipit, quam filius a patre, quod natus est.

"The father’s benefits cannot be surpassed by the son’s. Why? Because he received life from his father, which, had he not received, he could have given no benefits." This the father has in common with all who have given anyone life; for they could not have returned gratitude had they not received life. Therefore neither can gratitude be returned in greater measure to a physician (for a physician too is wont to give life), nor to a sailor, if he has rescued a shipwrecked man. And yet the benefits both of these and of others who have in some way given us life can be surpassed; therefore the benefits of fathers can be too.

" Patris beneficia vinci a filii beneficiis non possunt. Quare? Quia vitam accepit a patre, quam nisi accepisset, nulla dare beneficia potuisset." Hoc commune est patri eum omnibus, qui vitam alicui dederunt; non potuissent enim referre gratiam, nisi vitam accepissent. Ergo nec medico gratia in maius referri potest (solet enim et medicus vitam dare), nec nautae, si naufragum sustulit. Atqui et horum et aliorum, qui aliquo modo nobis vitam dederunt, beneficia vinci possunt; ergo et patrum possunt.

If someone has given me a benefit that needed the help of many benefits, while I have given him a benefit that needed no one’s aid, I have given more than I received. The father gave his son a life that would perish unless many things were added to guard it; if the son has given his father life, he has given a life that would require no one’s help to endure; therefore the father who received life received a greater benefit from his son than he himself gave him.

Si quis mihi beneficium dedit, quod multorum beneficiis adiuvandum esset, ego autem illi beneficium dedi id, quod nullius egeret adiutorio, maius dedi quam accepi. Pater filio vitam dedit perituram, nisi multa accessissent, quae illam tuerentur; filius patri si dedit vitam, dedit eam, quae nullius desideraret auxilium in hoc, ut permaneret; ergo maius beneficium accepit a filio pater, qui vitam accepit, quam ipse illi dedit.

These things do not destroy reverence for parents, nor make children worse toward them — rather, even better; for virtue by nature is glory-loving and longs to outstrip those who went before. Devotion will be the keener if it comes to the repaying of benefits with the hope of winning. To the fathers themselves this will fall out as a thing they wish and rejoice in, since there are many matters in which we are surpassed to our own good.

Haec non destruunt parentium venerationem nec deteriores illis liberos faciunt, immo etiam meliores; natura enim gloriosa virtus est et anteire priores cupit. Alacrior erit pietas, si ad reddenda beneficia eum vincendi spe venerit. Ipsis patribus id volentibus laetisque contigerit, quoniam pleraque sunt, in quibus nostro bono vincimur.

Whence comes a contest so desirable? Whence so great a happiness for parents — that they confess themselves unequal to the benefits of their children? Unless we judge it so, we give children an excuse and make them slower to return gratitude, when we ought to add the goad and say: "Set to it, you excellent young men! An honorable contest is set before parents and children — whether the parents have given more, or received. The parents have not won merely because they came first.

Unde certamen tam optabile? Unde tantam felicitatem parentibus, ut fateantur ipsos liberorum beneficiis impares? Nisi hoc ita iudicamus, excusationem damus liberis et illos segniores ad referendam gratiam facimus, quibus stimulos adicere debemus et dicere: " Hoc agite, optimi iuvenes! Proposita est inter parentes ac liberos honesta contentio, dederint maiora an receperint. Non ideo vicerunt, quia occupaverunt.

Only take up the spirit that befits you, and do not flag: you will conquer those who wish you to win. Nor does so fair a contest lack leaders, who urge you to like deeds, and bid you go in their own footsteps to a victory already often won over parents."

Sumite modo animum, qualem decet, et deficere nolite: vincetis optantes. Nec desunt tam pulchro certamini duces, qui ad similia vos cohortentur ac per vestigia sua ire ad victoriam saepe iam partam ex parentibus iubeant.

"Aeneas surpassed his father — Aeneas, who in his own infancy had been his father’s light and safe burden, now carried him, heavy with age, through the midst of the enemy’s columns and through the falling ruins of the city about him, while the scrupulous old man, clasping the sacred objects and the household gods, weighed down his bearer with no single load; he bore him through the fires and (what can devotion not do?) bore him to the end, and set him to be honored among the founders of the Roman empire. Sicilian youths surpassed their parents: when Etna, driven by a greater force, had poured out its fire upon the cities, the fields, a great part of the island, they carried their parents to safety; it was believed that the flames parted, and that, the fire drawing back on either side, a path was opened for the young men to run through — youths most worthy to dare great things in safety. Antigonus surpassed his father: having overcome the enemy in a vast battle, he transferred the prize of war to his father and handed over to him the kingship of Cyprus. This is true kingship — to be unwilling to reign, when you can. Manlius surpassed his father — a domineering one indeed — who, having earlier been banished for a time by his father on account of his dull and sluggish youth, came to the tribune of the plebs who had set a day of trial for his father; the tribune granted him an interview in the hope that he would betray his hated parent (and believed he had deserved well of the young man, whose exile he was charging against Manlius among other things, as a most grievous offense), but the youth, once he had got his man alone, drew the sword hidden in his cloak and said: ’Unless you swear to remit my father’s day of trial, I shall run you through with this sword. It is in your power which way my father shall have no accuser.’ The tribune swore, and did not break his word, and gave the assembly the reason for dropping the action. No one else was ever allowed to reduce a tribune to the ranks and go unpunished."

" Vicit Aeneas patrem, ipse eius in infantia leve tutumque gestamen, gravem senio per media hostium agmina et per cadentis circa se urbis ruinas ferens, cum complexus sacra ac penates deos religiosus senex non simplici vadentem sarcina premeret; tulit illum per ignes et (quid non pietas potest?) pertulit colendumque inter conditores Romani imperii posuit. " Vicere Siculi iuvenes: cum Aetna maiore vi peragitata in urbes, in agros, in magnam insulae partem effudisset incendium, vexerunt parentes suos; discessisse creditum est ignes et utrimque flamma recedente limitem adapertum, per quem transcurrerent iuvenes dignissimi, qui magna tuto auderent. " Vicit Antigonus, qui, cum ingenti proelio superasset hostem, praemium belli ad patrem transtulit et imperium illi Cypri tradidit. Hoc est regnum nolle regnare, cum possis. " Vicit patrem imperiosum quidem Manlius, qui, eum ante ad tempus relegatus esset a patre ob adulescentiam brutam et hebetem, ad tribunum plebis, qui patri suo diem dixerat, venit; petito tempore, quod ille dederat sperans fore proditorem parentis invisi, (et bene meruisse se de iuvene credebat, cuius exilium pro gravissimo crimine inter alia Manlio obiciebat), nanctus adulescens secretum stringit occultatum sinu ferrum et: ’ Nisi iuras,’ inquit, ’ te diem patri remissuruin, hoc te gladio transfodiam. In tua potestate est, utro modo pater meus accusatorem non habeat.’ Iuravit tribunus nec fefellit et causam actionis omissae contioni reddidit. Nulli alii licuit impune tribunum in ordinem redigere.

There are example after example of men who have snatched their parents from danger, who have lifted them from the lowest to the highest, and from the commons and the nameless heap have given them to the ages, never to be passed over in silence.

Alia ex aliis exempla sunt eorum, qui parentes suos periculis eripuerint, qui ex infimo ad summum protulerint et e plebe acervoque ignobili numquam tacendos saeculis dederint.

By no force of words, by no faculty of talent, can it be expressed how great a thing it is, how praiseworthy, and how it will never pass out of the memory of men, to be able to say this: "I obeyed my parents, I yielded to their command, whether it was fair or unfair and harsh; I showed myself compliant and submissive; in this one thing alone I was defiant — that I might not be surpassed in benefits.

Nulla vi verborum, nulla ingenii facultate exprimi potest, quantum opus sit, quam laudabile quamque numquam memoria hominum exiturum, posse hoc dicere: ’ Parentibus meis parui, cessi imperio eorum, sive aecum sive inicum ac durum fuit, obsequentem submissumque me praebui; ad hoc unum contumax fui, ne beneficiis vincerer.

Strive, I beseech you, and even when weary restore the battle-line. Happy those who shall conquer, happy those who shall be conquered! What is more glorious than that young man who will be able to say to himself (for it is not right for another to say it): ’I have surpassed my father in benefits’? What more fortunate than that old man who will proclaim to everyone everywhere that he has been surpassed by his son in benefits? What, indeed, is happier than to be outdone there?"

’ Certate, obsecro vos, et fessi quoque restituite aciem. Felices, qui vincent, felices, qui vincentur! Quid eo adulescente praeclarius, qui sibi ipsi dicere poterit (neque enim est fas alteri dicere): ’Patrem meum beneficiis vici’? Quid eo fortunatius sene, qui omnibus ubique praedicabit a filio se suo beneficiis victum? Quid autem est felicius quam ibi cedere? "

Of all the matters we have handled, Aebutius Liberalis, none can seem so necessary, or — as Sallust says — to be treated with such care, as the one now in hand: whether to give a benefit, and in turn to return gratitude, are things to be sought for their own sake.

Ex omnibus, quae tractavimus, Aebuti Liberalis, potest videri nihil tam necessarium aut magis, ut ait Sallustius, cum cura dicendum, quam quod in manibus est: an beneficium dare et in vicem gratiam referre per se res expetendae sint.

There are men to be found who cultivate the honorable for a wage, to whom virtue without pay is no pleasure — virtue that has nothing magnificent in it, if any part of it is for sale. For what is baser than to reckon up how much a good man is worth, when virtue neither lures with gain nor frightens off with loss, and is so far from corrupting anyone by hope and promise that, on the contrary, she bids him spend upon her, and lies more often in what is freely paid out? She must be approached over trampled-down advantages; wherever she has called, wherever she has sent, one must go without regard for one’s household estate, sometimes even without any sparing of one’s own blood, and her command must never be shirked.

Inveniuntur, qui honesta in mercedem colant quibusque non placeat virtus gratuita; quae nihil habet in se magnificum, si quicquam venale. Quid enim est turpius, quam aliquem computare, quanti vir bonus sit, cum virtus nec lucro invitet nec absterreat damno adeoque neminem spe ac pollicitatione corrumpam ut contra impendere in se iubeat et saepius in ultro tributis sit? Calcatis ad illam utilitatibus eundum est; quocumque vocavit, quocumque misit, sine respectu rei familiaris, interdum etiam sine ulla sanguinis sui parsimonia vadendum nec umquam imperium eius detractandum.

"What shall I gain," he says, "if I do this bravely, if I do this gratefully?" The having done it; nothing beyond is promised you. If any advantage chances to come your way, you will count it among the extras. The price of honorable things is in themselves. If the honorable is to be sought for its own sake, and a benefit is honorable, then it can have no other condition, since its nature is the same. And that the honorable is to be sought for its own sake has often and abundantly been proved.

" Quid consequar," inquit, " si hoc fortiter, si hoc grate fecero? " Quod feceris; nihil tibi extra promittitur. Si quid commodi forte obvenerit, inter accessiones numerabis. Rerum honestarum pretium in ipsis est. Si honestum per se expetendum est, beneficium autem honestum est, non potest alia eius condicio esse, cum eadem natura sit. Per se autem expetendum esse honestum saepe et abunde probatum est.

On this point we have a fight with the Epicureans — a soft and shade-loving crowd, philosophizing at their own banquet, among whom virtue is the handmaid of pleasures, obeys them, is their servant, sees them set above herself. "There is no pleasure," you say, "without virtue."

In hac parte nobis pugna est cum Epicureis, delicata et umbratica turba in convivio suo philosophantium, apud quos virtus voluptatum ministra est, illis paret, illis deservit, illas supra se videt. " Non est," inquis, " voluptas sine virtute."

But why is she placed before virtue? Do you think the dispute is about order? It is the whole matter, and her authority, that is in question. It is not virtue, if it can follow; hers is the first part, she ought to lead, to command, to stand in the highest place; and you bid her ask for the watchword! "What," he says, "does it matter to you?

Sed quare ante virtutem est? De ordine putas disputationem esse? De re tota et de potestate eius ambigitur. Non est virtus, si sequi potest; primae partes eius sunt, ducere debet, imperare, summo loco stare; tu illam iubes signum petere! " Quid," inquit, " tua refert?

I too deny that a happy life can stand without virtue. The very pleasure I pursue, to which I have made myself over, I disapprove and condemn once virtue is removed. This one thing only is disputed: whether virtue is the cause of the highest good, or is herself the highest good." To settle this one question, do you suppose it a mere change of order? No, it is confusion, and manifest blindness, to prefer the last things to the first.

Et ego sine virtute nego beatam vitam posse constare. Ipsam voluptatem, quam sequor, cui me emancipavi, remota illa improbo et damno. De hoc uno disputatur, utrum virtus summi boni causa sit an ipsa summum bonum." Ut hoc unum quaeratur, ordinis tantum existimas mutationem? Ista vero confusio est et manifesta caecitas primis postrema praeferre.

I am not indignant that virtue is placed after pleasure, but that she is placed with pleasure at all — she who scorns it and is its enemy, who recoils as far as possible from it, more at home with toil and with pain, with manly hardships, than with that effeminate good.

Non indignor, quod post voluptatem ponitur virtus, sed quod omnino cum voluptate, contemptrix eius et hostis et longissime ab illa resiliens, labori ac dolori familiarior, virilibus incommodis, quam isti effeminato bono.

These things had to be inserted, my Liberalis, because to give a benefit, the subject now before us, belongs to virtue, and it is most base to give it for the sake of anything other than that it be given. For if we bestowed it in the hope of recovery, we should give to the richest man, not the worthiest; but as it is, we prefer a poor man to a troublesome rich one. That is no benefit which has an eye to fortune.

Inserenda haec, mi Liberalis, fuerunt, quia beneficium, de quo nunc agitur, dare virtutis est et turpissimum id causa ullius alterius rei dare, quam ut datum sit. Nam si recipiendi spe tribueremus, locupletissimo cuique, non dignissimo daremus; nunc vero diviti importuno pauperem praeferimus. Non est beneficium, quod ad fortunam spectat.

Besides, if utility alone invited us to do good, those who could do so most easily ought least of all to distribute benefits — the wealthy and the powerful and kings, who have no need of another’s help; and the gods, in truth, would not give the countless gifts they pour out without ceasing by day and night; for their own nature suffices them for all things and renders them full and safe and inviolable; therefore they will give a benefit to no one, if the sole cause of giving is to regard oneself and one’s own advantage.

Praeterea, si, ut prodessemus, sola nos invitaret utilitas, minime beneficia distribuere deberent, qui facillime possent, locupletes et potentes et reges aliena ope non indigentes; di vero tot munera, quae sine intermissione diebus ac noctibus fundunt, non darent; in omnia enim illis natura sua sufficit plenosque et tutos et inviolabiles praestat; nulli ergo beneficium dabunt, si una dandi causa est se intueri ae suum commodum.

That is not benefit but usury — to look about not for where you may best place it, but for where you may hold it most profitably, from which you may most easily take it back. And since this is far removed from the gods, it follows that they would be ungenerous; for if the sole cause of giving a benefit is the giver’s advantage, while no advantage is to be hoped from us by a god, then a god has no cause to give a benefit at all.

Istud non beneficium, sed fenus est circumspicere, non ubi optime ponas, sed ubi quaestuosissime habeas, unde facillime tollas. Quod cum longe a dis remotum sit, sequitur, ut inliberales sint; nam si una beneficii dandi causa sit dantis utilitas, nulla autem ex nobis utilitas deo speranda est, nulla deo dandi beneficii causa est.

I know what is answered at this point: "And so a god gives no benefits, but, untroubled and heedless of us, turned away from the world, does something else — or, what seems to Epicurus the greatest happiness, does nothing — and benefits touch him no more than injuries."

Scio, quid hoc loco respondeatur: " Itaque non dat deus beneficia, sed securus et neclegens nostri, aversus a mundo aliud agit aut, quae maxima Epicuro felicitas videtur, nihil agit, nec magis illum beneficia quam iniuriae tangunt."

He who says this does not hear the voices of those who pray, and of those who, with hands lifted to heaven on every side, make their vows, private and public; which assuredly would not happen, nor would all mortals have agreed in this madness of addressing deaf divinities and ineffectual gods, had we not known their benefits — now offered unasked, now given to those who pray — great, timely, dissolving huge threats by their intervention.

Hoc qui dicit, non exaudit precantium voces et undique sublatis in caelum manibus vota facientium privata ac publica; quod profecto non fieret, nec in hunc furorem omnes profecto mortales consensissent adloquendi surda numina et inefficaces deos, nisi nossemus illorum beneficia nunc oblata ultro, nunc orantibus data, magna, tempestiva, ingentes minas interventu suo solventia.

And who is so wretched, so neglected, who so born to a hard fate and to punishment, that he has not felt so great a munificence of the gods? Look around at those very men who bewail their lot and complain: you will find that they are not wholly without share in the heavenly benefits, that there is no one to whom something has not flowed from that most generous spring. And is that little which is distributed equally to all at birth? To pass over the things that follow, dispensed by an unequal measure — did nature give little, when she gave herself?

Quis est autem tam miser, tam neclectus, quis tam duro fato et in poenam genitus, ut non tantam deorum munificentiam senserit? Ipsos illos complorantes sortem suam et querulos circumspice: invenies non ex toto beneficiorum caelestium expertes, neminem esse, ad quem non aliquid ex illo benignissimo fonte manaverit. Parum est autem id, quod nascentibus ex aequo distribuitur? Ut quae secuntur inaequali dispensata mensura transeamus, parum dedit natura, cum se dedit?

"A god gives no benefits." Whence, then, these things you possess, which you give, which you refuse, which you keep, which you snatch? Whence these countless things that soothe the eyes, the ears, the mind? Whence that abundance which equips even our luxury (for provision has been made not for our needs alone; we are loved all the way to our indulgences)?

" Non dat deus beneficia." Unde ergo ista, quae possides, quae das, quae negas, quae servas, quae rapis? Unde haec innumerabilia oculos, aures, animum mulcentia? Unde illa luxuriam quoque instruens copia (neque enim necessitatibus tantummodo nostris provisum est; usque in delicias amamur)?

So many trees fruitful in more than one way, so many healing herbs, so many varieties of food spread through the whole year, so that the earth might offer even to the idle a chance sustenance? And animals of every kind — some born on the dry and solid land, some in the wet, some let down through the heights — so that every part of nature might bring us some tribute?

Tot arbusta non uno modo frugifera, tot herbae salutares, tot varietates ciborum per totum annum digestae, ut inerti quoque fortuita terrae alimenta praeberent? Iam animalia omnis generis, alia in sicco solidoque, alia in umido nascentia, alia per sublime demissa, ut omnis rerum naturae pars tributum aliquod nobis conferret?

These rivers girdling the plains with their loveliest windings, those moving with a vast and navigable course to offer commerce a road, some of which in the days of summer draw a marvelous increase, so that the sudden force of a summer torrent waters places parched and lying under a burning sky? What of the veins of medicinal springs? What of the welling-up of warm waters on the very shores? And you, greatest Larius, and you, Benacus, rising with a swell and a roar like the sea’s?

Flumina haec amoenissimis flexibus campos cingentia, illa praebitura commercio viam vasto et navigabili cursu vadentia, ex quibus quaedam aestatis diebus mirabile incrementum trahunt, ut arida et ferventi subiecta caelo loca subita vis aestivi torrentis irriget? Quid mercatorum torrentium venae? Quid in ipsis litoribus aquarum calentium exundatio? Te, Lari maxime, teque, fluctibus et fremitu adsurgens, Benace, marino?

If someone had given you a few acres, you would say you had received a benefit; the immense expanses of lands stretching far and wide — do you deny that they are a benefit? If someone gives you money and fills your strongbox, because that seems great to you, you will call it a benefit; God has buried so many metals, sent forth so many rivers over the lands across which they run, carrying gold; an immense weight of silver, bronze, and iron lies heaped in every place, and he gave you the means of finding it out, and set on the surface of the earth the signs of the riches that lie hidden — and you deny that you have received a benefit?

Si pauca quis tibi donasset iugera, accepisse te diceres beneficium; immensa terrarum late patentium spatia negas esse beneficium? Si pecuniam tibi aliquis donaverit et arcam tuam, quoniam tibi id ma gnum videtur, impleverit, beneficium vocabis; tot metalla deus defodit, tot flumina emisit terra, super quae decurrunt sola, aurum vehentia; argenti, aeris, ferri immane pondus omnibus locis obrutum, cuius investigandi tibi facultatem dedit, ac latentium divitiarum in summa terra signa disposuit: negas te accepisse beneficium?

If a house were given to you, in which some marble gleamed and the ceiling were brightened with gold or sprinkled with colors, you would call it no ordinary gift. He has built you an enormous dwelling without any fear of fire or collapse, in which you see not thin veneers slenderer than the very blade by which they are cut, but whole masses of the most precious stone, all of varied and patterned material, of which you marvel at tiny fragments, and a ceiling shining one way by night, another by day — and you deny that you have received any gift?

Si domus tibi donetur, in qua marmoris aliquid resplendeat et tectum nitidi us auro aut coloribus sparsum, non mediocre munus vocabis. Ingens tibi domicilium sine ullo incendii aut ruinae metu struxit, in quo vides non tenues crustas et ipsa, qua secantur, lamna gracili ores, sed integras lapidis pretiosissimi moles, sed totas variae distinctaeque materiae, cuius tu parvula frusta miraris, tectum vero aliter nocte, aliter interdiu fulgens: negas te ullum munus accepisse?

And while you value highly the things you have — which is the mark of an ungrateful man — do you judge that you owe nothing to anyone? Whence comes that breath you draw? Whence that light by which you arrange and order the acts of your life? Whence the blood, in whose flowing the vital heat is contained? Whence those things that provoke your palate with exquisite flavors beyond satiety? Whence these stimulants of an already jaded pleasure? Whence that ease in which you rot and molder?

Et cum ista, quae habes, magno aestimes, quod est ingrati hominis, nulli debere te iudicas? Unde tibi istum, quem trahis, spiritum? Unde istam, per quam actus vitae tuae disponis atque ordinas, lucem? Unde sanguinem, cuius cursu vitalis continetur calor? Unde ista palatum tuum saporibus exquisitis ultra satietatem lacessentia? Unde haec irritamenta iam lassae voluptatis? Unde ista quies, in qua putrescis ac marces?

Will you not, if you are grateful, say: "A god gave us this ease — for he will always be a god to me; his altar a tender lamb from our folds will often stain; he it was who let my cattle roam, as you see, and let me play upon the rustic reed whatever I would."

Nonne, si gratus es, dices: Deus nobis haec otia fecit, namque erit ille mihi semper deus, illius aram saepe tener nostris ab ovilibus inbuet agnus, ille meas errare boves, ut cernis, et ipsum ludere, quae vellem, calamo permisit agresti.

That one is a god — not he who let a few cattle roam, but he who released herds over the whole world, who supplies fodder to flocks wandering everywhere at large, who set summer pastures in place of winter ones, who taught us not only to sing upon the reed and to tune a rustic and artless song to some measure at least, but contrived so many arts, so many varieties of voice, so many sounds — some to give forth song by our own breath, some by an external one.

Ille deus est, non qui paucas boves, sed qui per totum orbem armenta dimisit, qui gregibus ubique passim vagantibus pabulum praestat, qui pascua hibernis aestiva substituit, qui non calamo tantum cantare et agreste atque inconditum carmen ad aliquam tamen observationem modulari docuit, sed tot artes, tot vocum varietates, tot sonos alios spiritu nostro, alios externo cantus edituros commentus est.

For you would not call our own these things we have discovered, any more than that we grow, or that at the appointed times the body’s functions answer their turns: now the falling-out of the milk teeth, now puberty, as age rises and passes to a sturdier stage, and that last tooth which sets a limit to rising youth. Implanted in us are the seeds of all ages, of all arts, and from his hiding-place God, the master, brings forth our talents.

Neque enim nostra ista, quae invenimus, dixeris, non magis, quam quod crescimus, quam quod ad constitutum temporum sua corpori officia respondent: nunc puerilium dentium lapsus, nunc ad surgentem iam aetatem et in robustiorem gradum transeuntem pubertas et ultimus ille dens surgenti iuventae terminum ponens. Insita sunt nobis omnium aetatium, omnium artium semina, magisterque ex occulto deus producit ingenia.

"It is Nature," he says, "that provides me these things." Do you not understand that, when you say this, you only change God’s name? For what is Nature but God, and the divine reason set within the whole world and its parts? As often as you wish, you may address in another way this author of all that is ours; you will rightly call him Jupiter Best and Greatest, and the Thunderer, and the Stayer — who is Stayer and Steadier not, as the historians have handed down, because after a vow was made the line of the fleeing Romans stood firm, but because by his benefit all things stand. If you call this same one Fate, you will not be lying;

" Natura," inquit, " haec mihi praestat." Non intellegis te, cum hoc dicis, mutare nomen deo? Quid enim aliud est natura quam deus et divina ratio toti mundo partibusque eius inserta? Quotiens voles, tibi licet aliter hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare; et Iovem illum Optimum ac Maximum rite dices et Tonantem et Statorem, qui non, ut historici tradiderunt, ex eo, quod post votum susceptum acies Romanorum fugientium stetit, sed quod stant beneficio eius omnia, stator stabilitorque est. Hunc eundem et Fatum si dixeris, non mentieris;

for since Fate is nothing else than the interwoven chain of causes, he is the first cause of all, on which the rest depend. Whatever names you wish, you may fittingly apply to him — names that hold some force and effect of the heavenly things: his titles can be as many as his gifts.

nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit, quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent. Quaecumque voles, illi nomina proprie aptabis vim aliquam effectumque caelestium rerum continentia: tot appellationes eius possunt esse, quot munera.

Our people think him both Father Liber and Hercules and Mercury: Father Liber, because he is the parent of all, who first discovered the power of seeds that would provide for life through pleasure; Hercules, because his force is unconquered and, when at some time it is wearied by the works it has produced, will withdraw into fire; Mercury, because reason rests with him, and number and order and knowledge. Wherever you turn, there you will see him coming to meet you;

Hunc et Liberum patrem et Herculem ac Mercurium nostri putant: Liberum patrem, quia omnium parens sit, cui primum inventa seminum vis est vitae consultura per voluptatem; Herculem, quia vis eius invicta sit quandoque lassata fuerit operibus editis, in ignem recessura; Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est numerusque et ordo et scientia. Quocumque te flexeris, ibi illum videbis occurrentem tibi;

nothing is empty of him; he himself fills his own work. So you accomplish nothing, most ungrateful of mortals, when you deny that you owe anything to God, but rather to Nature — since neither is Nature without God nor God without Nature, but the two are the same thing, differing in their function.

nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet. Ergo nihil agis, ingratissime mortalium, qui te negas deo debere, sed naturae, quia nec natura sine deo est nec deus sine natura, sed idem est utrumque, distat officio.

If, when you had received something from Seneca, you said you owed it to Annaeus or to Lucius, you would not change your creditor but his name — since whether you named his first name, his clan name, or his surname, he would still be the same man. So now: call him Nature, Fate, Fortune; they are all names of the same god, who uses his own power in varied ways. And justice, honesty, prudence, courage, temperance are the goods of one soul; whichever of these has pleased you, it is the soul that pleases you.

Si, quod a Seneca accepisses, Annaeo te debere diceres vel Lucio, non creditorem mutares, sed nomen, quoniam, sive praenomen eius sive nomen dixisses sive cognomen, idem tamen ille esset. Sic nune naturam voca, fatum, fortunam; omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate. Et iustitia, probitas, prudentia, fortitudo, frugalitas unius animi bona sunt; quidquid horum tibi placuit, animus placet.

But — not to take up another dispute sidelong — God confers on us very many benefits, and the greatest, with no hope of recovery, since he neither needs what is given nor can we confer anything on him; therefore a benefit is a thing to be sought for its own sake. In it the recipient’s advantage alone is regarded; let us approach this, setting our own profits aside.

Sed ne aliam disputationem ex obliquo habeam, plurima beneficia ac maxima in nos deus defert sine spe recipiendi, quoniam nec ille conlato eget nec nos ei quidquam conferre possumus; ergo beneficium per se expetenda res est. Una spectatur in eo accipientis utilitas; ad hanc accedamus sepositis commodis nostris.

"You say," he objects, "that those to whom we give benefits must be chosen with care, since not even farmers commit their seed to the sands; and if this is true, we are pursuing our own advantage in giving benefits, just as in plowing and sowing — for sowing is not a thing to be sought for its own sake. Besides, you ask where and how you should give a benefit, which would not have to be done if to give a benefit were a thing to be sought for its own sake, since, in whatever place and whatever way it were given, it would be a benefit."

" Dicitis," inquit, " diligenter eligendos, quibus beneficia demus, quia ne agricolae quidem semina harenis committant; quod si verum est, nostram utilitatem in beneficiis dandis sequimur, quemadmodum in arando serendoque; neque enim serere per se res expetenda est. Praeterea quaeritis, ubi et quomodo detis beneficium, quod non esset faciendum, si per se beneficium dare expetenda res esset, quoniam, quocumque loco et quocumque modo daretur, beneficium erat."

We pursue the honorable for no other cause than for its own sake; yet, even if nothing else is to be pursued, we still ask what we are to do, and when, and how; for it consists in these. And so, when I choose to whom I shall give a benefit, my aim is that it be a benefit at all — because, if it is given to a base man, it can be neither honorable nor a benefit.

Honestum propter nullam aliam causam quam propter ipsum sequimur; tamen, etiam si nihil aliud sequendum est, quaerimus, quid faciamus et quando et quemadmodum; per haec enim constat. Itaque, cum eligo, cui dem beneficium, id ago, ut quandoque beneficium sit, quia, si turpi datur, nec honestum esse potest nec beneficium.

To return a deposit is a thing to be sought for its own sake; yet I shall not always return it, nor in any place, nor at any time. Sometimes it makes no difference whether I deny it or return it openly. I shall look to the advantage of the man to whom I am to return it, and shall deny him a deposit that will harm him. The same I shall do with a benefit.

Depositum reddere per se res expetenda est; non tamen semper reddam nec quolibet loco nec quolibet tempore. Aliquando nihil interest, utrum infitier an palam reddam. Intuebor utilitatem eius, cui redditurus sum, et nociturum illi depositum negabo. Idem in beneficio faciam.

I shall consider when to give, to whom, how, and why. For nothing is to be done without reason; and nothing is a benefit except what is given with reason, since reason is the companion of all that is honorable. How often do we hear this cry from men reproaching their own ill-considered gift:

Videbo, quando dem, cui dem, quemadmodum, quare. Nihil enim sine ratione faciendum est; non est autem beneficium, nisi quod ratione datur, quoniam ratio omnis honesti comes est. Quam saepe hominum donationem suam inconsultam obiurgantium hanc exaudimus vocem:

"I would rather have lost it than have given it to him!" An ill-considered gift is the basest kind of loss, and it is far worse to have given a benefit badly than not to have recovered one; for that we do not recover is another’s fault — that we did not choose to whom we should give is our own.

" Mallem perdidisse quam illi dedisse "! Turpissimum genus damni est inconsulta donatio multoque gravius male dedisse beneficium quam non recepisse; aliena enim culpa est, quod non recipimus; quod, cui daremus, non elegimus, nostra.

In choosing, nothing shall I regard less than this, which you suppose chief — from whom I am to recover; for choose the man who is grateful, not the one who will repay; for often the man who will not repay is grateful, and the man who has repaid is ungrateful.

In electione nihil minus quam hoc, quod tu existimas, spectabo, a quo recepturus sim; elige enim eum, qui gratus, non qui redditurus sit, saepe autem et non redditurus gratus est et ingratus, qui reddidit.

My appraisal reaches toward the soul; therefore I shall pass over the rich but unworthy man and give to a poor good one; for he will be grateful in the depth of want, and when all things fail him, the soul will remain over.

Ad animum tendit aestimatio mea; ideo locupletem sed indignum praeteribo, pauperi viro bono dabo; erit enim in summa inopia gratus et, cum omnia illi deerunt, supererit animus.

I take no gain from a benefit, no pleasure, no glory; content to please one man only, I shall give for this — that I do what I ought. But what one ought is not without choosing. You ask what kind of choice it will be? I shall choose a man upright, straightforward, mindful, grateful, who keeps off another’s goods and is not greedily tight with his own, well-disposed; and once I have chosen him, though fortune grant him nothing with which to return the favor, the thing will have been done as I intended.

Non lucrum ex beneficio capto, non voluptatem, non gloriam; uni placere contentus in hoc dabo, ut quod oportet faciam. Quod oportet autem non est sine electione. Quae qualis futura sit, interrogas? Eligam virum integrum, simplicem, memorem, gratum, alieni abstinentem, sui non avare tenacem, benevolum; hunc ego cum elegero, licet nihil illi fortuna tribuat, ex quo referre gratiam possit, ex sententia gesta res erit.

If advantage and sordid calculation make me generous, if I help no one except that he may help me in turn, I shall give no benefit to a man setting out for distant and far-off regions, never to return; I shall give none to a man so stricken that he has no hope of recovering; I shall give none when I myself am failing, for I have no time to recover it.

Si utilitas me et sordida computatio liberalem facit, si nulli prosum, nisi ut in vicem ille mihi prosit, non dabo beneficium proficiscenti in diversas longinquasque regiones, afuturo semper; non dabo sic adfecto, ut spes ei nulla sit convalescendi; non dabo ipse deficiens, non enim habeo recipiendi tempus.

And yet, that you may know that to do good is a thing to be sought for its own sake: to strangers just carried into our harbor, about to leave at once, we bring aid; to an unknown shipwrecked man we both give and build a ship in which he may sail home. He departs scarcely knowing well the author of his rescue, and, never to return into our sight again, he assigns the gods to us as debtors and prays that they may return the favor on his behalf; meanwhile the consciousness of a barren benefit gladdens us. What of this —

Atqui ut scias rem per se expetendam esse bene facere, advenis modo in nostrum delatis portum, statim abituris, succurrimus; ignoto naufrago navem, qua revehatur, et damus et struimus. Discedit ille vix satis noto salutis auctore et numquam amplius in conspectum nostrum reversurus debitores nobis deos delegat precaturque, illi pro se gratiam referant; interim nos iuvat sterilis beneficii conscientia. Quid?

when we have come to the very end of life, when we set our will in order, do we not distribute benefits that will profit us nothing? How much time is spent, how long it is pondered in private — how much, and to whom, we should give! For what does it matter to whom we give, when we shall recover from no one?

cum in ipso vitae fine constitimus, cum testamentum ordinamus, non beneficia nihil nobis profutura dividimus? Quantum temporis consumitur, quam diu secreto agitur, quantum et quibus demus! Quid enim interest, quibus demus a nullo recepturi?

And yet never do we give more carefully, never do we wring our judgments harder, than when, advantages removed, the honorable alone has stood before our eyes — we who are bad judges of our duties just so long as hope and fear and that most slothful vice, pleasure, corrupt them. When death has shut off everything and sent an uncorrupted judge to deliver the verdict, we seek out the worthiest to whom to hand our goods, and we settle nothing with more sacred care than what does not concern us.

Atqui numquam diligentius damus, numquam magis iudicia nostra torquemus, quam ubi remotis utilitatibus solum ante oculos honestum stetit, tam diu officiorum mali iudices, quam diu illa depravat spes ac metus et inertissimum vitium, voluptas. Ubi mors interclusit omnia et ad ferendam sententiam incorruptum iudicem misit, quaerimus dignissimos, quibus nostra tradamus, nec quicquam cura sanctiore componimus, quam quod ad nos non pertinet. At mehercules tunc magna voluptas subit cogitantem:

But, by Hercules, then a great pleasure steals over a man as he thinks: "This man I shall make richer, and on his standing I shall pour some splendor by adding to his wealth." If we give no benefits except when we are to recover them, then we must die intestate!

" Hunc ego locupletiorem faciam, et huius dignitati adiectis opibus aliquid splendoris adfundam." Si non damus beneficia nisi recepturi, intestatis moriendum sit!

"You say," he objects, "that a benefit is a loan that cannot be called in; but a loan is not a thing to be sought for its own sake." When we call it a loan, we use an image, a figure of speech; for in the same way we call law the rule of the just and the unjust, and a rule is not a thing to be sought for its own sake. We come down to these words for the sake of illustrating the matter; when I say "loan," it is understood as if a loan. Do you want proof? I add the word "uncollectable" — and there is no true loan that cannot or ought not be paid.

"Dicitis," inquit, "beneficium creditum insolubile esse; creditum autem non est res per se expetenda." Cum creditum dicimus, imagine et translation utimur; sic enim et legem dicimus iusti iniustique regulam esse, et regula non est res per se expetenda. Ad haec verba demonstrandae rei causa descendimus; eum dico creditum, intellegitur tamquam creditum. Vis scire? Adicio insolubile, eum creditum nullum non solvi aut possit aut debeat.

So far is a benefit from having to be given for the sake of advantage that often, as I have said, it must be given at one’s own loss and risk. Thus I defend a man hemmed in by bandits, that he may be let pass in safety; I protect a defendant struggling against influence and turn the faction of powerful men upon myself — the filth I scrape off him I shall perhaps take on under the same accusers, when I could cross to the other side and watch others’ struggles untroubled; I go surety for a man condemned, and when a friend’s goods are put up at auction I tear down the notice, binding myself to his creditors; to save a man proscribed, I myself enter the danger of proscription.

Adeo beneficium utilitatis causa dandum non est, ut saepe, quemadmodum dixi, cum damno ac periculo dandum sit. Sic latronibus circumventum defendo, ut tuto transire permittatur; reum gratia laborantem tueor et hominum potentium factionem in me converto, quas illi detraxero sordes, sub accusatoribus isdem fortasse sumpturus, cum abire in partem alteram possim et securus spectare aliena certamina; spondeo pro iudicato et suspensis amici bonis libellum deicio creditoribus eius me obligaturus; ut possim servare proscriptum, ipse proscriptionis periculum adeo.

No one about to buy an estate at Tusculum or Tibur, for his health and a summer’s retreat, argues over in what year his purchase will pay for itself; once he has it, it must be kept up.

Nemo Tusculanum aut Tiburtinum paraturus salubritatis causa et aestivi secessus, quoto anno empturus sit, disputat; cum erit, tuendum est.

The same reasoning holds for a benefit; for when you ask what it returns, I shall answer: a good conscience. What does a benefit return? Tell me yourself — what does justice return, what innocence, what greatness of soul, what chastity, what temperance? If you seek anything beyond these themselves, it is not these you seek. To what end does the universe unwind its successions?

Eadem in beneficio ratio est; nam cum interrogaveris, quid reddat, respondebo: bonam conscientiam. Quid reddat beneficium? Dic tu mihi, quid reddat iustitia, quid innocentia, quid magnitudo animi, quid pudicitia, quid temperantia; si quicquam praeter ipsas, ipsas non petis. In quid mundus vices suas solvit?

To what end does the sun lengthen the day and draw it in? All these are benefits, for they are done to profit us. As it is the office of the universe to wheel round the order of things, as it is the sun’s to change the places from which it rises and into which it sets, and to do these things to our good without reward, so it is a man’s office, among the rest, to give a benefit too. Why then does he give? So as not to fail to give, not to lose the chance of doing good.

In quid sol diem extendit et contrahit? Omnia ista beneficia sunt, fiunt enim nobis profutura. Quomodo mundi officium est circumagere rerum ordinem, quomodo solis loca mutare, ex quibus oriatur, in quae cadat, et haec salutaria nobis facere sine praemio, ita viri officium est inter alia et beneficium dare. Quare ergo dat? Ne non det, ne occasionem bene faciendi perdat.

For you, pleasure is to make the poor little body the creature of idle leisure, to crave a security most like sleep, to lurk under thick shade and set against the most delicate musings — which you call tranquility — the torpor of a languishing mind, and within the hiding-places of your gardens to fatten with food and drink bodies pale with sloth;

Vobis voluptas est inertis otii facere corpusculum et securitatem sopitis simillimam appetere et sub densa umbra latitare tenerrimisque cogitationibus, quas tranquillitatem vocatis, animi marcentis obiectare torporem et cibis potionibusque intra hortorum latebram corpora ignavia pallentia saginare;

for us, pleasure is to give benefits — laborious though they be, so long as they lighten others’ labors; perilous, so long as they draw others out of perils; weighing down our own accounts, so long as they loosen the needs and straits of others.

nobis voluptas est dare beneficia vel laboriosa, dum aliorum labores levent, vel periculosa, dum alios periculis extrahant, vel rationes nostras adgravatura, dum aliorum necessitates et angustias laxent.

What does it matter to me whether I get benefits back? Even when I have got them back, they must be given again. A benefit looks to the good of the one it is bestowed on, not to ours; otherwise we give it to ourselves. And so many things that bring others the highest advantage lose their grace by their price. The merchant profits cities, the doctor the sick, the slave-dealer his wares; but all these, because they come to another’s advantage for the sake of their own, do not put under obligation those they profit. That is no benefit which is sent out for gain. "I shall give this and get that" — that is an auction.

Quid mea interest, an recipiam beneficia? Etiam cum recepero, danda sunt. Beneficium eius commodum spectat, cui praestatur, non nostrum; alioquin nobis illud damus. Itaque multa, quae summam utilitatem aliis adferunt, pretio gratiam perdunt. Mercator urbibus prodest, medicus aegris, mango venalibus; sed omnes isti, quia ad alienum commodum pro suo veniunt, non obligant eos, quibus prosunt. Non est beneficium, quod in quaestum mittitur. " Hoc dabo et hoc recipiam " auctio est.

I shall not call her chaste who repelled her lover only to inflame him, who feared either the law or her husband; as Ovid says: "She who did not give because it was not allowed — she gave." Not without cause is she counted among the sinners, who rendered her chastity to her fear, not to herself. In the same way, he who gave a benefit in order to get it back has not given.

Non dicam pudicam, quae amatorem ut incenderet reppulit, quae aut legem aut virum timuit; ut ait Ovidius: Quae, quia non licuit, non dedit, illa dedit. Non immerito in numerum peccantium refertur, quae pudicitiam timori praestitit, non sibi. Eodem modo, qui beneficium ut reciperet dedit, non dedit.

So then we give a benefit, do we, to the animals we rear to be of use or food! We give a benefit to the orchards we tend, lest they suffer from drought or the hardness of unstirred and neglected soil!

Ergo et nos beneficium damus animalibus, quae aut usui aut alimento futura nutrimus! Beneficium damus arbustis, quae colimus, ne siccitate aut immoti et neclecti soli duritia laborent!

No one comes to the tilling of a field out of fairness and goodness, nor to any thing whose fruit lies outside itself; to the giving of a benefit one is led by no thought greedy or sordid, but human, generous, eager to give even when it has given, and to swell the old gifts with new and fresh ones, with one aim only: how great a good it will be to the man on whom it is bestowed. Otherwise it is low — without praise, without glory — to do good because it is expedient.

Nemo ad agrum colendum ex aequo et bono venit nec ad ullam rem, cuius extra ipsam fructus est; ad beneficium dandum non adducit cogitatio avara nec sordida, sed humana, liberalis, cupiens dare, etiam eum dederit, et augere novis ac recentibus vetera, unum habens propositum, quanto ei, cui praestat, bono futura sit; alioqui humile est, sine laude, sine gloria, prodesse, quia expedit.

What is grand about loving oneself, sparing oneself, acquiring for oneself? From all these the true desire of giving a benefit calls us away; it lays its hand on us and drags us toward loss and forsakes advantages, most delighted by the very work of doing good.

Quid magnifici est se amare, sibi parcere, sibi adquirere? Ab omnibus istis vera beneficii dandi cupido avocat, ad detrimentum iniecta manu trahit et utilitates relinquit ipso bene faciendi opere laetissima.

Is there any doubt that injury is the opposite of a benefit? As to do injury is a thing in itself to be avoided and shunned, so to give a benefit is a thing in itself to be sought. There baseness outweighs all the rewards that urge to crime; to this the in-itself-compelling face of the honorable invites us.

Numquid dubium est, quin contraria sit beneficio iniuria? Quomodo iniuriam facere per se vitanda ac fugienda res est, sic beneficium dare per se expetenda. Illic turpitudo contra omnia praemia in scelus hortantia valet; ad hoc invitat honesti per se efficax species.

I shall not lie if I say that there is no one who does not love his own benefits, no one so disposed in mind as not to look more gladly on the man on whom he has heaped much, for whom the once-giving is itself a reason to give again. This would not happen unless benefits themselves delighted us. How often you may hear a man say:

Non mentiar, si dixero neminem non amare beneficia sua, neminem non ita compositum animo, ut libentius eum videat, in quem multa congessit, cui non causa sit iterum dandi beneficii semel dedisse. Quod non accideret, nisi ipsa nos delectarent beneficia. Quam saepe dicentem audias:

"I cannot bear to abandon the man to whom I gave life, whom I snatched from danger. He asks me to plead his case against men of influence; I would rather not, but what am I to do? Already I have stood by him once, and twice." Do you not see that there is in this thing a power all its own, which compels us to give benefits — first because we ought, then because we have given?

" Non sustineo illum deserere, cui dedi vitam, quem e periculo eripui. Rogat me, ut causam suam contra homines gratiosos agam; nolo, sed quid faciam? Iam illi semel, iterum adfui." Non vides inesse isti rei propriam quandam vim, quae nos dare beneficia cogit, primum quia oportet, deinde quia dedimus?

To one we would at first have had no reason to render anything, we render it for this — because we have rendered before; and so far is it from advantage that drives us to benefits, that we go on protecting and cherishing the unprofitable out of love of the benefit alone, to indulge which, even when it has fallen out badly, is as natural as to indulge wayward children.

Cui initio ratio non fuisset praestandi aliquid, ei praestamus ob hoc, quia praestitimus; adeoque ad beneficia nos non impellit utilitas, ut inutilia tueri ac fovere perseveremus sola beneficii caritate, cui etiam infeliciter dato indulgere tam naturale est quam liberis pravis.

These same men confess that they themselves return gratitude — not because it is honorable, but because it is useful. That this is not so takes the less effort to prove, because by the very arguments with which we gathered that to give a benefit is a thing to be sought for its own sake, by those same we gather this too.

Idem isti gratiam referre ipsos fatentur, non quia honestum est, sed quia utile. Quod non esse ita minore opera probandum est, quia, quibus argumentis collegimus beneficium dare per se rem expetendam esse, isdem etiam hoc colligimus.

This is the fixed point from which our proofs set out toward the rest: the honorable is cultivated for no other cause than because it is honorable. Who then will dare make a dispute of it, whether to be grateful is honorable? Who does not detest the ingrate, a man useless to his very self? And when it is told you, "He is ungrateful in the face of his friend’s highest benefits," how are you affected? As though he had done a base thing, or as though he had left undone a thing useful and profitable to himself? I think you judge him a worthless man, one who needs punishment, not a guardian; and this would not happen unless to be grateful were a thing to be sought for its own sake and honorable.

Fixum illud est, a quo in cetera probationes nostrae exeunt, honestum ob nullam aliam causam, quam quia honestum sit, coli. Quis ergo controversiam facere audebit, an gratum esse honestum sit? Quis non ingratum detestetur, hominem sibi ipsum inutilem? Quid autem cum tibi narratur, " Adversus summa beneficia amici sui ingratus est," quomodo adficeris? Utrum tamquam rem turpem fecerit, an tamquam rem utilem sibi et profuturam omiserit? Puto, nequam hominem existimas, cui poena, non cui curatore opus sit; quod non accideret, nisi gratum esse per se expetendum honestumque esset.

Other things perhaps display their worth less and need an interpreter as to whether they are honorable. This one is on open view, and too beautiful for its splendor to shine doubtfully and dimly. What is so praiseworthy, what so evenly received into the minds of all, as to return gratitude to those who have deserved well?

Alia fortasse minus dignitatem suam praeferunt et, an sint honesta, interprete egent. Hoc expositum est pulchriusque, quam ut splendor eius dubie ac parum luceat. Quid tam laudabile, quid tam aequaliter in omnium animos receptum quam referre bene meritis gratiam?

To this end, tell me, what cause leads us? Gain? But whoever does not despise gain is ungrateful. Ambition? And what boast is it to have paid what you owe? Fear? The ingrate has none; for to this one thing alone we have set no law, as though nature had guarded it well enough.

Ad hoc, dic mihi, quae causa nos perducit? Lucrum? Quod qui non contemnit, ingratus est. Ambitio? Et quae iactatio est solvisse, quod debeas? Metus? Nullus ingrato; huic enim uni rei non posuimus legem, tamquam satis natura cavisset.

As no law commands us to love our parents, to indulge our children — for it is superfluous to be driven toward what we are going to anyway — as no one need be exhorted into love of himself, which he draws upon at the very moment of birth, so neither toward this, to seek the honorable for its own sake; the honorable pleases by its own nature, and virtue is so winning that it is implanted even in the wicked to approve the better. Who is there who does not wish to seem beneficent, who amid his crimes and injuries does not strive after a reputation for goodness, who does not throw over the very deeds he did most lawlessly some appearance of right, and wish to seem to have given a benefit even to those he has harmed?

Quomodo nulla lex amare parentes, indulgere liberis iubet (supervacuum est enim, in quod imus, impelli), quemadmodum nemo in amorem sui cohortandus est, quem adeo, dum nascitur, trahit, ita ne ad hoc quidem, ut honesta per se petat; placent suapte natura, adeoque gratiosa virtus est, ut insitum sit etiam malis probare meliora. Quis est, qui non beneficus videri velit, qui non inter scelera et iniurias opinionem bonitatis adfectet, qui non ipsis, quae impotentissime fecit, speciem aliquam induat recti velitque etiam his videri beneficium dedisse, quos laesit?

And so they let thanks be given them by those whom they have crushed, and they feign themselves good and generous, because they cannot truly be so. This they would not do unless the love of the honorable and of what is to be sought for its own sake compelled them to seek a reputation contrary to their own characters and to hide the wickedness whose fruit they covet, while the thing itself is to them an object of hatred and shame; nor has anyone fallen so far from the law of nature and put off his humanity as to be evil for the sheer love of evil.

Gratias itaque agi sibi ab iis, quos adflixere, patiuntur bonosque se ac liberales fingunt, quia praestare non possunt. Quod non facerent, nisi illos honesti et per se expetendi amor cogeret moribus suis opinionem contrariam quaerere et nequitiam abdere, cuius fructus concupiscitur, ipsa vero odio pudorique est; nec quisquam tantum a naturae lege descivit et hominem exuit, ut animi causa malus sit.

For ask any one of those who live by plunder whether they would rather come by a good means to those things they win through brigandage and theft: the man whose trade is to waylay and strike down passers-by will wish rather to find those things than to wrest them away; you will find no one who would not rather enjoy the rewards of wickedness without the wickedness. This is the greatest gift we hold from nature, that virtue sends its light into the minds of all; even those who do not follow her, see her.

Dic enim cuilibet ex istis, qui rapto vivunt, an ad illa, quae latrociniis et furtis consecuntur, malint ratione bona pervenire: optabit ille, cui grassari et transeuntes percutere quaestus est, potius illa invenire quam eripere; neminem reperies, qui non nequitiae praemiis sine nequitia frui malit. Maximum hoc habemus naturae meritum, quod virtus lumen suum in omnium animos permittit; etiam, qui non secuntur illam, vident.

That you may know the disposition of a grateful mind is to be sought for its own sake — to be ungrateful is a thing in itself to be shunned, since nothing so dissolves and tears apart the concord of the human race as this vice. For by what else are we safe, than that we are helped by mutual services? It is by this one thing, the exchange of benefits, that life is better equipped and the more fortified against sudden incursions.

Ut scias per se expetendam esse grati animi adfectionem, per se fugienda res est ingratum esse, quoniam nihil aeque concordiam humani generis dissociat ac distrahit quam hoc vitium. Nam quo alio tuti sumus, quam quod mutuis iuvamur officiis? Hoc uno instructior vita contraque incursiones subitas munitior est, beneficiorum commercio.

Take us one by one — what are we? The prey of beasts, their victims, and the choicest, easiest blood. For while the other animals have strength enough for their own keeping — and whatever were born to wander and to lead a life apart are armed — man a feeble skin girds round; no force of claws, no force of teeth has made him terrible to the rest; naked and weak, it is fellowship that fortifies him. Two things God gave that would make him, exposed as he is, the most powerful: reason and fellowship; and so he who, set apart, could be a match for none becomes master of all things.

Fac nos singulos, quid sumus? Praeda animalium et victimae ac bellissimus et facillimus sanguis. Quoniam ceteris animalibus in tutelam sui satis virium est, quaecumque vaga nascebantur et actura vitam segregem, armata sunt, hominem imbecilla cutis cingit; non unguium vis, non dentium terribilem ceteris fecit, nudum et infirmum societas munit. Duas deus res dedit, quae illum obnoxium validissimum facerent, rationem et societatem; itaque, qui par esse nulli posset, si seduceretur, rerum potitur.

Fellowship gave him dominion over all the animals; fellowship, though he was born of the earth, passed him over into empire over a nature not his own and bade him be master even upon the sea; this has warded off the onsets of disease, has provided supports for old age, has given solaces against pain; this makes us brave, since we may call it up against fortune.

Societas illi dominium omnium animalium dedit; societas terris genitum in alienae naturae transmisit imperium et dominari etiam in mari iussit; hoc morborum impetus arcuit, senectuti adminicula prospexit, solacia contra dolores dedit; hoc fortes nos facit, quod licet contra fortunam advocare.

Take away this fellowship, and you will rend the unity of the human race by which life is upheld; and it will be taken away if you bring it about that the ungrateful mind is to be shunned not for its own sake, but because it has something to fear; for how many there are who may be ungrateful with impunity! In short, I call him ungrateful, whoever is grateful out of fear.

Hanc societatem tolle, et unitatem generis humani, qua vita sustinetur, scindes; tolletur autem, si efficis, ut ingratus animus non per se vitandus sit, sed quia aliquid illi timendum est; quam multi enim sunt, quibus ingratis esse tuto licet! Denique ingratum voco, quisquis metu gratus est.

No sane man fears the gods; for it is madness to fear what is wholesome, and no one loves those whom he fears. You, in the end, Epicurus, make God unarmed; you have stripped from him every weapon, every power, and, that he might be feared by no one, you have cast him out beyond fear.

Deos nemo sanus timet; furor est enim metuere salutaria, nec quisquam amat, quos timet. Tu denique. Epicure, deum inermem facis, omnia illi tela, omnem detraxisti potentiam et, ne cuiquam metuendus esset, proiecisti illum extra metum.

Him, then — hedged about with a wall vast indeed and impassable, cut off from the touch and the sight of mortals — you have no reason to revere; he has no means either of granting or of harming; in the middle space between this heaven and another, deserted, without a living thing, without a man, without anything, he dodges the wreckage of worlds falling above him and around him, hearing no prayers and incurious of us.

Hunc igitur insaeptum ingenti quidem et inexplicabili muro divisumque a contactu et a conspectu mortalium non habes quare verearis; nulla illi nec tribuendi nec nocendi materia est; in medio intervallo huius et alterius caeli desertus sine animali, sine homine, sine re ruinas mundorum supra se circaque se cadentium evitat non exaudiens vota nec nostri curiosus.

And yet you wish to seem to worship him no otherwise than a parent, with a grateful mind, I suppose; or, if you do not wish to seem grateful, since you have no benefit of his — but atoms and those crumbs of yours have balled you together by chance and at random — why do you worship him?

Atqui hunc vis videri colere non aliter quam parentem grato, ut opinor, animo; aut, si non vis gratus videri, quia nullum habes illius beneficium, sed te atomi et istae micae tuae forte ac temere conglobaverunt, cur colis?

"Because of his majesty," you say, "and his surpassing and singular nature." Granting you that — then surely you do this drawn by no price, by no hope; there is therefore something to be sought for its own sake, whose very worth draws you, that is, the honorable. And what is more honorable than to be grateful? The matter of this virtue lies open as wide as life.

" Propter maiestatem," inquis, " eius eximiam ac singularem naturam." Ut concedam tibi, nempe hoc facis nullo pretio inductus, nulla spe; est ergo aliquid per se expetendum, cuius te ipsa dignitas ducit, id est honestum. Quid est autem honestius, quam gratum esse? Huius virtutis materia tam late patet quam vita.

"But there is in this good," he objects, "some advantage as well." For what virtue has none? But that is said to be sought for its own sake which, though it have some advantages outside it, pleases even when these too are set aside and removed. It profits to be grateful; yet I shall be grateful even if it harms. What does the grateful man pursue?

" Sed inest," inquit, " huic bono etiam utilitas aliqua." Cui enim virtuti non inest? Sed id propter se expeti dicitur, quod, quamvis habeat aliqua extra commoda, sepositis quoque illis ac remotis placet. Prodest gratum esse; ero tamen gratus, etiam si nocet. Gratus quid sequitur?

That this thing should win him other friends, other benefits? What then? If a man is going to stir up enmities against himself, if he understands that so far from gaining anything by it he must even lose much of what he has laid up and acquired — does he not go down willingly into the losses?

Ut haec res illi alios amicos, alia beneficia conciliet? Quid ergo? Si quis sibi offensas concitaturus est, si quis intellegit adeo per hoc se nihil consecuturum, ut multa etiam ex reposito adquisitoque perdenda sint, non libens in detrimenta descendit?

He is ungrateful who, in returning gratitude, looks to a second gift, who hopes while he repays. I call him ungrateful who sits beside a sick man because the man is going to make a will, who has leisure to think about the inheritance or the legacy. Let him do everything that a good and mindful friend ought to do: if the hope of gain hovers before his mind, he is a legacy-hunter and is casting a hook. As the birds that feed on the tearing of bodies watch from close by for flocks worn out by disease and about to fall, so this man hangs over death and circles the corpse.

Ingratus est, qui in referenda gratia secundum datum videt, qui sperat, cum reddit. Ingratum voco, qui aegro adsidit, quia testamentum facturus est, cui de hereditate aut de legato vacat cogitare. Faciat licet omnia, quae facere bonus amicus et memor officii debet: si animo eius obversatur spes lucri, captator est et hamum iacit. Ut aves, quae laceratione corporum aluntur, lassa morbo pecora et casura ex proximo speculantur, ita hic imminet morti et circa cadaver volat.

A grateful mind is held captive by the very virtue of its purpose. Do you wish to know that this is so, and that it is not corrupted by advantage? There are two kinds of grateful man. He is called grateful who returned something for what he had received; this one perhaps can make a show of himself, he has what to boast of, what to bring forward. He is called grateful who received a benefit with good will and owes it with good will; this one is shut up within his own conscience.

Gratus animus ipsa virtute propositi sui capitur. Vis scire hoc ita esse nec illum utilitate corrumpi? Duo genera sunt grati hominis. Dicitur gratus, qui aliquid pro eo, quod acceperat, reddidit; hic fortasse ostentare se potest, habet, quod iactet, quod proferat. Dicitur gratus, qui bono animo accepit beneficium, bono debet; hic intra conscientiam elusus est.

What advantage can come to him from a hidden feeling? And yet this man, even if he can do nothing further, is grateful. He loves, he owes, he longs to return the favor; whatever beyond this you require, it is not he who falls short.

Quae illi contingere potest utilitas ex adfectu latenti? Atqui hic, etiam si ultra facere nil potest, gratus est. Amat, debet, referre gratiam cupit; quidquid ultra desideras, non ipse deest.

He too is a craftsman whose tools are not at hand for plying his craft, and no less skilled in song is he whose voice the din of those drowning him out will not let be heard. I wish to return the favor: after this something is still left me to do — not that I may be grateful, but that I may be discharged; for often both he who has returned the favor is ungrateful, and he who has not returned it is grateful. For as with all the other virtues, so with this one the whole reckoning comes back to the mind; if the mind is at its duty, whatever was lacking, it is fortune that sins.

Artifex est etiam, cui ad exercendam artem instrumenta non suppetunt, nec minus canendi peritus, cuius vocem exaudiri fremitus obstrepentium non sinit. Volo referre gratiam: post hoc aliquid superest mihi, non ut gratus, sed ut solutus sim; saepe enim et qui gratiam rettulit, ingratus est, et qui non rettulit, gratus. Nam ut omnium aliarum virtutum, ita huius ad animum tota aestimatio redit; hic si in officio est, quidquid defuit, fortuna peccat.

As a man is eloquent even when he is silent, brave even with his hands pressed shut or even bound, as a man is a helmsman even when he is on dry land, because nothing is wanting to his finished skill though something hinders his using it, so a man is grateful even who only wills it and has of this will of his no other witness than himself. Nay, I shall add more:

Quomodo est disertus etiam qui tacet, fortis etiam qui compressis manibus vel etiam adligatis, quomodo gubernator etiam, qui in sicco est, quia consummatae scientiae nihil deest, etiam si quid obstat, quominus se utatur, ita gratus est etiam, qui vult tantum nec habet huius voluntatis suae ullum alium quam se testem. Immo amplius adiciam:

sometimes a man is grateful even who seems ungrateful, whom rumor, an ill interpreter, has reported the opposite. What does this man pursue but conscience itself? — which delights even when buried, which cries out against the assembly and against report and lays all things upon itself, and, when it has looked upon a vast crowd on the other side dissenting, does not count the votes, but conquers by a single ballot.

est aliquando gratus etiam qui ingratus videtur, quem mala interpres opinio contrarium tradidit. Hic quid aliud sequitur quam ipsam conscientiam? Quae etiam obruta delectat, quae contioni ac famae reclamat et in se omnia reponit et, cum ingentem ex altera parte turbam contra sentientium adspexit, non numerat suffragia, sed una sententia vincit.

But if it sees good faith visited with the punishments of treachery, it does not come down from its height and it stands above its own penalty. "I have," it says, "what I wished, what I sought; I do not repent and I shall not repent, nor by any injustice will fortune bring me to the point of hearing this cry: ’What did I want for myself? What good now is my good will to me?’ " It does good even on the rack, it does good even in the fire; and though that fire be applied limb by limb and travel little by little round the living body, though the very heart, full of a good conscience, drip — the fire will please him, by which his good faith shines out.

Si vero bonam fidem perfidiae suppliciis adfici videt, non descendit e fastigio et supra poenam suam consistit. " Habeo," inquit, " quod volui, quod petii; nec paenitet nec paenitebit nec ulla iniquitate me eo fortuna perducet, ut hanc vocem audiat: ’ Quid mihi volui? Quid nunc mihi prodest bona voluntas? ’ " Prodest et in eculeo, prodest et in igne; qui si singulis membris admoveatur et paulatim vivum corpus circumeat, licet ipsum cor plenum bona conscientia stillet: placebit illi ignis, per quem bona fides conlucebit.

Now let that argument too, though already spoken, be brought back: what is it that makes us wish to be grateful when we are dying, makes us weigh the services of each, makes us do it while our memory passes judgment over our whole life, lest we seem to have forgotten any service? Nothing now remains toward which hope may reach; yet, set upon that hinge, we wish to depart from human affairs as grateful as may be.

Nunc illud quoque argumentum quamvis dictum iam reducatur: quid est, quare grati velimus esse, cum morimur, quare singulorum perpendamus officia, quare id agamus in omnem vitam nostram memoria decernente, ne cuius officii videamur obliti? Nihil iam superest, quo spes porrigatur; in illo tamen cardine positi abire e rebus humanis quam gratissimi volumus.

There is, evidently, a great reward in the deed itself, and a vast power in the honorable to allure the minds of men, whose beauty pours round our souls and, soothing them, carries them off in wonder at its light and brightness.

Est videlicet magna in ipso opere merces rei et ad adliciendas mentes hominum ingens honesti potentia, cuius pulchritudo animos circumfundit et delenitos admiratione luminis ac fulgoris sui rapit.

But many advantages arise from this, and life is safer for the better sort, and love attends them, and — by the judgment of the good — a more untroubled span of years, which innocence and a grateful mind escort. For the nature of things would have been most unfair, had it made this so great a good a wretched, doubtful, and barren thing. But consider this: whether to that virtue, which is often approached by a safe and easy road, you would still be willing to go even by a way over rocks and crags and beset by beasts and serpents.

At multa hoc commoda oriuntur, et tutior est vita melioribus amorque et secundum bonorum iudicium aetasque securior, quam innocentia, quam grata mens prosequitur. Fuisset enim iniquissima rerum natura, si hoc tantum bonum miserum et anceps et sterile fecisset. Sed illud intuere, an ad istam virtutem, quae saepe tuta ac facili aditur via, etiam per saxa et rupes et feris ac serpentibus obsessum iter fueris iturus.

A thing is not for that reason not to be sought for its own sake, to which some profit also clings from outside; for nearly all the most beautiful things are accompanied by many adventitious endowments as well, but they draw these behind them, while themselves leading the way.

Non ideo per se non est expetendum, cui aliquid extra quoque emolumenti adhaeret; fere enim pulcherrima quaeque multis et adventiciis comitata sunt dotibus, sed illas trahunt, ipsa praecedunt.

Is there any doubt that the circuit of sun and moon, each in its turn, tempers this dwelling-place of the human race? That by the heat of the one our bodies are nourished, the earth is loosened, immoderate moistures are checked, the grimness of winter that binds all things is broken; that by the effective and penetrating warmth of the other the ripening of the crops is governed? That to its course human fecundity answers? That the one has made the year markable by its wheeling round, the other the month, bending itself through smaller spaces?

Num dubium est, quin hoc humani generis domicilium circumitus solis ac lunae vicibus suis temperet? Quin alterius calore alantur corpora, terrae relaxentur, immodici umores comprimantur, adligantis omnia hiemis tristitia frangatur, alterius tepore efficaci et penetrabili regatur maturitas frugum? Quin ad huius cursum fecunditas humana respondeat? Quin ille annum observabilem fecerit circumactu suo, haec mensem minoribus se spatiis flectens?

And yet, take these things away — was not the sun itself a spectacle fit for the eyes and worthy to be adored, even if it only passed by? Was not the moon worthy to be gazed up at, even if it ran across as an idle star? The universe itself, as often as through the night it has poured forth its fires and shone with so many countless stars — whom does it not hold rapt and fixed upon it? Who, when he marvels at those things, thinks then of their profit to himself?

Ut tamen detrahas ista, non erat ipse sol idoneum oculis spectaculum dignusque adorari, si tantum praeteriret? Non erat digna suspectu luna, etiam si otiosum sidus transcurreret? Ipse mundus, quotiens per noctem ignes suos fudit et tantum stellarum innumerabilium refulsit, quem non intentum in se tenet? Quis sibi illa tunc, cum miratur, prodesse cogitat?

Look at those bodies gliding overhead in so great a company — how they hide their speed under the appearance of a standing and motionless work. How much is transacted in that night which you watch only to number and divide the days! What a throng of things unrolls beneath this silence!

Adspice ista tanto superne coetu labentia, quemadmodum velocitatem suam sub specie stantis atque immoti operis abscondant. Quantum ista nocte, quam tu in numerum ac discrimen dierum observas, agitur! Quanta rerum turba sub hoc silentio evolvitur!

What a sequence of fates a fixed boundary leads forth! Those bodies which you regard as scattered only for adornment are each at their work. For there is no reason to think that seven alone range abroad and the rest stand fixed; we grasp the motions of a few, but countless others, drawn farther off from our view — gods — come and go, and of those that suffer our eyes, most proceed by a dim step and are driven through the hidden.

Quantam fatorum seriem certus limes educit! Ista, quae tu non aliter, quam in decorem sparsa consideras, singula in opere sunt. Nec enim est, quod existimes septem sola discurrere, cetera haerere; paucorum motus comprehendimus, innumerabiles vero longiusque a conspectu seducti di eunt redeuntque, et ex his, qui oculos nostros patiuntur, plerique obscuro gradu pergunt et per occultum aguntur.

What then? Are you not seized by the sight of so great a mass, even if it did not cover you, guard you, cherish and beget you and water you with its breath? As these things, though they have the first usefulness and are necessary and life-giving, yet their majesty takes the whole mind captive, so all that virtue, and above all the virtue of a grateful mind, gives much indeed, but does not wish to be loved for that reason; it has something more in itself, and is not understood well enough by him who numbers it among useful things.

Quid ergo? Non caperis tantae molis adspectu, etiam si te non tegat, non custodiat, non foveat generetque ac spiritu suo riget? Quemadmodum haec cum primum usum habeant et necessaria vitaliaque sint, maiestas tamen eorum totam mentem occupat, ita omnis illa virtus et in primis grati animi multum quidem praestat, sed non vult ob hoc diligi; amplius quiddam in se habet nec satis ab eo intellegitur a quo inter utilia numeratur.

Is he grateful because it is expedient? Then also only so far as it is expedient? Virtue does not admit a sordid lover; one must come to her with an open fold. The ingrate thinks thus: "I wanted to return the favor, but I fear the expense, I fear the danger, I dread giving offense; I shall do rather what is expedient." The same principle cannot make a man both grateful and ungrateful; as their works are different, so are their purposes at odds with each other. The one is ungrateful, although he ought not to be, because it is expedient; the other is grateful, although it is not expedient, because he ought to be.

Gratus est, quia expedit? Ergo et quantum expedit? Non recipit sordidum virtus amatorem; soluto ad illam sinu veniendum est. Ingratus hoc cogitat: " Volebam gratiam referre, sed timeo impensam, timeo periculum, vereor offensam; faciam potius, quod expedit." Non potest eadem ratio et gratum facere et ingratum; ut diversa illorum opera, ita diversa inter se proposita sunt. Ille ingratus est, quamvis non oporteat, quia expedit; hic gratus est, quamvis non expediat, quia oportet.

Our purpose is to live according to the nature of things and to follow the example of the gods. But the gods, in whatever they do, what do they pursue beyond the very principle of the doing? Unless perhaps you suppose them to take the fruit of their works from the smoke of entrails and the smell of incense!

Propositum est nobis secundum rerum naturam vivere et deorum exemplum sequi. Di autem, quodcumque faciunt, in eo quid praeter ipsam faciendi rationem secuntur? Nisi forte illos existimas fructum operum suorum ex fumo extorum et turis odore percipere!

See how much they contrive each day, how much they distribute; with how great fruits they fill the lands, how with winds opportune and bearing toward every shore they stir the seas, with what rains suddenly poured down they soften the soil and restore the parched veins of springs and renew them with nourishment infused through hidden channels. All this they do without pay, without any advantage reaching themselves.

Vide, quanta cotidie moliantur, quanta distribuant; quantis terras fructibus impleant, quam opportunis et in omnes oras ferentibus ventis maria permoveant, quantis imbribus repente deiectis solum molliant venasque fontium arentes redintegrent et infuso per occulta nutrimento novent. Omnia ista sine mercede, sine ullo ad ipsos perveniente commodo faciunt.

Let our reason too keep this rule, if it does not stray from its model — that it come not hired to honorable things. Let us be ashamed that any benefit should be for sale: we have gods that give for nothing!

Hoc nostra quoque ratio, si ab exemplari suo non aberrat, servet, ne ad res honestas conducta veniat. Pudeat ullum venale esse beneficium: gratuitos habemus deos!

"If you imitate the gods," he says, "give benefits even to the ungrateful; for the sun rises even on the wicked, and the seas lie open even to pirates." At this point they ask whether a good man will give a benefit to an ungrateful man, knowing him to be ungrateful. Allow me to put in a word, lest we be caught by an insidious question.

" Si deos," inquit, " imitaris, da et ingratis beneficia; nam et sceleratis sol oritur et piratis patent maria." Hoc loco interrogant, an vir bonus daturus sit beneficium ingrato sciens ingratum esse. Permitte mihi aliquid interloqui, ne interrogatione insidiosa capiamur.

Take, on the Stoic constitution, two kinds of ingrate. The one is ungrateful because he is foolish; the fool is also bad; because he is bad, he lacks no vice: therefore he is ungrateful too. So we call all bad men intemperate, greedy, profligate, spiteful — not because all these are in each of them great and conspicuous vices, but because they can be; and they are, even if they lie hidden. The other is the ingrate of common speech, by nature prone to this vice.

Duos ex constitutione Stoica accipe ingratos. Alter est ingratus, quia stultus est; stultus etiam malus est; quia malus est, nullo vitio caret: ergo et ingratus est. Sic omnes malos intemperantes dicimus, avaros,luxuriosos, malignos, non quia omnia ista singulis magna et nota vitia sunt, sed quia esse possunt; et sunt, etiam si latent. Alter est ingratus, qui volgo dicitur, in hoc vitium natura propensus.

To that ingrate, who is no more free of this fault than he is free of any, the good man will give a benefit; for he will be able to give to no one if he removes such men from consideration. But to this ingrate, who is a defrauder of benefits and has fallen with his whole mind to this side, he will no more give a benefit than he would lend money to a bankrupt or entrust a deposit to one who has already refused many.

Illi ingrato, qui sic hac culpa non caret, quomodo nulla caret, dabit beneficium vir bonus; nulli enim dare poterit, si tales homines submoverit. Huic ingrato, qui beneficiorum fraudator est et in hanc partem procubuit animo, non magis dabit beneficium, quam decoctori pecuniam credet aut depositum committet ei, qui iam pluribus abnegavit.

A man is called timid because he is foolish: and this follows the bad, whom undivided and universal vices surround; a man is called timid in the proper sense who by nature is frightened even at empty noises. The fool has all the vices, but is not by nature prone toward all; one inclines to greed, another to luxury, another to insolence.

Timidus dicitur aliquis, quia stultus est: et hoc malos sequitur, quos indiscreta et universa vitia circumstant; dicitur timidus proprie natura etiam ad inanes sonos pavidus. Stultus omnia vitia habet, sed non in omnia natura pronus est; alius in avaritiam, alius in luxuriam, alius in petulantiam inclinatur.

And so they err who ask the Stoics: "What then? Is Achilles timid? What then? Is Aristides, to whom justice gave his name, unjust? What then? Is Fabius too, who ’by delaying restored the state,’ rash? What then? Does Decius fear death? Is Mucius a traitor? Is Camillus a deserter?" We do not say that all vices are in all men in the way that single vices stand out in some, but that the bad and foolish man is empty of no vice; we do not even acquit the bold man of fear, we do not even free the prodigal of greed.

Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant Stoicos: " Quid ergo? Achilles timidus est? Quid ergo? Aristides, cui iustitia nomen dedit, iniustus est? Quid ergo? Et Fabius, qui ’ cunctando restituit rem,’ temerarius est? Quid ergo? Decius mortem timet? Mucius proditor est? Camillus desertor? " Non hoc dicimus sic omnia vitia esse in omnibus, quomodo in quibusdam singula eminent, sed malum ac stultum nullo vitio vacare; ne audacem quidem timoris absolvimus, ne prodigum quidem avaritia liberamus.

As a man has all the senses, yet not for that reason do all men have a sight like Lynceus’s, so he who is foolish does not have all his vices so keen and aroused as some have some. All vices are in all, but not all stand out in each. Nature drives this man to greed; this one is given to wine, this to lust — or, if not yet given, so formed that his character carries him toward it. And so, to return to the matter, there is no bad man who is not ungrateful:

Quomodo homo omnes sensus habet nec ideo tamen omnes homines aciem habent Lynceo similem, sic, qui stultus est, non tam aeria et concitata habet omnia, quam quidam quaedam. Omnia in omnibus vitia sunt, sed non omnia in singulis extant. Hunc natura ad avaritiam impellit; hic vino, hic libidini deditus est aut, si nondum deditus, ita formatus, ut in hoc illum mores sui ferant. Itaque, ut ad propositum revertar, nemo non ingratus est, qui malus:

for he has all the seeds of wickedness; yet he is properly called ungrateful who leans toward this vice. To this man, then, I shall not give a benefit.

habet enim omnia nequitiae semina; tamen proprie ingratus appellatur, qui ad hoc vitium vergit. Huic ergo beneficium non dabo.

As a man will counsel his daughter ill who has betrothed her to one often and insultingly divorced, as he will be held a bad head of a household who has entrusted the care of his estate to a man condemned for mismanagement of affairs, as he will make his will most insanely who has left his son a guardian who is a despoiler of wards, so he will be said to give benefits most badly, whoever chooses out the ungrateful to bestow upon them what will perish.

Quomodo male filiae suae consulet, qui illam contumeliose et saepe repudiate collocavit, malus pater familiae habebitur, qui negotiorum gestorum damnato patrimonii sui curam mandaverit, quomodo dementissime testabitur, qui tutorem filio reliquerit pupillorum spoliatorem, sic pessime beneficia dare dicetur, quicumque ingratos eligit, in quos peritura conferat.

"The gods too," he says, "bestow much on the ungrateful." But they prepared those things for the good; they fall to the bad as well, because they cannot be separated. And it is better to profit even the bad for the good’s sake than to fail the good for the bad’s. So the things you bring up — day, sun, the courses of winter and summer and, by the tempering of spring and autumn in between, the rains and the draughts of springs, the fixed blowings of the winds — these they devised for all in common; they could not pick out single men.

" Di quoque," inquit, " multa ingratis tribuunt." Sed illa bonis paraverunt; contingunt autem etiam malis, quia separari non possunt. Satius est autem prodesse etiam malis propter bonos, quam bonis deesse propter malos. Ita, quae refers, diem, solem, hiemis aestatisque cursus et media veris autumnique temperamento imbres et fontium haustus, ventorum statos flatus pro universis invenerunt; excerpere singulos non potuerunt.

A king gives honors to the worthy, a largess even to the unworthy; the public grain the thief receives as much as the perjurer and the adulterer, and without any sorting of characters, whoever has been enrolled; whatever else is given to a man as a citizen, not as a good man, the good and the bad carry off in equal measure.

Rex honores dignis dat, congiarium et indignis; frumentum publicum tam fur quam periurus et adulter accipiunt et sine dilectu morum, quisquis incisus est; quidquid aliud est, quod tamquam civi, non tamquam bono datur, ex aequo boni ac mali ferunt.

God too has given certain gifts to the whole human race, from which no one is excluded. For it could not come about that the wind should be favorable to good men and contrary to the bad; and it was for the common good that the commerce of the sea lie open and the empire of the human race be enlarged; nor could a law be laid down for the rains as they fall, that they not run down into the fields of the bad and the wicked. Certain things are set in the midst.

Deus quoque quaedam munera universo humano generi dedit, a quibus excluditur nemo. Nec enim poterat fieri, ut ventus bonis viris secundus esset, contrarius malis, communi autem bono erat patere commercium maris et regnum humani generis relaxari; nec poterat lex casuris imbribus dici, ne in malorum improborumque rura defluerent. Quaedam in medio ponuntur.

Cities are founded for the bad as much as the good; the monuments of genius, though they will reach the unworthy too, publication has made common; medicine shows its aid even to the wicked; no one has suppressed the compounding of wholesome remedies, lest the unworthy be healed.

Tam bonis quam malis conduntur urbes; monumenta ingeniorum et ad indignos perventura publicavit editio; medicina etiam sceleratis opem monstrat; compositiones remediorum salutarium nemo suppressit, ne sanarentur indigni.

In those things demand a censor’s scrutiny and a weighing of persons that are given separately, as to one who is worthy, not in these, which admit the crowd indiscriminately. For it matters much whether you do not exclude someone or whether you choose him. Justice is pronounced even to the thief; murderers too enjoy the peace; even those who have seized others’ goods recover their own; the wall defends from the enemy assassins and those who ply the blade at home; by the protection of the laws those are sheltered who have sinned most against them.

In iis exige censuram et personarum aestimationem, quae separatim tamquam digno dantur, non in his, quae promiscue turbam admittunt. Multum enim refert, utrum aliquem non excludas an eligas. Ius et furi dicitur; pace et homicidae fruuntur; sua repetunt etiam, qui aliena rapuerunt; percussores et domi ferrum exercentes murus ab hoste defendit; legum praesidio, qui plurimum in illas peccaverunt,proteguntur.

Certain things could not fall to the rest unless they were given to all; there is no reason, then, to dispute about those things to which we are publicly invited. But that which, by my own judgment, ought to reach a particular man, I shall not give to one whom I know to be ungrateful.

Quaedam non poterant ceteris contingere, nisi universis darentur; non est itaque, quod de istis disputes, ad quae publice invitati sumus. Illud, quod iudicio meo ad aliquem pervenire debebit, ei, quem esse ingratum sciam, non dabo.

"So then," he says, "you will neither give counsel to an ungrateful man who deliberates, nor let him draw water, nor show the way to one who wanders? Or will you do these things, yet give him nothing?" I shall distinguish that — at any rate I shall try to distinguish.

" Ergo," inquit, " nec consilium deliberanti dabis ingrato nec aquam haurire permittes nec viam monstrabis erranti? An haec quidem facies, sed nihil donabis? " Distinguam istud, certe temptabo distinguere.

A benefit is a useful service, but not every useful service is a benefit; for some are so slight that they do not claim the name of benefit. Two things must come together to make a benefit. First, the greatness of the thing; for some are below the measure of this name. Who has called a hunk of bread a benefit, or a coin of thrown-down bronze, or the granted leave to kindle a fire? And sometimes these profit more than the greatest gifts; yet their own cheapness, even when by the necessity of the moment they have become necessary, strips them of value.

Beneficium est opera utilis, sed non omnis opera utilis beneficium est; quaedam enim tam exigua sunt, ut beneficii nomen non occupent. Duae res coire debent, quae beneficium efficiant. Primum rei magnitudo; quaedam enim sunt infra huius nominis mensuram. Quis beneficium dixit quadram panis aut stipem aeris abiecti aut ignis accendendi factam potestatem? Et interdum ista plus prosunt, quam maxima; sed tamen vilitas sua illis, etiam ubi temporis necessitate facta sunt necessaria, detrahit pretium.

Then there must be added this, which is the most powerful thing: that I do it for the sake of the man to whom I want the benefit to reach, that I judge him worthy and bestow it gladly and take joy in my own gift — of which there is nothing in those things we were speaking of; for we do not bestow them as upon the worthy, but carelessly as trifles, and we give them not to a man, but to humanity.

Deinde hoc, quod potentissimum est, oportet accedat, ut eius causa faciam, ad quem volam pervenire beneficium, dignumque eum iudicem et libens id tribuam percipiensque ex munere meo gaudium, quorum nihil est in istis, de quibus loquebamur; non enim tamquam dignis illa tribuimus, sed neclegenter tamquam parva, et non homini damus, sed humanitati.

Sometimes I would not deny that I shall give certain things even to the unworthy, for the honor of others, just as in the seeking of offices nobility has, not without reason, preferred certain most base men to industrious but new ones. The memory of great virtues is sacred, and it helps that there be more good men, if the favor owed to the good does not fall with them. What made Cicero’s son a consul, if not his father?

Aliquando daturum me etiam indignis quaedam non negaverim in honorem aliorum, sicut in petendis honoribus quosdam turpissimos nobilitas industriis sed novis praetulit non sine ratione. Sacra est magnarum virtutum memoria, et esse plures bonos iuvat, si gratia bonorum non cum ipsis cadit. Ciceronem filium quae res consulem fecit nisi pater?

What lately brought Cinna back to the consulship out of the enemy’s camp; what raised Sextus Pompeius and the other Pompeii, if not the greatness of one man, once so great that it lifted all his own high enough even by his ruin? What lately made Fabius Persicus — whose very kiss even the shameless marked down with disgust — a priest in more than one college, if not the Verrucosus and the Allobrogicus and those three hundred who, for the republic, threw a single house against the enemy’s onset?

Cinnam nuper quae res ad consulatum recepit ex hostium castris, quae Sex. Pompeium aliosque Pompeios, nisi unius viri magnitudo tanta quondam, ut satis alte omnes suos etiam ruina eius attolleret? Quid nuper Fabium Persicum, cuius osculum etiam impudici denotabant, sacerdotem non in uno collegio fecit nisi Verrucosi et Allobrogici et illi trecenti, qui hostium incursioni pro re publica unam domum obiecerant?

We owe this to the virtues: to cultivate them not only when present, but even when removed from sight; as they brought it about that they should profit not one age alone, but should leave their benefits even after themselves, so let us be grateful for more than one age. This man begot great men: he is worthy of benefits, whatever he is; he gave us worthy ones.

Hoc debemus virtutibus, ut non praesentes solum illas, sed etiam ablatas e conspectu colamus; quomodo illae id egerunt, ut non in unam aetatem prodessent, sed beneficia sua etiam post ipsas relinquerent, ita nos non una aetate grati simus. Hic magnos viros genuit: dignus est beneficiis, qualiscumque est; dignos dedit.

This man is sprung from distinguished forebears: whatever he is, let him hide in the shade of his own. As foul places are lit up by the sun’s reflection, so let the inert shine back with the light of their ancestors.

Hic egregiis maioribus ortus est: qualiscumque est, sub umbra suorum lateat. Ut loca sordida repercussu solis illustrantur, ita inertes maiorum suorum luce resplendeant.

At this point, my dear Liberalis, I wish to make excuse to you for the gods. For sometimes we are wont to say: "What did Providence mean by it, in setting Arrhidaeus on a throne?"

Excusare hoc loco tibi, mi Liberalis, deos volo. Interdum enim solemus dicere: " Quid sibi voluit providentia, quae Arrhidaeum regno imposuit?"

Do you think this was given to him? It was given to his father and his brother. "Why did it set Gaius Caesar over the whole world — a man most greedy for human blood, which he ordered to flow in his sight no otherwise than if he were going to catch it with his mouth?" What then? Do you suppose this was given to him? It was given to his father Germanicus, to his grandfather and great-grandfather and, before these, to other men no less illustrious, even though they passed their lives as private men and the equals of others. What of this?

Illi putas hoc datum? Patri eius datum est et fratri. " Quare C Caesarem orbi terrarum praefecit, hominem sanguinis humani avidissimum, quem non aliter fluere in conspectu suo iubebat, quam si ore excepturus esset? " Quid ergo? Tu hoc illi datum existimas? Patri eius Germanico datum, avo proavoque et ante hos aliis non minus claris viris, etiam si privati paresque aliis vitam exegerunt. Quid?

You, when you made Mamercus Scaurus consul, did you not know that he used to catch the menstrual flux of his serving-women in his gaping mouth? Did he himself, indeed, conceal it? Did he wish to seem clean? I shall report to you a saying of his against himself, which I remember was passed around and praised in his very presence.

Tu, cum Mamercum Scaurum consulem faceres, ignorabas ancillarum illum suarum menstruum ore hiante exceptare? Numquid enim ipse dissimulabat? Numquid purus videri volebat? Referam tibi dictum eius in se, quod circumferri memini et ipso praesente laudari.

To Annius Pollio, as he lay there, he had said, using an obscene word, that he would do to him the thing he himself preferred to suffer; and when he had seen Pollio’s brow drawn the tighter: "Whatever evil," he said, "I have spoken, be it on me and on my own head!" This saying of his he used to tell himself. A man so openly obscene — did you admit him to the rods and to the tribunal?

Pollioni Annio iacenti obsceno verbo usus dixerat se facturum id, quod pati malebat; et eum Pollionis adtractiorem vidisset frontem: " Quidquid," inquit, " mali dixi, mihi et capiti meo! " Hoc dictum suum ipse narrabat. Hominem tam palam obscenum ad fasces et ad tribunal admisisti?

No doubt while you think of that old Scaurus, the leader of the senate, and bear it ill that his offspring lies low.

Nempe dum veterem illum Scaurum senatus principem cogitas et indigne fers subolem eius iacere.

It is likely that the gods do the same — that they treat some more indulgently for the sake of their parents and grandparents, others for the sake of the coming character of grandsons and great-grandsons and a long line of following descendants; for the sequence of their work is known to them, and the knowledge of all things that will pass through their hands is always open before them; to us it comes up out of the hidden, and what we think sudden comes to them foreseen and familiar.

Idem facere deos veri simile est, ut alios indulgentius tractent propter parentes avosque, alios propter futuram nepotum pronepotumque ac longe sequentium posterorum indolem; nota enim illis est operis sui series, omniumque illis rerum per manus suas iturarum scientia in aperto semper est; nobis ex abdito subit, et, quae repentina putamus, illis provisa veniunt ac familiaria.

"Let these be kings, because their forebears were not — because they held justice and self-restraint in place of supreme power, because they consecrated not the republic to themselves, but themselves to the republic. Let these reign, because some good man, an ancestor of theirs, came before, who bore his mind above fortune, who in civil strife, since it was so expedient for the republic, chose to be conquered rather than to conquer; gratitude could not be returned to him over so long a span; in regard for him let this man preside over the people — not because he knows or is able, but because another deserved it on his behalf.

" Sint hi reges, quia maiores eorum non fuerunt, quia pro summo imperio habuerunt iustitiam, abstinentiam, quia non rem publicam sibi, sed se rei publicae dicaverunt. Regnent hi, quia vir bonus quidam ante proavus eorum fuit, qui animum supra fortunam gessit, qui in dissensione civili, quoniam ita expediebat rei publicae, vinci quam vincere maluit; referri gratia illi tam longo spatio non potuit; in illius respectum iste populo praesideat, non quia scit aut potest, sed quia alius pro illo meruit.

This man is deformed in body, foul to look upon and one who will disgrace his own distinctions; now men will accuse me, will call me blind and rash, not knowing in what place I set the things owed to the highest and most exalted; but I know that I am giving this to one man, and paying off to another what was once owed.

Hic corpore deformis est, adspectu foedus et ornamenta sua traducturus; iam me homines accusabunt, caecum ac temerarium dicent, nescientem, quo loco, quae summis atque excelsissimis debentur, ponam; at ego scio alii me istud dare, alii olim debitum solvere.

Whence do these men know that ancestor of his, once most fugitive from the glory that pursued him, going to dangers with the same face with which others come back from danger, never marking off his own good from the public’s? ’Where,’ you say, ’is that man, or who is he?’ Whence do you know? With me these accounts of outlays and receipts are balanced; I know what I owe and to whom. To some I repay after a long day, to others in advance, as the occasion and the means of my commonwealth allowed." So I shall sometimes give certain things to an ungrateful man — but not for his own sake.

Unde isti norunt illum quondam gloriae sequentis fugacissimum, eo voltu ad pericula euntem, quo alii e periculo redeunt, numquam bonum suum a publico distinguentem? ’ Ubi,’ inquis, ’ iste aut quis est? ’ Unde vos scitis? Apud me istae expensorum acceptorumque rationes dispunguntur, ego, quid cui debeam, scio. Aliis post longam diem repono, aliis in antecessum ae prout occasio et rei publicae meae facultas tulit." Ingrato ergo aliquando quaedam, sed non propter ipsum dabo.

"What? If," he says, "you do not know whether he is ungrateful or grateful, will you wait until you know, or will you not lose the time for giving the benefit? To wait is long (for, as Plato says, the conjecture of the human mind is difficult); not to wait is rash."

" Quid? Si," inquit, " nescis, utrum ingratus sit an gratus, expectabis, donec scias, an dandi beneficii tempus non amittes? Expectare longum est (nam, ut ait Platon, difficilis humani animi coniectura est), non expectare temerarium est."

To this we shall answer that we never wait for the most certain comprehension of things, since the search for truth is steep, but we go where the likeness of truth leads. Every duty proceeds by this road. Thus we sow, thus we sail, thus we make war, thus we marry, thus we raise children; though the outcome of all these is uncertain, we approach those things about which we believed we should hope well. For who promises a harvest to the sower, a harbor to the sailor, victory to the soldier, a chaste wife to the husband, dutiful children to the father? We follow where reason, not where truth, has drawn us.

Huic respondebimus numquam expectare nos certissimam rerum comprehensionem, quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio, sed ea ire, qua ducit veri similitudo. Omne hac via procedit officium. Sic serimus, sic navigamus, sic militamus, sic uxores ducimus, sic liberos tollimus; cum omnium horum incertus sit eventus, ad ea accedimus, de quibus bene sperandum esse credidimus. Quis enim pollicetur serenti proventum, naviganti portum, militanti victoriam, marito pudicam uxorem, patri pios liberos? Sequimur, qua ratio, non qua veritas traxit.

Wait, so as to do nothing unless it is going to turn out well, and to know nothing unless the truth has been ascertained: with all action abandoned, life comes to a halt. Since likelihoods, not truths, drive me toward this or that, I shall give a benefit to the man whom it will be likely to be grateful.

Expecta, ut nisi bene cessura non facias et nisi comperta veritate nil noveris: relicto omni actu vita consistit. Cum veri similia me in hoc aut in illud impellant, non vera, ei beneficium dabo, quem veri simile erit gratum esse.

"Many things," he says, "will intervene, on account of which both the bad man may creep in as good and the good man displease as bad; for the appearances of things, which we trusted, are deceptive." Who denies it? But I find nothing else by which to govern my thinking. These are the tracks by which truth must be followed; I have nothing more certain; I shall give my effort to weighing these as carefully as may be, and shall not quickly assent to them.

" Multa," inquit, " intervenient, propter quae et malus pro bono surrepat et bonus pro malo displiceat; fallaces enim sunt rerum species, quibus credidimus." Quis negat? Sed nihil aliud invenio, per quod cogitationem regam. His veritas mihi vestigiis sequenda est, certiora non habeo; haec ut quam diligentissime aestimem, operam dabo nec cito illis adsentiar.

For so in battle it can happen that my hand, deceived by some error, directs my weapon against a fellow soldier and spares an enemy as if he were my own; but this will both happen rarely and not by my fault, whose purpose is to strike the enemy, to defend the citizen. If I should know a man to be ungrateful, I shall not give him a benefit. But he stole in, he imposed on me: there is here no fault of the giver, because I gave as if to a grateful man.

Sic enim in proelio potest accidere, ut telum meum in commilitonem manus dirigat aliquo errore decepta et hosti tamquam meo parcam; sed hoc et raro accidet et non vitio meo, cuius propositum est hostem ferire, civem defendere. Si sciam ingratum esse, non dabo beneficium. At obrepsit, at imposuit: nulla hic culpa tribuentis est, quia tamquam grato dedi.

"If you should have promised," he says, "that you would give a benefit, and afterward learn that the man is ungrateful, will you give it or not? If you do it knowingly, you sin, for you give to one to whom you ought not to give; if you refuse, then too you sin: you do not give to one to whom you promised. Your conscience falters at this point, and so does that proud claim that the wise man never repents of his deed, nor ever amends what he has done, nor changes his plan."

"Si promiseris," inquit, " te daturum beneficium et postea ingratum esse scieris, dabis an non? Si facis sciens, peccas, das enim, cui non debes dare; si negas, et hoc modo peccas: non das ei, cui promisisti. Conscientia vestra hoc loco titubat et illud superbum promissum numquam sapientem facti sui paenitere nec umquam emendare, quod fecerit, nec mutare consilium,"

The wise man does not change his plan, so long as all those things remain that were present when he formed it; therefore repentance never steals upon him, because nothing better could have been done at that time than what was done, nothing better resolved than was resolved; for the rest, he comes to everything with a reservation: "If nothing falls out to hinder it." Therefore we say that all things succeed for him and that nothing happens contrary to his expectation, because he presumes in his mind that something can intervene to prevent his intentions.

Non mutat sapiens consilium omnibus his manentibus, quae erant, cum sumeret; ideo numquam illum paenitentia subit, quia nihil melius illo tempore fieri potuit, quam quod factum est, nihil melius constitui, quam constitutum est; ceterum ad omnia cum exceptione venit: "Si nihil inciderit, quod impediat." Ideo omnia illi succedere dicimus et nihil contra opinionem accidere, quia praesumit animo posse aliquid intervenire, quod destinata prohibeat.

It is the assurance of the imprudent to pledge fortune to themselves; the wise man considers both sides of her; he knows how much room there is for error, how uncertain human things are, how many things stand against our plans; in suspense he follows the doubtful and slippery lot of things, and weighs uncertain outcomes against certain plans. But the reservation, without which he resolves nothing, enters on nothing, here too protects him.

Imprudentium ista fiducia est fortunam sibi spondere; sapiens utramque partem eius cogitat; scit, quantum liceat errori, quam incerta sint humana, quam multa consiliis obstent; ancipitem rerum ac lubricam sortem suspensus sequitur, consiliis certis incertos eventus expendit. Exceptio autem, sine qua nihil destinat, nihil ingreditur, et hic illum tuetur.

I promised a benefit, unless something fell out for which I ought not to give it. For what if my country should order me to give to itself what I have promised to him? If a law be passed that no one do the thing I had promised to do for my friend? I promised you my daughter in marriage; afterward you turned out to be a foreigner; I have no right of marriage with an alien; the same thing defends me that forbids me.

Promisi beneficium, nisi si quid incidisset, quare non deberem dare. Quid enim, si, quod illi pollicitus sum, patria sibi dare iusserit? Si lex lata erit, ne id quisquam faciat, quod ego me amico meo facturum promiseram? Promisi tibi in matrimonium filiam; postea peregrinus apparuisti; non est mihi cum externo conubium; eadem res me defendit, quae vetat.

Then I shall break faith, then I shall hear the charge of inconstancy, if, when all things are the same that were when I promised, I do not render the promise; but otherwise, whatever is changed makes me free to deliberate anew and frees me from my pledge. I promised my advocacy: afterward it appeared that through that case a prejudgment against my father was being sought; I promised that I would go abroad: but the road is reported beset by brigands; I was going to come to the place in person: but a sick son, but a wife in childbed, holds me back.

Tunc fidem fallam, tunc inconstantiae crimen audiam, si, cum eadem omnia sint, quae erant promittente me, non praestitero promissum; alioquin, quidquid mutatur, libertatem facit de integro consulendi et me fide liberat. Promisi advocationem: postea apparuit per illam causam praeiudicium in patrem meum quaeri; promisi me peregre exiturum: sed iter infestari latrociniis nuntiatur; in rem praesentem venturus fui: sed aeger filius, sed puerpera uxor tenet.

All things must be the same that were when I promised, for you to hold me to a promiser’s faith; but what greater change can occur than if I have found you a bad man and ungrateful? What I was giving as to a worthy man, I shall refuse to an unworthy one, and, deceived, I shall have a cause for anger besides.

Omnia esse debent eadem, quae fuerunt, eum promitterem, ut promittentis fidem teneas; quae autem maior fieri mutatio potest, quam si te malum virum et ingratum comperi? Quod tamquam digno dabam, indigno negabo et nascendi quoque causam habebo deceptus.

Yet I shall look also at how great is the matter at issue; the size of the promised thing will give me counsel. If it is trifling, I shall give — not because you are worthy, but because I promised — and I shall give it not as a gift, but I shall redeem my words and tweak my own ear. By the loss I shall chastise the rashness of the promiser: "There — that it may hurt you, that you may speak more considerately hereafter!" I shall pay what we are accustomed to call a tongue-fine.

Inspiciam tamen et, quantum sit, de quo agitur; dabit mihi consilium promissae rei modus. Si exiguum est, dabo, non quia dignus es, sed quia promisi, nec tamquam munus dabo, sed verba mea redimam et aurem mihi pervellam. Damno castigabo promittentis temeritatem: " Ecce, ut doleat tibi, ut postea consideratius loquaris! " Quod dicere solemus, linguarium dabo.

If it is greater, I shall not let it happen — as Maecenas says — that I be rebuked to the tune of ten million sesterces. For I shall compare the two with each other. There is something in persevering in what you have promised; there is again much in not giving a benefit to the unworthy; but how great is this? If it is light, let us shut our eyes; but if it is going to be to my great loss or shame, I prefer to make excuse once, why I refused, than always, why I gave. The whole thing, I say, lies in this: at how much the words of my promise are to be assessed.

Si maius erit, non committam, quemadmodum Maecenas ait, ut sestertio centies obiurgatus sim. Inter se enim utrumque comparabo. Est aliquid in eo, quod promiseris, perseverare; est rursus multum in eo, ne indigno beneficium des; hoc tamen quantum est? Si leve, coniveamus; si vero magno mihi aut detrimento aut rubori futurum, malo semel excusare, quare negaverim, quam semper, quare dederim. Totum, inquam, in eo est, quanti promissi mei verba taxentur.

Not only shall I hold back what I rashly promised, but I shall demand back what I gave not rightly; he is mad who keeps faith with an error.

Non tantum, quod temere promisi, retinebo, sed, quod non recte dedi, repetam; demens est, qui fidem praestat errori.

Philip, king of the Macedonians, had a soldier brave of hand, whose useful service he had proved in many campaigns, and from time to time he had given him something out of the spoil for his valor, and kept kindling the man’s venal soul with frequent bounties. This man, shipwrecked, was cast up onto the estate of a certain Macedonian; when this was reported, the man ran up, gathered back his breath, carried him into his own farmhouse, gave up his own little bed, revived him stricken and half-dead, tended him at his own expense for thirty days, restored him, and equipped him with travel-money, as he kept saying: "I shall return the favor to you, only let it fall to me to see my commander."

Philippus Macedonum rex habebat militem manu fortem, cuius in multis expeditionibus utilem expertus operam subinde ex praeda aliquid illi virtutis causa donaverat et hominem venalis animae crebris auctoramentis accendebat. Hic naufragus in possessiones cuiusdam Macedonis expulsus est; quod ut nuntiatum est, accucurrit, spiritum eius recollegit, in villam illum suam transtulit, lectulo suo cessit, adfectum semianimemque recreavit, diebus triginta sua impensa curavit, refecit, viatico instruxit subinde dicentem: " Gratiam tibi referam, videre tantum mihi imperatorem meum contingat."

He told Philip of his shipwreck, was silent about the help, and at once asked that the king give him the lands of a certain man. That certain man was his host — the very one by whom he had been taken in, by whom he had been healed. Kings, meanwhile, give many things, especially in war, with eyes covered. "One just man does not suffice against so many armed greeds; no one can at the same time play both the good man and the good general. How shall so many thousands of insatiable men be satisfied? What will they have, if each has his own?"

Narravit Philippo naufragium suum, auxilium tacuit et protinus petit, ut sibi cuiusdam praedia donaret. Ille quidam erat hospes eius, is ipse, a quo receptus erat, a quo sanatus. Multa interim reges in bello praesertim opertis oculis donant. " Non sufficit homo iustus tot armatis cupiditatibus, non potest quisquam eodem tempore et bonum virum et bonum ducem agere. Quomodo tot milia hominum insatiabilia satiabuntur? Quid habebunt, si suum quisque habuerit?

This Philip said to himself, when he ordered the man to be put in possession of the goods he sought. The man, driven from his goods, did not, like a peasant, bear the wrong in silence, content that he himself had not been given away as well, but wrote Philip a tight and outspoken letter; on receiving which the king so blazed up that he straightway charged Pausanias to restore the goods to their former owner, but to brand upon that most wicked soldier, most ungrateful guest, most greedy castaway, marks attesting an ungrateful man.

" Haec Philippus sibi dixit, cum illum induci in bona, quae petebat, iussit. Expulsus bonis suis ille non ut rusticus iniuriam tacitus tulit contentus, quod non et ipse donatus esset, sed Philippo epistulam strictam ac liberam scripsit; qua accepta ita exarsit, ut statim Pausaniae mandaret, bona priori domino restitueret, ceterum improbissimo militi, ingratissimo hospiti, avidissimo naufrago stigmata inscriberet ingratum hominem testantia.

He deserved indeed that those letters be not written but carved upon him, who had driven his host, naked and like a shipwrecked man, onto that very shore on which he himself had lain. But we shall see what measure of punishment should have been kept; at all events what he had seized by the highest crime had to be taken away. But who would be moved by his punishment? He had committed the thing for which no merciful man could pity him.

Dignus quidem fuit, cui non inscriberentur illae litterae, sed insculperentur, qui hospitem suum nudo et naufrago similem in id, in quo iacuerat ipse, litus expulerat. Sed videbimus, quis modus poenae servandus fuerit; auferendum utique fuit, quod summo scelere invaserat. Quis autem poena eius moveretur? Id commiserat, propter quod nemo misereri misericors posset.

Will Philip give to you, because he promised, even if he does not owe it, even if he is going to do a wrong, even if he is going to do a crime, even if by one deed he is going to shut the shores against the shipwrecked? It is no inconstancy to depart from a recognized and condemned error, and one must frankly confess: "I thought otherwise; I was deceived." But this is the perseverance of proud folly: "What I have once said, whatever it is, let it stand fixed and ratified."

Dabit tibi Philippus, quia promisit, etiam si non debet, etiam si iniuriam facturus est, etiam si scelus facturus est, etiam si uno facto praeclusurus est naufragis litora? Non est levitas a cognito et damnato errore discedere, et ingenue fatendum est: " Aliud putavi, deceptus sum." Haec vero superbae stultitiae perseverantia est: " Quod semel dixi, qualecumque est, fixum ratumque sit."

It is no disgrace to change one’s plan with the circumstance. Come, if Philip had left that man the possessor of those shores which he had taken by shipwreck, would he not have forbidden water and fire to all the wretched? "Rather," he says, "carry those letters about within the bounds of my kingdom, inscribed on your eyes with that hardest brow. Go, show how sacred a thing is the table of hospitality; offer this decree to be read on your face, by which it is provided that to help the wretched with a roof be a capital offense. This ordinance will be more firmly ratified thus than if I had cut it in bronze."

Non est turpe cum re mutare consilium. Age, si Philippus possessorem illum eorum litorum reliquisset, quae naufragio ceperat, non omnibus miseris aqua et igni interdixerat? " Potius," inquit, " intra fines regni mei tu litteras istas oculis inscribendas durissima fronte circumfer. I, ostende, quam sacra res sit mensa hospitalis; praebe in facie tua legendum istuc decretum, quo cavetur, ne miseros tecto iuvare capital sit. Magis ista constitutio sic rata erit, quam si illam in aes incidissem."

"Why then," he says, "did your Zeno, when he had promised five hundred denarii to a certain man as a loan and had himself found him scarcely suitable, though his friends urged him not to give, persist in lending, because he had promised?"

" Quare ergo," inquit, " Zeno vester, cum quingentos denarios cuidam mutuos promisisset et ipse illum parum idoneum comperisset, amicis suadentibus, ne daret, perseveravit credere, quia promiserat?

First, the case is one thing in a loan, another in a benefit. Of money even badly lent there is a calling-in; and I can summon the debtor on the day, and, if he yields to the court, I shall carry off a share; a benefit perishes both wholly and at once. Besides, the one is the act of a bad man, the other of a bad householder. Then, not even Zeno would have persisted in lending, had the sum been larger. It is five hundred denarii: it is what is commonly said, "let him spend it in his sickness"; it was worth that much not to recall his promise.

" Primum alia condicio est in credito, alia in beneficio. Pecuniae etiam male creditae exactio est; et appellare debitorem ad diem possum et, si foro cesserit, portionem feram; beneficium et totum perit et statim. Praeterea hoc mali viri est, illud mali patris familiae. Deinde ne Zeno quidem, si maior fuisset summa, credere perseverasset. Quingenti denarii sunt: illud quod dici solet, " in morbo consumat "; fuit tanti non revocare promissum suum.

To dinner, because I promised, I shall go, even if it is cold; not, indeed, if snow falls. I shall rise for a betrothal, because I promised, although I have not digested; but not if I am running a fever. I shall go down to stand surety, because I promised; but not if you bid me pledge myself for an uncertain sum, if you would bind me to the treasury. There is underneath, I say, a tacit reservation: "If I can, if I ought, if these things shall be so."

Ad cenam, quia promisi, ibo, etiam si frigus erit; non quidem, si nives cadent. Surgam ad sponsalia, quia promisi, quamvis non concoxerim; sed non, si febricitavero. Sponsum descendam, quia promisi; sed non, si spondere me in incertum iubebis, si fisco obligabis. Subest, inquam, tacita exceptio: "Si potero, si debebo, si haec ita erunt."

Bring it about that the state of things be the same when you exact as it was when I promised; to fail you will be inconstancy. If anything new has intervened, why do you wonder, when the condition of the promiser has changed, that his plan has changed? Furnish me all the same things, and I am the same. We promise to appear in court, yet an action does not lie against all who fail to appear: superior force excuses the man who fails.

Effice, ut idem status sit, cum exigis, qui fuit, cum promitterem; destituere levitas erit. Si aliquid intervenit novi, quid miraris, cum condicio promittentis mutata sit, mutatum esse consilium? Eadem mihi omnia praesta, et idem sum. Vadimonium promittimus, tamen deserti non in omnes datur actio: deserentem vis maior excusat.

Consider that the same answer is given also in that question, whether gratitude must be returned in every way, and whether a benefit must at all costs be repaid. I ought to furnish a grateful mind; but for the rest, sometimes my own ill fortune does not allow me to return the favor, sometimes the good fortune of him to whom I owe it.

Idem etiam in illa quaestione responsum existima, an omni modo referenda sit gratia, et an beneficium utique reddendum sit. Animum praestare gratum debeo, ceterum aliquando me referre gratiam non patitur mea infelicitas, aliquando felicitas eius,cui debeo.

For what shall I repay a king, what shall I, a poor man, repay a rich one — especially when certain men judge it an injury to receive a benefit and load benefit upon benefit, one after another, with others? What more can I do, in the person of these men, than wish? For I ought not to reject a new benefit for this reason, that I have not yet repaid the former. I shall receive it as gladly as it is given, and I shall offer myself to my friend as a capacious material for exercising his goodness. He who does not wish to receive new gifts is offended at those received. I do not return the favor:

Quid enim regi, quid pauper diviti reddam, utique cum quidam recipere beneficium iniuriam iudicent et beneficia subinde aliis beneficiis onerent? Quid amplius in horum persona possum quam velle? Nec enim ideo beneficium novum reicere debeo, quia nondum prius reddidi. Accipiam tam libenter, quam dabitur, et praebebo me amico meo exercendae bonitatis suae capacem materiam. Qui nova accipere non vult, acceptis offenditur. Non refero gratiam:

what of it? There is no delay on my part, if either the occasion fails me or the means. He bestowed on me, no doubt when he had the occasion, when he had the means. Is he a good man or a bad one? With a good man I have a good case; with a bad one I do not plead.

quid ad rem? Non est per me mora, si aut occasio mihi deest aut facultas. Ille praestitit mihi, nempe cum occasionem haberet, cum facultatem. Utrum bonus vir est an malus? Apud bonum virum bonam causam habeo, apud malum non ago.

I do not even think this should be done — that we hasten to return the favor even to those unwilling to whom it is returned, and press it on them as they draw back. It is not returning a favor, to repay unwilling what you received willing. Some men, when some little gift has been sent them, straightway send back another out of season and testify that they owe nothing; it is a kind of rejection, at once to send another in turn and to cancel a gift with a gift.

Ne illud quidem existimo faciendum, ut referre gratiam etiam invitis his, quibus refertur, properemus et instemus recedentibus. Non est referre gratiam, quod volens acceperis, nolenti reddere. Quidam, cum aliquod illis missum est munusculum, subinde aliud intempestive remittunt et nihil se debere testantur; reiciendi genus est protinus aliud in vicem mittere et munus munere expungere.

Sometimes I shall even not repay a benefit, though I can. When? If I am going to take from myself more than I shall confer on him, if he is not going to feel any increase from receiving that which, once repaid, will mean much going from me. He who hastens at all costs to repay has not the mind of a grateful man, but of a debtor; and, to be brief, he who too eagerly wishes to pay off owes unwillingly; he who owes unwillingly is ungrateful.

Aliquando et non reddam beneficium, cum possim. Quando? Si plus mihi detracturus ero quam illi conlaturus, si ille non erit sensurus ullam accessionem recepto eo, quo reddito mihi multum abscessurum erit. Qui festinat utique reddere, non habet animum grati hominis, sed debitoris; et, ut breviter, qui nimis cupit solvere, invitus debet; qui invitus debet, ingratus est.

In the earlier books I seemed to have completed my purpose, when I had treated how a benefit should be given, how it should be received; for these are the bounds of this duty. Whatever further I linger over, I am not serving the subject, but indulging it — which must be followed where it leads, not where it invites; for from time to time something will arise to provoke the mind with a certain sweetness, more not-superfluous than necessary.

In prioribus libris videbar consummasse propositum, cum tractassem, quemadmodum dandum esset beneficium, quemadmodum accipiendum; hi enim sunt huius officii fines. Quidquid ultra moror, non servio materiae, sed indulgeo, quae, quo ducit, sequenda est, non quo invitat; subinde enim nascetur, quo lacessat aliqua dulcedine animum, magis non supervacuum quam necessarium.

But, since you so wish, let us persevere, and, the things that contained the matter now done, examine also those which — if you want the truth — are connected, not cohering; and whoever inspects these carefully neither earns his pay nor yet wastes his effort.

Verum, quia ita vis, perseveremus peractis, quae rem continebant, scrutari etiam ea, quae, si vis verum, conexa sunt, non cohaerentia; quae quisquis diligenter inspicit, nec facit operae pretium nec tamen perdit operam.

But to you, Liberalis Aebutius, a man by nature most good and inclined to benefits, no praise of them is enough. I have never seen anyone so kindly an appraiser even of the slightest services; now your goodness has slipped so far that you think a benefit given to you which is given to anyone; you are ready, lest anyone repent of a benefit, to pay on behalf of the ungrateful.

Tibi autem, homini natura optimo et ad beneficia propenso, Liberalis Aebuti, nulla eorum laudatio satis facit. Neminem umquam vidi tam benignum etiam levissimorum officiorum aestimatorem; iam bonitas tua eo usque prolapsa est, ut tibi dari putes beneficium, quod ulli datur; paratus es, ne quem beneficii paeniteat, pro ingratis dependere.

You yourself are so far from all boasting, so far do you wish at once to unburden those you oblige, that whatever you confer on anyone, you wish to seem not to bestow, but to repay; and therefore things so given will return to you the more fully. For benefits generally follow him who does not ask them back, and, as glory follows more closely those who flee it, so the fruit of benefits answers back more pleasingly through men by whose grace even the ungrateful are suffered to be.

Ipse usque eo abes ab omni iactatione, usque eo statim vis exonerare, quos obligas, ut, quidquid in aliquem confers, velis videri non praestare, sed reddere, ideoque plenius ad te sic data revertentur. Nam fere secuntur beneficia non reposcentem et, ut gloria fugientes magis sequitur, ita fructus beneficiorum gratius respondet, per quos esse etiam ingratis licet.

Through you, indeed, there is no delay but that those who have received benefits seek them again unbidden, nor will you refuse to confer others and to add more and greater to those suppressed and dissembled: it is the resolve of the best man and a great soul to bear the ungrateful so long, until you have made him grateful. Nor will that reasoning deceive you; vices yield to virtues, if you do not hasten to hate them too quickly.

Per te vero non est mora, quominus beneficia, qui acceperunt, ultro repetant, nec recusabis conferre alia et suppressis dissimulatisque plura ac maiora adicere: propositum optimi viri et ingentis animi tam diu ferre ingratum, donec feceris gratum. Nec te ista ratio decipiet; succumbunt vitia virtutibus, si illa non cito odisse properaveris.

That saying, at any rate, pleases you uniquely as nobly put — that it is base to be outdone in benefits. Whether this is true is not without reason wont to be asked, and it is far other than you conceive in your mind. For never, in a contest of honorable things, is it base to be surpassed, provided you do not throw away your arms and, even conquered, still wish to conquer.

Illud utique unice tibi placet velut magnifice dictum turpe esse beneficiis vinci. Quod an sit verum, non immerito quaeri solet, longeque aliud est, quam mente concipis. Numquam enim in rerum honestarum certamine superari turpe est, dummodo arma non proicias et victus quoque velis vincere.

Not all bring the same strength to a good purpose, the same means, the same fortune, which tempers the outcome even of the best plans; the will itself, seeking the right, is to be praised, even if another has gone before it with a swifter step. It is not as in contests put on for show, where the palm declares the better man — though in those too chance has often preferred the worse.

Non omnes ad bonum propositum easdem adferunt vires, easdem facultates, eandem fortunam, quae optimorum quoque consiliorum dumtaxat exitus temperat; voluntas ipsa rectum petens laudanda est, etiam si illam alius gradu velociori antecessit. Non ut in certaminibus ad spectaculum editis meliorem palma declarat, quamquam in illis quoque saepe deteriorem praetulit casus.

When it is a matter of duty, which each wishes to be on his own side as full as possible, if one was able to do more and had at hand material sufficient to his spirit, if fortune allowed him as much as he attempted, but the other is equal in will, even though he returned less than he received, or did not return all, but wishes to return and is intent on this with his whole mind — he is no more conquered than one who dies in arms, whom the enemy could more easily kill than turn aside.

Ubi de officio agitur, quod uterque a sua parte esse quam plenissimum cupit, si alter plus potuit et ad manum habuit materiam sufficientem animo suo, si illi, quantum conatus est, fortuna permisit, alter autem voluntate par est, etiam si minora, quam accepit, reddidit aut omnia non reddidit, sed vult reddere et toto in hoc intentus est animo, non magis victus est, quam qui in armis moritur, quem occidere facilius hostis potuit quam avertere.

What you think base — to be conquered — cannot befall a good man. For he will never yield, never renounce; to the very last day of life he will stand ready and will die at this post, openly avowing that he received great things, that he willed equal ones.

Quod turpe existimas, id accidere viro bono non potest, ut vincatur. Numquam enim succumbet, numquam renuntiabit; ad ultimum usque vitae diem stabit paratus et in hac statione morietur magna se accepisse prae se ferens, paria voluisse.

The Lacedaemonians forbid their men to compete in the pancratium or with the caestus, where the loser’s confession marks the inferior. The runner first touched the chalk; he outstripped his rival by speed, not by spirit. The wrestler, thrown three times, lost the palm, did not hand it over. Since the Lacedaemonians set a high value on their citizens being unconquered, they removed them from those contests in which not the judge, nor the outcome by itself, makes the victor, but the voice of the one yielding and bidding him take the prize.

Lacedaemonii vetant suos pancratio aut caestu decernere, ubi inferiorem ostendit victi confessio. Cursor cretam prior contigit; velocitate illum, non animo antecessit. Luctator ter abiectus perdidit palmam, non tradidit. Cum invictos esse Lacedaemonii cives suos magno aestimarent, ab iis certaminibus removerunt, in quibus victorem facit non iudex nec per se ipse exitus, sed vox cedentis et tradere iubentis.

What they preserve in their citizens, virtue and good will furnish to all: that they never be conquered, since indeed even amid things that overpower, the spirit is unconquered. Therefore no one says the three hundred Fabii were conquered, but slain; and Regulus was captured by the Carthaginians, not conquered, and so is whoever else, crushed by the force and weight of raging fortune, does not lower his spirit. In benefits it is the same.

Hoc, quod illi in suis civibus custodiunt, virtus ac bona voluntas omnibus praestat, ne umquam vincantur, quoniam quidem etiam inter superantia animus invictus est. Ideo nemo trecentos Fabios victos dicit, sed occisos; et Regulus captus est a Poenis, non victus, et quisquis alius saevientis fortunae vi ac pondere oppressus non submittit animum. In beneficiis idem est.

Someone received more, greater, more frequent benefits; yet he is not conquered. Benefits perhaps have been outdone by benefits, if you reckon up between them what was given and received; but if you compare the giver and the receiver, whose minds are to be appraised in themselves, the palm will be with neither. For it commonly happens that, even when one is pierced with many wounds, the other but lightly grazed, they are said to have come off equal, although the one seems the inferior.

Plura aliquis accepit, maiora, frequentiora; non tamen victus est. Beneficia fortasse beneficiis victa sunt, si inter se data et accepta computes; si dantem et accipientem comparaveris, quorum animi et per se aestimandi sunt, penes neutrum erit palma. Solet enim fieri, ut, etiam cum alter multis vulneribus confossus est, alter leviter quidem saucius pares exisse dicantur, quamvis alter videatur inferior.

Therefore no one can be conquered by benefits, if he knows that he owes, if he wishes to repay: if, where he cannot match a man in deeds, he matches him in spirit. As long as he abides in this, as long as he holds the will to prove a grateful mind by tokens, what does it matter on which side the little gifts are counted the more numerous? You can give much, and I can only receive; fortune stands with you, good will with me; yet I am as much your equal as the naked or lightly armed are of many in full armor.

Ergo nemo vinci potest beneficiis, si scit debere, si vult referre: si, quem rebus non potest, animo aequat. Hic quam diu in hoc permanet, quam diu tenet voluntatem gratum animum signis approbandi, quid interest, ab utra parte munuscula plura numerentur? Tu multa dare potes, et ego tantum accipere possum; tecum stat fortuna, mecum bona voluntas; tamen tam par tibi sum, quam multis armatissimis nudi aut leviter armati.

And so no one is conquered by benefits, because each is as grateful as he willed to be. For if it is base to be conquered by benefits, one ought not to receive a benefit from over-powerful men, whom you cannot requite — from princes, I mean, from kings, whom fortune has set in such a place that they can lavish much, about to get back very little and unequal to what they gave.

Nemo itaque beneficiis vincitur, quia tam gratus est quisque, quam voluit. Nam si turpe est beneficiis vinci, non oportet a praepotentibus viris accipere beneficium, quibus gratiam referre non possis, a principibus dico, a regibus, quos eo loco fortuna posuit, ex quo largiri multa possent pauca admodum et imparia datis recepturi.

I said kings and princes, to whom nevertheless service can be rendered, and whose surpassing power rests on the agreement and ministry of lesser men. But there are certain men withdrawn beyond all desire, whom scarcely any human longings touch; to whom fortune herself can furnish nothing. I must needs be conquered in benefits by Socrates, I must needs be by Diogenes, who walked naked through the midst of the Macedonians’ treasures, the king’s riches trodden underfoot.

Reges et principes dixi, quibus tamen potest opera navari et quorum illa excellens potentia per minorum consensum ministeriumque constat. At sunt quidam extra omnem subducti cupiditatem, qui vix ullis humanis desideriis continguntur; quibus nihil potest praestare ipsa fortuna. Necesse est a Socrate beneficiis vincar, necesse est a Diogene, qui per medias Macedonum gazas nudus incessit calcatis regis opibus.

O, surely then he deservedly seemed, both to himself and to the rest for whom no fog was poured over the discerning of truth, to tower above the man beneath whom all things lay. Far more powerful, far richer was he than Alexander, who then possessed all things; for there was more that this man would not receive than that the other could give.

O! ne ille tunc merito et sibi et ceteris, quibus ad dispiciendam veritatem non erat obfusa caligo, supra eum eminere visus est, infra quem omnia iacebant. Multo potentior, multo locupletior fuit omnia tunc possidente Alexandro; plus enim erat, quod hic nollet accipere, quam quod ille posset dare.

It is no disgrace to be conquered by such men; for I am no less brave if you set me against an invulnerable enemy, nor for that reason can fire less burn, if it has fallen on matter inviolable by flames, nor has iron lost its power of cutting, if a stone — not taking the blow, solid and of a nature unconquered against hard things — is to be cleft. The same I answer you concerning a grateful man. He is not basely conquered by benefits, if he has been put under obligation by those to whom either the greatness of fortune or surpassing virtue has shut the approach to benefits that would return to them.

Non est turpe ab his vinci; neque enim minus fortis sum, si cum invulnerabili me hoste committis, nec ideo minus ignis urere potest, si in materiam incidit inviolabilem flammis, nec ideo ferrum secandi vim perdidit, si non recipiens ictum lapis solidusque et invictae adversus dura naturae dividendus est. Idem tibi de homine grato respondeo. Non turpiter vincitur beneficiis, si ab his obligatus est, ad quos aut fortunae magnitudo aut eximia virtus aditum redituris ad se beneficiis clusit.

By our parents we are generally conquered. For we have them only so long as we judge them harsh and so long as we do not understand their benefits. When at last our age has gathered some prudence and it has begun to appear that they ought to be loved by us for those very things — admonitions, severity, and the careful watch over heedless youth — for which they were not loved, they are snatched from us. Few their age has brought to the reaping of the true fruit from their children; the rest felt their sons as a burden.

A parentibus fere vincimur. Nam tam diu illos habemus, quam diu iudicamus graves et quam diu beneficia illorum non intellegimus. Cum iam aetas aliquid prudentiae collegit et apparere coepit propter illa ipsa eos amari a nobis debere, propter quae non amabantur, admonitiones, severitatem et inconsultae adulescentiae diligentem custodiam, rapiuntur nobis. Paucos usque ad verum fructum a liberis percipiendum perduxit aetas; ceteri filios onere senserunt.

Yet it is no disgrace to be conquered in benefits by a parent; why should it not be no disgrace, since it is so by no one at all? For with some we are both equal and unequal — equal in spirit, which alone they exact, which alone we promise; unequal in fortune, which, if it has stood in someone’s way, that he could not return the favor, he need not for that reason blush as though conquered. It is no disgrace not to attain, provided you pursue.

Non est tamen turpe vinci beneficiis a parente; quidni non sit turpe, eum a nullo sit? Quibusdam enim et pares et impares sumus, pares animo, quem solum illi exigunt, quem nos solum promittimus, impares fortuna, quae si cui obstitit, quominus referret gratiam, non ideo illi tamquam victo erubescendum est. Non est turpe non consequi, dummodo sequaris.

Often we must needs ask for further benefits before we have repaid the former, nor do we for that reason not ask, or ask basely, because we shall owe without being about to repay; because there will be no delay on our part but that we be most grateful, but something will intervene from outside to prevent it. Yet we shall neither be conquered in spirit nor basely overcome by those things which are not in our power.

Saepe necesse est ante alia beneficia petamus, quam priora reddidimus, nec ideo non petimus aut turpiter, quia non reddituri debebimus, quia non per nos erit mora, quominus gratissimi simus, sed interveniet aliquid extrinsecus, quod prohibeat. Nos tamen nec vincemur animo nec turpiter his rebus superabimur, quae non sunt in nostra potestate.

Alexander, king of the Macedonians, used to boast that he was conquered in benefits by no one. There is no reason for him, excessive in spirit, to look down on the Macedonians and Greeks and Carians and Persians and the nations marshaled into his army, nor to judge that this kingdom, stretched from a corner of Thrace to the shore of an unknown sea, bestowed it on him. Of the same thing Socrates could have boasted, of the same Diogenes, by whom at all events he was conquered. Why should he not have been conquered on that day on which a man already swelling beyond the measure of human pride saw someone to whom he could neither give anything nor take anything away?

Alexander Macedonum rex gloriari solebat a nullo se beneficiis victum. Non est, quod nimius animi Macedonas et Graecos et Caras et Persas et nationes discriptas in exercitum suspiciat, nec hoc sibi praestitisse regnum a Thraciae angulo porrectum usque ad litus incogniti maris iudicet. Eadem re gloriari Socrates potuit, eadem Diogenes, a quo utique victus est, Quidni victus sit illo die, quo homo super mensuram iam humanae superbiae tumens vidit aliquem, cui nec dare quicquam posset nec eripere?

King Archelaus asked Socrates to come to him; Socrates is reported to have said that he was unwilling to come to a man from whom he would receive benefits when he could not return him equal ones. First, it was in his own power not to receive; then, he himself was beginning to give a benefit first, for he came when asked and gave that which at all events the other was not going to repay to Socrates. Even so, Archelaus was going to give gold and silver and receive contempt of gold and silver: could Socrates not return thanks to Archelaus?

Archelaus rex Socratem rogavit, ut ad se veniret; dixisse Socrates traditur nolle se ad eum venire, a quo acciperet beneficia, cum reddere illi paria non posset. Primum in ipsius potestate erat non accipere; deinde ipse dare beneficium prior incipiebat, veniebat enim rogatus et id dabat, quod utique ille non erat Socrati redditurus. Etiamnunc Archelaus daturus erat aurum et argentum recepturus contemptum auri et argenti: non poterat referre Archelao Socrates gratias?

And how much was he going to receive as great as what he gave, if he had shown him a man skilled in life and death, holding the bounds of both? If he had admitted the king, erring in broad daylight, to the nature of things — so ignorant of it that, on the day a solar eclipse occurred, he shut up the palace and, as is the custom in mourning and adversity, shaved his son’s head?

Et quid tantum erat accepturus, quantum dabat, si ostendisset hominem vitae ac mortis peritum utriusque fines tenentem? Si regem in luce media errantem ad rerum naturam admisisset usque eo eius ignarum, ut, quo die solis defectio fuit,regiam eluderet et filium, quod in luctu ac rebus adversis moris est, tenderet?

How great a benefit it would have been, if he had drawn the frightened king from his hiding-places and bidden him be of good cheer, saying: "That is no failing of the sun, but a meeting of two heavenly bodies, when the moon, running on a lower path, has set its own orb beneath the sun itself and hidden it by interposing itself; which now, if in passing it has grazed small parts of it, covers them, now covers more, if it has thrown a greater part of itself before it, now shuts off the sight of the whole, if with exact poise it has come in midway between the sun and the lands.

Quantum fuisset beneficium, si timentem e latebris suis extraxisset et bonum animum habere iussisset dicens: " Non est ista solis defectio, sed duorum siderum coitus, cum luna humiliore currens via infra ipsum solem orbem suum posuit et illum obiectu sui abscondit; quae modo partes eius exiguas, si in transcursu strinxit, obducit, modo plus tegit, si maiorem partem sui obiecit, modo excludit totius adspeetum, si recto libramento inter solem terrasque media successit.

But soon their own swiftness will draw those heavenly bodies this way and that; soon the lands will recover the day, and this order will go on through the ages and has its appointed and predicted days, on which the sun, by the moon’s running across, is forbidden to pour out all its rays. Wait a little; soon it will emerge, soon it will leave that cloud, as it were, soon, freed of its hindrances, it will send out its light unimpeded."

Sed iam ista sidera hoc et illo diducet velocitas sua; iam recipient diem terrae, et hic ibit ordo per saecula dispositosque ac praedictos dies habet, quibus sol intercursu lunae vetetur omnes radios effundere. Paulum expecta; iam emerget, iam istam velut nubem relinquet, iam exsolutus impedimentis lucem suam libere mittet."

Could Socrates not return equal thanks to Archelaus, if he had forbidden him to reign? No doubt he received too small a benefit from Socrates, if he could give Socrates any! Why then did Socrates say this? A witty man, whose speech proceeded by figures, a mocker of all, and most of the powerful, he preferred to refuse him drily rather than stubbornly or proudly; he said that he was unwilling to receive benefits from one to whom he could not return equal ones. He feared, perhaps, lest he be compelled to receive what he did not want; he feared lest he receive something unworthy of Socrates. Someone will say: "He could have refused, if he wished."

Socrates parem gratiam Archelao referre non posset, si illum regnare vetuisset? Parum scilicet magnum beneficium a Socrate accipiebat, si ullum dare Socrati potuisset. Quare ergo hoc Socrates dixit? Vir facetus et cuius per figuras sermo procederet, derisor omnium, maxime potentium, maluit illi nasute negare quam contumaciter aut superbe; dixit se nolle beneficia ab eo accipere, cui non posset paria reddere. Timuit fortasse, ne cogeretur accipere, quae nollet, timuit, ne quid indignum Socrate accipere. Dicet aliquis: " Negasset, si vellet.

But he would have provoked against himself an insolent king who wished all his own things to be greatly valued. It makes no difference to the matter whether you refuse to give something to a king or to receive from a king; he puts both rebuffs on the same footing, and to be disdained is to a proud man more bitter than not to be feared. Do you wish to know what he truly meant? He was unwilling to go to a voluntary servitude — he whose liberty a free city could not bear!

" Sed instigasset in se regem insolentem et omnia sua magno aestimari volentem. Nihil ad rem pertinet, utrum dare aliquid regi nolis an accipere a rege; in aequo utramque ponit repulsam, et superbo fastidiri acerbius est quam non timeri. Vis scire, quid vere voluerit? Noluit ire ad voluntariam servitutem is, cuius libertatem civitas libera ferre non potuit!

Enough, as I judge, have we treated this part — whether it were base to be conquered by benefits. He who asks this knows that men are not wont to give a benefit to themselves; for it would have been manifest that it is not base to be conquered by oneself.

Satis, ut existimo, hanc partem tractavimus, an turpe esset beneficiis vinci. Quod qui quaerit, scit non solere homines sibi ipsos dare beneficium; manifestum enim fuisset non esse turpe a se ipsum vinci.

And yet among certain Stoics this too is disputed — whether anyone can give himself a benefit, whether he ought to return himself thanks. These things made it seem worth asking: we are wont to say, "I give myself thanks," and "I can complain of no other than myself," and "I am angry at myself," and "I shall exact a penalty from myself," and "I hate myself," and many besides of this kind, by which each speaks of himself as of another.

Atqui apud quosdam Stoicos et de hoc ambigitur, an possit aliquis sibi beneficium dare, an debeat referre sibi gratiam. Quod ut videretur quaerendum, illa fecerunt: solemus dicere; " gratias mihi ago " et " de nullo queri possum alio quam de me" et " ego mihi irascor " et " ego a me poenas exigam " et " odi me," multa praeterea eiusmodi, per quae unusquisque de se tamquam de altero loquitur.

"If I can harm myself," he says, "why can I not also give myself a benefit? Besides, the things which, if I had conferred them on another, would be called benefits — why, if I conferred them on myself, are they not? What, if I had received it from another, I should owe — why, if I gave it to myself, do I not owe? Why am I ungrateful toward myself — which is no less base than to be sordid toward oneself, and hard and cruel toward oneself, and neglectful of oneself?

" Si nocere," inquit, " mihi possum, quare non et beneficium mihi dare possim? Praeterea quae, si in alium contulissem, beneficia vocarentur, quare, si in me contuli, non sint? Quod, si ab altero accepissem, deberem, quare, si mihi ipse dedi, non debeam? Quare sim adversus me ingratus, quod non minus turpe est quam in se sordidum esse et in se durum ae saevum et sui neclegentem?

A pander of another’s body is in as ill repute as a pander of his own. To be sure, the flatterer is blamed, and he who echoes another’s words, ready to praise falsehoods; no less is he who pleases himself and looks up to himself — his own flatterer, so to speak. Vices are hateful not only when they sin abroad, but when they are turned back upon oneself.

Tam alieni corporis leno male audit quam sui. Nempe reprenditur adsentator et aliena subsequens verba, paratus ad falsa laudator; non minus placens sibi et se suspiciens, ut ita dicam, adsentator suus. Vitia non tantum, cum foris peceant, invisa sunt, sed cum in se retorquentur.

Whom will you admire more than him who commands himself, than him who has himself in his power? It is easier to rule barbarous nations impatient of another’s command than to restrain one’s own mind and hand it over to oneself. Plato," he says, "gives Socrates thanks, because he learned from him; why should not Socrates give thanks to himself, because he taught himself? Marcus Cato says: ’What you lack, borrow from yourself.’ Why can I not make myself a gift, if I can lend to myself? There are countless things in which usage divides us;

Quem magis admiraberis, quam qui imperat sibi, quam qui se habet in potestate? Gentes facilius est barbaras impatientesque arbitrii alieni regere, quam animum suum continere et tradere sibi. Platon, inquit, agit Socrati gratias, quod ab illo didicit; quare Socrates sibi non agat, quod ipse se docuit? M. Cato ait: ’ Quod tibi deerit, a te ipso mutuare.’ Quare donare mihi non possim, si commodare possum? Innumerabilia sunt, in quibus consuetudo nos dividit;

we are wont to say: ’Let me speak with myself’ and ’I shall tweak my own ear.’ If these things are true, then, as one ought to be angry at himself, so also to give himself thanks; as to upbraid himself, so also to praise himself; as he can be a loss to himself, so also a gain. Injury and benefit are opposites; if we say of someone, ’He did himself an injury,’ we shall be able to say also: ’He gave himself a benefit.’ "

dicere solemus: ’ Sine, loquar mecum ’ et ’ Ego mihi aurem pervellam.’ Quae si vera sunt, quemadmodum aliquis sibi irasci debet, sic et gratias agere; quomodo obiurgare se, sic et laudare se; quomodo damno sibi esse, sic et lucro potest. Iniuria et beneficium contraria sunt; si de aliquo dicimus: ’ Iniuriam sibi fecit,’ poterimus dicere et: ’ Beneficium sibi dedit.’ "

By nature it is first that one owes, then that he returns thanks; there is no debtor without a creditor, no more than a husband without a wife or a father without a son; someone must give, that someone may receive. To transfer something into the right hand from the left is neither giving nor receiving.

Natura prius est, ut quis debeat, deinde, ut gratiam referat; debitor non est sine creditore, non magis quam maritus sine uxore aut sine filio pater; aliquis dare debet, ut aliquis accipiat. Non est dare nec accipere in dexteram manum ex sinistra transferre.

As no one carries himself, although he moves and transfers his own body; as no one, although he has spoken for himself, is said to have been his own advocate, nor sets up a statue to himself as to his own patron; as a sick man, when by his own care he has recovered, does not exact a fee from himself; so in every transaction, even when he has done something that would profit himself, he will nevertheless not owe thanks to himself, because he will have no one to whom to return them.

Quomodo nemo se portat, quamvis corpus suum moveat et transferat, quomodo nemo, quamvis pro se dixerit, adfuisse sibi dicitur nec statuam sibi tamquam patrono suo ponit, quomodo aeger, cum cura sua convaluit, mercedem a se non exigit, sic in omni negotio, etiam cum aliquid, quod prodesset sibi, fecerit, non tamen debebit referre gratiam sibi, quia non habebit, cui referat.

Grant that someone gives himself a benefit: while he gives, he also receives; grant that someone receives a benefit from himself: while he receives, he repays. At home, as they say, a re-borrowing takes place, and the debt, as in a game, passes over at once; for it is no other who gives than who receives, but one and the same. This word "to owe" has no place except between two; how then will it stand in one man, who frees himself by binding himself?

Ut concedam aliquem dare sibi beneficium, dum dat, et recipit; ut concedam aliquem a se accipere beneficium, dum accipit, reddit. Domi, quod aiunt, versura fit et velut lusorium nomen statim transit; neque enim alius dat quam accipit, sed unus atque idem. Hoc verbum " debere " non habet nisi inter duos locum; quomodo ergo in uno consistet, qui se obligando liberat?

As in a sphere or a ball there is nothing lowest, nothing highest, nothing last, nothing first, because by motion the order is changed and what followed goes before and what was setting rises, and all things, however they have gone, return to the same; so think it happens in a man: though you have changed him into many roles, he is one. He struck himself: he has no one against whom to bring an action for injuries; he bound and shut himself in: he is not held for violence; he gave himself a benefit: he repaid it to the giver at once.

Ut in orbe ac pila nihil imum est, nihil summum, nihil extremum, nihil primum, quia motu ordo mutatur et quae sequebantur praecedunt et quae occidebant oriuntur, omnia, quomodocumque ierunt, in idem revertuntur, ita in homine existima fieri; cum illum in multa mutaveris, unus est. Cecidit se: iniuriarum cum quo agat, non habet; adligavit et clusit: de vi non tenetur; beneficium sibi dedit: danti protinus reddidit.

The nature of things is said to lose nothing, because whatever is torn from it returns to it, nor can anything perish which has nowhere to fall out to, but is rolled back to the same place from which it departs. "What likeness," you say, "has this example to the question proposed?"

Rerum natura nihil dicitur perdere, quia, quidquid illi avellitur, ad illam redit, nec perire quicquam potest, quod, quo excidat, non habet, sed eodem revolvitur, unde discedit. " Quid simile," inquis, " hoc exemplum habet huic propositae quaestioni? "

I shall tell you. Suppose you are ungrateful: the benefit does not perish; he who gave it has it. Suppose you are unwilling to take it back: it is with you, before it is returned. You cannot lose anything, because what is taken away is none the less acquired for you. The circle is driven within your very self; by receiving you give, by giving you receive.

Dicam. Puta te ingratum esse: non perit beneficium, habet illud, qui dedit. Puta te recipere nolle: apud te est, antequam redditur. Non potes quicquam amittere, quia, quod detrahitur, nihilo minus tibi adquiritur. Intra te ipsum orbis agitur; accipiendo das, dando accipis.

"A benefit," he says, "one ought to give to oneself; therefore one ought also to return oneself thanks." First, that is false from which the rest hangs; for no one gives himself a benefit, but obeys his own nature, by which he was framed to love himself, whence his highest care is to avoid what will harm, to seek what will profit.

" Beneficium," inquit, " sibi dare oportet; ergo et referre gratiam oportet." Primum illud falsum est, ex quo pendent sequentia; nemo enim sibi beneficium dat, sed naturae suae paret, a qua ad caritatem sui compositus est, unde summa illi cura est nocitura vitandi, profutura appetendi.

And so he is not generous who gives to himself, nor merciful who pardons himself, nor compassionate who is touched by his own ills. What it is generosity, mercy, compassion to furnish to others, to furnish to oneself is nature. A benefit is a voluntary thing, but to profit oneself is necessary. The more benefits a man has given, the more beneficent he is; who was ever praised because he had been a help to himself? Because he had snatched himself from robbers? No one gives himself a benefit, no more than he gives himself hospitality; no one makes himself a gift, no more than he lends to himself.

Itaque nec liberalis est, qui sibi donat, nec clemens, qui sibi ignoscit, nec misericors, qui malis suis tangitur. Quod aliis praestare liberalitas est, clementia, misericordia, sibi praestare natura est. Beneficium res voluntaria est, at prodesse sibi necessarium est. Quo quis plura beneficia dedit, beneficentior est; quis umquam laudatus est, quod sibi ipse fuisset auxilio? Quod se eripuisset latronibus? Nemo sibi beneficium dat, non magis quam hospitium; nemo sibi donat, non magis quam credit.

If each gives himself a benefit, he gives always, gives without intermission, cannot enter the number of his own benefits. When then will he return thanks, since by the very act by which he returns thanks he gives a benefit? For how will you be able to distinguish whether he gives himself a benefit or repays one, when the matter is transacted within the same man? I freed myself from danger: I gave myself a benefit. Again I free myself from danger: do I give a benefit or repay one?

Si dat sibi quisque beneficium, semper dat, sine intermissione dat, inire beneficiorum suorum non potest numerum. Quando ergo gratiam referet, cum per hoc ipsum, quo gratiam refert, beneficium det? Quomodo enim discernere poteris, utrum det sibi beneficium an reddat, cum intra eundem hominem res geratur? Liberavi me periculo: beneficium mihi dedi. Iterum me periculo libero: utrum do beneficium an reddo?

Then, granting the first — that we give ourselves a benefit — what follows I shall not grant; for even if we give, we do not owe. Why? Because we receive it at once. I ought to receive a benefit, then to owe it, then to return it; there is no place for owing, because without any delay we receive. No one gives except to another, no one owes except to another, no one repays except to another. That cannot happen within one which each time requires two.

Deinde, ut primum illud concedam dare nos nobis beneficium, quod sequitur, non concedam; nam etiam si damus, non debemus. Quare? Quia statim recipimus. Accipere beneficium me oportet, deinde debere, deinde referre; debendi locus non est, quia sine ulla mora recipimus. Dat nemo nisi alteri, debet nemo nisi alteri, reddit nemo nisi alteri. Id intra unum non potest fieri, quod totiens duos exigit.

A benefit is to have furnished something usefully; but the word "to have furnished" looks to others. Will he not seem mad who shall say he has sold something to himself? For selling is an alienation and a transfer to another of one’s property and of one’s right in it. But, as to sell, so to give, is to let something go from oneself and to hand to another for keeping what you had held. If this is so, no one has given himself a benefit, because no one gives to himself; otherwise two contraries meet in one, so that to give and to receive are the same.

Beneficium est praestitisse aliquid utiliter; verbum autem " praestitisse " ad alios spectat. Numquid non demens videbitur, qui aliquid sibi vendidisse se dicet? Quia venditio alienatio est et rei suae iurisque in ea sui ad alium translatio. Atqui, quemadmodum vendere, sic dare aliquid a se dimittere est et id, quod tenueris, habendum alteri tradere. Quod si est, beneficium nemo sibi dedit, quia nemo dat sibi; alioqui duo contraria in uno coeunt, ut sit idem dare et accipere.

And still there is much difference between giving and receiving; why not? since these words are set in opposition. But if anyone gives himself a benefit, there is no difference between giving and receiving. A little before I was saying that certain things pertain to others and are so formed that their whole meaning departs from us: I am a brother — of another, for no one is his own brother; I am an equal — but to someone, for who is equal to himself? What is compared is not understood without another; what is joined is not without another; so too what is given is not without another, and a benefit is not without another.

Etiamnunc multum interest inter dare et accipere; quidni? eum ex diverso ista verba posita sint. Atqui si quis sibi beneficium dat, nihil interest inter dare et accipere. Paulo ante dicebam quaedam ad alios pertinere et sic esse formata, ut tota significatio illorum discedat a nobis: frater sum, alterius, nemo est enim suus frater; par sum, sed alicui, quis enim par est sibi? Quod comparatur, sine altero non intellegitur; quod iungitur, sine altero non est; sic et, quod datur, sine altero non est, et beneficium sine altero non est.

The same appears from the very word, in which this is contained, "to have done well"; but no one does well to himself, no more than he favors himself, than he is of his own party. One may pursue this longer and with more examples.

Idem ipso vocabulo apparet, in quo hoc continetur, " bene fecisse "; nemo autem sibi bene facit, non magis quam sibi favet, quam suarum partium est. Diutius hoc et pluribus exemplis licet prosequi.

Why not? since a benefit is to be reckoned among those things that require a second person. Certain things, though they are honorable, most beautiful, of the highest virtue, have no place except in another. Good faith is praised and cultivated among the greatest goods of the human race; is anyone then said to have kept faith with himself?

Quidni? cum inter ea sit habendum beneficium, quae secundam personam desiderant. Quaedam, cum sint honesta, pulcherrima, summae virtutis, nisi in altero non habent locum. Laudatur et inter maxima humani generis bona fides colitur; num quis ergo dicitur sibi fidem praestitisse?

I come now to the last part. He who returns thanks must expend something, just as he who pays expends money; but he who returns thanks to himself expends nothing, no more than he obtains who has received a benefit from himself. A benefit and the return of thanks ought to go to and fro; within one man there is no reciprocity. He who returns thanks profits in turn the man from whom he obtained something. He who returns thanks to himself, whom does he profit? Himself. And who does not think of the return of thanks in one place, of the benefit in another? He who returns thanks to himself profits himself. And what ingrate ever was unwilling to do this? Nay, who was not ungrateful, in order to do this?

Venio nunc ad ultimam partem. Qui gratiam refert, aliquid debet impendere, sicut, qui solvit, pecuniam; nihil autem impendit, qui gratiam sibi refert, non magis quam consequitur, qui beneficium a se accepit. Beneficium et gratiae relatio ultro citro ire debent; intra unum hominem non est vicissitudo. Qui gratiam refert, invicem prodest ei, a quo consecutus est aliquid. Qui sibi gratiam refert, cui prodest? Sibi. Et quis non alio loco relationem gratiae, alio beneficium cogitat? Qui gratiam refert sibi, sibi prodest. Et quis umquam ingratus hoc noluit facere? Immo quis non ingratus fuit, ut hoc faceret?

"If," he says, "we ought to give ourselves thanks, we ought also to return ourselves thanks; and we do say: ’I give myself thanks, that I did not wish to marry that wife,’ and ’that I did not enter that partnership with him.’ " When we say this, we praise ourselves and, to approve our own deed, we misuse the words of those giving thanks.

"Si gratias," inquit, " nobis agere debemus, et gratiam referre debemus; dicimus autem: ’ Ago gratias mihi, quod illam uxorem nolui ducere ’ et ’ quod cum illo non contraxi societatem.’ " Cum hoc dicimus, laudamus nos et, ut factum nostrum comprobemus, gratias agentium verbis abutimur.

A benefit is something which, when it has been given, can also not be returned; he who gives himself a benefit cannot fail to receive what he gave; therefore it is not a benefit. At one time a benefit is received, at another returned.

Beneficium est, quod potest, cum datum est, et non reddi; qui sibi beneficium dat, non potest non recipere, quod dedit; ergo non est beneficium. Alio tempore beneficium accipitur, alio redditur. In

In a benefit this too is commendable, this to be looked up to: that someone, in order to profit another, forgot meanwhile his own advantage, that he gave to another what he was going to take from himself. This he does not do who gives himself a benefit.

beneficio et hoc est probabile, hoc suspiciendum, quod aliquis, ut alteri prodesset, utilitatis interim suae oblitus est, quod alteri dedit ablaturus sibi. Hoc non facit, qui beneficium sibi dat.

To give a benefit is a social thing; it wins someone, it binds someone; to give to oneself is not a social thing, it wins no one, binds no one, leads no one into hope, so that he say: "This man is to be cultivated; he gave a benefit to that man, he will give to me too."

Beneficium dare socialis res est, aliquem conciliat, aliquem obligat, sibi dare non est socialis res, neminem conciliat, neminem obligat, neminem in spem inducit, ut dicat: " Hic homo colendus est; illi beneficium dedit, dabit et mihi.

A benefit is what one gives not for his own sake, but for the sake of him to whom he gives; but he who gives himself a benefit gives for his own sake; therefore it is not a benefit.

" Beneficium est, quod quis non sua causa dat, sed eius, cui dat; is autem, qui sibi beneficium dat, sua causa dat; non est ergo beneficium.

I seem to you now to have lied in what I said at the beginning. You say that I am far from one who earns his pay — nay, that I am in good faith wasting all my pains. Wait, and presently you will say this more truly, once I have led you to these hiding-places, from which, when you have escaped, you will have gained nothing more than that you have fled the difficulties into which you need not have gone down.

Videor tibi iam illud, quod in principio dixeram, mentitus. Dicis me abesse ab eo, qui operae pretium facit, immo totam operam bona fide perdere. Expecta, et iam hoc verius dices, simul te ad has latebras perduxero, ex quibus cum evaseris, nihil amplius eris adsecutus, quam ut eas difficultates effugeris, in quas licuit non descendere.

For what good is it to undo laboriously knots which you yourself have made in order to undo them? But as certain things are tied for amusement and sport in such a way that their undoing is difficult for the unskilled, which to him who entangled them yields without any trouble, because he knows their joinings and delays — these none the less have a certain pleasure (for they test the keenness of minds and rouse their attention) — so these things, which seem cunning and insidious, take away from wits their ease and sloth, for which now a field must be spread on which they may roam, now something dim and rugged must be thrown before them, through which they may creep out and anxiously make their footing.

Quid enim boni est nodos operose solvere, quos ipse, ut solveres, feceris? Sed quemadmodum quaedam in oblectamentum ac iocum sic inligantur, ut eorum solutio imperito difficilis sit, quae illi, qui implicuit, sine ullo negotio paret, quia commissuras eorum et moras novit, nihilo minus illa habent aliquam voluptatem (temptant enim acumen animorum et intentionem excitant), ita haec, quae videntur callida et insidiosa, securitatem ac segnitiam ingeniis auferunt, quibus modo campus, in quo vagentur, sternendus est, modo creperi aliquid et confragosi obiciendum, per quod erepant et sollicite vestigium faciant.

It is said that no one is ungrateful; it is gathered thus: "A benefit is what profits; but no one can profit a bad man, as you Stoics say; therefore a bad man does not receive a benefit, and yet he is ungrateful." Still, a benefit is an honorable and commendable thing; in a bad man there is no place for any honorable or commendable thing, therefore none for a benefit; and if he cannot receive it, neither does he owe to return it, and therefore he does not become ungrateful.

Dicitur nemo ingratus esse; id sic colligitur: " Beneficium est, quod prodest; prodesse autem nemo homini malo potest, ut dicitis Stoici; ergo beneficium non accipit malus, ingratus est. " Etiamnunc beneficium honesta et probabilis res est; apud malum nulli honestae rei aut probabili locus est, ergo nec beneficio; quod si accipere non potest, ne reddere quidem debet, et ideo non fit ingratus.

"Still, as you say, the good man does all things rightly; if he does all things rightly, he cannot be ungrateful. To a bad man no one can give a benefit. The good man returns a benefit, the bad does not receive one; and if this is so, neither is any good man ungrateful nor any bad one. So in the nature of things there is no ingrate, and this is an empty name."

" Etiamnunc, ut dicitis, bonus vir omnia recte facit; si omnia recte facit, ingratus esse non potest. Malo viro beneficium nemo dare potest. Bonus beneficium reddit, malus non accipit; quod si est, nec bonus quisquam ingratus est nec malus. Ita ingratus in rerum natura est nemo, et hoc inane nomen."

With us there is one good — the honorable. This cannot reach a bad man; for he will cease to be bad, if virtue has entered into him; but so long as he is bad, no one can give him a benefit, because bad and good things dissent and do not go into one. Therefore no one profits him, because whatever reaches him is corrupted by his depraved use.

Unum est apud nos bonum, honestum. Id pervenire ad malum non potest; desinet enim malus esse, si ad illum virtus intraverit; quam diu autem malus est, nemo illi dare beneficium potest, quia mala bonaque dissentiunt nec in unum eunt. Ideo nemo illi prodest, quia, quidquid ad illum pervenit, id pravo usu corrumpitur.

As a stomach spoiled by disease and gathering bile changes whatever foods it has received and turns all nourishment into a cause of pain, so a perverse mind makes whatever you have entrusted to it its own burden and ruin and an occasion of misery. And so the most fortunate and most opulent are subject to the greatest fever, and the less do they find themselves, the greater the matter they have fallen upon in which to be tossed about.

Quemadmodum stomachus morbo vitiatus et colligens bilem, quoscumque accepit cibos, mutat et omne alimentum in causam doloris trahit, ita animus scaevus, quidquid illi commiseris, id onus suum et perniciem et occasionem miseriae facit. Felieissimis itaque opulentissimisque plurimum aestus subest minusque se inveniunt, quo in maiorem materiam inciderunt, qua fluctuarentur.

Therefore nothing can reach the bad which profits — nay, nothing which does not harm. For whatever has befallen them they turn into their own nature, and things outwardly fair and profitable, were they given to a better man, are to them pestilent. Therefore they cannot give a benefit either, since no one can give what he does not have; this man lacks the will to do good.

Ergo nihil potest ad malos pervenire, quod prosit, immo nihil, quod non noceat. Quaecumque enim illis contigerunt, in naturam suam vertunt et extra speciosa profuturaque, si meliori darentur, illis pestifera sunt. Ideo nec beneficium dare possunt, quoniam nemo potest, quod non habet, dare; hic bene faciendi voluntate caret.

But although these things are so, even a bad man can yet receive certain things which are like benefits, and which, if not returned, will make him ungrateful. There are goods of the mind, there are of the body, there are of fortune. Those goods of the mind are withheld from the foolish and bad man; to these others he is admitted, which he can both receive and ought to return, and, if he does not return, he is ungrateful. Nor is this from our constitution alone. The Peripatetics too, who set the bounds of human happiness far and wide, say that small benefits will reach the bad; he who does not return these is ungrateful.

Sed quamvis haec ita sint, accipere etiam malus tamen quaedam potest, quae beneficiis similia sint, quibus non redditis ingratus erit. Sunt animi bona, sunt corporis, sunt fortunae. Illa animi bona a stulto ac malo submoventur; ad haec admittitur, quae et accipere potest et debet reddere, et, si non reddit, ingratus est. Nec hoc ex nostra tantum constitutione. Peripatetici quoque, qui felicitatis humanae longe lateque terminos ponunt, aiunt minuta beneficia perventura ad malos; haec qui non reddit, ingratus est.

And so it is not our view that those things are benefits which will not make the mind better; yet we do not deny that they are advantages and to be sought. These a bad man can both give to a good man and receive from a good man — money and clothing and honors and life; which, if he does not return, he will fall into the name of ingrate.

Nobis itaque beneficia esse non placet, quae non sunt animum factura meliorem; commoda tamen illa esse et expetenda non negamus. Haec et viro bono dare malus potest et accipere a bono, ut pecuniam et vestem et honores et vitam; quae si non reddit, in ingrati nomen incidet.

"But how do you call a man ungrateful for not returning what you deny to be a benefit?" Certain things, even if they are not true ones, are comprehended under the same word because of their likeness. So we call a pyxis both silver and gold; so we call illiterate not one wholly untrained, but one not brought through to the higher letters; so he who has seen a man ill-clad and ragged says he has seen him naked. Those are not benefits, yet they have the appearance of a benefit.

"At quomodo ingratum vocas eo non reddito, quod negas esse beneficium? " Quaedam, etiam si vera non sunt, propter similitudinem eodem vocabulo comprehensa sunt. Sic pyxidem et argenteam et auream dicimus; sic inlitteratum non ex toto rudem, sed ad litteras altiores non perductum; sic, qui male vestitum et pannosum vidit, nudum vidisse se dicit. Beneficia ista non sunt, habent tamen beneficii speciem.

"As those are as-it-were benefits, so he too is as-it-were ungrateful, not ungrateful." It is false, because both he who gives and he who receives call those benefits. So he who has cheated the appearance of a true benefit is as ungrateful as the poisoner is who mixed a sleeping-draught when he believed it to be poison.

" Quomodo ista sunt tamquam beneficia, sic et ille tamquam ingratus est, non ingratus." Falsum est, quia illa beneficia et qui dat appellat et qui accipit. Ita, qui veri beneficii speciem fefellit, tam ingratus est quam veneficus, qui soporem, cum venenum esse crederet, miscuit.

Cleanthes argues more vehemently. "Although," he says, "what he received was not a benefit, yet he himself is ungrateful, because he was not going to return it, even if he had received one.

Cleanthes vehementius agit. " Licet," inquit, " beneficium non sit, quod accepit, ipse tamen ingratus est, quia non fuit redditurus, etiam si accepisset.

So a man is a robber even before he stains his hands, because he is already armed for killing and has the will to despoil and to slay; wickedness is exercised and revealed by the deed, it does not begin there. The sacrilegious pay the penalty, although no one stretches out his hand all the way to the gods."

" Sic latro est etiam antequam manus inquinet, quia ad occidendum iam armatus est et habet spoliandi atque interficiendi voluntatem; exercetur et aperitur opere nequitia, non incipit. Sacrilegi dant poenas, quamvis nemo usque ad deos manus porrigat.

"How," he says, "is anyone ungrateful toward a bad man, when a benefit cannot be given by a bad man?" By this reasoning, of course: that the very thing he received was not a benefit, but was called one; he who shall receive from him anything of those things which are valued among the ignorant — of which the bad too have abundance — he himself also, in similar material, will be bound to be grateful, and to return those things, whatever they are, since he received them as goods, as goods.

" Quomodo," inquit, " adversus malum ingratus est quisquam, cum a malo dari beneficium non possit? " Ea scilicet ratione, quia ipsum, quod accepit, beneficium non erat, sed vocabatur; qui accipiet ab illo aliquid ex his, quae apud imperitos sunt, quorum et malis copia est, ipse quoque in simili materia gratus esse debebit et illa, qualiacumque sunt, cum pro bonis acceperit, pro bonis reddere.

A man is said to be in debt both who owes gold coins and who owes leather stamped with the public mark, such as there was among the Lacedaemonians, which serves the use of counted money. By whatever kind you are bound, by this discharge your faith.

Aes alienum habere dicitur et qui aureos debet et qui corium forma publica percussum, quale apud Lacedaemonios fuit, quod usum numeratae pecuniae praestat. Quo genere obligatus es, hoc fidem exsolve.

What benefits are, and whether the greatness of a famous name ought to be brought down even to this sordid and lowly material, does not concern you; the truth is sought concerning others. Do you compose your mind to the appearance of truth, and, while you learn the honorable, cultivate whatever it is in which the name of the honorable is bandied about.

Quid sint beneficia, an et in hanc sordidam humilemque materiam deduci magnitudo nominis clari debeat, ad vos non pertinet; in alios quaeritur verum. Vos ad speciem veri componite animum et, dum honestum discitis, quidquid est, in quo nomen honesti iactatur, id colite.

"How," he says, "in your view is no one ungrateful, while again all are ungrateful?" For, as we say, all fools are bad; but he who has one vice has all; but all fools are also bad; therefore all are ungrateful.

" Quomodo," inquit, " nemo per vos ingratus est, sic rursus omnes ingrati sunt." Nam, ut dicimus, omnes stulti mali sunt; qui unum autem habet vitium, omnia habet; omnes autem stulti et mali sunt; omnes ergo ingrati sunt.

What then? Are they not? Is not abuse hurled at the human race on every side? Is it not the common complaint that benefits have perished and that there are very few who do not in turn deserve most ill of those who have deserved well of them? Nor have you reason to think this only our muttering, who count for worst and most perverse whatever has fallen short of the rule of the right.

Quid ergo? Non sunt? Non undique humano generi convicium fit? Non publica querella est perisse beneficia et paucissimos esse, qui de bene merentibus non invicem pessime mereantur? Nec est, quod hanc nostram tantum murmurationem putes pro pessimo pravoque numerantium, quidquid citra recti formulam cecidit.

Behold, some voice, not from the house of the philosophers, cries out; from the midst of the gathering a voice is sent forth condemning peoples and nations. This now is something more:

Ecce nescioqui non ex philosophorum domo clamat, ex medio conventu populos gentesque damnatum vox mittitur: Hoc iam amplius est:

benefits have been turned to crime, and the blood of those is not spared for whom blood ought to be shed; with sword and poison we pursue our benefits. To lay hands on one’s own country and to crush it with its own rods is power and rank; whoever has not stood above the republic thinks he stands in a low and abased place; the armies received from it are turned against it, and the general’s harangue runs:

beneficia in scelus versa sunt, et sanguini eorum non parcitur, pro quibus sanguis fundendus est; gladio ac venenis beneficia sequimur. Ipsi patriae manus adferre et fascibus illam suis premere potentia ac dignitas est; humili se ac depresso loco putat stare, quisquis non supra rem publicam stetit; accepti ab illa exercitus in ipsam convertuntur, et imperatoria contio est:

"Fight against your wives, fight against your children! Assail with arms the altars, the hearths, the household gods!" You, who ought not even to enter the city in triumph without the senate’s order, and for whom, when you led back a victorious army, the senate-house was offered outside the walls — now, with citizens slain, drenched with kindred gore, you enter the city with standards raised.

" Pugnate contra coniuges, pugnate contra liberos! Aras, focos, penates armis incessite! " Qui ne triumphatum quidem inire urbem iniussu senatus deberetis quibusque victorem exercitum reducentibus curia extra muros praeberetur, nunc civibus caesis perfusi cruore cognato urbem subrectis intrate vexillis.

Let liberty fall dumb amid the military standards, and let that people, victor and pacifier of nations, with wars removed far off and every terror suppressed, besieged within its own walls, shudder at its own eagles.

Obmutescat inter militaria signa libertas, et ille victor pacatorque gentium populus remotis procul bellis, omni terrore compresso, intra muros obsessus aquilas suas horreat.

Coriolanus was ungrateful, dutiful too late and after repentance of his crime; he laid down his arms, but laid them down in the midst of his parricide. Catiline was ungrateful; it was too little for him to seize his country, unless he overturned it, unless he sent the cohorts of the Allobroges into it and, an enemy summoned from across the Alps, sated his old and inborn hatreds and paid to the Gallic tombs the Roman generals long owed as offerings to the dead.

Ingratus est Coriolanus, sero et post sceleris paenitentiam pius; posuit arma, sed in medio parricidio posuit. Ingratus Catilina; parum est illi capere patriam, nisi verterit, nisi Allobrogum in illam cohortes immiserit et trans Alpes accitus hostis vetera et ingenita odia satiaverit ac diu debitas inferias Gallicis bustis duces Romanos persolverit.

Gaius Marius was ungrateful, led from the common soldier’s boot up to consulships, who, unless he should match Roman funerals with Cimbrian slaughters, unless he should not only give the signal of civil destruction and butchery but himself be the signal, will feel his fortune little changed and set back in its former place.

Ingratus C. Marius ad consulatus a caliga perductus, qui, nisi Cimbricis caedibus Romana funera aequaverit, nisi civilis exitii et trucidationis non tantum dederit signum, sed ipse signum fuerit, parum mutatam ac repositam in priorem locum fortunam suam sentiet.

Lucius Sulla was ungrateful, who healed his country with remedies harsher than the dangers were, who, when he had marched through human blood from the citadel of Praeneste all the way to the Colline gate, gave other battles in the city, other slaughters: two legions — which is cruel — after victory, which is impious, after a pledge of faith, herded together in a corner, he butchered, and devised proscription — great gods! — so that whoever had killed a Roman citizen should receive impunity, money, all but the civic crown!

Ingratus L. Sulla, qui patriam duri oribus remediis, quam pericula erant, sanavit, qui, cum a Praenestina arce usque ad Collinam portam per sanguinem humanum incessisset, alia edidit in urbe proelia, alias caedes: legiones duas, quod crudele est, post victoriam, quod nefas, post fidem in angulo congestas contrucidavit et proscriptionem commentus est, di magni, ut, qui civem Romanum occidisset, impunitatem, pecuniam, tantum non civicam acciperet!

Gnaeus Pompeius was ungrateful, who, for three consulships, for three triumphs, for so many honors which he had for the most part seized before their time, returned this thanks to the republic: that he brought others too into possession of it, as though about to lessen the odium of his own power, if what ought to be permitted to none had been permitted to several; while he covets extraordinary commands, while he distributes the provinces, that he may choose, while he so divides the republic with a third man that nevertheless two parts were in his own house, he reduced the Roman people to this — that it could not be safe except by the benefit of servitude.

Ingratus Cn. Pompeius, qui pro tribus consulatibus, pro triumphis tribus, pro tot honoribus, quos ex maxima parte immaturus invaserat, hanc gratiam rei publicae reddidit, ut in possessionem eius alios quoque induceret quasi potentiae suae detracturus invidiam, si, quod nulli licere debebat, pluribus licuisset; dum extraordinaria concupiscit imperia, dum provincias, ut eligat, distribuit, dum ita cum tertio rem publicam dividit, ut tamen in sua domo duae partes essent, eo redegit populum Romanum, ut salvus esse non posset nisi beneficio servitutis.

Pompey’s own enemy and conqueror was ungrateful; from Gaul and Germany he swung the war round upon the city, and that friend of the people, that man of the populace, set his camp in the Circus Flaminius nearer than Porsenna’s had been. He did indeed temper the right and cruelty of victory; what he was wont to say, he made good: he killed no one except in arms. What of it? The rest wielded their arms more bloodily, yet at last, sated, threw them away; this man quickly sheathed his sword, never laid it down.

Ingratus ipse Pompei hostis ac victor; a Gallia Germaniaque bellum in urbem circumegit, et ille plebicola, ille popularis castra in circo Flaminio posuit propius, quam Porsinae fuerant. Temperavit quidem ius crudelitatemque victoriae; quod dicere solebat, praestitit: neminem occidit nisi armatum. Quid ergo est? Ceteri arma cruentius exercuerunt, satiata tamen aliquando abiecerunt; hic gladium cito condidit, numquam posuit.

Antony was ungrateful toward his own dictator, whom he pronounced rightly slain; he sent the dictator’s murderers off into provinces and commands; but his country, torn by proscriptions, raids, and wars, he doomed after so many evils to a lot beneath even Roman kings, so that she who had restored to the Achaeans, the Rhodians, and many famous cities their full right and liberty with immunity should herself pay tribute to eunuchs!

Ingratus Antonius in dictatorem suum, quem iure caesum pronuntiavit, interfectores eius in provincias et imperia dimisit; patriam vero proscriptionibus, incursionibus, bellis laceratam post tot mala destinavit ne Romanis quidem regibus, ut, quae Achaeis, Rhodiis, plerisque urbibus claris ius integrum libertatemque cum immunitate reddiderat, ipsa tributum spadonibus penderet!

The day will fail one enumerating the ungrateful, down to the last ruin of their country. It will be equally boundless, if I begin to run through how ungrateful the republic itself has been toward those best and most devoted to it, and how it has sinned no less often than it has been sinned against.

Deficiet dies enumerantem ingratos usque in ultima patriae exitia. Aeque immensum erit, si percurrere coepero, ipsa res publica quam ingrata in optimos ac devotissimos sibi fuerit quamque non minus saepe peccaverit, quam in ipsam peccatum est.

It sent Camillus into exile, it dismissed Scipio; Cicero went into exile after Catiline, his household gods torn down, his goods plundered — everything done that Catiline as victor would have done; Rutilius bore the price of his innocence in lying hidden in Asia; the Roman people denied Cato the praetorship and utterly refused him the consulship.

Camillum in exilium misit, Scipionem dimisit; exsulavit post Catilinam Cicero, diruti eius penates, bona direpta, factum, quidquid victor Catilina fecisset; Rutilius innocentiae pretium tulit in Asia latere; Catoni populus Romanus praeturam negavit, consulatum pernegavit.

We are ungrateful in public life. Let each question himself: there is no one who does not complain of someone as ungrateful. But it cannot be that all complain, unless all are to be complained of: all therefore are ungrateful. Are they only ungrateful? Both greedy all, and spiteful all, and cowardly all — those above all who seem bold. Add: they are all ambitious too, and all impious. But you have no reason to be angry; pardon them — all are mad.

Ingrati publice sumus. Se quisque interroget: nemo non aliquem queritur ingratum. Atqui non potest fieri, ut omnes querantur, nisi querendum est de omnibus: omnes ergo ingrati sunt. Ingrati sunt tantum? Et cupidi omnes et maligni omnes et timidi omnes, illi in primis, qui videntur audaces. Adice: et ambitiosi omnes sunt et impii omnes. Sed non est, quod irascaris; ignosce illis, omnes insaniunt.

I do not wish to recall you to uncertainties, so as to say: "See how ungrateful is youth! Who does not, that he may be guiltless, wish for his father’s last day? — that he may be temperate, await it? — that he may be dutiful, ponder it? How few there are who fear the death of an excellent wife and do not also reckon it up? To what litigant, I ask, once defended, has the memory of so great a benefit endured beyond his nearest concerns?"

Nolo te ad incerta revocare, ut dicam: " Vide, quam ingrata sit iuventus! Quis non patris sui supremum diem, ut innocens sit, optat? Ut moderatus sit, expectat? Ut pius, cogitat? Quotus quisque uxoris optimae mortem timet, ut non et computet? Cui, rogo, litigatori defenso tam magni beneficii ultra res proximas memoria duravit? "

"I have lived, and the course that fortune gave I have run."

Vixi et quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi?

Consider that the highest good is not in time; whatever it is, take it for good. Though the day of your death be prolonged, nothing is gained toward happiness, since by delay a life is not made happier, but only longer.

Cogita non esse summum bonum in tempore; quantumcumque est, boni consules. Ut prorogetur tibi dies mortis, nihil proficitur ad felicitatem, quoniam mora non fit beatior vita sed longior.

How much better to be grateful for the pleasures we have received, and not to reckon up others’ years, but to appraise our own kindly and set them down as gain! "This God judged me worthy of, this is enough; he could have given more, but this too is a benefit." Let us be grateful toward the gods, grateful toward men, grateful toward those who have furnished something to us, grateful too toward those who have furnished it to ours.

Quanto satius est gratum adversus perceptas voluptates non aliorum annos computare, sed suos benigne aestimare et in lucro ponere! " Hoc me dignum iudicavit deus, hoc satis est; potuit plus, sed hoc quoque beneficium est." Grati simus adversus deos, grati adversus homines, grati adversus eos, qui aliquid nobis praestiterunt, grati etiam adversus eos, qui nostris praestiterunt.

"You bind me," he says, "by an endless obligation, when you say ’to ours too’; so set some limit. He who gives a benefit to a son, as you say, gives also to his father: this is the first point I ask about. Then I wish this at all events determined for me: if a benefit is given to the father too, is it also to the brother? Is it also to the uncle? Is it also to the grandfather? Is it also to the wife and the father-in-law? Tell me where I ought to stop, how far through the line of persons I am to follow."

" In infinitum ius," inquit, " me obligas, cum dicis: ’ et nostris ’; itaque pone aliquem finem. Qui filio beneficium dat, ut dicis, et patri eius dat: primum, de quo quaero. Deinde illud utique mihi determinari volo: si et patri beneficium datur, numquid et fratri? Numquid et patruo? Numquid et avo? Numquid et uxori et socero? Dic mihi, ubi debeam desinere, quousque personarum senem sequar."

If I cultivate your field, I shall have given you a benefit; if I put out your burning house, or prop it up that it not fall, I shall give you a benefit; if I heal your slave, I shall set it to your account; if I save your son, will you have no benefit of mine?

Si agrum tuum coluero, tibi beneficium dedero; si domum tuam ardentem restinxero aut, ne concidat, excepero, tibi beneficium dabo; si servum tuum sanavero, tibi imputabo; si filium tuum servavero, non habebis beneficium meum?

"You set down unlike examples, because he who cultivates my field gives no benefit to the field, but to me; and he who props my house, that it not collapse, furnishes it to me, for the house itself is without sense; he has me for debtor, because he has none; and he who cultivates my field wishes to oblige not it, but me. The same I shall say of the slave: he is the property of my ownership, he is saved for me; therefore I owe on his behalf. The son is himself capable of a benefit; and so he receives it, while I rejoice in the benefit and am touched by it, not bound."

" Dissimilia ponis exempla, quia, qui agrum meum colit, agro beneficium non dat sed mihi; et qui domum meam, quo minus ruat, fulcit, praestat mihi, ipsa enim domus sine sensu est; debitorem me habet, quia nullum habet; et qui agrum meum colit, non illum, sed me demereri vult. Idem de servo dicam: mei mancipii res est, mihi servatur; ideo ego pro illo debeo. Filius ipse beneficii capax est; itaque ille accipit, ego beneficio laetor et contingor, non obligor."

Yet I should like you, who think you do not owe, to answer me. The son’s good health, prosperity, patrimony pertain to the father; he will be happier if he has his son safe, unhappier if he loses him. What then? He who is both made happier by me and freed from the danger of the greatest unhappiness — does he not receive a benefit?

Velim tamen, tu, qui debere te non putas, respondeas mihi. Filii bona valetudo, felicitas, patrimonium pertinet ad patrem; felicior futurus est, si salvum filium habuerit, infelicior, si amiserit. Quid ergo? Qui et felicior fit a me et infelicitatis maximae periculo liberatur, non accipit beneficium?

"No," he says; "for certain things are conferred on others, but flow all the way through to us; but each thing ought to be exacted from him on whom it is conferred, just as money is sought from him to whom it was lent, although it has come to me in some way. There is no benefit whose advantage does not touch the nearest, sometimes even those set farther off;

" Non," inquit; " quaedam enim in alios conferuntur, sed ad nos usque permanant; ab eo autem exigi quidque debet, in quem confertur, sicut pecunia ab eo petitur, cui credita est, quamvis ad me illa aliquo modo venerit. Nullum beneficium est, cuius non commodum et proximos tangat, non numquam etiam longius positos;

the question is not whither the benefit has passed from him to whom it was given, but where it is first placed; the demand is from the defendant himself and from the principal." What then? I beg you, do you not say: "You gave me a son, and, if he had perished, I was not going to live"? Do you not owe a benefit for his life, whose life you prefer to your own? Even now, when I have saved your son, you fall at my knees, you pay your vows to the gods as though you yourself were saved; these words escape you:

non quaeritur, quo beneficium ab eo, cui datum est, transierit, sed ubi primo collocetur; a reo tibi ipso et a capite repetitio est." Quid ergo? Oro te, non dicis: " Filium mihi donasti, et, si hic perisset, victurus non fui "? Pro eius vita beneficium non debes, cuius vitam tuae praefers? Etiamnunc, cum filium tuum servavi, ad genua procumbis, dis vota solvis tamquam ipse servatus; illae voces exeunt tibi:

"It makes no difference whether you saved me; you saved two — nay, me the more." Why do you say this, if you do not receive a benefit? "Because, even if my son takes up borrowed money, I shall pay it out to the creditor, yet not for that reason shall I have owed it; because, even if my son is caught in adultery, I shall blush, yet not for that reason shall I be an adulterer.

" Nihil mea interest, an me servaveris; duos servasti, immo me magis." Quare ista dicis, si non accipis beneficium? " Quia et, si filius meus pecuniam mutuam sumpserit, creditori numerabo, non tamen ideo ego debuero; quia et, si filius meus in adulterio deprensus erit, erubescam, non ideo ego ero adulter.

I say I am bound to you for my son, not because I am, but because I wish to offer myself to you as a voluntary debtor. But there has come to me from his safety the highest pleasure, the highest advantage, and I have escaped the gravest wound of bereavement. The question now is not whether you profited me, but whether you gave a benefit; for both an animal profits, and a stone, and a herb, and yet they give no benefit, which is never given except by one who wills it.

Dico me tibi obligatum pro filio, non quia sum, sed quia volo me offerre tibi debitorem voluntarium. At pervenit ad me summa ex incolumitate eius voluptas, summa utilitas, et orbitatis gravissimum vulnus effugi. Non quaeritur nunc, an profueris mihi, sed an beneficium dederis; prodest enim et animal et lapis et herba, nec tamen beneficium dant, quod numquam datur nisi a volente.

But you wish to give not to the father, but to the son, and meanwhile you do not even know the father. So when you have said, ’Did I then give no benefit to the father by saving his son?’ set this against it: ’Did I then give a benefit to a father whom I do not know, of whom I did not think?’ And what of the fact that sometimes it will happen that you hate the father and save the son? Will you seem to have given a benefit to one to whom you were most hostile, when you gave it?"

Tu autem non vis patri, sed filio dare, et interim ne nosti quidem patrem. Itaque cum dixeris: ’ Patri ergo beneficium non dedi filium eius servando? ’ contra oppone: ’ Patri ergo beneficium dedi, quem non novi, quem non cogitavi? ’ Et quid quod aliquando eveniet, ut patrem oderis, filium serves? Beneficium ei videberis dedisse, cui tunc inimicissimus eras, cum dares? "

But, setting aside the wrangling of dialogues, that I may answer like a jurisconsult: the mind of the giver is to be regarded; he gave a benefit to the one to whom he willed it given. If he did it in honor of the father, the father received the benefit; if for the use of the son, the father is not bound by a benefit conferred on the son, even if he enjoys it. Yet if he has the occasion, he too will wish to furnish something — not as having a necessity of paying, but as a cause for beginning. A benefit ought not to be demanded back from the father; if he does anything kindly in return for this, he is just, not grateful.

Sed ut dialogorum altercatione seposita tamquam iuris consultus respondeam, mens spectanda est dantis; beneficium ei dedit, cui datum voluit. Si in patris honorem fecit, pater accepit beneficium; si filii in usum, pater beneficio in filium conlato non obligatur, etiam si fruitur. Si tamen occasionem habuerit, volet et ipse praestare aliquid, non tamquam solvendi necessitatem habeat, sed tamquam incipiendi causam. Repeti a patre beneficium non debet; si quid pro hoc benigne facit, iustus, non gratus est.

For that cannot be bounded: if I give a benefit to the father, I give to the mother too and to the grandfather and to the uncle and to the children and to the kindred and to the friends and to the slaves and to the country. Where then does the benefit begin to halt? For there comes on that inextricable bond, to which it is hard to set a limit, because little by little it creeps in and does not cease to spread.

Nam illud finiri non potest: si patri do beneficium, et matri et avo et avunculo et liberis et adfinibus et amicis et servis et patriae. Ubi ergo beneficium incipit stare? Sontes enim ille inexplicabilis subit, cui difficile est modum imponere, quia paulatim surrepit et non desinit serpere.

This is wont to be asked: "Two brothers are at odds; if I save the one, do I give a benefit to him who will not be sorry that his hated brother has not perished?" There is no doubt that it is a benefit to profit a man even against his will, just as he gave no benefit who profited another against his own will.

Illud solet quaeri: " Fratres duo dissident; si alterum servo, an dem beneficium ei, qui fratrem invisum non perisse moleste laturus est." Non est dubium, quin beneficium sit etiam invito prodesse, sicut non dedit beneficium, qui invitus profuit.

"Do you call it a benefit," he says, "by which that man is offended, by which he is tormented?" Many benefits have a sad and harsh front, like cutting and burning to heal, and restraining with bonds. One must look not at whether a man grieves at a benefit received, but at whether he ought to rejoice; a denarius is not bad which a barbarian, ignorant of the public stamp, has rejected. He both hates and has received the benefit, if only it profits, if he who gave it gave it to profit. It matters nothing whether someone receives a good thing with a bad spirit.

" Beneficium," inquit, " vocas, quo ille offenditur, quo torquetur? " Multa beneficia tristem frontem et asperam habent, quemadmodum secare et urere, ut sanes, et vinclis coercere. Non est spectandum, an doleat aliquis beneficio accepto, sed an gaudere debeat; non est malus denarius, quem barbarus et ignarus formae publicae reiecit. Beneficium et odit et accepit, si modo id prodest, si is, qui dabat, ut prodesset, dedit. Nihil refert, an bonam rem malo animo quis accipiat.

Come now, turn this to the contrary. He hates his brother, whom it is to his advantage to have; this brother I have killed: it is no benefit, although he says it is and rejoices. Most insidiously does he harm, to whom thanks are given for an injury!

Agedum, hoc in contrarium verte. Odit fratrem suum, quem illi habere expedit; hunc ego occidi: non est beneficium, quamvis ille dicat esse et gaudeat. Insidiosissime nocet, cui gratiae aguntur pro iniuria!

"I see: a thing profits and therefore is a benefit; it harms and therefore is not a benefit. Behold, I shall give what neither profits nor harms, and yet it will be a benefit. I found someone’s father dead in a solitude; I buried his body. I profited neither the man himself (for what did it matter to him in what manner he should dissolve?) nor the son (for what advantage accrued to him by this?)." I shall tell what he gained: through me he discharged a solemn and necessary duty;

" Video: prodest aliqua res et ideo beneficium est; nocet et ideo non est beneficium. Ecce, quod nec prosit nec noceat, dabo, et tamen beneficium erit. Patrem alicuius in solitudine exanimem inveni, corpus eius sepelivi. Nec ipsi profui (quid enim illius intererat, quo genere dilaberetur?) nec filio (quid enim illi per hoc commodi accessit?)." Dicam, quid consecutus sit: officio sollemni et necessario per me functus est;

I furnished to his father what he himself would have wished to furnish and indeed would have owed. Yet this is a benefit only on this condition: if I did not, out of pity and humanity, hide just any corpse, but if I recognized the body, if I thought then to furnish this to the son. But if I threw earth upon an unknown dead man, I have in this no debtor of this duty — being merely humane toward the public.

praestiti patri eius, quod ipse praestare voluisset nec non et debuisset. Hoc tamen ita beneficium est, si non misericordiae et humanitati dedi, ut quodlibet cadaver absconderem, sed si corpus adgnovi, si filio tunc hoc praestare me cogitavi. At si terram ignoto mortuo inieci, nullum in hoc habeo huius officii debitorem in publicum humanus.

Someone will say: "Why do you so earnestly ask to whom you have given a benefit, as though you were going to demand it back some day? There are those who think it never ought to be demanded back, and bring these reasons. The unworthy will not return it even when it is demanded; the worthy will return it himself, of his own accord. Besides, if you gave to a good man, wait, lest you do him an injury by dunning him, as though he would not have repaid of his own will. If you gave to a bad man, be punished for it; but do not corrupt the benefit by making it a loan. Besides, the law, in not bidding it be demanded back, has forbidden it."

Dicet aliquis: " Quid tanto opere quaeris, cui dederis beneficium, tamquam repetiturus aliquando? Sunt, qui numquam iudicent esse repetendum, et has causas adferunt. Indignus etiam repetenti non reddet, dignus ipse per se referet. Praeterea, si bono viro dedisti, expecta, ne iniuriam illi facias appellando, tamquam sua sponte redditurus non fuisset. Si malo viro dedisti, plectere; beneficium vero ne corruperis creditum faciendo. Praeterea lex, quod non iussit repeti, vetuit."

Those are words. As long as nothing presses me, as long as fortune compels nothing, I shall rather lose a benefit than demand it back. But if it is a matter of my children’s safety, if my wife is led into danger, if my country’s safety and liberty sends me even where I would not wish to go, I shall command my shame and shall call all to witness that I did everything that I might not need the help of an ungrateful man; at the last, the necessity of recovering the benefit will conquer the modesty of demanding it. Then, when I give a benefit to a good man, I so give it as never to demand it back, unless it be necessary.

Verba sunt ista. Quam diu me nihil urguet, quam diu fortuna nihil cogit, perdam potius beneficium quam repetam. Sed si de salute liberorum agitur, si in periculum uxor deducitur, si patriae salus ac libertas mittit me etiam, quo ire nollem, imperabo pudori meo et testabor omnia me fecisse, ne opus esset mihi auxilio hominis ingrati; novissime recipiendi beneficii necessitas repetendi verecundiam vincet. Deinde, eum bono viro beneficium do, sic do tamquam numquam repetiturus, nisi fuerit necesse.

"But the law," he says, "by not permitting it to be exacted, has forbidden it." Many things have neither law nor action, to which the custom of human life, stronger than any law, gives access. No law bids us not divulge friends’ secrets; no law bids us keep faith even with an enemy; what law binds us to furnish what we have promised to someone? None. Yet I shall complain of the man who has not kept a secret conversation, and I shall be indignant at faith given and not kept.

" Sed lex," inquit, " non permittendo exigere vetuit." Multa legem non habent nec actionem, ad quae consuetudo vitae humanae omni lege valentior dat aditum. Nulla lex iubet amicorum secreta non eloqui; nulla lex iubet fidem etiam inimico praestare; quae lex ad id praestandum nos, quod alicui promisimus, adligat? Nulla. Querar tamen cum eo, qui arcanum sermonem non continuerit, et fidem datam nec servatam indignabor.

"But," he says, "you make a loan out of a benefit." Not at all; for I do not exact, but ask back, and I do not even ask back, but remind. Shall the last necessity even drive me to this — that I come to a man with whom I must long wrestle? If anyone is so ungrateful that it is not enough for him to be reminded, I shall pass him by and shall not judge him worthy to be compelled to be grateful.

" Sed ex beneficio," inquit, " creditum facis." Minime; non enim exigo, sed repeto, et ne repeto quidem, sed admoneo. Num ultima quoque me necessitas in hoc aget, ut ad eum veniam, cum quo mihi diu luctandum sit? Si quis tam ingratus est, ut illi non sit satis admoneri, eum transibo nec dignum iudicabo, qui gratus esse cogatur.

As a moneylender does not dun certain debtors whom he knows to have gone bankrupt and in whose shame nothing remains except what may perish, so I shall openly and persistently pass by certain ungrateful men, and shall demand a benefit from no one except from one from whom I shall not be wresting it, but recovering it.

Quomodo fenerator quosdam debitores non appellat, quos scit decoxisse et in quorum pudorem nihil superest, nisi quod pereat, sic ego quosdam ingratos palam ac pertinaciter praeteribo nec ab ullo beneficium repetam, nisi a quo non ablaturus ero, sed recepturus.

There are many who can neither deny what they have received nor return it, who are neither so good as the grateful nor so bad as the ungrateful — sluggish and slow, slack debts, not bad ones. These I shall not dun, but I shall remind, and shall lead them back to their duty as they are busy with something else. They will at once answer me thus: "Pardon me; by Hercules, I did not know you wanted this, otherwise I would have offered it unbidden; I beg you, do not think me ungrateful; I remember what you furnished me." Why should I hesitate to make these men both better to themselves and to me? Whomever I can, I shall keep from sinning;

Multi sunt, qui nec negare sciant, quod acceperunt, nec referre, qui nec tam boni sunt quam grati nec tam mali quam ingrati, segnes et tardi, lenta nomina, non mala. Hos ego non appellabo, sed commonefaciam et ad officium aliud agentes reducam. Qui statim mihi sic respondebunt: " Ignosce; non mehercules scivi hoc te desiderare, alioqui ultro obtulissem; rogo, ne me ingratum existimes; memini, quid mihi praestiteris." Hos ego quare dubitem et sibi meliores et mihi facere? Quemcumque potuero, peccare prohibebo;

much more a friend — both from sinning, and from sinning most of all against me. I give him a second benefit, if I do not suffer him to be ungrateful; nor shall I harshly reproach him for what I furnished, but as gently as I can. That I may give him the power of returning thanks, I shall renew the memory of it and ask the benefit back; he himself will understand that I am demanding it.

multo magis amicum, et ne peccet et ne in me potissimum peccet. Alterum illi beneficium do, si illum ingratum esse non patior; nec dure illi exprobrabo, quod praestiti, sed quam potuero mollissime. Ut potestatem referendae gratiae faciam, renovabo memoriam eius et petam beneficium; ipse me intelleget repetere.

Sometimes I shall use harsher words, if I have hoped that he can be amended; for one past hope I shall not for this reason goad either, lest from an ingrate I make an enemy.

Aliquando utar verbis durioribus, si emendari illum posse speravero; nam deploratum propter hoc quoque non exagitabo, ne ex ingrato inimicum faciam.

But if we remit to the ungrateful even the rebuke of an admonition, we shall make them slower to return benefits; and certain men, curable and able to become good if something has stung them, we shall suffer to perish, the admonition removed by which a father has sometimes corrected a son, and a wife led back a straying husband to herself, and a friend roused a friend’s flagging faith.

Quod si admonitionis quoque sugillationem ingratis remittimus, segniores ad reddenda beneficia faciemus; quosdam vero sanabiles et qui fieri boni possint, si quid illos momorderit, perire patiemur admonitione sublata, qua et pater filium aliquando correxit et uxor maritum aberrantem ad se reduxit et amicus languentem amici fidem erexit.

Some, to be wakened, must not be struck, but only stirred; in the same way the faith of some toward returning thanks does not cease, but languishes. This let us pluck. "Do not turn your gift into an injury; for it is an injury, if you do not demand it back for this reason — that I may be ungrateful. What if I do not know what you want? What if, distracted by occupations and called away to other things, I have not watched for the occasion? Show me what I can do, what you wish. Why despair before you try?

Quidam, ut expergiscantur, non feriendi, sed commovendi sunt; eodem modo quorundam ad referendam gratiam fides non cessat, sed languet. Hanc pervellamus. " Noli munus tuum in iniuriam vertere; iniuria est enim, si in hoc non repetis, ut ingratus sim. Quid, si ignoro, quid desideres? Quid, si occupationibus districtus et in aha vocatus occasionem non observavi? Ostende mihi, quid possim, quid velis. Quare desperes, antequam temptes?

Why hasten to lose both the benefit and the friend? How do you know whether I am unwilling or ignorant, whether the will or the means is wanting to me? Make trial." I shall remind him, then — not bitterly, not openly, without reproach, in such a way that he may think he has come back into memory, not been led back.

Quare properas et beneficium et amicum perdere? Unde scis, nolim an ignorem, animus an facultas desit mihi? Experire." Admonebo ergo non amare, non palam, sine convicio, sic, ut se redisse in memoriam, non reduci putet.

A certain veteran, a little too violent toward his neighbors, was pleading his case before the deified Julius, and the case was going against him. "Do you remember, commander," he said, "that you twisted your ankle in Spain near the Sucro?" When Caesar said he remembered: "Do you remember indeed that, when you wished to rest under a certain tree scattering the least shade, in the most blazing sun, and the place was most rough, where from sharp rocks that single tree had broken out, one of your fellow soldiers spread his cloak beneath you?"

Causam dicebat apud divum Iulium ex veteranis quidam paulo violentior adversus vicinos suos et causa premebatur. " Meministi," inquit, " imperator, in Hispania, talum extorsisse te circa Sucronem?" Cum Caesar meminisse se dixisset: " Meministi quidem sub quadam arbore minimum umbrae spargente cum velles residere ferventissimo sole et esset asperrimus locus, in quo ex rupibus acutis unica illa arbor eruperat, quendam ex commilitonibus paenulam suam substravisse? "

When Caesar had said: "Why should I not remember? And indeed, worn out with thirst, because, hindered, I could not go to the nearest spring, I wished to crawl on my hands, had not a fellow soldier, a brave and energetic man, brought me water in his helmet" — "Can you then, commander," he said, "recognize that man or that helmet?" Caesar said that he could not recognize the helmet, but the man perfectly well, and added — angry, I suppose, that he was being drawn off from the matter in hand to an old story:

Cum dixisset Caesar: " Quidni meminerim? Et quidem siti confectus, quia impeditus ire ad fontem proximum non poteram, repere manibus volebam, nisi commilito, homo fortis ac strenuus, aquam mihi in galea sua adtulisset "—, " Potes ergo," inquit, " imperator, adgnoscere illum hominem aut illam galeam? " Caesar ait se non posse galeam adgnoscere, hominem pulchre posse, et adiecit, puto obiratus, quod se a cognitione media ad veterem fabulam abduceret:

"You at any rate are not that man." "Rightly, Caesar," he said, "you do not recognize me; for when this happened, I was whole; afterward, at Munda in the battle-line, my eye was gouged out and the bones picked out of my head. Nor will you recognize that helmet, if you see it; for it was split by a Spanish sword." Caesar forbade the suit to be brought against him and gave to his soldier the little fields over which the neighborhood road had been the cause of brawls and lawsuits.

" Tu utique ille non es." " Merito/’ inquit, " Caesar, me non adgnoscis; nam cum hoc factum est, integer eram; postea ad Mundam in acie oculus mihi effossus est et in capite lecta ossa. Nec galeam illam, si videris, adgnosces; machaera enim Hispana divisa est." Vetuit illi exhiberi negotium Caesar et agellos, in quibus vicinalis via causa rixae ac litium fuerat, militi suo donavit.

What then? Should he not have demanded a benefit from his commander, whose memory the multitude of affairs had confused, whom fortune, marshaling vast armies, did not suffer to meet single soldiers? This is not to demand a benefit back, but to take up again one well placed and ready — toward which, nevertheless, the hand must be stretched out, that it may be taken. I shall therefore demand it back, because I shall do this either out of great necessity or for the sake of him from whom I demand it.

Quid ergo? Non repeteret beneficium ab imperatore, cuius memoriam multitudo rerum confuderat, quem fortuna ingentes exercitus disponentem non patiebatur singulis militibus occurrere? Non est hoc repetere beneficium, sed resumere bono loco positum et paratum, ad quod tamen, ut sumatur, manus porrigenda est. Repetam itaque, quia hoc aut ex magna necessitate facturus ero aut illius causa, a quo repetam.

Tiberius Caesar, in his early days, to someone saying "Do you remember—" before he could bring forward more tokens of old familiarity, said: "I do not remember what I was." Why should not a benefit be demanded from this man? Oblivion was to be wished for; he turned away from the acquaintance of all his friends and equals, and wished that present fortune of his alone to be looked upon, that alone to be thought of and told. He had in an old friend an inquisitor!

Ti. Caesar inter initia dicenti cuidam: " Meministi—" antequam plures notas familiaritatis veteris proferret: " Non memini," inquit, " quid fuerim." Ab hoc quidni non esset repetendum beneficium? Optanda erat oblivio; aversabatur omnium amicorum et aequalium notitiam et illam solam praesentem fortunam suam adspici, illam solam cogitari ac narrari volebat. Inquisitorem habebat veterem amicum!

A benefit is to be demanded back more seasonably than asked for. A moderation of words must be applied, so that neither can the grateful be offended nor the ungrateful dissemble. One should keep silent and wait, if we lived among the wise; and yet even to the wise it would have been better to indicate what the state of our affairs demanded.

Magis tempestive repetendum est beneficium quam petendum. Adhibenda verborum moderatio, ut nec gratus possit offendi nec ingratus dissimulare. Tacendum erat et expectandum, si inter sapientes viveremus; et tamen sapientibus quoque indicare melius fuisset, quid rerum nostrarum status posceret.

The gods, whom no thing escapes the knowledge of, we entreat, and our vows do not prevail upon them, but remind them. To the gods too, I say, that Homeric priest alleges his services and his altars religiously tended. To be willing and able to be admonished is the second virtue.

Deos, quorum notitiam nulla res effugit, rogamus, et illos vota non exorant, sed admonent. Dis quoque, inquam, Homericus ille sacerdos adlegat officia et aras religiose cultas. Moneri velle ac posse secunda virtus est.

A horse compliant and obedient is to be turned this way and that by the reins lightly moved. Few have a mind that is its own best guide; next are those who, admonished, come back into the road; from these the guide is not to be taken away.

Equus obsequens facile et parens huc illuc frenis leniter motis flectendus est. Paucis animus sui rector optimus; proximi sunt, qui admoniti in viam redeunt; his non est dux detrahendus.

In covered eyes there is sight, but without use; which the light of day, let in upon them, calls out to its services. Instruments lie idle, unless the craftsman has moved them to their work. There is in minds, meanwhile, a good will, but it lies torpid, now through luxury and disuse, now through ignorance of duty. This we ought to make useful, and not, in anger, leave it in its vice, but, like teachers, patiently bear the stumblings of boys as they learn, the slipping of memory; which, as it is often, by one or two words supplied, brought back to the connected thread of the recited speech, so toward returning thanks is to be recalled by admonition.

Opertis oculis inest acies, sed sine usu; quam lumen diei iis immissum ad ministeria sua evocat. Instrumenta cessant, nisi illa in opus suum artifex movit. Inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet modo deliciis ac situ, modo officii inscitia. Hanc utilem facere debemus nec irati relinquere in vitio, sed ut magistri patienter ferre offensationes puerorum discentium memoriae labentis; quae quemadmodum saepe subiecto uno aut altero verbo ad contextum reddendae orationis adducta est, sic ad referendam gratiam admonitione revocanda est.

Some things, Liberalis, best of men, are inquired into only for the exercise of the wit, and lie always outside life; some are both a delight while they are inquired into and, once found, of use. I shall make you full provision of all of them; you, as it shall seem good to you, either bid them be carried through or be brought in to fill out the order of the show. And even with these, if you bid them depart at once, something will have been done; for even what it is superfluous to learn, it profits to have come to know. I shall hang, then, on your face; as it shall counsel me, I shall hold some back longer, drive others off and dispatch them at a stroke.

Quaedam, Liberalis, virorum optime, exercendi tantum ingenii causa quaeruntur et semper extra vitam iacent; quaedam et, dum quaeruntur, oblectamento sunt et quaesita usui. Omnium tibi copiam faciam; tu illa, utcumque tibi visum erit, aut peragi iubeto aut ad explicandum ludorum ordinem induci. Quin his quoque, si abire protinus iusseris, non nihil actum erit; nam etiam quae discere supervacuum est, prodest cognoscere. Ex vultu igitur tuo pendebo; prout ille suaserit mihi, alia detinebo diutius, alia expellam et capite agam.

Whether a benefit can be snatched away has been asked. Some deny it can; for it is not a thing, but an act. As a gift is one thing, the giving of it another; as he who sails is one thing, the sailing another; and, although a sick man is in his disease, yet the sick man and the disease are not the same: so the benefit itself is one thing, and what reaches each of us by the benefit another. The former is incorporeal, it is not made void;

An beneficium eripi posset, quaesitum est. Quidam negant posse; non enim res est, sed actio. Quomodo aliud est munus, aliud ipsa donatio, aliud qui navigat, aliud navigatio, et, quamvis in morbo aeger sit, non tamen idem est aeger et morbus, ita aliud est beneficium ipsum, aliud quod ad unumquemque nostrum beneficio pervenit. Illud incorporale est, irritum non fit;

but its material is tossed this way and that and changes its owner. And so, when you snatch it away, the very nature of things cannot recall what it gave. It interrupts its benefits, it does not rescind them: he who dies has yet lived; he who has lost his eyes has yet seen. The things that have reached us can be made not to be; that they have not been cannot be made; and a part of a benefit — and indeed the most certain — is that which has been.

materia vero eius huc et illuc iactatur et dominum mutat. Itaque eum eripis, ipsa rerum natura revocare, quod dedit, non potest. Beneficia sua interrumpit, non rescindit: qui moritur, tamen vixit; qui amisit oculos, tamen vidit. Quae ad nos pervenerunt, ne sint, effici potest, ne fuerint, non potest; pars autem beneficii et quidem certissima est, quae fuit.

Sometimes we are barred from a longer use of a benefit; the benefit itself is not erased. Though nature summon all her powers to this, she is not permitted to drive herself backward. A house can be snatched away, and money and a slave and whatever it is in which the name of benefit has clung; but the benefit itself is stable and unmoved; no force will bring it about that this man did not give, that that man did not receive.

Non numquam usu beneficii longiore prohibemur, beneficium quidem ipsum non eraditur. Licet omnes in hoc vires suas natura advocet, retro illi agere se non licet. Potest eripi domus et pecunia et mancipium et quidquid est, in quo haesit beneficii nomen; ipsum vero stabile et immotum est; nulla vis efficiet, ne hic dederit, ne ille acceperit.

Excellently, it seems to me, does Mark Antony, in the poet Rabirius, when he sees his fortune passing over to another and nothing left to him but the right of death — and that too only if he seizes it quickly — cry out: "This I have, whatever I have given." O, how much he could have had, had he wished! These are the riches that, in whatever fickleness of the human lot, will abide in one place; and the greater they have been, the less envy will they bear. Why do you spare it as though it were your own? You are a steward.

Egregie mihi videtur M. Antonius apud Rabirium poetam, cum fortunam suam transeuntem alio videat et sibi nihil relictum praeter ius mortis, id quoque, si cito occupaverit, exclamare: Hoc habeo, quodcumque dedi. O! quantum habere potuit, si voluisset! Hae sunt divitiae certae in quacumque sortis humanae levitate uno loco permansurae; quae cum maiores fuerint, hoc minorem habebunt invidiam. Quid tamquam tuo parcis? Procurator es.

All those things which force you — swollen and lifted above the human — to forget your frailty, which you guard armed behind iron bars, which, snatched from another’s blood, you defend with your own, for whose sake you launch fleets to bloody the seas, for whose sake you shatter cities, ignorant how many weapons fortune is preparing against your backs, for whose sake, the bonds of kinship, friendship, and alliance so often broken, the globe has been crushed between two contending men — these are not yours. They are in the condition of a deposit, looking already, at any moment, to another owner; either an enemy will seize them, or a successor of an enemy’s spirit.

Omnia ista, quae vos tumidos et supra humana elatos oblivisci cogunt vestrae fragilitatis, quae ferreis claustris custoditis armati, quae ex alieno sanguine rapta vestro defenditis, propter quae classes cruentaturas maria deducitis, propter quae quassatis urbes ignari, quantum telorum in aversos fortuna comparet, propter quae ruptis totiens adfinitatis, amicitiae, collegii foederibus inter contendentes duos terrarum orbis elisus est, non sunt vestra. In depositi causa sunt iam iamque ad alium dominum spectantia; aut hostis illa aut hostilis animi successor invadet.

Do you ask how you may make them your own? By giving them as gifts. Take thought, then, for your goods, and make your possession of them sure and impregnable, rendering them not only safer but more honorable.

Quaeris, quomodo illa tua facias? Dona dando. Consule igitur rebus tuis et certam tibi earum atque inexpugnabilem possessionem para honestiores illas, non solum tutiores facturus.

That which you look up to, by which you think yourself rich and powerful — as long as you possess it, it lies under a sordid name. It is a house, it is a slave, it is coins; when you have given it, it is a benefit.

Istud, quod suspicis, quo te divitem ac potentem putas, quam diu possides, sub nomine sordido iacet. Domus est, servus est, nummi sunt; cum donasti, beneficium est.

"You allow," he says, "that we sometimes do not owe a benefit to him from whom we received it; therefore it has been snatched away." There are many reasons for which we cease to owe a benefit — not because it was taken away, but because it was spoiled. Someone defended me as a defendant, but violated my wife by force in adultery; he has not taken away the benefit, but by setting against it an equal injury he has released me from the debt; and, if he has harmed me more than he had before profited me, not only is the gratitude extinguished, but there arises the liberty of avenging and complaining, when in the comparison the injury has outweighed the benefit; so the benefit is not taken away, but overcome. What?

Pateris," inquit, " nos aliquando beneficium non debere ei, a quo accepimus; ergo ereptum est." Multa sunt, propter quae beneficium debere desinimus, non quia ablatum sed quia corruptum est. Aliquis reum me defendit, sed uxorem meam per vim stupro violavit; non abstulit beneficium, sed opponendo illi parem iniuriam solvit me debito, et, si plus laesit, quam ante profuerat, non tantum gratia extinguitur, sed ulciscendi querendique libertas fit, ubi in comparatione beneficii praeponderavit iniuria; ita non aufertur beneficium, sed vincitur. Quid?

Are not certain fathers so harsh and so wicked that to turn from them and renounce them is right and lawful? Have they then taken away what they had given? By no means; but the impiety of the later times has removed the commendation of every earlier service. Not the benefit is removed, but the gratitude for the benefit, and it is brought about, not that I do not have it, but that I do not owe. As if someone lent me money, but burned down my house. The loan is balanced by the loss; I have neither repaid him, nor yet do I owe.

non tam duri quidam et tam scelerati patres sunt, ut illos aversari et eiurare ius fasque sit? Numquid ergo illi abstulerunt, quae dederant? Minime, sed impietas sequentium temporum commendationem omnis prioris officii sustulit. Non beneficium tollitur, sed beneficii gratia, et efficitur, non ne habeam, sed ne debeam. Tamquam pecuniam aliquis mihi credidit, sed domum meam incendit. Pensatum est creditum damno; nec reddidi illi, nec tamen debeo.

In the same way this man too, who did something kindly toward me, something generously, but afterward many things proudly, insultingly, cruelly, has put me in such a place that I am as free toward him as if I had received nothing; he has done violence to his own benefits.

Eodem modo et hic, qui aliquid benigne adversus me fecit, aliquid liberaliter, sed postea multa superbe, contumeliose, crudeliter, eo me loco posuit, ut proinde liber adversus eum essem, ac si nihil accepissem; vim beneficiis suis attulit.

A man does not hold his tenant, though the lease-tablets remain, who has trampled down his crop, who has cut down his orchard — not because he has recovered what he had bargained for, but because he has brought it about that he should not recover it. So a creditor is often condemned at the suit of his own debtor, when he has taken away more on another count than he seeks on the loan.

Colonum suum non tenet quamvis tabellis manentibus, qui segetem eius proculcavit, qui succidit arbusta, non quia recepit, quod pepigerat, sed quia, ne reciperet, effecit. Sic debitori suo creditor saepe damnatur, ubi plus ex alia causa abstulit, quam ex crediti petit.

Not only does a judge sit between creditor and debtor, to say: "You lent money. What of it? You drove off his cattle, you killed his slave, you possess silver which you had not bought; the appraisal made, depart a debtor, you who had come a creditor"; between benefits and injuries too the reckoning is brought together.

Non tantum inter creditorem et debitorem iudex sedet, qui dicat: " Pecuniam credidisti. Quid ergo est? Pecus abegisti, servum eius occidisti, argentum, quod non emeras, possides; aestimatione facta debitor discede, qui creditor veneras "; inter beneficia quoque et iniurias ratio confertur.

Often, I say, a benefit remains and yet is not owed: if repentance has followed the giver, if he has called himself wretched for having given, if, in giving, he sighed, drew up his face, believed himself to be losing, not bestowing, if he gave for his own sake or at least not for mine, if he has not ceased to insult, to boast, to flaunt it everywhere and to make his gift bitter — the benefit remains, although it is not owed, just as certain moneys, concerning which no right is pronounced for the creditor, are owed but not exacted.

Saepe, inquam, beneficium manet nec debetur; si secuta est dantem paenitentia, si miserum se dixit, quod dedisset, si, cum daret, suspiravit, vultum adduxit, perdere se credidit, non donare, si sua causa aut certe non mea dedit, si non desiit insultare, gloriari, ubique iactare et acerbum munus suum facere, manet beneficium, quamvis non debeatur, sicuti quaedam pecuniae, de quibus ius creditori non dicitur, debentur, sed non exiguntur.

You gave a benefit, you did an injury afterward; both gratitude was owed to the benefit and vengeance to the injury; I owe him no gratitude, nor he me any penalty: the one is acquitted by the other. When we say:

Dedisti beneficium, iniuriam postea fecisti; et beneficio gratia debebatur et iniuriae ultio; nec ego illi gratiam debeo nec ille mihi poenam: alter ab altero absolvitur. Cum dicimus:

"I have returned his benefit," we do not mean that we have returned that very thing which we had received, but another in its place. For to return is to give a thing for a thing; why not? since every payment returns not the same, but just as much. For we are said to have repaid money, although we have counted out gold for silver, although no coins have passed, but the payment is completed by assignment and by words.

" Beneficium illi reddidi," non hoc dicimus illud nos, quod acceperamus, reddidisse, sed aliud pro illo. Reddere est enim rem pro re dare; quidni? cum omnis solutio non idem reddat, sed tantundem. Nam et pecuniam dicimur reddidisse, quamvis numeraverimus pro argenteis aureos, quamvis non intervenerint nummi, sed delegatione et verbis perfecta solutio sit.

You seem to me to say: "You are wasting your pains; for what is the point of my knowing whether what is not owed remains? Those are the sharp inanities of the jurisconsults, who deny that an inheritance can be acquired by use, but only the things that are in the inheritance — as though an inheritance were anything other than the things that are in it.

Videris mihi dicere: " Perdis operam; quorsus enim pertinet scire me, an maneat, quod non debetur? Iuris consultorum istae acutae ineptiae sunt, qui hereditatem negant usu capi posse sed ea, quae in hereditate sunt, tamquam quicquam aliud sit hereditas, quam ea, quae in hereditate sunt.

Distinguish for me rather this, which can pertain to the matter, when the same man has given me a benefit and afterward done me an injury, whether I ought both to return him the benefit and none the less to avenge myself on him, and to answer separately, as it were on two accounts, or to set the one against the other and have no trouble, so that the benefit is cancelled by the injury, the injury by the benefit. For this I see being done in this court; what the law is in your school, you may know yourselves."

Illud potius mihi distingue, quod potest ad rem pertinere, cum idem homo beneficium mihi dedit et postea fecit iniuriam, utrum et beneficium illi reddere debeam et me ab illo nihilo minus vindicare ac veluti duobus nominibus separatim respondere an alterum alteri contribuere et nihil negotii habere, ut beneficium iniuria tollatur, beneficio iniuria. Illud enim video in hoc foro fieri; quid in vestra schola iuris sit, vos sciatis.

The actions are kept separate, nor is the formula of what we sue for confused with that of what is sued from us. If anyone has deposited money with me, and the same man afterward has committed theft against me, both I shall sue him for theft and he me for the deposit.

Separantur actiones nec de eo, quod agimus, et de eo, quod nobiscum agitur, confunditur formula. Si quis apud me pecuniam deposuerit, idem postea furtum mihi fecerit, et ego cum illo furti agam et ille mecum depositi."

The examples you have set down, my Liberalis, are contained by fixed laws, which one must follow. Law is not mixed with law; each goes its own way. A deposit has its own action, just as, by Hercules, theft does. A benefit is subject to no law; it uses me as its arbiter; I am permitted to compare between themselves how much each has profited or harmed me, then to pronounce whether more is owed to me or by me.

Quae proposuisti, mi Liberalis, exempla certis legibus continentur, quas necesse est sequi. Lex legi non miscetur, utraque sua via it. Depositum habet actionem propriam tam mehercules quam furtum. Beneficium nulli legi subiectum est, me arbitro utitur; licet mihi inter se comparare, quantum profuerit mihi quisque aut quantum nocuerit, tum pronuntiare, utrum plus debeatur mihi an debeam.

In those matters nothing is in our power; one must go where we are led; in a benefit the whole power is mine, I judge. And so I do not separate them nor draw them apart, but I send injuries and benefits to the same judge. Otherwise you bid me at the same time both love and hate, both complain and give thanks — which nature does not admit. Rather, the comparison made between benefit and injury, I shall see whether something is even owed to me besides.

In illis nihil est nostrae potestatis, eundum est, qua ducimur; in beneficio tota potestas mea est, ego iudico. Itaque non separo illa nec diduco, sed iniurias et beneficia ad eundem iudicem mitto. Alioqui iubes me eodem tempore et amare et odisse et queri et gratias agere, quod natura non recipit. Potius comparatione facta inter se beneficii et iniuriae videbo, an mihi etiam ultro debeatur.

As, if someone impresses other verses over our writings from above, he does not remove the earlier letters, but hides them, so an injury coming on top does not suffer the benefit to appear.

Quomodo, si quis scriptis nostris alios superne imprimit versus, priores litteras non tollit, sed abscondit, sic beneficium superveniens iniuria apparere non patitur.

Your face, to which I have handed myself to be governed, gathers wrinkles and draws up the brow, as though I were going too far out. You seem to me to say: "Whither so far do you sail off to the right of me? Direct your course hither, hug the shore." I cannot more. And so, if you think this point satisfied, let us pass to that other — whether anything is owed to him who profited us against his will. This I could have put more openly, had not the proposition needed to be more confused, so that the distinction immediately following might show that both are asked: both whether we owe to him who profited us while unwilling, and whether to him who profited while not knowing. For if anyone did some good thing under compulsion;

Vultus tuus, cui regendum me tradidi, colligit rugas et trahit frontem, quasi longius exeam. Videris mihi dicere: Quo tantum mihi dexter abis? Huc derige cursum, litus ama. Non possum magis. Itaque, si huic satis factum existimas, illo transeamus, an ei debeatur aliquid, qui nobis invitus profuit. Hoc apertius potui dicere, nisi propositio deberet esse confusior, ut distinctio statim subsecuta ostenderet utrumque quaeri, et an ei deberemus, qui nobis, dum non vult, profuit, et an ei, qui, dum nescit. Nam si quis coactus aliquid boni fecit;

that he does not bind us is too manifest for any words to be spent on it. And this question will be easily dispatched, and any like it that can be raised, if we so often turn our thought to this — that there is no benefit except what some thought first brings to us, and then a friendly and kindly one.

quin nos non obliget, manifestius est, quam ut ulla in hoc verba impendenda sint. Et haec quaestio facile expedietur et si qua similis huic moveri potest, si totiens illo cogitationem nostram converterimus beneficium nullum esse, nisi quod ad nos primum aliqua cogitatio defert, deinde amica et benigna.

And so we give no thanks to rivers, although they either bear great ships and run with a broad and perennial channel to carry up supplies, or, full of fish and pleasant, flow between rich fields; nor does anyone judge that he owes a benefit to the Nile, any more than hatred, if it has overflowed immoderately and withdrawn too late; nor does the wind give a benefit, though it breathe gentle and favorable, nor useful and wholesome food. For he who is to give me a benefit must not only profit, but will it. Therefore nothing is owed to dumb animals either: and how many a horse’s speed has snatched from danger! Nor to trees: and how many, laboring in the heat, the shade of branches has covered!

Itaque nec fluminibus gratias agimus, quamvis aut magna navigia patiantur et ad subvehendas copias largo ac perenni alveo currant aut piscosa et amoena pinguibus arvis interfluant; nec quisquam Nilo beneficium debere se iudicat, non magis quam odium, si immodicus superfluxit tardeque decessit; nec ventus beneficium dat, licet lenis et secundus adspiret, nec utilis et salubris cibus. Nam qui beneficium mihi daturus est, debet non tantum prodesse, sed velle. Ideo nec mutis animalibus quicquam debetur: et quam multos e periculo velocitas equi rapuit! nec arboribus: et quam multos aestu laborantes ramorum opacitas texit!

But what difference is there whether one profited me who did not know, or one who could not know, since in both the will was lacking? What difference is there whether you bid me owe a benefit to a ship or a carriage or a lance, or to one who, just as much as those, had no purpose of doing good, but profited me by chance?

Quid autem interest, utrum mihi, qui nescit, profuerit, an qui scire non potuit, cum utrique velle defuerit? Quid interest, utrum me iubeas navi aut vehiculo aut lanceae debere beneficium an ei, qui aeque quam ista propositum bene faciendi nullum habuit, sed profuit casu?

A benefit someone receives unknowing; no one from an unknowing giver. As chance things heal many, and are not for that reason remedies, and to have fallen into a river in great cold was for someone a cause of health; as some men’s quartan fever has been shaken off by lashes, and a sudden fear, by turning the mind to another care, has cheated the suspected hours — nor is any of these for that reason wholesome, even if it was the means of safety: so certain men profit us while they are unwilling, nay, because they are unwilling; yet we do not for that reason owe them a benefit, because fortune bent their pernicious counsels to the better.

Beneficium aliquis nesciens accipit, nemo a nesciente. Quomodo multos fortuita sanant nec ideo remedia sunt, et in flumen alicui cecidisse frigore magno causa sanitatis fuit, quomodo quorundam flagellis quartana discussa est et metus repentinus animum in aliam curam avertendo suspectas horas fefellit nec ideo quicquam horum, etiam si saluti fuit, salutare est, sic quidam nobis prosunt, dum nolunt, immo quia nolunt; non tamen ideo illis beneficium debemus, quod perniciosa illorum consilia fortuna deflexit in melius.

Do you think I owe anything to one whose hand, while it aimed at me, struck my enemy, who would have harmed me, had he not erred? Often a witness, while he openly perjures himself, has even taken away credit from true witnesses and made the defendant pitiable, as though surrounded by a faction.

An existimas me debere ei quicquam, cuius manus, cum me peteret, percussit hostem meum, qui nocuisset, nisi errasset? Saepe testis, dum aperte peierat, etiam veris testibus abrogavit fidem et reum velut factione circumventum miserabilem reddidit.

Some men the very power that pressed them has rescued, and judges have been unwilling to condemn out of favor one whom they were going to condemn on the merits. Yet these have not given the defendant a benefit, although they profited him, because the question is whither the weapon was aimed, not whither it reached, and what distinguishes a benefit from an injury is not the outcome but the will.

Quosdam ipsa, quae premebat, potentia eripuit, et iudices, quem damnaturi erant causae, damnare gratiae noluerunt. Non tamen hi beneficium reo dederunt, quamvis profuerint, quia, quo missum sit telum, non quo pervenerit, quaeritur, et beneficium ab iniuria distinguit non eventus sed animus.

My adversary, while he says contrary things and offends the judge by his arrogance and rashly commits the case to a single witness, has raised up my cause; I do not ask whether he erred in my favor: he willed against me.

Adversarius meus, dum contraria dicit et iudicem superbia offendit et in unum testem temere rem1 demittit, causam meam erexit; non quaero, an pro me erraverit: contra me voluit.

Surely, in order that I be grateful, I ought to will the same thing that he, in order to give a benefit, ought to have willed. Is anything more unfair than the man who hates one by whom in a crowd he has been trodden on, or spattered, or pushed where he did not wish? And yet what else is there that exempts that man from complaint, when there is an injury in the matter, except that he did not know what he was doing?

Nempe, ut gratus sim, velle debeo idem facere, quod ille, ut beneficium daret, debuit. Num quid est iniquius homine, qui eum odit, a quo in turba calcatus aut respersus aut, quo nollet, impulsus est? Atqui quid est aliud, quod illum querellae eximat, cum in re sit iniuria, quam nescisse, quid faceret?

The same thing brings it about that this man did not give a benefit, that that man did not do an injury; both friend and enemy the will makes. How many has disease snatched from military service! Some, that they might not run to the ruin of their own house, an enemy held by a bail-bond; that they might not come into the pirates’ hands, certain men have gained by shipwreck; yet to these we owe no benefit, because chance is outside the sense of duty, nor to the enemy whose lawsuit saved us while it vexes and detains us.

Eadem res efficit, ne hic beneficium dederit, ne ille iniuriam fecerit; et amicum et inimicum voluntas facit. Quam multos militiae morbus eripuit! Quosdam, ne ad ruinam domus suae occurrerent, inimicus vadimonio tenuit; ne in piratarum manus pervenirent, quidam naufragio consecuti sunt; nec his tamen beneficium debemus, quia extra sensum officii casus est, nec inimico, cuius nos lis servavit, dum vexat ac detinet.

It is no benefit unless it proceeds from a good will, unless he who gave it acknowledges it. Someone profited me while not knowing: I owe him nothing. He profited me while wishing to harm: I shall imitate him.

Non est beneficium, nisi quod a bona voluntate proficiscitur, nisi illud adcognoscit, qui dedit. Profuit aliquis mihi, dum nescit: nihil illi debeo. Profuit, cum vellet nocere: imitabor ipsum.

Let us return to that first man. To return a favor, you wish me to do something? He himself, to give me a benefit, did nothing! To pass to the second — you wish me to return a favor to this man, so that what I received from one unwilling, I should repay willing? For what shall I say of the third, who slipped from injury into a benefit?

Ad primum illum revertamur. Ut gratiam referam, aliquid facere me vis? Ipse, ut beneficium mihi daret, nihil fecit! Ut ad alterum transeamus, vis me huic gratiam referre, ut, quod a nolente accepi, volens reddam? Nam quid de tertio loquar, qui ab iniuria in beneficium delapsus est?

That I may owe you a benefit, it is too little that you wished to give; that I may not owe, it is enough that you did not wish. For a benefit a bare will does not make; but that which would not be a benefit, if to the best and fullest will fortune had been lacking, is equally not a benefit, unless will went before fortune. For you ought not merely to have profited me, that I be bound to you for it, but to have profited me by design.

Ut beneficium tibi debeam, parum est voluisse te dare; ut non debeam, satis est noluisse. Beneficium enim voluntas nuda non efficit, sed, quod beneficium non esset, si optimae ac plenissimae voluntati fortuna defuisset, id aeque beneficium non est, nisi fortunam voluntas antecessit. Non enim profuisse te mihi oportet, ut ob hoc tibi obliger, sed ex destinato profuisse.

Cleanthes uses an example of this kind: "I sent," he says, "two boys to seek and fetch Plato from the Academy. The one searched the whole colonnade, ran through the other places too in which he hoped he could be found, and came home no less weary than fruitless;

Cleanthes exemplo eiusmodi utitur: " Ad quaerendum," inquit, " et accersendum ex Academia Platonem duos pueros misi. Alter totam porticum perscrutatus est, alia quoque loca, in quibus illum inveniri posse sperabat, percucurrit et domum non minus lassus quam irritus redit;

the other sat down beside a nearby mountebank and, while as a vagrant and stray he mingled and played with the house-slaves, found Plato, whom he had not sought, passing by. That boy," he says, "we shall praise, who, as far as in him lay, did what he was bidden; this one, luckily idle, we shall chastise."

alter apud proximum circulatorem resedit et, dum vagus atque erro vernaculis congregatur et ludit, transeuntem Platonem, quem non quaesierat, invenit. Illum, inquit, laudabimus puerum, qui, quantum in se erat, quod iussus est, fecit; hunc feliciter inertem castigabimus."

It is the will that lodges the duty with us; see what its condition is, that it may bind me with a debt. It is too little for it to will, unless it has profited; too little to have profited, unless it willed. For suppose someone wished to make a gift and did not give: I have his mind indeed, but I have not the benefit, which both the thing and the mind complete.

Voluntas est, quae apud nos ponit officium; cuius vide quae condicio sit, ut me debito obstringat. Parum est illi velle, nisi profuit; parum est profuisse, nisi voluit. Puta enim aliquem donare voluisse nec donasse; animum quidem eius habeo, sed beneficium non habeo, quod consummat et res et animus.

As to him who wished indeed to lend me money, but did not give it, I owe nothing, so to him who wished to give me a benefit, but could not, I shall be a friend indeed but not bound; and I shall wish to furnish him something (for he too wished it to me); but, if, using a kinder fortune, I shall furnish it, I shall have given a benefit, not returned a favor. He will owe me a return of favor; here a beginning will be made, from me it will be counted.

Quemadmodum ei, qui voluit mihi quidem pecuniam credere, sed non dedit, nihil debeo, ita ei, qui voluit mihi beneficium dare, sed non potuit, amicus quidem ero sed non obligatus; et volam illi aliquid praestare (nam et ille voluit mihi), ceterum, si benigniore usus fortuna praestitero, beneficium dedero, non gratiam rettulero. Ille mihi gratiam referre debebit; hinc initium fiet, a me numerabitur.

I understand already what you wish to ask; there is no need for you to speak; your face is talking. "If someone profited us for his own sake, is anything owed to him?" you say. "For I often hear you complaining of this — that some men furnish things to themselves and set them to others’ account." I shall tell you, my Liberalis; but first I shall divide that little question and separate the fair from the unfair.

Intellego iam, quid velis quaerere; non opus est te dicere; vultus tuus loquitur. " Si quis sua nobis causa profuit, eine," inquis, " debetur aliquid? Hoc enim saepe te conquerentem audio, quod quaedam homines sibi praestant, aliis imputant." Dicam, mi Liberalis; sed prius istam quaestiunculam dividam et rem aequam ab iniqua separabo.

For there is much difference whether someone gives us a benefit for his own sake, or also for ours. He who looks wholly to himself and profits us because he cannot otherwise profit himself, is to me in the place of one who provides winter and summer fodder for his cattle; he is in the place of one who feeds his captives that they may sell more conveniently and fattens and rubs down fat oxen, like the lanista who trains and adorns his troop with the utmost care. There is much distance, as Cleanthes says, between a benefit and a business transaction.

Multum enim interest, utrum aliquis beneficium nobis det sua causa an et sua. Ille, qui totus ad se spectat et nobis prodest, quia aliter prodesse sibi non potest, eo mihi loco est, quo, qui pecori suo hibernum et aestivum pabulum prospicit; eo loco est, quo, qui captivos suos, ut commodius veneant, pascit et ut opimos boves saginat ac defricat, quo lanista, qui familiam summa cura exercet atque ornat. Multum, ut ait Cleanthes, a beneficio distat negotiatio.

Again, I am not so unfair as to owe nothing to him who, while he was useful to me, was so to himself also; for I do not demand that he take thought for me without regard to himself — nay, I even wish that the benefit given to me should profit the giver even more, provided that he who gave it gave it looking to two and divided it between me and himself.

Rursus non sum tam iniquus, ut ei nihil debeam, qui, cum mihi utilis esset, fuit et sibi; non enim exigo, ut mihi sine respectu sui consulat, immo etiam opto, ut beneficium mihi datum vel magis danti profuerit, dum modo id, qui dabat duos intuens dederit et inter me seque diviserit.

Though he possess the greater part of it himself, if only he admitted me into partnership, if he thought of two, I am ungrateful, not only unjust, unless I rejoice that this profited him which profited me. It is the height of malignity to call nothing a benefit except what has affected the giver with some loss.

Licet id ipse ex maiore parte possideat, si modo me in consortium admisit, si duos cogitavit, ingratus sum, non solum iniustus, nisi gaudeo hoc illi profuisse, quod proderat mihi. Summae malignitatis est non vocare beneficium, nisi quod dantem aliquo incommodo adfecit.

To that other man, who gives a benefit for his own sake, I shall answer: "Why, from the use, should you say that you profited me rather than I you?" "Suppose," he says, "I cannot become a magistrate otherwise than if I have ransomed ten captured citizens from a great number of captives; will you owe me nothing, when I have freed you from slavery and chains? And yet I shall do it for my own sake." Against this I answer: "You do something there for your own sake, something for mine:

Alteri illi, qui beneficium dat sua causa, respondebo: " Usus me quare potius te mihi profuisse dicas quam me tibi? " " Puta," inquit, " aliter fieri non posse me magistratum, quam si decem captos cives ex magno captivorum numero redemero; nihil debebis mihi, cum te servitute ac vinculis liberavero? Atqui mea id causa faciam." Adversus hoc respondeo: " Aliquid istic tua causa facis, aliquid mea:

for your own, that you ransom; for mine, that you ransom me; for it is enough for you, toward your advantage, to have ransomed any whatever. And so I owe — not that you ransom me, but that you choose me; for you could have attained the same by another’s ransom as by mine. You share the advantage of the thing with me and take me into the benefit, which is to profit two. You prefer me to others; this whole thing you do for my sake.

tua, quod redimis, mea, quod me redimis; tibi enim ad utilitatem tuam satis est quoslibet redemisse. Itaque debeo, non quod redimis me, sed quod eligis; poteras enim et alterius redemptione idem consequi, quod mea. Utilitatem rei partiris mecum et me in beneficium recipis duobus profuturum. Praefers me aliis; hoc totum mea causa facis.

And so, if the ransoming of ten captives were going to make you praetor, but we were only ten captives, no one of us would owe you anything, because you would have nothing to set to anyone’s account, separated from your own advantage. I am not an envious interpreter of a benefit, nor do I desire that it be given to me only, but to me too."

Itaque, si praetorem te factura esset decem captivorum redemptio, decem autem soli captivi essemus, nemo quicquam tibi deberet ex nobis, quia nihil haberes, quod cuiquam imputares, a tua utilitate seductum. Non sum invidus beneficii interpres nec desidero illud mihi tantum dari, sed et mihi."

"What then?" he says; "if I had ordered your names to be cast into the lot, and your name had come out among those to be ransomed, would you owe me nothing?"

" Quid ergo? " inquit; " si in sortem nomina vestra coici iussissem, et tuum nomen inter redimendos exisset, nihil deberes mihi?

Nay, I would owe — but a trifle; what this is, I shall tell. You do something there for my sake, in that you admit me to the chance of ransom; that my name comes out, I owe to the lot; that it could come out, to you. You gave me access to your benefit, the greater part of which I owe to fortune, but this very thing to you — that I could owe it to fortune.

" Immo deberem, sed exiguum; quid sit hoc, dicam. Aliquid istic mea causa facis, quod me ad fortunam redemptionis admittis; quod nomen meum exit, sorti debeo, quod exire potuit, tibi. Aditum mihi ad beneficium tuum dedisti, cuius maiorem partem fortunae debeo, sed hoc ipsum tibi, quod fortunae debere potui.

Those I shall wholly pass by whose benefit is mercenary, who, in giving, reckon not to whom but at what price they are going to give, whose every act is turned in upon itself. Someone sells me grain; I cannot live unless I buy; but I do not owe my life, because I bought.

Illos ex toto praeteribo, quorum mercennarium beneficium est, quod qui dat, non computat, cui sed quanti daturus sit, quod undique in se conversum est. Vendit mihi aliquis frumentum; vivere non possum, nisi emero; sed non debeo vitam, quia emi.

Nor do I weigh how necessary it was — that without which I was not going to live — but how ungrateful it would be, since I would not have had it unless I had bought, in importing which the merchant did not think how much help he was going to bring me, but how much gain to himself. What I bought, I do not owe.

Nec, quam necessarium fuerit, aestimo, sine quo victurus non fui, sed quam ingratum, quod non habuissem, nisi emissem, in quo invehendo mercator non cogitavit, quantum auxilii adlaturus esset mihi, sed quantum lucri sibi. Quod emi, non debeo.

"In that way," he says, "you say you owe nothing even to a doctor beyond his little fee, nor to a teacher, because you have paid him something. And yet of all these there is among us great affection, great reverence." To this it is answered that certain things are worth more than they are bought for.

" Isto modo," inquit, " nec medico quicquam debere te nisi mercedulam dicis nec praeceptori, quia aliquid numeraveris. Atqui omnium horum apud nos magna caritas, magna reverentia est." Adversus hoc respondetur quaedam pluris esse, quam emuntur.

You buy from a doctor a priceless thing — life and good health; from a teacher of the liberal arts, liberal studies and the cultivation of the mind; and so to these is paid not the price of the thing, but of their labor, that they serve us, that, called away from their own affairs, they have leisure for us; they bear a wage not of their merit, but of their occupation.

Emis a medico rem inaestimabilem, vitam ac bonam valetudinem, a bonarum artium praeceptore studia liberalia et animi cultum; itaque his non rei pretium, sed operae solvitur, quod deserviunt, quod a rebus suis avocati nobis vacant; mercedem non meriti, sed occupationis suae ferunt.

Yet something truer can be said, which I shall presently set down, if I first show how that can be refuted. "Certain things," he says, "are worth more than they were sold for, and for this reason you owe me something extra for them, although they were bought."

Aliud tamen dici potest verius, quod statim ponam, si prius, quomodo istud refelli possit, ostendero. " Quaedam," inquit," pluris sunt, quam venierunt, et ob hoc aliquid mihi extra pro illis quamvis empta sunt, debes."

First, what does it matter how much they are worth, when the price has been agreed between buyer and seller? Then, I did not buy that at its own price, but at yours. "It is worth more," you say, "than it sold for"; but it could not sell for more. The price of each thing is for the time; though you praise these things well, they are worth as much as that beyond which they cannot sell. Therefore he who has bought well owes nothing to the seller.

Primum quid interest, quanti sint, cum de pretio inter ementem vendentemque convenerit? Deinde non emi illud suo pretio, sed tuo. " Pluris est," inquis, " quam venit"; sed pluris venire non potuit. Pretium autem rei cuiusque pro tempore est; eum bene ista laudaveris, tanti sunt, quanto pluris venire non possunt; propterea nihil venditori debet, qui bene emit.

Then, even if those things are worth more, yet there is no gift of yours there, since it is appraised not from its use or effect, but from custom and the market-rate.

Deinde, etiam si pluris ista sunt, non tamen ullum istic tuum munus est, ut non ex usu effectuve, sed ex consuetudine et annona aestimetur.

What price do you set on the man who crosses the seas and, through the midst of the waves, when the land has receded from sight, cuts a sure path, and, foreseeing the storms to come, suddenly, while all are unconcerned, bids the sails be reefed, the rigging lowered, the crew stand ready against the onset and sudden assault of the squall? Yet for so great a service the fare pays the reward!

Quod tu pretium ponis traicienti maria et per medios fluctus, cum terra e conspectu recessit, certam secanti viam et prospiciens futuras tempestates et securis omnibus subito iubenti vela substringi, armamenta demitti, paratos ad incursum procellae et repentinum impetum stare? Huic tamen tantae rei praemium vectura persolvit!

At how much do you reckon a lodging in a wilderness, a roof in the rain, a bath or a fire in the cold? Yet I know at what price I shall get these when I turn in at the inn! How much does he furnish us who takes up a slipping house and, by incredible art, holds up a tenement that is cracking from the bottom! Yet at a fixed and trifling price the propping is hired.

Quanti aestimas in solitudine hospitium, in imbre tectum, in frigore balneum aut ignem? Scio tamen, quanti ista consecuturus deversorium subeam! Quantum nobis praestat, qui labentem domum suscipit et agentem ex imo rimas insulam incredibili arte suspendit! Certo tamen et levi pretio fultura conducitur.

The wall keeps us safe from enemies and from the sudden incursions of robbers; yet it is known, for those towers that are to be bulwarks for the public safety, what the builder earns by the day.

Murus nos ab hostibus tutos et a subitis latronum incursionibus praestat; notum est tamen, illas turres pro securitate publica propugnacula habituras excitaturus faber quid in diem mereat.

It will be endless, if I gather examples more widely, by which it may appear that great things stand at a small price. What then? Why do I owe both to a doctor and a teacher something more, and do not discharge my debt to them by a wage? Because from doctor and teacher they pass over into friends, and bind us not by the art they sell, but by a kindly and intimate good will.

Infinitum erit, si latius exempla conquiram, quibus appareat parvo magna constare. Quid ergo? Quare et medico et praeceptori plus quiddam debeo nec adversus illos mercede defungor? Quia ex medico et praeceptore in amicum transeunt et nos non arte, quam vendunt, obligant, sed benigna et familiari voluntate.

And so, to a doctor, if he does no more than touch my hand and puts me among those whom he goes round, prescribing without any feeling what is to be done or avoided, I owe nothing more, because he sees me not as a friend, but as a commander.

Itaque medico, si nihil amplius quam manum tangit et me inter eos, quos perambulat, ponit sine ullo adfectu facienda aut vitanda praecipiens, nihil amplius debeo, quia me non tamquam amicum videt, sed tamquam imperatorem.

Nor have I cause to revere even a teacher, if he held me in the herd of pupils, if he did not think me worthy of his own particular care, if he never directed his mind upon me, and, when he poured out into the midst what he knew, I did not learn, but caught it up. What is it, then, for which we owe much to these men?

Ne praeceptorem quidem habeo cur venerer, si me in grege discipulorum habuit, si non putavit dignum propria et peculiari cura, si numquam in me derexit animum, et, cum in medium effunderet, quae sciebat, non didici, sed excepi. Quid ergo est, quare istis multum debeamus?

Not because what they sold is worth more than we bought it for, but because they have furnished something to us ourselves. That doctor weighed more anxiously than was necessary for a doctor; he feared for me, not for the reputation of his art; he was not content to point out remedies: he applied them too; he sat among the anxious, he hurried to the suspected hours; no service was to him a burden, none a disgust;

Non quia pluris est, quod vendiderunt, quam emimus, sed quia nobis ipsis aliquid praestiterunt. Ille magis pependit, quam medico necesse est; pro me, non pro fama artis extimuit; non fuit contentus remedia monstrare: et admovit; inter sollicitos adsedit, ad suspecta tempora occurrit; nullum ministerium illi oneri, nullum fastidio fuit;

he heard my groans not unconcerned; in a crowd of many calling on him, I was to him the chief care; he had leisure for the others only so far as my health permitted: to this man I am bound not as to a doctor but as to a friend.

gemitus meos non securus audivit; in turba multorum invocantem ego illi potissima curatio fui; tantum aliis vacavit, quantum mea valetudo permiserat: huic ego non tamquam medico sed tamquam amico obligatus sum.

The other, again, in teaching bore both labor and tedium; besides those things that are said by teachers in common, he instilled and handed on some things, by his encouragement raised up a good disposition, and now by praises gave spirit, now by admonitions shook off sloth;

Alter rursus docendo et laborem et taedium tulit; praeter illa, quae a praecipientibus in commune dicuntur, aliqua instillavit ac tradidit, hortando bonam indolem erexit et modo laudibus fecit animum, modo admonitionibus discussit desidiam;

then he drew out a latent and sluggish talent by laying, so to speak, his hand upon it; nor did he dispense what he knew grudgingly, that he might longer be necessary, but desired, if he could, to pour over the whole: I am ungrateful, unless I love him among the dearest of my kindred.

tum ingenium latens et pigrum iniecta, ut ita dicam, manu extraxit; nec, quae sciebat, maligne dispensavit, quo diutius esset necessarius, sed cupit, si posset, universa transfundere: ingratus sum, nisi illum inter gratissimas necessitudines diligo.

Even to the dealers of the most sordid crafts we have added something above what was fixed, if their service has seemed to us more strenuous; and to a helmsman and to the maker of the cheapest ware and to one hiring out his hands by the day we have sprinkled a gratuity. But in the best arts, which either preserve or refine life, he who thinks he owes nothing more than he bargained for is ungrateful.

Sordidissimorum quoque artificiorum institoribus supra constitutum aliquid adiecimus, si nobis illorum opera enixior visa est; et gubernatori et opifici vilissimae mercis et in diem locanti manus suas corollarium adspersimus. In optimis vero artibus, quae vitam aut conservant aut excolunt, qui nihil se plus existimat debere, quam pepigit, ingratus est.

Add that the imparting of such studies mingles minds; when this has happened, to a doctor as to a teacher the price of his labor is paid, of his heart it is owed.

Adice, quod talium studiorum traditio miscet animos; hoc cum factum est, tam medico quam praeceptori pretium operae solvitur, animi debetur.

When Plato had crossed a river by boat and the ferryman had exacted nothing from him, believing it given in his own honor, he said that the ferryman had a service deposited with Plato; then a little after, when the man ferried over one and another free of charge with the same diligence, he denied that he now had a service deposited with Plato.

Platon cum flumen nave transisset nec ab illo quicquam portitor exegisset, honori hoc suo datum credens dixit positum illi esse apud Platonem officium; deinde paulo post, cum alium atque alium gratis eadem sedulitate transveheret, negavit illi iam apud Platonem positum officium.

For that I may owe you anything for what you furnish, you must furnish it not only to me, but as to me; you cannot dun anyone for what you scatter among the people. What then? Will nothing be owed you for this? Nothing, as from one man; with all I shall pay what with all I owe.

Nam ut tibi debeam aliquid pro eo, quod praestas, debes non tantum mihi praestare, sed tamquam mihi; non potes ob id quemquam appellare, quod spargis in populum. Quid ergo? Nihil tibi debebitur pro hoc? Tamquam ab uno nihil; cum omnibus solvam, quod cum omnibus debeo.

"Do you deny," he says, "that he gives any benefit who carried me free in his boat across the river Po?" I deny it. He does some good thing, he gives no benefit; for he does it either for his own sake or at all events not for mine; in short, not even he himself judges that he gives me a benefit, but furnishes it either to the republic or to the neighborhood or to his own ambition, and expects for it some advantage other than what he is going to get from individuals.

" Negas," inquit, " ullum dare beneficium eum, qui me gratuita nave per flumen Padum tulit? " Nego. Aliquid boni facit, beneficium non dat; facit enim aut sua causa aut utique non mea; ad summam ne ipse quidem se mihi beneficium iudicat dare, sed aut rei publicae aut viciniae aut ambitioni suae praestat et pro hoc aliud quoddam commodum expectat, quam quod a singulis recepturus est. " Quid ergo?

"What then?" he says; "if a prince gives citizenship to all the Gauls, immunity to the Spaniards, will individuals owe nothing under this head?" Why should they not owe? But they will owe it not as a private benefit, but as a share of a public one. "He had," he says, "no thought of me at that time when he was profiting all;

" inquit, " si princeps civitatem dederit omnibus Gallis, si immunitatem Hispanis, nihil hoc nomine singuli debebunt? " Quidni debeant? debebunt autem non tamquam proprium beneficium, sed tamquam publici partem. " Nullam," inquit, " habuit cogitationem illo tempore mei, quo universis proderat;

he did not wish to give me citizenship in particular, nor did he direct his mind upon me; so why should I owe to him who did not put me in his thoughts, when he was going to do what he did?"

noluit mihi civitatem proprie dare nec in me direxit animum; ita quare ei debeam, qui me sibi non substituit, cum facturus esset, quod fecit?

First, when he thought to profit all the Gauls, he thought to profit me too; for I was a Gaul, and he comprehended me, even if not by my own, yet by the public mark. Then I too shall owe him, not as a private gift, but as a common one; as one of the people, I shall pay not as for myself, but contribute as for my country.

" Primum, cum cogitavit Gallis omnibus prodesse, et mihi cogitavit prodesse; eram enim Gallus et me etiam si non mea, publica tamen nota comprendit. Deinde ego quoque illi non tamquam proprium debebo, sed tamquam commune munus; unus ex populo non tamquam pro me solvam, sed tamquam pro patria conferam.

If someone lends money to my country, I shall not call myself his debtor, nor shall I profess this debt either as a candidate or as a defendant; yet toward discharging it I shall give my portion. So of that gift which is given to all, I deny that I am the debtor, because it gave to me indeed but not on my account, and to me indeed, but not knowing whether it gave to me; none the less I shall know that something is to be paid by me, because it has reached me too by a long circuit. For me it must have been done, that it may bind me.

Si quis patriae meae pecuniam credat, non dicam me illius debitorem nec hoc aes alienum profitebor aut candidatus aut reus; ad exsolvendum tamen hoc dabo portionem meam. Sic istius muneris, quod universis datur, debitorem me nego, quia mihi quidem dedit sed non propter me, et mihi quidem, sed nesciens, an mihi daret; nihilo minus aliquid mihi dependendum sciam, quia ad me quoque circumitu longo pervenit. Propter me debet factum esse, quod me obliget.

"In that way," he says, "you owe nothing to the moon or the sun either; for they do not move on your account." But since they move to this end — to preserve the universe — they move for me too; for I am a part of the universe. Add now that our condition and theirs is unlike;

" Isto," inquit, " modo nec lunae nec soli quicquam debes; non enim propter te moventur." Sed cum in hoc moveantur, ut universa conservent, et pro me moventur; universorum enim pars sum. Adice nunc, quod nostra et horum condicio dissimilis est;

for he who profits me, that through me he may profit himself, has not given a benefit, because he has made me the instrument of his advantage; but the sun and the moon, even if they profit us for their own sake, do not yet profit to this end — that through us they may profit themselves; for what can we contribute to them?

nam qui mihi prodest, ut per me prosit sibi, non dedit beneficium, quia me instrumentum utilitatis suae fecit; sol autem et luna, etiam si nobis prosunt sua causa, non in hoc tamen prosunt, ut per nos prosint sibi; quid enim nos conferre illis possumus?

"I shall know," he says, "that the sun and moon wish to profit us, if they could refuse; but they are not permitted not to move. In short, let them stand still and break off their work." See in how many ways this is refuted. He wishes no less who cannot refuse;

" Sciam," inquit, " solem ac lunam nobis velle prodesse, si nolle potuerint; illis autem non licet non moveri. Ad summam consistant et opus suum intermittant." Hoc vide quot modis refellatur. Non ideo minus vult, qui non potest nolle;

nay, it is the greatest proof of a firm will that it cannot even be changed. A good man cannot fail to do what he does; for he will not be good unless he does it; therefore not even the good man gives a benefit, since he does what he ought, and cannot fail to do what he ought. Besides, there is much difference whether you say:

immo maximum argumentum est firmae voluntatis ne mutari quidem posse. Vir bonus non potest non facere, quod facit; non enim erit bonus, nisi fecerit; ergo nec bonus vir beneficium dat, quia facit, quod debet, non potest autem non facere, quod debet. Praeterea multum interest, utrum dicas:

"He cannot fail to do this," because he is compelled, or "He cannot fail to wish it." For if it is necessary for him to do it, I owe the benefit not to him, but to the one compelling; if it is necessary for him to wish it on this account, that he has nothing better to wish, he compels himself; so what, as to one compelled, I would not owe, as to one compelling I owe.

" Non potest hoc non facere," quia cogitur, an: " Non potest nolle." Nam si necesse est illi facere, non debeo ipsi beneficium, sed cogenti; si necesse est illi velle ob hoc, quia nihil habet melius, quod velit, ipse se cogit; ita, quod tamquam coacto non deberem, tamquam cogenti debeo.

"Let them cease to wish," he says. At this point let this occur to you: Who is so mad as to deny that to be a will which is in no danger of ceasing and turning itself into the contrary, when, on the other hand, no one ought to seem to will as much as he whose will is so sure as to be eternal? Or, if he too wills who can at once cease to will, will he not seem to will into whose nature it does not fall to be unwilling?

" Desinant," inquit, " velle." Hoc loco tibi illud occurrat: Quis tam demens est, ut eam neget voluntatem esse, cui non est periculum desinendi vertendique se in contrarium, cum ex diverso nemo aeque videri debeat velle, quam cuius voluntas usque eo certa est, ut aeterna sit? An, si is quoque vult, qui potest statim nolle, is non videbitur velle, in cuius naturam non cadit nolle?

"Come now," he says, "if they can, let them resist." This is what you say: "Let all those bodies, drawn apart by vast intervals and set to guard the universe, desert their stations; let star rush upon star in a sudden confusion of things, and, the concord of things broken, let divine things slide to ruin, and let the fabric of the swiftest speed fail in mid-course of the changes promised for so many ages, and let those bodies which now go and return in alternation, tempering the world by their well-balanced poise, be burned up in a sudden conflagration, and from so great a variety be dissolved and all go into one; let fire possess all things, which then sluggish night may seize, and a deep abyss swallow up so many gods." Is it worth so much, that you be confuted, for those things to fall? They profit you even against your will, and they go their way for your sake, even if there is for them another and prior cause.

" Agedum," inquit, " si possunt, resistant." Hoc dicis: " Omnia ista ingentibus intervallis diducta et in custodiam universi disposita stationes suas deserant; subita confusione rerum sidera sideribus incurrant, et rupta rerum concordia in ruinam divina labantur, contextusque velocitatis citatissimae in tot saecula promissas vices in medio itinere destituat, et, quae nunc alternis eunt redeuntque opportunis libramentis mundum ex aequo temperantia, repentino concrementur incendio, et ex tanta varietate solvantur atque eant in unum omnia; ignis cuncta possideat, quem deinde pigra nox occupet, et profunda vorago tot deos sorbeat." Est tanti, ut tu coarguaris, ista concidere? Prosunt tibi etiam invito euntque ista tua causa, etiam si maior illis alia ac prior causa est.

Add now that no external things compel the gods, but their own will is to them an eternal law. They have established what they would not change; and so they cannot seem about to do anything, though unwilling, because whatever they cannot cease from, they have willed to persevere in, nor does it ever repent the gods of their first counsel.

Adice nunc, quod non externa cogunt deos, sed sua illis in lege aeterna voluntas est. Statuerunt, quae non mutarent; itaque non possunt videri facturi aliquid, quamvis nolint, quia, quidquid desinere non possunt, perseverare voluerunt, nec umquam primi consilii deos paenitet.

Without doubt it is not permitted them to halt and to fall away to the contrary; but for no other reason than that their own power holds them in their purpose; nor do they persevere from weakness, but because it does not please them to stray from the best, and it has been decreed to go thus.

Sine dubio stare illis et desciscere in contrarium non licet, sed non ob aliud, quam quia vis sua illos in proposito tenet; nec imbecillitate permanent, sed quia non libet ab optimis aberrare et sic ire decretum est.

But in that first constitution, when they ordered the universe, they looked to our things too and had regard for man; and so they cannot seem to run their course and unfold their work only for their own sake, because a part of the work is we also. We owe, therefore, both to the sun and to the moon and to the other heavenly bodies a benefit, because, even if there are more important things for which they rise, yet they help us who are bound for greater things.

In prima autem illa constitutione, cum universa disponerent, etiam nostra viderunt rationemque hominis habuerunt; itaque non possunt videri sua tantum causa decurrere et explicare opus suum, quia pars operis et nos sumus. Debemus ergo et soli et lunae et ceteris caelestibus beneficium, quia, etiam si potiora illis sunt, in quae oriuntur, nos tamen in maiora ituri iuvant.

Add that they help by design, and therefore we are bound, because we did not fall upon the benefit of unknowing givers, but they knew that we should receive these things which we receive; and although their purpose is greater and the fruit of their action greater than to preserve mortal things, yet toward our advantages too a mind was sent forth from the beginning of things, and such an order given to the world that it might appear that care for us was not held among the last things.

Adice, quod ex destinato iuvant, ideoque obligati sumus, quia non in beneficium ignorantium incidimus, sed haec, quae accipimus, accepturos scierunt; et quamquam maius illis propositum sit maiorque actus sui fructus, quam servare mortalia, tamen in nostras quoque utilitates a principio rerum praemissa mens est et is ordo mundo datus, ut appareat curam nostri non inter ultima habitam.

We owe our parents dutifulness, and many did not come together to beget. The gods cannot seem to have not known what they were going to bring about, since they straightway provided nourishment and aids for all, nor did they beget through negligence those for whom they were begetting so many things. Nature thought of us before it made us, nor are we so slight a work that we could have escaped its notice.

Debemus parentibus nostris pietatem, et multi non, ut gignerent, coierant. Di non possunt videri nescisse, quid effecturi essent, eum omnibus alimenta protinus et auxilia providerint, nec eos per neclegentiam genuere, quibus tam multa generabant. Cogitavit nos ante natura, quam fecit, nec tam leve opus sumus, ut illi potuerimus excidere.

See how much it has permitted us, how the condition of human dominion is not bounded within men; see how far it is allowed to range over the bodies which it has not confined within the limit of the lands, but has sent into every part of itself; see how much minds dare, how they alone either know the gods or seek them and, with the mind lifted on high, accompany the divine: you will know that man is no tumultuary and unconsidered work.

Vide, quantum nobis permiserit, quam non intra homines humani imperii condicio sit; vide, in quantum corporibus vagari liceat, quae non coercuit fine terrarum, sed in omnem partem sui misit; vide, animi quantum audeant, quemadmodum soli aut noverint deos aut quaerant et mente in altum elata divina comitentur: scies non esse hominem tumultuarium et incogitatum opus.

Among the greatest of her works nature has nothing in which she may more glory, or at least to which she may glory. How great is that madness, to make a controversy with the gods over their gift! How will this man be grateful toward those to whom gratitude cannot be returned without expense, who denies that he has received from those from whom he is at this very moment receiving, who are both always going to give and never to receive?

Inter maxima rerum suarum natura nihil habet, quo magis glorietur, aut certe, cui glorietur. Quantus iste furor est controversiam dis muneris sui facere! Quomodo adversus eos hic erit gratus, quibus gratia referri sine impendio non potest, qui negat se ab iis accepisse, a quibus cum maxime accepit, qui et semper daturi sunt et numquam recepturi?

But how great is the perversity, to owe nothing to someone for this reason — that he is kind even to one denying it — and to call the very continuance and seat of his benefits a proof of one who gives by necessity! "I do not want it! Let him keep it to himself! Who asks him?" — and add to these all the other voices of an impudent spirit. He deserves no less of you, whose generosity reaches even you while you deny it, and of whose benefits this is even the greatest, that he is going to give even to one complaining.

Quanta autem perversitas ob hoc alicui non debere, quia etiam infitianti benignus est, et continuationem ipsam sedemque beneficiorum argumentum vocare necessario dantis! "Nolo! Sibi habeat! Quis illum rogat? " et omnes alias impudentis animi voces his adstrue. Non ideo de te minus meretur is, cuius liberalitas ad te etiam, dum negas, pervenit, cuiusque beneficiorum vel hoc maximum est, quod etiam querenti daturus est.

Do you not see how parents force the tender infancy of their children to the endurance of wholesome things? They cherish with careful attention the bodies of the crying and resisting and, lest an untimely freedom distort the limbs, they bind them up, to come out straight, and presently they instill liberal studies, fear applied to the unwilling; at last they apply audacious youth — forced, if it follows too little — to frugality, modesty, good morals.

Non vides, quemadmodum teneram liberorum infantiam parentes ad salubrium rerum patientiam cogant? Flentium corpora ac repugnandum diligens cura fovent et, ne membra libertas immatura detorqueat, in rectum exitura constringunt et mox liberalia studia inculcant adhibito timore nolentibus; ad ultimum audacem iuventam frugalitati, pudori, moribus bonis, si parum sequitur, coactam applicant.

To young men too, now masters of themselves, if they reject remedies through fear or intemperance, force and severity are applied. And so the greatest of benefits are those which we receive from our parents while we either do not know or do not wish.

Adulescentibus quoque ac iam potentibus sui, si remedia metu aut intemperantia reiciunt, vis adhibetur ac severitas. Itaque beneficiorum maxima sunt, quae a parentibus accepimus, dum aut nescimus aut nolumus.

To these ungrateful men, who repudiate benefits not because they are unwilling, but lest they owe, those on the other side are like — the too grateful, who are wont to pray for some inconvenience for those to whom they are bound, some adversity, in which they may prove the feeling mindful of a benefit received.

His ingratis et repudiantibus beneficia, non quia nolunt, sed ne debeant, similes sunt ex diverso nimis grati, qui aliquid incommodi precari solent iis, quibus obligati sunt, aliquid adversi, in quo adfectum memorem accepti beneficii approbent.

Whether they do this rightly and with dutiful will is asked; whose mind is most like those burning with a depraved love, who wish their mistress exile, that they may accompany her deserted and fleeing; wish her poverty, that they may give to one who longs the more; wish her sickness, that they may sit by her; and whatever an enemy would wish, they, the lovers, vow. And so the outcome of hatred and of insane love is nearly the same.

An hoc recte faciant et pia voluntate, quaeritur; quorum animus simillimus est pravo amore flagrantibus, qui amicae suae optant exilium, ut desertam fugientemque comitentur, optant inopiam, ut magis desiderant donent, optant morbum, ut adsideant, et, quidquid inimicus optaret, amantes vovent. Fere idem itaque exitus est odii et amoris insani.

Something of this kind happens to these too, who wish their friends inconveniences which they may remove, and come to a benefit through an injury, when it were better even to do nothing than to seek a place for a service through a crime.

Tale quiddam et his accidit, qui amicis incommoda optant, quae detrahant, et ad beneficium iniuria veniunt, cum satius sit vel cessare, quam per scelus officio locum quaerere.

What if a helmsman should ask of the gods the most hostile tempests and storms, that his art might become more welcome by the danger? What if a general should pray the gods that a great force of enemies poured round the camp might fill the trenches by a sudden assault and tear up the rampart, the army trembling, and plant hostile standards in the very gates, that with the greater glory he might succor things wearied and beaten down?

Quid, si gubernator a dis tempestates infestissimas et procellas petat, ut gratior ars sua periculo fiat? Quid, si imperator deos oret, ut magna vis hostium circumfusa castris fossas subito impetu compleat et vallum trepidante exercitu vellat et in ipsis portis infesta signa constituat, quo maiore cum gloria rebus lassis profligatisque succurrat?

All these lead their benefits by a detestable road, who call the gods against the man whom they themselves are going to aid, and wish him laid low before he is raised up. Inhuman is this nature of a perversely grateful mind — to wish against the man whom you cannot honorably fail.

Omnes isti beneficia sua detestabili via ducunt, qui deos contra eum advocant, cui ipsi adfuturi sunt, et ante illos sterni quam erigi volunt. Inhumana ista perverse grati animi natura est contra eum optare, cui honeste deesse non possis.

"My vow does not harm him," he says, "because I wish at once both the danger and the remedy." This is to say that you sin not nothing at all, but less than if you wished the danger without the remedy. It is wickedness to plunge a man that you may draw him out, to overturn that you may set up, to shut in that you may let out. It is no benefit to end an injury, nor was it ever a merit to have taken away what he who took it away had himself brought on.

" Non nocet," inquit, " illi votum meum, quia simul opto et periculum et remedium." Hoc dicis non nihil te peccare sed minus, quam si sine remedio periculum optares. Nequitia est ut extrahas mergere, evertere ut suscites, ut emittas includere. Non est beneficium iniuriae finis, nec umquam id detraxisse meritum est, quod ipse, qui detraxit, intulerat.

Do not wound me rather than heal me. You can win favor if, because I have been wounded, you heal — not if you wound, that I may need healing. Never has a scar pleased except in comparison with the wound, which we so rejoice has closed that we would rather it had not been. If you wished this for one of whose benefit you had none, the vow was inhuman; how much more inhumanly do you wish it for one to whom you owe a benefit!

Non vulneres me malo quam sanes. Potes inire gratiam, si, quia vulneratus sum, sanas, non, si vulneras, ut sanandus sim. Numquam cicatrix nisi conlata vulneri placuit, quod ita coisse gaudemus, ut non fuisse mallemus. Si hoc ei optares, cuius nullum beneficium haberes, inhumanum erat votum; quanto inhumanius ei optas, cui beneficium debes!

"At the same time," he says, "I pray that I may be able to bring him aid." First, that I may catch you in the middle of your vow, you are already ungrateful; I do not yet hear what you wish to furnish him, I know what you wish him to suffer. You imprecate on him anxiety and fear and some greater evil. You wish that he may need aid: this is against him; you wish that he may need your aid: this is for you. You do not wish to succor him, but to discharge your debt: he who so hastens, wishes to be discharged, not to discharge.

Simul," inquit, " ut possim ferre illi opem, precor." Primum, ut te in media parte voti tui occupem, iam ingratus es; nondum audio, quid illi velis praestare, scio, quid illum velis pati. Sollicitudinem illi et metum et maius aliquod imprecaris malum. Optas, ut ope indigeat: hoc contra illum est; optas, ut ope tua indigeat: hoc pro te est. Non succurrere vis illi, sed solvere: qui sic properat, solvi vult, non solvere.

So, what alone in your vow could seem honorable, this very thing is base and ungrateful — the unwillingness to owe; for you wish, not that you may have the means of returning the favor, but that he may have the necessity of imploring it. You make yourself the superior and, what is impious, you send your benefactor to your feet. How much better to owe with an honorable will than to settle the account by an evil means!

Ita, quod unum in voto tuo honestum videri poterat, ipsum turpe et ingratum est, nolle debere; optas enim, non ut tu facultatem habeas referendae gratiae, sed ut ille necessitatem implorandae. Superiorem te facis et, quod nefas est, bene meritum ad pedes tuos mittis. Quanto satius est honesta voluntate debere, quam rationem per malam solvere!

If you denied what you had received, you would sin less; for he would lose nothing except what he had given. Now you wish him to be subjected to you, by the loss of his goods and the change of his state to be brought down to this — that he may lie beneath his own benefits. Shall I think you grateful? Wish it in the presence of the man you wish to profit! Do you call that a vow which can be divided between the grateful and the enemy, which you would not doubt an adversary and a foe had made, if the last words were left unsaid?

Si infitiareris, quod acceperas, minus peccares; nihil enim, nisi quod dederat, amitteret. Nunc vis illum subici tibi, iactura rerum suarum et status mutatione in id devocari, ut infra beneficia sua iaceat. Gratum te putabo? Coram eo, cui prodesse vis, opta! Votum tu istud vocas, quod inter gratum et inimicum potest dividi, quod non dubites adversarium et hostem fecisse, si extrema taceantur?

Enemies too have wished to capture certain cities, that they might preserve them, and to conquer certain men, that they might pardon them; yet they are not for that reason not hostile vows, in which the mildest thing comes after the cruelty.

Hostes quoque optaverunt capere quasdam urbes, ut servarent, et vincere quosdam, ut ignoscerent, nec ideo non hostilia vota, in quibus, quod mitissimum est, post crudelitatem venit.

In short, what sort of vows do you judge those to be which no one will wish to succeed for you less than the man for whom they are made? You deal worst with the man whom you wish to be harmed by the gods, succored by you; unfairly with the gods themselves; for you impose on them the hardest parts, on yourself the human ones; that you may profit, the gods will harm.

Denique qualia esse iudicas vota, quae nemo minus tibi volet, quam is, pro quo fiunt, succedere? Pessime cum eo agis, cui vis a dis noceri, a te succurri, inique cum ipsis dis; illis enim durissimas partes imponis, tibi humanas; ut tu prosis, di nocebunt.

If you suborned an accuser whom you would then remove, if you entangled him in some lawsuit which you would presently dispel, no one would doubt of your crime. What difference is there whether this is attempted by fraud or by vow, except that you seek more powerful adversaries against him? There is no reason for you to say: "For what injury do I do him?"

Si accusatorem submitteres, quem deinde removeres, si aliqua illum lite implicares, quam subinde discuteres, nemo de tuo scelere dubitaret. Quid interest, utrum istuc fraude temptetur an voto, nisi quod potentiores illi adversarios quaeris? Non est, quod dicas: " Quam enim illi iniuriam facio?

Your vow is either superfluous or injurious — nay, injurious, even if void. Whatever you do not effect is the gift of the god; the injury, however, is whatever you wish. It is enough; we ought to be angry at you no otherwise than if you had succeeded.

" Votum tuum aut supervacuum est aut iniuriosum, immo iniuriosum, etiam si irritum. Quidquid non efficis, dei munus est, iniuria vero, quidquid optas. Sat est; tibi non aliter debemus irasci, quam si profeceris.

"If vows," he says, "had availed, they would have availed for this too — that you should be safe." First, you wish me a certain danger under an uncertain aid. Then suppose both certain: what harms comes first.

" Si vota," inquit, " valuissent, et in hoc valuissent, ut tutus esses." Primum certum mihi optas periculum sub incerto auxilio. Deinde utrumque certum puta: quod nocet, prius est.

Besides, you know the condition of your vow; a tempest has caught me, doubtful of harbor and of refuge. How great a torment do you think it is, even if I shall receive aid, to have been in need? Even if I shall be saved, to have trembled? Even if I shall be acquitted, to have pleaded my cause? No end of any fear is so welcome as not to make a solid and unshaken security more welcome.

Praeterea tu condicionem voti tui nosti, me tempestas occupavit portus ac praesidii dubium. Quantum tormentum existimas, etiam si accepero, eguisse? Etiam si servatus fuero, trepidasse? Etiam si absolutus fuero, causam dixisse? Nullius metus tam gratus est finis, ut non gratior sit solida et inconcussa securitas.

Pray that you may be able to return me a benefit when there is need, not that there be need. If what you pray for were in your power, you would have done it yourself.

Opta, ut reddere mihi beneficium possis, cum opus erit, non, ut opus sit. Si esset in tua potestate, quod optas, ipse fecisses.

How much more honorable is this vow: "I pray he may be in that state in which he always distributes benefits, never needs them; let there follow him the material which he uses so kindly, of lavishing and helping; let him never have want of benefits to give, nor repentance of those given; let a crowd of grateful men rouse and provoke his nature, of itself inclined to compassion, humanity, mercy — whom may it fall to him to have, and not be necessary to put to the test; let him be implacable to none, let no one need to be placated by him; let fortune persevere toward him with such even indulgence that no one can be grateful to him except by conscience."

Quanto hoc honestius votum est: " Opto, in eo statu sit, quo semper beneficia distribuat, numquam desideret; sequatur illum materia, qua tam benigne utitur, largiendi iuvandique; numquam illi sit dandorum beneficiorum inopia, datorum paenitentia; naturam per se pronam ad misericordiam, humanitatem, clementiam irritet ac provocet turba gratorum, quos illi et habere contingat nec experiri necesse sit; ipse nulli implacabilis sit, ipsi nemo placandus; tam aequali in eum fortuna indulgentia perseveret, ut nemo in illum possit esse nisi conscientia gratus."

How much juster are these vows, which put you off to no occasion, but make you grateful at once! For what forbids returning the favor in prosperity? How many things there are, through which, whatever we owe, we can repay even to the fortunate! Faithful counsel, constant company, talk affable and pleasant without flattery, ears diligent if he would deliberate, safe if he would confide, the intimacy of shared living. Prosperity has set no one so high that a friend is not the more lacking to him, because nothing is lacking.

Quanto haec iustiora vota sunt, quae te in nullam occasionem differunt, sed gratum statim faciunt! Quid enim prohibet referre gratiam prosperis rebus? Quam multa sunt, per quae, quidquid debemus, reddere etiam felicibus possumus! Fidele consilium, adsidua conversatio, sermo comis et sine adulatione iucundus, aures, si deliberari velit, diligentes, tutae, si credere, convictus familiaritas. Neminem tam alte secunda posuerunt, ut non illi eo magis amicus desit, quia nihil absit.

That sad occasion is to be removed from every vow and driven far off. To be able to be grateful, do you need the gods to be angry? Do you not understand that you sin even in this — that it goes better with the man to whom you are ungrateful? Set before your mind prison, chains, squalor, slavery, war, want: these are the occasions of your vow. If anyone has dealt with you, he is set free through these!

Ista tristis et omni voto submovenda occasio ac procul repellenda. Ut gratus esse possis, iratis dis opus est? Ne ex hoc quidem peccare te intellegis, quod melius cum eo agitur, cui ingratus es? Propone animo tuo carcerem, vincula, sordes, servitutem, bellum, egestatem; haec sunt occasiones voti tui. Si quis tecum contraxit, per ista dimittitur!

Why do you not rather wish him powerful, to whom you owe most, and blessed? For what, as I said, forbids you to return the favor even to those endowed with the highest felicity? A full and varied material for it will meet you. What? Do you not know that a debt is paid even to the rich?

Quin potius eum potentem esse vis, cui plurimum debes, et1 beatum? Quid enim, ut dixi, vetat te referre etiam summa felicitate praeditis gratiam? Cuius plena tibi occurret et varia materia. Quid? tu nescis debitum etiam locupletibus solvi?

Nor shall I tie you down unwilling. Suppose opulent felicity has shut out everything; I shall show you what thing great heights labor in want of, what is lacking to those who possess all: namely, one who will speak the truth and rescue a man stupefied among liars, and led by the very habit of hearing flatteries instead of right things into ignorance of the truth, from the consent and chorus of falsehoods.

Nec te invitum distringam. Omnia sane excluserit opulenta felicitas, monstrabo tibi, cuius rei inopia laborent magna fastigia, quid omnia possidentibus desit: scilicet ille, qui verum dicat et hominem inter mentientes stupentem ipsaque consuetudine pro rectis blanda audiendi ad ignorantiam veri perductum vindicet a consensu concentuque falsorum.

Do you not see how extinguished liberty and faith lowered to servile compliance drive them headlong?

Non vides, quemadmodum illos in praeceps agat extincta libertas et fides in obsequium servile submissa?

While no one advises or dissuades from the judgment of his own mind, but it is a contest of flattering and the one duty of all friends, one struggle, who shall deceive most charmingly — they have not known their own strength, and, while they believe themselves as great as they hear, they have drawn on superfluous wars destined to bring all things to a crisis, have broken a useful and necessary concord, and, following an anger no one recalled, have drained the blood of many, at last to shed their own;

Dum nemo ex animi sui sententia suadet dissuadetque, sed adulandi certamen est et unum amicorum omnium officium, una contentio, quis blandissime fallat, ignoravere vires suas, et, dum se tam magnos, quam audiunt, credunt, attraxere supervacua et in discrimen rerum omnium perventura bella, utilem et necessariam rupere concordiam, secuti iram, quam nemo revocabat, multorum sanguinem hauserunt fusuri novissime suum;

while they vindicate unexplored things as certain, and think it no less base to be bent than to be conquered, and believe perpetual those things which, brought to the summit, most totter, they have shattered vast kingdoms above themselves and their own; nor have they understood that on that stage, gleaming with vain and quickly-dissolving goods, they themselves should have expected every adversity from the time when they could hear nothing true.

dum vindicant inexplorata pro certis flectique non minus existimant turpe quam vinci et perpetua credunt, quae in summum perducta maxime nutant, ingentia super se ac suos regna fregerunt; nec intellexerunt in illa scena vanis et cito diffluentibus bonis refulgente ex eo tempore ipsos nihil non adversi expectare debuisse, ex quo nihil veri audire potuerunt.

When Xerxes declared war on Greece, no one failed to urge on his swelling mind, forgetful of how perishable were the things it trusted in. One said the Greeks would not bear the message of war and would turn their backs at the first rumor of his coming;

Cum bellum Graeciae indiceret Xerxes, animum tumentem oblitumque, quam caducis confideret, nemo non impulit. Alius aiebat non laturos nuntium belli et ad primam adventus famam terga versuros;

another, that there was no doubt that Greece could not only be conquered by that mass, but overwhelmed; that there was more to fear, lest they should find the cities empty and deserted and, the enemy fled, vast solitudes be left, with nowhere to exercise such great forces;

alius nihil esse dubii, quin illa mole non vinci solum Graecia, sed obrui posset; magis verendum, ne vacuas desertasque urbes invenirent et profugis hostibus vastae solitudines relinquerentur non habituris, ubi tantas vires exercere possent;

another, that the nature of things scarcely sufficed him, that the seas were narrow for his fleets, the camps for his soldiers, the plains for deploying his cavalry, that the sky scarcely lay open enough for hurling weapons with his whole host.

alius vix illi rerum naturam sufficere, angusta esse classibus maria, militi castra, explicandis equestribus copiis campestria, vix patere caelum satis ad emittenda omni manu tela.

When many such things were tossed about on every side, to inflame a man raging with too high an estimate of himself, Demaratus the Lacedaemonian alone said that the very multitude in which he pleased himself was disorderly and unwieldy, to be feared by its own leader; for it had not strength, but weight; that things immoderate can never be ruled, nor does anything last long that cannot be ruled.

Cum in hunc modum multa undique iactarentur, quae hominem nimia aestimatione sui furentem concitarent, Demaratus Lacedaemonius solus dixit ipsam illam, qua sibi placeret, multitudinem indigestam et gravem metuendam esse ducenti; non enim vires habere, sed pondus; immodica numquam regi posse, nec diu durare, quidquid regi non potest. "

"On the very first mountain," he said, "the Spartans set against you will at once give proof of themselves. Those so many thousands of nations three hundred will hold up; they will cling fixed in their tracks and guard with arms the narrows entrusted to them, will block them with their bodies; all Asia will not move them from their place; these very few will stay so great threats of war and the onset of well-nigh the whole human race rushing on.

"In primo," inquit, " statim monte Lacones obiecti dabunt sui experimentum. Tot ista gentium milia trecenti morabuntur; haerebunt in vestigio fixi et commissas sibi angustias armis tuebuntur, corporibus obstruent; tota illos Asia non movebit loco; tantas minas belli et paene totius generis humani ruentis impetum paucissimi sistent.

When nature, her own laws changed, has carried you across, you will stick in the path, and, reckoning the losses to come, when you have computed at what price the narrows of Thermopylae have cost you, you will know that you can be put to flight, since you know you can be held.

Cum te mutatis legibus suis natura transmiserit, in semita haerebis et aestimans futura damna, cum computaveris, quanti Thermopylarum angusta constiterint; scies te fugari posse, cum sciens posse retineri.

They will yield to you indeed in many places, like a torrent swept away, whose first force flows off with great terror; then here and there they will rise up and press you with your own strength.

Cedent quidem tibi pluribus locis velut torrentis modo ablati, cuius cum magno terrore prima vis defluit; deinde hinc atque illinc coorientur et tuis te viribus prement.

It is true, what is said, that the apparatus of war is greater than can be received by those regions which you resolve to attack; but this thing is against us. For this very reason Greece will conquer you, because it does not hold you; you cannot use the whole of yourself.

Verum est, quod dicitur, maiorem belli apparatum esse, quam qui recipi ab his regionibus possit, quas oppugnare constituis, sed haec res contra nos est. Ob hoc ipsum te Graecia vincet, quia non capit; uti toto te non potes.

Besides, that one safety in affairs — to meet the first onsets of things and bring aid to the failing — you will not be able, nor to prop and steady what is sliding; you will be conquered long before you feel that you have been conquered.

Praeterea, quae una rebus salus est, occurrere ad primos rerum impetus et inclinatis opem ferre non poteris nec fulcire ac firmare labentia; multo ante vincens, quam victum esse te sentias.

For the rest, there is no reason to think your army cannot be withstood because its number is unknown even to its leader; nothing is so great that it cannot perish; for that which is born to its own destruction has, though all else rest, in its very greatness a cause."

Ceterum non est, quod exercitum tuum ob hoc sustineri non putes posse, quia numerus eius duci quoque ignotus est; nihil tam magnum est, quod perire non possit, cui nascitur in perniciem, ut alia quiescant, ex ipsa magnitudine sua causa."

What Demaratus foretold came to pass. Three hundred bade him stand still who was driving and changing things divine and human, whatever had stood in his way, and the Persian, laid low far and wide through all Greece, understood how much a mob differs from an army. And so Xerxes, more wretched from shame than from loss, gave thanks to Demaratus, because he alone had told him the truth, and permitted him to ask what he wished.

Acciderunt, quae Demaratus praedixerat. Divina atque humana impellentem et mutantem, quidquid obstiterat, trecenti stare iusserunt, stratusque passim per totam Graeciam Perses intellexit, quantum ab exercitu turba distaret. Itaque Xerxes pudore quam damno miserior Demarato gratias egit, quod solus sibi verum dixisset, et permisit petere, quod vellet.

He asked to enter Sardis, the greatest city of Asia, carried on a chariot, wearing the tiara upright on his head; that was granted to kings only. He had been worthy of the reward before he asked; but how pitiable a nation, in which there was no one to tell the king the truth, except one who did not tell it to himself!

Petit ille, ut Sardis, maximam Asiae civitatem, curru vectus intraret rectam capite tiaram gerens; id solis datum regibus. Dignus fuerat praemio, ante quam peteret; sed quam miserabilis gens, in qua nemo fuit, qui verum diceret regi, nisi qui non dicebat sibi!

The deified Augustus relegated his daughter, unchaste beyond the reproach of unchastity, and made public the disgraces of the imperial house: that adulterers were admitted in droves, that the city was roamed in nocturnal revels, that the very forum and the Rostra, from which her father had passed the law on adulteries, had pleased the daughter for her debaucheries, that there was a daily concourse at the statue of Marsyas, since, turned from adulteress into a prostitute, she sought the right of every license under an unknown paramour.

Divus Augustus filiam ultra impudicitiae maledictum impudicam relegavit et flagitia principalis domus in publicum emisit: admissos gregatim adulteros, pererratam nocturnis comissationibus civitatem, forum ipsum ac rostra, ex quibus pater legem de adulteriis tulerat, filiae in stupra placuisse, cotidianum ad Marsyam concursum, cum ex adultera in quaestuariam versa ius omnis licentiae sub ignoto adultero peteret.

These things, as much to be punished by a prince as to be kept silent — because the baseness of certain matters recoils even on the one who punishes — too little master of his anger, he had made public. Then, when, time intervening, shame had come in place of anger, groaning that he had not pressed those things in silence which he had so long not known, until it was base to speak of them, he often cried out: "None of these things would have happened to me, if either Agrippa or Maecenas had lived!" So hard it is, for one having so many thousands of men, to replace two.

Haec tam vindicanda principi quam tacenda, quia quarundam rerum turpitudo etiam ad vindicantem redit, parum potens irae publicaverat. Deinde, cum interposito tempore in locum irae subisset verecundia, gemens, quod non illa silentio pressisset, quae tam diu nescierat, donec loqui turpe esset, saepe exclamavit: " Horum mihi nihil accidisset, si aut Agrippa aut Maecenas vixisset! " Adeo tot habenti milia hominum duos reparare difficile est.

Legions were cut down and at once enrolled anew; a fleet was wrecked and within a few days a new one floated; public works were ravaged by fires, better ones rose from the consumed. The place of Agrippa and Maecenas stood empty his whole life. What? Should I think that like men were lacking, to be taken up, or that it was his own fault, because he preferred to complain rather than to seek?

Caesae sunt legiones et protinus scriptae; fracta classis et intra paucos dies natavit nova; saevitum est in opera publica ignibus, surrexerunt meliora consumptis. Tota vita Agrippae et Maecenatis vacavit locus. Quid? Putem defuisse similes, qui adsumerentur, an ipsius vitium fuisse, quia maluit queri quam quaerere?

There is no reason to think that Agrippa and Maecenas were wont to tell him the truth; who, had they lived, would have been among the dissemblers. It is the way of a royal temper to praise what is lost, in reproach of the present, and to give to those the virtue of truth-telling from whom there is now no danger of hearing it.

Non est, quod existimemus Agrippam et Maecenatem solitos illi vera dicere; qui si vixissent, inter dissimulantes fuissent. Regalis ingenii mos est in praesentium contumeliam amissa laudare et his virtutem dare vera dicendi, a quibus iam audiendi periculum non est.

But, to bring myself back to my proposal, you see how easy it is to return the favor to the fortunate and those set at the summit of human resources. Tell them, not what they wish to hear, but what they will always wish to have heard; let a true voice sometimes enter ears full of flatteries; give useful counsel. Do you ask what you can furnish to the fortunate?

Sed ut me ad propositum reducam, vides, quam facile sit gratiam referre felicibus et in summo humanarum opum positis. Dic illis, non quod volunt audire, sed quod audisse semper volent; plenas aures adulationibus aliquando vera vox intret; da consilium utile. Quaeris, quid felici praestare possis?

Bring it about that he not trust his felicity, that he know it must be held by many and faithful hands. You will have conferred not a little on him, if you have shaken out of him the foolish confidence in a power that will abide always, and have taught that the things chance has given are mobile and flee with a greater course than they come, and that there is no going back by the same stages by which the summit was reached, but that often between the greatest fortune and the last there is no difference.

Effice, ne felicitati suae credat, ut sciat illam multis et fidis manibus continendam. Parum in illum contuleris, si illi stultam fiduciam permansurae semper potentiae excusseris docuerisque mobilia esse, quae dedit casus, et maiore cursu fugere, quam veniunt, nec iis portionibus, quibus ad summa perventum est, retro iri, sed saepe inter maximam fortunam et ultimam nihil interesse?

You do not know how great is the price of friendship, if you do not understand that you will give much to him to whom you have given a friend — a thing rare not only to houses, but to ages, which is nowhere more lacking than where it is believed to abound. What?

Nescis, quantum sit pretium amicitiae, si non intellegis multum te ei daturum, cui dederis amicum, rem non domibus tantum, sed saeculis raram, quae non aliubi magis deest, quam ubi creditur abundare. Quid?

Do those registers, which the memory or the hand of the nomenclators scarcely embraces, do you think these are of friends? They are not friends, those who in a great column knock at the door, who are sorted into first and second admissions.

Istos tu libros, quos vix nomenclatorum complectitur aut memoria aut manus, amicorum existimas esse? Non sunt isti amici, qui agmine magno ianuam pulsant, qui in primas et secundas admissiones digeruntur.

That is an old custom, for kings and those who play at kings to marshal a populace of friends, and it is proper to pride to set a high value on the entrance and the touching of one’s threshold, and to give it for an honor, that you sit nearer his door, that you set your foot first within the house, in which there are then many doors, that shut out even those received.

Consuetudo ista vetus est regibus regesque simulantibus populum amicorum discribere, et proprium superbiae magno aestimare introitum ac tactum sui liminis et pro honore dare, ut ostio suo propius adsideas, ut gradum prior intra domum ponas, in qua deinceps multa sunt ostia, quae receptos quoque excludant.

Among us, first of all, Gaius Gracchus, and soon Livius Drusus, instituted to segregate their crowd and to receive some into private, some with the many, some all together. And so these men had first friends, had second, never true ones.

Apud nos primi omnium C. Gracchus et mox Livius Drusus instituerunt segregare turbam suam et alios in secretum recipere, alios cum pluribus, alios universos. Habuerunt itaque isti amicos primos, habuerunt secundos, numquam veros.

Do you call a man a friend whose greeting is arranged in order? Or can the faith of one lie open to you who does not enter through a grudgingly opened door, but slips in? To whom is it permitted to come all the way to drawn-out frankness, whose common and public word, shared even with strangers — "Hail!" — is uttered only in his order?

Amicum vocas, cuius disponitur salutatio? Aut potest huius tibi fides patere, qui per fores maligne apertas non intrat, sed illabitur? Huic pervenire usque ad libertatem destringendam licet, cuius vulgare et publicum verbum et promiscuum ignotis " Have! " non nisi suo ordine emittitur?

To whichever of these men, then, you come, whose greeting shakes the city, know — even if you have noticed the streets beset by a vast throng and the ways pressed by bands going both directions — that you nevertheless come into a place full of men, empty of friends.

Ad quemcumque itaque istorum veneris, quorum salutatio urbem concutit, scito, etiam si animadverteris obsessos ingenti frequentia vicos et commeantium in utramque partem catervis itinera compressa, tamen venire te in locum hominibus plenum, amicis vacuum.

A friend is sought in the breast, not in the hall; there he is to be received, there held, and stored in the senses. Teach this: you are grateful.

In pectore amicus, non in atrio quaeritur; illo recipiendus, illic retinendus est et in sensus recondendus. Hoc doce: gratus es.

You think ill of yourself, if you are useless except to the afflicted, if you are superfluous in good times. As you bear yourself wisely both in doubtful and in adverse and in glad things — so that you handle the doubtful prudently, the adverse bravely, the glad with moderation — so you can show yourself useful to a friend in all things. His adversities you should neither desert nor wish for; many things none the less, though you not wish them, will fall out in so great a variety, to give you material for exercising your faith.

Male de te existimas, si inutilis es nisi adflicto, si rebus bonis supervacuus es. Quemadmodum te et in dubiis et in adversis et in laetis sapienter geris, ut dubia prudenter tractes, adversa fortiter, laeta moderate, ita in omnia utilem te exhibere amico potes. Adversa eius nec deserueris nec optaveris; multa nihilo minus, ut non optes, in tanta varietate, quae tibi materiam exercendae fidei praebeant, incident.

As he who wishes riches for someone to this end, that he himself may bear a part of them, although he seems to wish for the other, takes thought for himself; so he who wishes a friend some necessity, which by his own aid and faith he may dispel — which is the mark of an ingrate — prefers himself to the other and reckons it worth so much for that man to be wretched, that he himself may be grateful; for this very reason ungrateful; for he wishes to unburden himself and be freed of a heavy load.

Quemadmodum, qui optat divitias alicui in hoc, ut illarum ipse partem ferat, quamvis pro illo videatur optare, sibi prospicit, sic, qui optat amico aliquam necessitatem, quam adiutorio suo fideque discutiat, quod est ingrati, se illi praefert et tanti existimat illum miserum esse, ut ipse gratus sit, ob hoc ipsum ingratus; exonerare enim se vult et gravi sarcina liberare.

There is much difference whether you hasten to return the favor, to repay the benefit, or not to owe it. He who wishes to repay will adapt himself to the other’s convenience and wish a fit time to come for him; he who wishes nothing else than to be himself set free, will desire to reach this by whatever means — which is the mark of the worst will.

Multum interest, utrum properes referre gratiam, ut reddas beneficium, an ne debeas. Qui reddere vult, illius se commodo aptabit et idoneum illi venire tempus volet; qui nihil aliud quam ipse liberari vult, quomodocumque ad hoc cupiet pervenire, quod est pessimae voluntatis.

"That," he says, "is the haste of one too grateful!" I cannot express it more openly than if I repeat what I said. You do not wish to repay the benefit received, but to escape it. You seem to say this: "When shall I be rid of this? By whatever means I must labor, that I be not bound to this man." If you wished to pay him from your own, you would seem far from grateful. This which you wish is more unfair; for you curse him and fasten a curse on his sacred head with a dire imprecation.

" Ista," inquit, " festinatio nimium grati est! " Id apertius exprimere non possum, quam si repetivero, quod dixi. Non vis reddere acceptum beneficium, sed effugere. Hoc dicere videris: " Quando isto carebo? Quocumque modo mihi laborandum est, ne isti obligatus sim." Si optares, ut illi de suo solveres, multum abesse videreris a grato. Hoc, quod optas, iniquius est; exsecraris enim illum et caput sanctum tibi dira precatione defigis.

No one, I think, would doubt of the savagery of your mind, if you openly imprecated on him poverty, captivity, hunger, and fear; but what difference is there whether this voice is your vow or your violence? For you wish some one of these. Go now and think this to be the mark of one grateful, which not even an ingrate would do, provided he came not all the way to hatred, but only to the denial of the benefit!

Nemo, ut existimo, de immanitate animi tui dubitaret, si aperte illi paupertatem, si captivitatem, si famem ac metum imprecareris; at quid interest, utrum vox ista sit voti tui an vis? Aliquid enim horum optas. I nunc et hoc esse grati puta, quod ne ingratus quidem faceret, qui modo non usque in odium, sed tantum usque ad infitiationem beneficii perveniret!

Who will call Aeneas dutiful, if he wished his country captured, that he might snatch his father from captivity? Who will point out the Sicilian youths as good examples to children, if they wished that Aetna, blazing above its wont, should hurl an immense force of fires, kindled, to give them the occasion of showing their dutifulness by snatching their parents from the midst of the conflagration?

Quis pium dicet Aenean, si patriam capi voluerit, ut captivitati patrem eripiat? Quis Siculos iuvenes ut bona liberis exempla monstrabit, si optaverint, ut Aetna immensam ignium vim super solitum ardens et incensa praecipitet datura ipsis occasionem exhibendae pietatis ex medio parentibus incendio raptis?

Rome owes nothing to Scipio, if he fed the Punic War in order to end it; nothing to the Decii, that they saved their country by death, if they had first wished that the last necessity of things should make a place for their most valiant self-devotion. It is the gravest infamy for a doctor to seek work; many, the diseases they had increased and inflamed, that they might heal them with greater glory, they could not dispel, or conquered them with great suffering of the wretched.

Nihil debet Scipioni Roma, si Punicum bellum, ut finiret, aluit; nihil Deciis, quod morte patriam servaverunt, si prius optaverant, ut devotioni fortissimae locum ultima rerum necessitas faceret. Gravissima infamia est medici opus quaerere; multi, quos auxerant morbos et irritaverant, ut gloria maiore sanarent, non potuerunt discutere aut cum magna miserorum vexatione vicerunt.

They say that Callistratus (so at least Hecaton is the authority), when he was going into the exile into which a seditious and intemperately free state had driven many along with him, when someone wished that the Athenians might have a necessity of restoring the exiles, abominated such a return.

Callistratum aiunt (ita certe Hecaton auctor est), cum in exilium iret, in quod multos cum illo simul seditiosa civitas et intemperanter libera expulerat, optante quodam, ut Atheniensibus necessitas restituendi exules esset, abominatum talem reditum.

Our Rutilius more spiritedly, when someone consoled him and said that civil war was at hand, that soon all the exiles would return: "What evil," he said, "have I done you, that you wish me a worse return than my going out? I would rather my country blush at my exile than mourn at my return!" That is no exile of which everyone is more ashamed than the man condemned.

Rutilius noster animosius, cum quidam illum consolaretur et diceret instare arma civilia, brevi futurum, ut omnes exules reverterentur: " Quid tibi," inquit, " mali feci, ut mihi peiorem reditum quam exitum optares? Ut malo, patria exilio meo erubescat, quam reditu maereat! " Non est istud exilium, cuius neminem non magis quam damnatum pudet.

As those preserved the duty of good citizens, who were unwilling that their household gods be given back to them by a common disaster, because it was better that two be afflicted with an unfair evil than all with a public one, so he does not preserve the feeling of a grateful man, who wishes one who has deserved well of him to be oppressed by difficulties which he himself may remove, because, even if he means well, he prays ill. It is not even a defense, far less a glory, to have put out a fire which you yourself made.

Quemadmodum illi servaverunt bonorum civium officium, qui reddi sibi penates suos noluerunt clade communi, quia satius erat duos iniquo malo adfici quam omnes publico, ita non servat grati hominis adfectum, qui bene de se merentem difficultatibus vult opprimi, quas ipse submoveat, quia, etiam si bene cogitat, male precatur. Ne in patrocinium quidem, nedum in gloriam est incendium extinxisse, quod feceris.

In certain states an impious vow has held the place of a crime. Demades at Athens, at least, condemned a man who sold the necessaries for funerals, when he had proved that he had wished for great gain, which could not befall him without the death of many. Yet it is wont to be asked whether he was justly condemned. Perhaps he wished, not to sell to many, but dearly — that what he was going to sell should stand him at a low price.

In quibusdam civitatibus impium votum sceleris vicem tenuit. Demades certe Athenis eum, qui necessaria funeribus venditabat, damnavit, cum probasset magnum lucrum optasse, quod contingere illi sine multorum morte non poterat. Quaeri tamen solet, an merito damnatus sit. Fortasse optavit, non ut multis venderet, sed ut care, ut parvo sibi constarent, quae venditurus esset.

Since his business consists of buying and selling, why do you drag his vow to one side, when the gain is from both? Besides, you may condemn all who are in that business; for all wish the same, that is, within themselves they pray for it. You will condemn a great part of mankind; for who has not gain from another’s inconvenience?

Cum constet negotiatio eius ex empto et vendito, quare votum eius in unam partem trahis, cum lucrum ex utraque sit? Praeterea omnes licet, qui in ista negotiatione sunt, damnes; omnes enim idem volunt, id est, intra se optant. Magnam partem hominum damnabis; cui enim non ex alieno incommodo lucrum?

The soldier wishes for war, if for glory; the dearness of the grain-supply raises up the farmer; the number of lawsuits stirs up the price of eloquence; a heavy year is in the doctors’ gain; the corrupted youth enriches the dealers in dainty wares; let no roofs be harmed by tempest, by no fire: the smith’s work will lie idle. One man’s vow was caught; it is like all men’s.

Miles bellum optat, si gloriam; agricolam annonae caritas erigit; eloquentiae pretium excitat litium numerus; medicis gravis annus in quaestu est; institores delicatarum mercium iuventus corrupta locupletat; nulla tempestate tecta, nullo igne laedantur: iacebit opera fabrilis. Unius votum deprensum est, omnium simile est.

Or do you not think that Arruntius and Haterius and the others who have professed the art of catching legacies have the same vows as the undertakers and funeral-men? Yet these do not know whose deaths they wish; those desire that each closest friend, from whom there is most of hope through friendship, should die. No one lives by the others’ loss; these, whoever delays, drains them; they wish, therefore, not only to receive what they have earned by base servitude, but also to be freed of a heavy tribute.

An tu Arruntium et Haterium et ceteros, qui captandorum testamentorum artem professi sunt, non putas eadem habere quae dissignatores et libitinarios vota? Illi tamen, quorum mortes optent, nesciunt, hi familiarissimum quemque, ex quo propter amicitiam spei plurimum est, mori cupiunt. Illorum damno nemo vivit, hos, quisquis differt, exhaurit; optant ergo non tantum, ut accipiant, quod turpi servitute meruerunt, sed etiam, ut tributo gravi liberentur.

There is no doubt, then, that these wish more for what was condemned in the one man, to whom anyone about to profit them by his death harms by his life. Yet the vows of all these are as well known as they are unpunished. In short, let each consult himself and return into the secret of his breast and look at what he has silently wished. How many vows there are, which it shames one to confess even to oneself! How few, which we could make in the presence of a witness!

Non est itaque dubium, quin hi magis, quod damnatum est in uno, optent, quibus, quisquis morte profuturus est, vita nocet. Omnium tamen istorum tam nota sunt vota quam impunita. Denique se quisque consulat et in secretum pectoris sui redeat et inspiciat, quid tacitus optaverit. Quam multa sunt vota, quae etiam sibi fateri pudet! Quam pauca, quae facere coram teste possimus!

But not everything to be reprehended is also to be condemned, like this vow of a friend, which is in hand, ill-using his good will and falling into the very vice he avoids; for while he hastens to show a grateful mind, he is ungrateful. He says this:

Sed non, quidquid reprehendendum, etiam damnandum est, sicut hoc votum amici, quod in manibus est, male utentis bona voluntate et in id vitium incidentis, quod devitat; nam dum gratum animum festinat ostendere, ingratus est. Hoc ait:

"Let him fall back into my power, let him need my favor, let him not be able to be safe, honorable, secure without me, let him be so wretched that whatever is returned be to him in the place of a benefit." These things, the gods hearing: "Let domestic plots beset him, which I alone can put down; let a powerful and grievous enemy press on, a hostile and not unarmed crowd, let a creditor urge him, an accuser."

" In potestatem meam recidat, gratiam meam desideret, sine me salvus, honestus, tutus esse non possit, tam miser sit, ut illi beneficii loco sit, quidquid redditur." Haec dis audientibus: " Circumveniant illum domesticae insidiae, quas ego possim solus opprimere, instet potens inimicus et gravis, infesta turba nec inermis, creditor urgueat, accusator."

See how fair you are! You would wish none of these things, if he had not given you a benefit. To say nothing of the graver things you commit, in repaying the worst for the best, you certainly offend in this — that you do not wait for each thing’s own time; for he sins equally who does not follow as he who goes before. As a benefit is not always to be received, so it is not at all costs to be returned.

Vide, quam sis aecus! Horum optares nihil, si tibi beneficium non dedisset. Ut alia taceam, quae graviora committis pessima pro optimis referendo, hoc certe delinquis, quod non expectas suum cuiusque rei tempus, quod aeque peccat, qui non sequitur, quam qui antecedit. Quomodo beneficium non semper recipiendum est, sic non utique reddendum.

If you returned it to me not desiring it, you would be ungrateful; how much more ungrateful are you, who force me to desire it! Wait! Why do you not wish my gift to settle with you? Why do you bear it ill that you are bound? Why, as with a harsh moneylender, do you hasten to seal a balanced account? Why do you seek trouble for me? Why do you loose the gods upon me? How would you exact, who repay thus?

Si mihi non desideranti redderes, ingratus esses; quanto ingratior es, qui desiderare me cogis! Expecta! Quare subsidere apud te munus meum non vis? Quare obligatum moleste te fers? Quare quasi cum acerbo feneratore signare rationem parem properas? Quid mihi negotium quaeris? Quid in me deos immittis? Quomodo exigeres, qui sic reddis?

Before all things, then, Liberalis, let us learn this — to owe benefits securely and to watch for the occasions of returning them, not to make them by hand. Let us remember that this very eagerness to free oneself at the first opportunity is the mark of an ingrate; for no one gladly repays what he owes unwillingly, and what he does not wish to be with him he judges a burden, not a gift.

Ante omnia ergo, Liberalis, hoc discamus, beneficia debere secure et occasiones reddendorum observare, non manu facere. Ipsam hanc cupiditatem primo quoque tempore liberandi se meminerimus ingrati esse; nemo enim libenter reddit, quod invitus debet, et, quod apud se esse non vult, onus iudicat esse, non munus.

How much better and juster to hold the deserts of friends ready and offer them, not thrust them, nor judge oneself a debtor, since a benefit is a common bond and binds two together! Say: "I do not delay your gift’s return; I pray you receive it gladly. If necessity threatens either of us, and it is given by some fate that either you be forced to receive a benefit or I to receive another, let him rather give who is wont. I am ready: ’There is no delay in Turnus’; I shall show this spirit as soon as the time comes; meanwhile the gods are witnesses."

Quanto melius ac iustius in promptu habere merita amicorum et offerre, non ingerere, nec obaeratum se iudicare, quoniam beneficium commune vinculum est et inter se duos adligat! Dic: " Nihil moror, quominus tuum revertatur; opto, hilaris accipias. Si necessitas alterutri nostrum imminet fatoque quodam datum est, ut aut tu cogaris beneficium recipere aut ego alterum accipere, det potius, qui solet. Ego paratus sum: Nulla mora in Turno est; ostendam hunc animum, cum primum tempus advenerit; interim di testes sunt."

I am wont, my Liberalis, to mark this feeling in you and, as it were, to take by the hand one fearing and seething, lest in any duty you be too slow. Anxiety does not become a grateful mind; on the contrary, the highest confidence in oneself and, from the consciousness of true love, all anxiety dismissed. "Receive" is as much a reproach as "You owe." Let this be the first right of a benefit given, that he who gave it choose the time of receiving. "But I fear lest men speak the worse of me." He acts ill who is grateful to reputation, not to conscience. You have two judges of this matter: him, whom you ought not to fear, and yourself, whom you cannot. "What then? If no occasion intervenes, shall I owe always?" You shall owe; but you shall owe openly, you shall owe gladly, you shall with great pleasure look upon what is deposited with you. It repents one of a benefit received, whom it irks not yet to have repaid it. Why should one who seemed to you worthy for you to receive from, seem unworthy for you long to owe to?

Soleo, mi Liberalis, notare hunc in te adfectum et quasi manu prendere verentis et aestuantis, ne in ullo officio sis tardior. Non decet gratum animum sollicitudo, contra summa fiducia sui et ex conscientia veri amoris dimissa omnis anxietas. Tam convicium est: " Recipe " quam: " Debes." Hoc primum beneficii dati sit ius, ut recipiendi tempus eligat, qui dedit. " At vereor, ne homines de me sequius loquantur." Male agit, qui famae, non conscientiae gratus est. Duos istius rei iudices habes, illum, quem non debes timere, et te, quem non potes. " Quid ergo? Si nulla intervenerit occasio, semper debebo? " Debebis; sed palam debebis, sed libenter debebis, sed cum magna voluptate apud te depositum intueberis. Paenitet accepti beneficii, quem nondum redditi piget. Quare, qui tibi dignus visus est, a quo acciperes, indignus videatur, cui diu debeas?

They are in great errors who believe it the mark of a vast spirit to bring forth, to give, to fill the fold and house of many, when sometimes not a great spirit does these things, but a great fortune; they do not know how much greater and harder it sometimes is to receive than to pour out. For, to take nothing from the other — since both, when done by virtue, are equal — it is of no less spirit to owe a benefit than to give; nay, this more laboriously than that, in that things received are guarded with greater care than they are given.

In magnis erroribus sunt, qui ingentis animi credunt proferre, donare, plurium sinum ac domum implere, cum ista interdum non magnus animus faciat, sed magna fortuna; nesciunt, quanto interim maius ac difficilius sit capere, quam fundere. Nam, ut nihil alteri detraham, quoniam utrumque, ubi virtute fit, par est, non minoris est animi beneficium debere quam dare; eo quidem operosius hoc quam illud, quo maiore diligentia custodiuntur accepta, quam dantur.

And so one must not be anxious how quickly we repay, nor run out unseasonably, because he offends equally who delays returning the favor at his own time, as he who hastens at another’s. It is deposited with me; I fear neither for his account nor for mine. It is well secured for him; he cannot lose this benefit except with me — nay, not even with me. I have given him thanks, that is, I have returned them.

Itaque non est trepidandum, quam cito reponamus, nec procurrendum intempestive, quia aeque delinquit, qui ad referendam gratiam suo tempore cessat, quam qui alieno properat. Positum est illi apud me; nec illius nomine nec meo timeo. Bene illi cautum est; non potest hoc beneficium perdere nisi mecum, immo ne mecum quidem. Egi illi gratias, id est, rettuli.

He who thinks too much about repaying a benefit, thinks the other thinks too much about receiving it. Let him show himself easy toward either. If he wishes to receive the benefit, let us return and repay it gladly; if he prefers it to be guarded with us, why do we dig up his treasure? Why do we refuse the guardianship? He is worthy that, whichever he wishes, be permitted him. Let us hold opinion and reputation in such a place, as though it ought not to lead, but to follow.

Qui nimis de reddendo beneficio cogitat, nimis cogitare alterum de recipiendo putat. Praestet se in utrumque facilem. Si vult recipere beneficium, referamus reddamusque laeti; si illud apud nos custodiri mavult, quid thensaurum eius eruimus? Quid custodiam recusamus? Dignus est cui, utrum volet, liceat. Opinionem quidem et famam eo loco habeamus, tamquam non ducere sed sequi debeat.

I want you, my Liberalis, to be of good cheer: "land within reach"; I shall not here hold you with a long song and through windings and lengthy preludes. This book forces the rest into shape, and, the matter exhausted, I look about not for what to say, but for what I have not said; yet you will take in good part whatever is left there, since it will be left over for you.

Bonum, mi Liberalis, habeas animum volo: In manibus terrae; non hic te carmine longo atque per ambages et longa exorsa tenebo. Reliqua hic liber cogit, et exhausta materia circumspicio, non quid dicam, sed quid non dixerim; boni tamen consules, quidquid ibi superest, cum tibi superfuerit.

Had I wished to flatter myself, the work ought to have grown little by little, and that part reserved for the end which anyone, even sated, would still crave. But whatever was most necessary, I heaped into the first part; now, if anything has escaped, I gather it up again. Nor, by Hercules, if you ask me, do I think it much to the point, when the things that shape character have been said, to pursue the rest — devised not for the cure of the mind, but for the exercise of the wit.

Si voluissem lenocinari mihi, debuit paulatim opus crescere et ea pars in finem reservari, quam quilibet etiam satiatus appeteret. Sed quidquid maxime necessarium erat, in primum congessi; nunc, si quid effugit, recolligo. Nec mehercules, si me interroges, nimis ad rem existimo pertinere, ubi dicta sunt, quae Tegunt mores, prosequi cetera non in remedium animi, sed in exercitationem ingenii inventa.

For excellently is Demetrius the Cynic — a man great in my judgment, even if compared with the greatest — wont to say that it profits more if you hold a few precepts of wisdom, but have them ready and in use, than if you have learned many, but do not have them at hand.

Egregie enim hoc dicere Demetrius Cynicus, vir meo iudicio magnus, etiam si maximis comparetur, solet plus prodesse, si pauca praecepta sapientiae teneas, sed illa in promptu tibi et in usu sint, quam si multa quidem didiceris, sed illa non habeas ad manum.

"As a great wrestler," he says, "is not he who has thoroughly learned all the figures and holds, whose use under an adversary is rare, but he who has well and diligently exercised himself in one or two and watches intently for their occasions (for it matters not how many he knows, if he knows as much as suffices for victory), so in this study many things delight, few conquer.

" Quemadmodum," inquit, " magnus luctator est, non qui omnes numeros nexusque perdidicit, quorum usus sub adversario rarus est, sed qui in uno se aut altero bene ac diligenter exercuit et eorum occasiones intentus expectat (neque enim refert, quam multa sciat, si scit, quantum victoriae satis est), sic in hoc studio multa delectant, pauca vincunt.

Though you do not know what principle pours forth the ocean and recalls it, why every seventh year sets a mark on a man’s age, why the breadth of a colonnade does not, for those looking from afar, keep its proportion, but the farthest columns meet in narrows and the intervals of the columns are at last joined; what it is that separates the conception of twins and joins their birth, whether one coupling is divided into two or they were conceived as often as there are twins; why those born together have diverse fates and stand apart by the greatest spans of fortune, between whose births there is the least interval — it will not much harm you to have passed over what it is neither permitted nor profitable to know. Truth, wrapped up, lies hidden in the deep.

Licet nescias, quae ratio oceanum effundat ac revocet, quare septimus quisque annus aetati signum imprimat, quare latitudo porticus ex remoto sperantibus non servet portionem suam, sed ultima in angustiis coeant et columnarum novissime intervalla iungantur, quid sit, quod geminorum conceptum separet, partum iungat, utrum unus concubitus spargatur in duos an totiens concepti sint, cur pariter natis fata diversa sint maximisque rerum spatiis distent, quorum inter ortus minimum interest: non multum tibi nocebit transisse, quae nec licet scire nec prodest. Involuta veritas in alto latet.

Nor can we complain of nature’s malignity, because the finding of nothing is difficult except of that whose only fruit, once found, is to have found it; whatever is going to make us better and blessed, she has set either in the open or close at hand.

Nec de malignitate naturae queri possumus, quia nullius rei difficilis inventio est, nisi cuius hic unus inventae fructus est invenisse; quidquid nos meliores beatosque facturum est, aut in aperto aut in proximo posuit.

If the mind has despised the things of chance, if it has raised itself above fears and does not embrace the infinite with greedy hope, but has learned to seek riches from itself; if it has cast out the dread of gods and men and knows that there is not much to be feared from man, nothing from a god; if, a despiser of all the things by which life is tormented while it is adorned, it has been brought to this — that it is clear to it that death is the material of no evil, the end of many; if it has consecrated its mind to virtue and thinks level whatever way she calls; if, a social animal and born for the common good, it looks on the world as the one house of all and has opened its conscience to the gods and always lives as though in public, fearing itself more than others: that mind, withdrawn from the tempests, has stood on solid and serene ground and has completed a useful and necessary knowledge. The rest are the amusements of leisure; for now, with the mind drawn back into safety, it is permitted to run out to these things too, which bring to wits cultivation, not strength."

Si animus fortuita contempsit, si se supra metus sustulit nec avida spe infinita complectitur, sed didicit a se petere divitias; si deorum hominumque formidinem eiecit et scit non multum esse ab homine timendum, a deo nihil; si contemptor omnium, quibus torquetur vita, dum ornatur, eo perductus est, ut illi liqueat mortem nullius mali materiam esse, multorum finem; si animum virtuti consecravit et, quacumque vocat illa, planum putat; si sociale animal et in commune genitus mundum ut unam omnium domum spectat et conscientiam suam dis aperuit semperque tamquam in publico vivit se magis veritus quam alios: subductus ille tempestatibus in solido ac sereno stetit consummavitque scientiam utilem ac necessariam. Reliqua oblectamenta otii sunt; licet enim iam in tutum retracto animo ad haec quoque excurrere cultum, non robur, ingeniis adferentia."

These things our Demetrius bids one hold confidently with both hands, these never to let go — nay, to fasten on and make a part of oneself, and by daily meditation to be brought to this: that wholesome things occur of their own accord and, everywhere and at once, are at hand when desired, and that that distinction of the base and the honorable come without any delay.

Haec Demetrius noster utraque manu tenere pro fidentem iubet, haec nusquam dimittere, immo adfigere et partem sui facere eoque cotidiana meditatione perduci, ut sua sponte occurrant salutaria et ubique ac statim desiderata praesto sint et sine ulla mora veniat illa turpis honestique distinctio.

Let him know that there is no evil except the base, no good except the honorable. By this rule let him distribute the works of life; to this law let him both do all things and exact them, and let him judge the most wretched of mortals — in however great riches they will gleam — those given over to the belly and to lust, and those whose mind grows torpid in inert leisure. Let him say to himself: "Pleasure is fragile, brief, exposed to disgust, the more greedily drunk the more quickly recoiling into its opposite, of which one must straightway either repent or be ashamed; in which there is nothing magnificent or befitting the nature of man, next to the gods — a lowly thing, coming by the service of base or cheap members, foul in its issue.

Sciat nec malum esse ullum nisi turpe nec bonum nisi honestum. Hac regula vitae opera distribuat; ad hanc legem et agat cuncta et exigat miserrimosque mortalium iudicet, in quantiscumque opibus refulgebunt, ventri ac libidini deditos quorumque animus inerti otio torpet. Dicat sibi ipse: " Voluptas fragilis est, brevis, fastidio obiecta, quo avidius hausta est citius in contrarium recidens, cuius subinde necesse est aut paeniteat aut pudeat, in qua nihil est magnificum aut quod naturam hominis dis proximi deceat, res humilis, membrorum turpium aut vilium ministerio veniens, exitu foeda.

That is a pleasure worthy of a man, and of a man indeed — not to fill the body nor to fatten it nor to provoke the desires, whose safest state is quiet, but to be free of perturbation, both that which the ambition of men quarreling among themselves shakes, and that intolerable one which comes from on high, when belief has been given to the rumor about the gods and we have appraised them by our own vices."

Illa est voluptas et homine et viro digna non implere corpus nec saginare nec cupiditates irritare, quarum tutissima est quies, sed perturbatione carere et ea, quam hominum inter se rixantium ambitus concutit, et ea, quae intolerabilis ex alto venit, ubi de dis famae creditum est vitiisque illos nostris aestimavimus."

This pleasure — even, unafraid, never about to feel weariness of itself — he perceives whom we are at this very moment shaping, skilled, so to speak, in divine and human law. This man rejoices in the present, hangs not on the future; for he has nothing firm who is bent toward uncertainties. And so, exempted from great cares and those that wrench the mind, he hopes for or desires nothing, nor sends himself into the doubtful, content with himself.

Hanc voluptatem aequalem, intrepidam, numquam sensuram sui taedium percipit hic, quem deformamus cum maxime, ut ita dicam, divini iuris atque humani peritus. Hic praesentibus gaudet, ex futuro non pendet; nihil enim firmi habet, qui in incerta propensus est. Magnis itaque curis exemptus et distorquentibus mentem nihil sperat aut cupit nec se mittit in dubium suo contentus.

And lest you think him content with little, all things are his — not as they were Alexander’s, to whom, although he had stood on the shore of the Red Sea, more was lacking than that by which he had come. Not even those things were his which he held or had conquered, while Onesicritus, sent ahead as a scout, wandered on the ocean and sought wars in an unknown sea.

Et ne illum existimes parvo esse contentum, omnia illius sunt, non sic, quemadmodum Alexandri fuerunt, cui, quamquam in litore rubri maris steterat, plus deerat, quam qua venerat. Illius ne ea quidem erant, quae tenebat aut vicerat, cum in oceano Onesicritus praemissus explorator erraret et bella in ignoto mari quaereret.

Was it not plain enough that he was poor, who carried his arms beyond the bounds of nature, who plunged himself headlong into the unexplored and immense deep with a blind greed? What does it matter how many kingdoms he snatched, how many he gave, how much of the lands he weighs down with tribute? As much is lacking to him as he desires.

Non satis apparebat inopem esse, qui extra naturae terminos arma proferret, qui se in profundum inexploratum et immensum aviditate caeca prosus immitteret? Quid interest, quot eripuerit regna, quot dederit, quantum terrarum tributo premat? Tantum illi deest, quantum cupit.

Nor was this the vice of Alexander only, whom a fortunate rashness drove along the footsteps of Liber and Hercules, but of all whom fortune has provoked by filling them. Run through Cyrus and Cambyses and the whole line of the Persian kingdom. Whom will you find for whom satiety set a limit to empire, who did not end his life in some thought of proceeding further? Nor is that to be wondered at; whatever falls to greed is utterly swallowed and buried, nor does it matter how much you heap on that which is insatiable.

Nec hoc Alexandri tantum vitium fuit, quem per Liberi Herculisque vestigia felix temeritas egit, sed omnium, quos fortuna irritavit implendo. Cyrum et Cambysen et totum regni Persici stemma percense. Quem invenies, cui modum imperii satietas fecerit, qui non vitam in aliqua ulterius procedendi cogitatione finierit? Nec id mirum est; quidquid cupiditati contingit, penitus hauritur et conditur, nec interest, quantum eo, quod inexplebile est, congeras.

One alone is the wise man, whose all things are, nor are they to be guarded with difficulty. He has no envoys to send across the seas, nor camps to measure out on hostile banks, no garrisons to dispose in well-placed forts; he needs no legion nor squadrons of cavalry. As the immortal gods rule their kingdom unarmed, and the guardianship of their affairs is theirs from a height and a calm, so this man performs his duties, however widely they stretch, without tumult, and, most powerful and best, sees the whole human race beneath him. You may laugh:

Unus est sapiens, cuius omnia sunt nec ex difficili tuenda. Non habet mittendos trans maria legatos nec metanda in ripis hostilibus castra, non opportunis castellis disponenda praesidia; non opus est legione nec equestribus turmis. Quemadmodum di immortales regnum inermes regunt et illis rerum suarum ex edito tranquilloque tutela est, ita hic officia sua, quamvis latissime pateant, sine tumultu obit et omne humanum genus potentissimus eius optimusque infra se videt. Derideas licet:

it is a thing of vast spirit, when you have surveyed in mind the East and the West, by which even remote things and those shut off in solitudes are penetrated, when you have looked upon so many living things, so great an abundance of things which nature most blessedly pours forth, to send forth this voice of a god: "All these things are mine!" So it comes about that he desires nothing, because there is nothing outside all things.

ingentis spiritus res est, cum Orientem Occidentemque lustraveris animo, quo etiam remota et solitudinibus interclusa penetrantur, cum tot animalia, tantam copiam rerum, quas natura beatissime fundit, adspexeris, emittere hanc dei vocem: " Haec omnia mea sunt! " Sic fit, ut nihil cupiat, quia nihil est extra omnia.

"This very thing," you say, "I wanted! I have you! I wish to see how you will extricate yourself from these snares into which you have fallen of your own accord. Tell me. How can anyone make a gift to the wise man, if all things are the wise man’s? For that too, which one gives him, is his own. And so a benefit cannot be given to the wise man, to whom whatever is given is given from his own; and yet you say a gift can be given to the wise man. Know also that I am asking the same about friends. You say all things are common to them; therefore no one can give anything to a friend; for he gives him things in common."

" Hoc ipsum," inquis, " volui! teneo te! Volo videre, quomodo ex his laqueis, in quos tua sponte decidisti, expliceris. Dic mihi. Quemadmodum potest aliquis donare sapienti, si omnia sapientis sunt? Nam id quoque, quod illi donat, ipsius est. Itaque non potest beneficium dari sapienti, cui, quidquid datur, de suo datur; atqui dicitis sapienti posse donari. Idem autem me scito et de amicis interrogare. Omnia dicitis illis esse communia; ergo nemo quicquam donare amico potest; donat enim illi communia."

Nothing forbids that something be both the wise man’s and also his who possesses it, to whom it has been given and assigned. By the civil law all things are the king’s, and yet those things, the universal possession of which pertains to the king, are parceled out to individual owners, and each single thing has its own possessor. And so we can give the king both a house and a slave and money, nor are we said to give him of his own; for to the king pertains the power over all, to individuals the properties.

Nihil prohibet aliquid et sapientis esse et etiam eius, qui possidet, cui datum et adsignatum est. Iure civili omnia regis sunt, et tamen illa, quorum ad regem pertinet universa possessio, in singulos dominos discripta sunt, et unaquaeque res habet possessorem suum. Itaque dare regi et domum et mancipium et pecuniam possumus nec donare illi de suo dicimur; ad regem enim potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos proprietates.

We call the territories "of the Athenians" or "of the Campanians," which then the neighbors mark off among themselves by a private boundary; and the whole field is at all events of some commonwealth, but each part is then assessed to its own owner; and therefore we can give our fields to the commonwealth, although they are said to be its, because in one way they are its, in another mine.

Fines Atheniensium aut Campanorum vocamus, quos deinde inter se vicini privata terminatione distinguunt; et totus ager utique ullius rei publicae est, pars deinde suo domino quaeque censetur; ideoque donare agros nostros rei publicae possumus, quamvis illius esse dicantur, quia aliter illius sunt, aliter mei.

Is there any doubt that a slave with his peculium is his master’s? Yet he gives a gift to his master. For a slave does not therefore have nothing, because he is not going to have it, if his master should be unwilling for him to have it; nor is it therefore not a gift, when he gave it willing, because it could have been snatched away, even had he been unwilling.

Numquid dubium est, quin servus cum peculio domini sit? Dat tamen domino suo munus. Non enim ideo nihil habet servus, quia non est habiturus, si dominus illum habere noluerit; nec ideo non est munus, cum volens dedit, quia potuit eripi, etiam si noluisset.

How shall we prove that all things are the wise man’s? For now it is agreed between the two of us that all things are the wise man’s; the thing in question is to be gathered — how there remains material of generosity toward him whose universal possession we have granted.

Quemadmodum probemus omnia? Nunc enim omnia sapientis esse inter duos convenit; illud, quod quaeritur, colligendum est, quomodo liberalitatis materia adversus eum supersit, cuius universa esse concessimus.

All things are the father’s that are in the children’s hand; yet who does not know that a son too gives something to his father? All things are the gods’; yet we have both set a gift before the gods and cast a coin. It is not, therefore, that what I have is not mine, if mine is yours; for the same thing can be both mine and yours.

Omnia patris sunt, quae in liberorum manu sunt; quis tamen nescit donare aliquid et filium patri? Omnia deorum sunt; tamen et dis donum posuimus et stipem iecimus. Non ideo, quod habeo, meum non est, si meum tuum est; potest enim idem meum esse et tuum.

"He," he says, "whose prostitutes they are is a pander; but all things are the wise man’s; among all things are prostitutes too; therefore prostitutes are the wise man’s. But he is a pander whose prostitutes they are; therefore the wise man is a pander." So they forbid him to buy, for they say:

"Is," inquit, " cuius prostitutae sunt, leno est; omnia autem sapientis sunt; inter omnia et prostitutae sunt; ergo prostitutae sapientis sunt. Leno autem est, cuius prostitutae sunt; ergo sapiens leno est," Sic illum vetant emere, dicunt enim:

"No one buys his own thing; but all things are the wise man’s; therefore the wise man buys nothing." So they forbid him to take a loan, because no one pays interest on his own money. There are countless things by which they quibble, though they understand most beautifully what is said by us.

" Nemo rem suam emit; omnia autem sapientis sunt; ergo sapiens nihil emit." Sic vetant mutuum sumere, quia nemo usuram pro pecunia sua pendat. Innumerabilia sunt, per quae cavillantur, cum pulcherrime, quid a nobis dicatur, intellegant.

For I so say that all things are the wise man’s that none the less each has his own dominion over his own things, just as under the best king the king possesses all things by sovereignty, individuals by ownership. The time for proving this matter will come; meanwhile this is enough for this question — that what is in one way the wise man’s, in another mine, I can give to the wise man.

Etenim sic omnia sapientis esse dico, ut nihilo minus proprium quisque in rebus suis dominium habeat, quemadmodum sub optimo rege omnia rex imperio possidet, singuli dominio. Tempus istius probandae rei veniet; interim hoc huic quaestioni sat est me id, quod aliter sapientis est, aliter meum est, posse donare sapienti.

Nor is it strange that something can be given to him whose is the whole. I have rented a house from you; in it something is yours, something mine: the thing is yours, the use of your thing is mine. And so you will not touch the produce, your tenant forbidding, although they are born on your possession, even if the grain be dearer or there be famine. Alas! in vain will you look at another’s great heap born on your own, set on your own, going into your own barns.

Nec mirum est aliquid ei, cuius est totum, posse donari. Conduxi domum a te; in hac aliquid tuum est, aliquid meum: res tua est, usus rei tuae meus est. Itaque nec fructus tanges colono tuo prohibente, quamvis in tua possessione nascantur, et, si annona carior fuerit aut fames. Heu! frustra magnum alterius spectabis acervum in tuo natum, in tuo positum, in horrea iturum tua.

Nor will you enter what I have rented, although you are the owner, nor lead away your slave, my hired man; and, when I have hired a carriage from you, you will receive a benefit, if I permit you to sit in your own vehicle. You see, then, that it can happen that someone, by receiving what is his own, receives a gift.

Nec conductum meum, quamquam sis dominus, intrabis nec servum tuum, mercennarium meum, abduces et, cum a te raedam conduxero, beneficium accipies, si tibi in vehiculo tuo sedere permisero. Vides ergo posse fieri, ut aliquis accipiendo, quod suum est, munus accipiat.

In all those things which I have just related, each is owner of the same thing. How so? Because one is owner of the thing, the other of the use. We say the books are Cicero’s; the same Dorus the bookseller calls them his own, and both are true. The one claims them as the author, the other as the buyer; and rightly are they said to be of both, for they are of both, but not in the same way. So Titus Livius can receive or buy his own books from Dorus.

In omnibus istis, quae modo rettuli, uterque eiusdem rei dominus est. Quo modo? Quia alter rei dominus est, alter usus. Libros dicimus esse Ciceronis; eosdem Dorus librarius suos vocat, et utrumque verum est. Alter illos tamquam auctor sibi, alter tamquam emptor adserit; ac recte utriusque dicuntur esse, utriusque enim sunt, sed non eodem modo. Sic potest Titus Livius a Doro accipere aut emere libros suos.

I can give the wise man what is mine man by man, though all things be his; for although in royal fashion he possesses all things by awareness, but the property of single things is scattered upon each man, he can both receive a gift and owe and buy and rent.

Possum donare sapienti, quod viritim meum est, licet illius sint omnia; nam cum regio more cuncta conscientia possideat, singularum autem rerum in unumquemque proprietas sit sparsa, et accipere munus et debere et emere et conducere potest.

Caesar has all things, his treasury only the private and his own; and the universal things are in his empire, his own in his patrimony. What is his, what is not, is inquired into without diminution of his empire; for that too which is adjudged away as another’s is in another way his. So the wise man possesses all things in his mind, his own by right and dominion.

Caesar omnia habet, fiscus eius privata tantum ac sua; et universa in imperio eius sunt, in patrimonio propria. Quid eius sit, quid non sit, sine diminutione imperii quaeritur; nam id quoque, quod tamquam alienum abiudicatur, aliter illius est. Sic sapiens animo universa possidet, iure ac dominio sua.

Bion now by arguments gathers that all men are sacrilegious, now that no one is. When he is about to throw all from the rock, he says: "Whoever has taken up and consumed and turned to his own use that which is the gods’, is sacrilegious; but all things are the gods’; whatever, therefore, anyone takes up, he takes up of the gods’, whose all things are; therefore whoever takes up anything is sacrilegious."

Bion modo omnes sacrilegos esse argumentis colligit, modo neminem. Cum omnes de saxo deiecturus est, dicit: " Quisquis id, quod deorum est, sustulit et consumpsit atque in usum suum vertit, sacrilegus est; omnia autem deorum sunt; quod quisque ergo tollit, deorum tollit, quorum omnia sunt; ergo, quisquis tollit aliquid, sacrilegus est.

Then, when he bids the temples be broken into and the Capitol be plundered with impunity, he says that no one is sacrilegious, because whatever is taken away is transferred from that place which was the gods’ into that place which is the gods’.

" Deinde, cum effringi templa et expilari impune Capitolium iubet, dicit nullum sacrilegum esse, quia, quidquid sublatum est, ex eo loco, qui deorum erat, in eum transfertur locum, qui deorum est.

Here it is answered that all things indeed are the gods’, but not all things dedicated to the gods; in those things sacrilege is observed which religion has ascribed to a divinity. So too the whole world is the temple of the immortal gods, the only one indeed worthy of their amplitude and magnificence; yet the profane is distinguished from the sacred; not all things are permitted in a corner on which the name of shrine has been imposed, which are permitted under the sky and the sight of the stars. Injury indeed the sacrilegious man cannot do to a god, whom his own divinity has set beyond the blow, but he is punished because he did it as though to a god: our opinion and his own bind him to the penalty.

Hic respondetur omnia quidem deorum esse, sed non omnia dis dedicata; in iis observari sacrilegium, quae religio numini adscripsit. Sic et totum mundum deorum esse immortalium templum, solum quidem amplitudine illorum ac magnificentia dignum: tamen a sacris profana discerni; non omnia licere in angulo, cui fani nomen impositum est, quae sub caelo et conspectu siderum licent. Iniuriam sacrilegus deo quidem non potest facere, quem extra ictum sua divinitas posuit, sed punitur, quia tamquam deo fecit: opinio illum nostra ac sua obligat poenae.

As, then, he seems sacrilegious who takes away something sacred, even if, wherever he transferred what he had stolen, it is within the bounds of the world, so too theft can be done to the wise man; for it will be taken from him, not from those things which he has universally, but from those of which he is inscribed owner, which serve him man by man.

Quomodo ergo sacrilegus videtur, qui aliquid aufert sacri, etiam si, quocumque transtulit, quod surripuerat, intra terminos mundi est, sic et sapienti furtum potest fieri; auferetur enim illi non ex iis, quae universa habet, sed ex iis, quibus dominus inscriptus est, quae viritim ei serviunt.

That other possession he will acknowledge; this he will be unwilling to have, if he can, and will send forth that voice which a Roman general sent forth, when, for his valor and the commonwealth well managed, so much land was decreed him as he could go round in one day’s plowing: "There is no need," he said, "for you of a citizen who has need of more than one citizen." How much the part of a greater man, do you think, to have spurned this gift than to have earned it! For many have taken away the boundaries of others; no one set bounds for himself!

Illam alteram possessionem adgnoscet, hanc nolet habere, si poterit, emittetque illam vocem, quam Romanus imperator emisit, cum illi ob virtutem et bene gestam rem publicam tantum agri decerneretur, quantum arando uno die circumire potuisset: " Non opus est," inquit, " vobis eo cive, cui plus opus sit quam uni civi." Quanto maioris viri putas respuisse hoc munus, quam meruisse! Multi enim fines aliis abstulerunt, sibi nemo constituit!

Therefore, when we look upon the mind of the wise man, master of all things and diffused through the universe, we say all things are his, while toward this everyday right, if the matter so requires, he will be assessed at the lowest rating. There is much difference whether his possession is appraised by his mind and greatness or by his property-rating.

Ergo cum animum sapientis intuemur potentem omnium et per universa dimissum, omnia illius esse dicimus, cum ad hoc ius cotidianum, si ita res tulerit, capite censebitur. Multum interest, possessio eius animo ac magnitudine aestimetur an censu.

He will abominate having all these universal things of which you speak. I shall not bring you Socrates, Chrysippus, Zeno, and the other men great indeed — nay, greater, because in praise of the ancients envy stands not in the way. A little before I cited Demetrius, whom the nature of things seems to me to have brought to our times to show both that he could not be corrupted by us nor we caught out by him — a man of finished wisdom, though he himself deny it, and of firm constancy in the things he proposed, but of an eloquence such as befits the bravest matters, not trimmed nor anxious over words, but pursuing his themes with a vast spirit, as the impulse bore him.

Haec universa habere, de quibus loqueris, abominabitur. Non referam tibi Socraten, Chrysippum, Zenonem et ceteros magnos quidem viros, maiores quidem, quia in laudem vetustorum invidia non obstat. Paulo ante Demetrium rettuli, quem mihi videtur rerum natura nostris tulisse temporibus, ut ostenderet nec illum a nobis corrumpi nec nos ab illo corripi posse, virum exactae, licet neget ipse, sapientiae firmaeque in iis, quae proposuit, constantiae, eloquentiae vero eius, quae res fortissimas deceat, non concinnatae nec in verba sollicitae, sed ingenti animo, prout impetus tulit, res suas prosequentis.

To him I do not doubt that Providence gave both such a life and such a faculty of speaking, that our age should lack neither an example nor a reproach. If one of the gods should wish to hand over our affairs to Demetrius to possess, under a fixed law that he not be permitted to give them away, I would affirm that he would refuse and would say:

Huic non dubito quin providentia et talem vitam et talem dicendi facultatem dederit, ne aut exemplum saeculo nostro aut convicium deesset. Demetrio si res nostras aliquis deorum possidendas velit tradere sub lege certa, ne liceat donare, adfirmaverim repudiaturum dicturumque:

"I, indeed, do not bind myself to that inextricable weight, nor send down this unencumbered man into the deep dregs of things. Why do you bring to me the evils of all peoples? Which, even were I going to give them, I would not accept, since I see many things which it would not become me to give. I wish to set before my eyes the things that dazzle the eyes of nations and kings; I wish to look upon the prices of your blood and your souls.

" Ego vero me ad istud inextricabile pondus non adligo nec in altam faecem rerum hunc expeditum hominem demitto. Quid ad me defers populorum omnium mala? Quae ne daturus quidem acciperem, quoniam multa video, quae me donare non deceat. Volo sub conspectu meo ponere, quae gentium oculos regumque praestringunt, volo intueri pretia sanguinis animarumque vestrarum.

Set before me first the spoils of luxury, whether you wish to spread them out in order or, as is better, to give them in one heap. I see tortoiseshell elaborated with scrupulous distinction, and the shells of the foulest and laziest of animals bought at vast prices, in which that very variegation which pleases is colored by applied dyes into the likeness of the true. I see there tables, and wood appraised at a senator’s rating, the more precious the more the tree’s misfortune has twisted it into many knots.

Prima mihi luxuriae spolia propone, sive illa Vis per ordinem expandere sive, ut est melius, in unum acervum dare. Video elaboratam scrupulosa distinctione testudinem et foedissimorum pigerrimorumque animalium testas ingentibus pretiis emptas, in quibus ipsa illa, quae placet, varietas subditis medicamentis in similitudinem veri Coloratur. Video istic mensas et aestimatum lignum senatorio censu, eo pretiosius, quo illud in plures nodos arboris infelicitas torsit.

I see there crystal vessels, whose fragility kindles their price; for the pleasure of all things, among the ignorant, grows by the very danger by which it ought to be driven off. I see murrine cups; for luxury, forsooth, would cost too little, unless they had pledged one another, in capacious gems, with what they were going to vomit.

Video istic crystallina, quorum accendit fragilitas pretium; omnium enim rerum voluptas apud imperitos ipso, quo fugari debet, periculo crescit. Video murrea pocula; parum scilicet luxuria magno fuerit, nisi, quod vomant, capacibus gemmis inter se propinaverint.

I see pearls, not single ones matched to single ears; for now ears trained to bearing a burden are joined together, and besides others are set in pairs upon them. Womanish madness had not sufficiently heaped itself upon men, unless two or three patrimonies had hung from single ears.

Video uniones non singulos singulis auribus comparatos; iam enim exercitatae aures oneri ferundo sunt; iunguntur inter se et insuper alii binis superponuntur. Non satis muliebris insania viros superiecerat, nisi bina ac terna patrimonia auribus singulis pependissent.

I see silken garments — if they are to be called garments — in which there is nothing by which either the body or, in short, modesty could be defended; with these put on, a woman will scarcely swear convincingly that she is not naked. These are fetched at a vast sum from nations unknown even to commerce, that our matrons may show no more of themselves even to their adulterers in the bedchamber than in public.

Video sericas vestes, si vestes vocandae sunt, in quibus nihil est, quo defendi aut corpus aut denique pudor possit, quibus sumptis parum liquido nudam se non esse iurabit. Hae ingenti summa ab ignotis etiam ad commercium gentibus accersuntur, ut matronae nostrae ne adulteris quidem plus sui in cubiculo, quam in publico ostendant.

What are you doing, avarice? In how many things has the dearness outdone your gold! All those things I have related are in greater honor and price. Now I wish to review your wealth — the ingots of either metal, at which our greed grows dim.

" Quid agis, avaritia? Quot rerum caritate aurum tuum victum est! Omnia ista, quae rettuli, in maiore honore pretioque sunt. Nunc volo tuas opes recognoscere, lamnas utriusque materiae, ad quam cupiditas nostra caligat.

But, by Hercules, the earth, which brought forth whatever was going to be useful to us, buried and sank those things and lay upon them with all her weight, as on noxious things and an evil for the nations, about to come forth into the midst. I see iron brought forth from the same darkness as gold and silver, lest either the instrument for mutual slaughters or the price for it be lacking.

At mehercules terra, quae, quidquid utile futurum nobis erat, protulit, ista defodit et mersit et ut noxiosis rebus ac malo gentium in medium prodituris toto pondere incubuit. Video ferrum ex isdem tenebris esse prolatum, quibus aurum et argentum, ne aut instrumentum in caedes mutuas deesset aut pretium.

And yet these things still have some material substance; there is something in which the mind can follow the error of the eyes. I see there warrants and bonds and securities, empty images of having, certain shadowy coverings of a laboring avarice, by which it may deceive the mind rejoicing in the opinion of empty things. For what are these things — what are interest and the ledger and usury — but names of human greed sought outside nature?

Et tamen adhuc ista aliquam materiam habent; est, in quo errorem oculorum animus subsequi possit. Video istic diplomata et syngraphas et cautiones, vacua habendi simulacra, umbracula avaritiae quaedam laborantis, per quae decipiat animum inanium opinione gaudentem. Quid enim ista sunt, quid fenus et calendarium et usura, nisi humanae cupiditatis extra naturam quaesita nomina?

I can complain of the nature of things, that it did not hide gold and silver more deeply, that it did not lay upon them a weight greater than could be drawn off; what are those tablets, what the computations and time put up for sale and the bloody hundredths of interest? Voluntary evils hanging from our own constitution, in which there is nothing that can be set before the eyes, that can be held in the hand — the dreams of empty avarice.

"Possum de rerum natura queri, quod aurum argentumque non interius absconderit, quod non illis maius, quam quod detrahi posset, pondus iniecerit: quid sunt istae tabellae, quid computationes et venale tempus et sanguinulentae centesimae? Voluntaria mala ex constitutione nostra pendentia, in quibus nihil est, quod subici oculis, quod teneri manu possit, inanis avaritiae somnia.

O wretched man, if anyone is delighted by the great register of his patrimony, and vast spaces of lands to be cultivated by men in chains, and immense herds of cattle to be pastured through provinces and kingdoms, and a household greater than warlike nations, and private buildings surpassing the breadth of great cities!

O miserum, si quem delectat patrimonii sui liber magnus et vasta spatia terrarum colenda per vinctos et immensi greges pecorum per provincias ac regna pascendi et familia bellicosis nationibus maior et aedificia privata laxitatem urbium magnarum vincentia!

When he has well looked round on those things through which he has disposed and poured out his riches, and has made himself proud, let him compare whatever he has with what he desires: he is poor. Dismiss me and give me back to those riches of mine. I know the kingdom of wisdom, great, secure; I so have all things that they are all men’s."

Cum bene ista, per quae divitias suas disposuit ac fudit, circumspexerit superbumque se fecerit, quidquid habet, ei, quod cupit, comparet: pauper est. Dimitte me et illis divitiis meis redde. Ego regnum sapientiae novi, magnum, securum; ego sic omnia habeo, ut omnium sint."

And so, when Gaius Caesar offered him two hundred thousand, he laughingly rejected it, not judging it even a sum worth glorying in for not having accepted. Gods and goddesses, with how petty a spirit did he wish either to honor or to corrupt him! A testimony must be rendered to that excellent man;

Itaque cum C. Caesar illi ducenta donaret, ridens reiecit ne dignam quidem summam iudicans, qua non accepta gloriaretur. Di deaeque, quam pusillo animo illum aut honorare voluit aut corrumpere! Reddendum egregio viro testimonium est;

I heard a vast thing said by him, when he marveled at Gaius’s madness, that he had thought he could be changed at so great a price. "If he had resolved to tempt me," he said, "he should have made trial of me with his whole empire."

ingentem rem ab illo diei audivi, cum miraretur Gai dementiam, quod se putasset tanti posse mutari. " Si temptare," inquit, " me constituerat, toto illi fui experiendus imperio."

Therefore something can be given to the wise man, even if all things are the wise man’s. Equally, nothing forbids, although we say all things are common to friends, that something be given to a friend. For all things are not common to me with a friend as with a business partner, so that part be mine, part his, but as children are common to father and mother, who, when they are two, do not have, each, single ones, but each two.

Sapienti ergo donari aliquid potest, etiam si sapientis omnia sunt. Aeque nihil prohibet, cum omnia amicis dicamus esse communia, aliquid amico donari. Non enim milli sic cum amico communia omnia sunt, quomodo cum socio, ut pars mea sit, pars illius, sed quomodo patri matrique communes liberi sunt, quibus cum duo sunt, non singuli singulos habent, sed singuli binos.

First of all, I shall now bring it about that whoever this man is who calls me into partnership may know that he has nothing common with me. Why? Because this fellowship is only among the wise, among whom there is friendship; the rest are no more friends than partners.

Primum omnium iam efficiam, ut, quisquis est iste, qui me in societatem vocat, sciat se nihil mecum habere commune. Quare? Quia hoc inter sapientes solum consortium est, inter quos amicitia est; ceteri non magis amici sunt quam socii.

Then, things are common in more than one way. The equestrian seats are of all the Roman knights; yet in them my place, which I have taken, becomes my own; if I have yielded this to anyone, although I have yielded in a common thing, yet I seem to have given something. Certain things are of certain men under a fixed condition.

Deinde pluribus modis communia sunt. Equestria omnium equitum Romanorum sunt; in illis tamen meus fit proprius locus, quem occupavi; hoc si cui cessi, quamvis illi communi re cesserim, tamen aliquid dedisse videor. Quaedam quorundam sub certa condicione sunt.

I have a place in the equestrian seats, not to sell, not to let, not to dwell in, only to this end — to watch; therefore I do not lie if I say I have a place in the equestrian seats. But when I have come into the theatre, if the equestrian seats are full, I both by right have a place there, because it is permitted me to sit, and I do not have it, because it is occupied by those with whom I have a common right to the place.

Habeo in equestribus locum, non ut vendam, non ut locem, non ut habitem, in hoc tantum, ut spectem; propterea non mentior, si dico habere me in equestribus locum. Sed cum in theatrum veni, si plena sunt equestria, et iure habeo locum illic, quia sedere mihi licet, et non habeo, quia ab his, cum quibus mihi ius loci commune est, occupatus est.

Think the same happens among friends. Whatever a friend has is common to us, but it is the property of him who holds it; I cannot use those things if he is unwilling. "You mock me," you say; "if what is my friend’s is mine, let it be permitted me to sell it." It is not permitted; for neither are the equestrian seats yours to sell, and yet they are common to you with the other knights.

Idem inter amicos puta fieri. Quidquid habet amicus, commune est nobis, sed illius proprium est, qui tenet; uti iis illo nolente non possum. " Derides me," inquis; " si, quod amici est, meum est, liceat mihi vendere." Non licet; nam nec equestria, et tamen communia tibi cum ceteris equitibus sunt.

It is no argument that a thing is therefore not yours, because you cannot sell it, because you cannot consume it, because you cannot change it for worse or better; for that too is yours which is yours under a fixed condition.

Non est argumentum ideo aliquid tuum non esse, quia vendere non potes, quia consumere, quia mutare in deterius aut melius; tuum enim est etiam, quod sub lege certa tuum est.

… I have received, but certainly no less. Not to draw it out longer, a benefit cannot be greater; the things through which a benefit is given can be greater and more numerous, into which finally benevolence may pour itself and so indulge itself, as lovers are wont, whose more numerous kisses and tighter embraces do not increase love, but exercise it.

accepi, sed certe non minus. Ne traham longius, beneficium maius esse non potest; ea, per quae beneficium datur, possunt esse maiora et plura, in quae se denique benevolentia effundat et sic sibi indulgeat, quemadmodum amantes solent, quorum plura oscula et complexus artiores non augent amorem, sed exercent.

This question too, which comes next, was settled in the earlier books; and so it will be briefly touched on; for the arguments which were given to others can be transferred to this one. It is asked whether one who has done everything to return a benefit has returned it.

Haec quoque, quae venit, quaestio profligata est in prioribus; itaque breviter perstringetur; possunt enim in hanc, quae aliis data sunt, argumenta transferri. Quaeritur, an, qui omnia fecit, ut beneficium redderet, reddiderit.

"That you may know," he says, "that he has not returned it — he did everything to return it; it appears, therefore, that that was not done, of doing which he had not the occasion. And a man has not paid the money to his creditor who, in order to pay, sought everywhere and did not find it."

" Ut scias," inquit, " illum non reddidisse, omnia fecit, ut redderet; apparet ergo non esse id factum, cuius faciendi occasionem non habuit. Et creditori suo pecuniam non solvit is, qui, ut solveret, ubique quaesivit nec invenit."

Certain things are of such a condition that they must furnish the effect; for certain others, to have tried everything to effect them is in place of the effect. If he did everything to heal, the doctor has performed his part; even when the defendant is condemned, the office of eloquence stands good for the orator, if he has used all his force; the general’s praise is rendered even to a beaten leader, if both prudence and industry and fortitude have discharged their offices.

Quaedam eius condicionis sunt, ut effectum praestare debeant; quibusdam pro effectu est omnia temptasse, ut efficerent. Si omnia fecit, ut sanaret, peregit partes suas medicus; etiam damnato reo oratori constat eloquentiae officium, si omni vi usus est; laus imperatoria etiam victo duci redditur, si et prudentia et industria et fortitudo muneribus suis functa est.

He did everything to return the benefit; your felicity stood in his way; nothing harder fell out, to test true friendship; he could not give to the rich, sit by the healthy, succor the fortunate: he returned the favor, even if you did not receive the benefit. Besides, this man, always intent on it and awaiting the time for this thing, who spent on it much care, much diligence, labored more than one to whom it fell to return the favor quickly.

Omnia fecit, ut beneficium redderet, obstitit illi felicitas tua; nihil incidit durius, quod veram amicitiam experiretur; locupleti donare non potuit, sano adsidere, felici succurrere: gratiam rettulit, etiam si tu beneficium non recepisti. Praeterea huic intentus semper et huius rei tempus opperiens, qui in hoc multum curae, multum sedulitatis impendit, plus laboravit, quam cui cito referre gratiam contigit.

The example of the debtor is unlike, for whom it is too little to have sought the money, unless he pays it; for there the harsh creditor stands over his head, who suffers no day to set free; here is the most kindly one, who, when he has seen you running about and anxious and troubled, says: "Send this care from your breast; cease to press yourself wearisomely. I have everything from you; you do me an injury if you judge that I desire anything more; your mind has reached me most fully." "Tell me," he says: "if he had returned the benefit, you would say he had returned the favor; is he, then, in the same place who has returned it and who has not returned it?" Now set this against it: if he had forgotten the benefit received, if he had not even tried to be grateful, you would deny that he had returned the favor; but this man has wearied himself days and nights and has renounced all other duties, intent on this one and laboring lest any occasion escape him; will he, then, be in the same place — that man who cast off the care of returning the favor, and this one who never withdrew from it? You are unfair, if you exact the deed from me, when you see that the will was not lacking.

Debitoris exemplum dissimile est, cui parum est pecuniam quaesisse, nisi solvit; illic enim stat acerbus super caput creditor, qui nullum diem gratis occidere patiatur; hic benignissimus, qui, te cum viderit concursantem et sollicitum atque anxium, dicat: " Mitte hanc de pectore curam; desine tibi molestus instare. Omnia a te habeo; iniuriam mihi facis, si me quicquam desiderare amplius iudicas; plenissime ad me pervenit animus tuus." " Dic," inquit, " mihi: si reddidisset beneficium, diceres illum gratiam rettulisse; eodem ergo loco est, qui reddidit et qui non reddidit? " Contra nunc illud pone: si oblitus esset accepti beneficii, si ne temptasset quidem gratus esse, negares illum gratiam rettulisse; at hic se diebus noctibusque lassavit et omnibus aliis renuntiavit officiis huic uni imminens et operatus, ne qua se fugeret occasio; eodem ergo loco erunt ille, qui curam referendae gratiae abiecit, et hic, qui numquam ab illa recessit? Iniquus es, si rem a me exigis, cum videas animum non defuisse.

In short, suppose, when you had been captured, that I, having borrowed money with my own goods pledged for the creditor’s security, sailed in a winter so savage along shores beset with robberies, and traversed whatever of perils even a peaceful sea can bring; that, all the solitudes traveled through, when I sought those whom no one did not flee, at last I came to the pirates; that already another had ransomed you: will you deny that I returned the favor? Even if, on that voyage, I, shipwrecked, lost the money which I had borrowed for your safety, even if I myself fell into the chains which I wished to take off you, will you deny that I returned the favor?

Ad summam puta, cum captus esses, me pecuniam mutuatum rebus meis in securitatem creditoris oppositis navigasse hieme tam saeva per infesta latrociniis litora, emensum, quidquid periculorum adferre potest etiam pacatum mare; peragratis omnibus solitudinibus, cum, quos nemo non fugiebat, ego quaererem, tandem ad piratas perveni; iam te alius redemerat: negabis me gratiam rettulisse? Etiamne, si in illa navigatione pecuniam, quam saluti tuae contraxeram, naufragus perdidi, etiamne, si in vincula, quae detrahere tibi volui, ipse incidi, negabis me rettulisse gratiam?

But, by Hercules, the Athenians call Harmodius and Aristogiton tyrannicides, and the hand left by Mucius on the enemy’s altar was as good as Porsenna slain, and virtue, always struggling against fortune, has shone forth even short of effecting the work proposed. He furnished more who followed the fleeing occasions and caught at one and another through which he might return the favor, than he whom the first occasion made grateful without any sweat.

At mehercules Athenienses Harmodium et Aristogitonem tyrannicidas vocant, et Mucio manus in hostili ara relicta instar occisi Porsinae fuit, et semper contra fortunam luctata virtus etiam citra effectum propositi operis enituit. Plus praestitit, qui fugientes occasiones secutus est et alia atque alia captavit, per quae referre gratiam posset, quam quem sine ullo sudore gratum prima fecit occasio.

"Two things," he says, "that man furnished you, the will and the deed; you too owe him two." You would rightly say that to one who returned you an idle will, but to this man, who both wills and tries and leaves nothing unattempted, you cannot say it; for he furnishes both, as far as in him lies.

" Duas," inquit, " res ille tibi praestitit, voluntatem et rem; tu quoque illi duas debes." Merito istud diceres ei, qui tibi reddidit voluntatem otiosam, huic vero, qui et vult et conatur et nihil intemptatum relinquit, id non potes dicere; utrumque enim praestat, quantum in se est.

Then, number is not always to be made equal to number; sometimes one thing is worth two; and so in the place of the deed succeeds so ready a will, eager to repay. But if the mind without the deed avails not toward returning the favor, no one is grateful toward the gods, on whom the will alone is conferred. "To the gods," he says, "we can furnish nothing else." But if to this man too, to whom I ought to return the favor, I can furnish nothing else, what reason is there that I be not as grateful toward a man by that by which I confer nothing more upon the gods?

Deinde non semper numero numerus aequandus est, aliquando una res pro duabus valet; itaque in locum rei succedit tam propensa voluntas et cupida reddendi. Quod si animus sine re ad referendam gratiam non valet, nemo adversus deos gratus est, in quos voluntas sola confertur. " Dis," inquit, " nihil aliud praestare possumus." Sed si huic quoque, cui referre gratiam debeo, nihil aliud praestare possum, quid est, quare non eo adversus hominem gratus sim, quo nihil amplius in deos confero?

Yet if you ask what I think, and wish to mark my answer: let this man judge that he has received the benefit, let that one know that he has not returned it; let this one release him, let that one hold himself bound; let this one say, "I have it," let that one answer, "I owe."

Si tamen quaeris, quid sentiam, et vis signare responsum, hic beneficium recepisse se iudicet, ille se sciat non reddidisse; hic illum dimittat, ille se teneat; hic dicat: " Habeo," ille respondeat: " Debeo.

In every question let the public good be our aim; excuses must be shut off from the ungrateful, to which they cannot flee back and under which they may hide their denial. "I did everything." Do it still. What?

" In omni quaestione propositum sit nobis bonum publicum; praecludendae sunt excusationes ingratis, ad quas refugere non possint et sub quibus infitiationem suam tegere. " Omnia feci." Fac etiamnunc. Quid?

Do you judge our ancestors to have been so imprudent as not to understand that it is most unfair to hold in the same place the man who took the money he had received from a creditor for his lust or for the dice, and the man who lost others’ goods with his own by fire or robbery or some sadder chance? They accepted no excuse, that men might know that faith must at all costs be kept; for it was better that even a just excuse not be accepted from a few than that some be attempted by all. You did everything to repay;

tu tam imprudentes iudicas maiores nostros fuisse, ut non intellegerent iniquissimum esse eodem loco haberi eum, qui pecuniam, quam a creditore acceperat, libidini aut aleae adsumpsit, et eum, qui incendio aut latrocinio aut aliquo casu tristiore aliena cum suis perdidit? Nullam excusationem receperunt, ut homines scirent fidem utique praestandam; satius enim erat a paucis etiam iustam excusationem non accipi quam ab omnibus aliquam temptari. Omnia fecisti, ut redderes;

let this suffice for him, too little for you. For as he, if he suffers strenuous and assiduous effort to pass for void, to whom the favor is to be returned, is unworthy, so you are ungrateful, unless you owe the more gladly to him who accepts a good will as payment in full, because he releases you. Do not snatch at this nor call it to witness; seek the occasions of repaying none the less. Repay him because he demands it, this man because he remits it; that one because he is good, this man because he is bad.

hoc illi satis sit, tibi parum. Nam quemadmodum ille, si enixam et sedulam operam transire pro irrita patitur, cui gratia referatur, indignus est, ita tu ingratus es, nisi ei, qui voluntatem bonam in solutum accipit, eo libentius debes, quia dimittens. Non rapias hoc nec testeris; occasiones reddendi nihilo minus quaeras. Redde illi, quia repetit, huic, quia remittit; illi, quia bonus est, huic, quia malus.

And therefore there is no reason for you to judge that this question pertains to you — whether one ought to repay a benefit which he received from a wise man, if that man has ceased to be wise and turned to evil. For you would return even a deposit which you had received from a wise man, even to a bad man; you would return a loan. What reason is there why not a benefit too? Because he is changed, should he change you? What?

Ideoque hanc quaestionem non est quod ad te iudices pertinere, an, quod beneficium quis a sapiente accepit, reddere debeat, si ille desiit esse sapiens et in malum versus est. Redderes enim et depositum, quod a sapiente accepisses, etiam malo, redderes creditum. Quid est, cur non et beneficium? Quia mutatus est, ille te mutet? Quid?

If you had received something from a healthy man, would you not return it to a sick one, since we always owe more to a weak friend? And this man is sick in mind; let him be helped, let him be borne with. Folly is a disease of the mind.

Si quid a sano accepisses, aegro non redderes, cum plus semper imbecillo amico debeamus? Et hic aeger est animo; adiuvetur, feratur. Stultitia morbus est animi.

This must be distinguished, I think, that it may be the better understood. There are two benefits: one which none but a wise man can give to a wise man — this is the absolute and true benefit; the other common, plebeian, the commerce of which is among us, the unskilled.

Drstinguendum hoc, quo magis intellegatur, existimo. Duo sunt beneficia: unum, quod dare nisi sapiens sapienti non potest; hoc est absolutum et verum beneficium; alterum vulgare, plebeium, cuius inter nos imperitos commercium est.

Of this there is no doubt that, whatever he is, I ought to repay it to him, whether he has turned out a murderer or a thief or an adulterer. Crimes have their own laws; a judge mends those men better than an ingrate. Let no one make you bad because he is so. To a bad man I shall throw away the benefit, to a good man repay it — to the latter because I owe, to the former that I may not owe.

De hoc non est dubium, quin illi, qualiscumque est, debeam reddere, sive homicida sive fur sive adulter evasit. Habent scelera leges suas; melius istos iudex quam ingratus emendat. Nemo te malum, quia est, faciat. Malo beneficium proiciam, bono reddam, huic, quia debeo, illi, ne debeam.

About the other kind of benefit there is doubt, since, if I could not receive it except as a wise man, I cannot even repay it except to a wise man. "For suppose I repay: he cannot receive it, he is no longer capable of this thing, he has lost the knowledge of using it. What, if you bid me return a ball to one who cannot catch it? It is foolish to give someone what he cannot receive." That I may begin my answer from the last point: I shall not give anyone what he will not be able to receive; I shall repay, even if he will not be able to receive it. For I cannot put under obligation any but a receiver; I can only be freed, if I have repaid. He will not be able to use it? Let him see to that; the fault will be his, not mine.

De altero beneficii genere dubitatur, quod si accipere non potui nisi sapiens, ne reddere quidem nisi sapienti possum. " Puta enim me reddere: ille non potest recipere, non est iam huius rei capax, scientiam utendi perdidit. Quid, si me remittere maneo pilam iubeas? Stultum est dare alicui, quod accipere non possit." Ut respondere ab ultimo incipiam: non dabo ulli, quod accipere non poterit; reddam, etiam si recipere non poterit. Obligare enim non possum nisi accipientem; liberari tantum, si reddidi, possum. Ille uti illo non poterit? Viderit; penes illum erit culpa, non penes me.

"To repay," he says, "is to have handed over to one who will receive. For what? if you owe someone wine and he bids you pour it for him into a net or a sieve, will you say you have repaid it? Or will you wish to repay what, while it is being repaid, perishes between the two?"

" Reddere est," inquit, " accepturo tradidisse. Quid enim? si cui vinum debeas et hoc ille te infundere reticulo iubeat aut cribro, reddidisse te dices? Aut reddere voles, quod, dum redditur, inter duos pereat? "

To repay is to give what you owe to him whose it is, when he wishes it. This one thing I must furnish. That he should keep what he received from me is now a matter of further care; I owe him not guardianship, but good faith, and it is much better that he not have it than that I not repay.

Reddere est id, quod debeas, ei, cuius est, volenti dare. Hoc unum mihi praestandum est. Ut quidem habeat, quod a me accepit, iam ulterioris est curae; non tutelam illi, sed fidem debeo, multoque satius est illum non habere, quam me non reddere.

And I shall repay the creditor who is going to carry at once into the meat-market what he receives; even if he assigns to me an adulteress to whom I should pay it, I shall pay; and if he, ungirt, will pour into his own lap the coins he receives, I shall give them. For I must repay, not keep safe, when I have repaid, and guard; of a benefit received, not repaid, I owe the keeping. While it is with me, let it be safe; for the rest, though it flow out of the receiver’s hands, it must be given to him who demands it. I shall repay the good man when it is convenient, the bad when he asks.

Et creditori statim in macellum laturo, quod acceperit, reddam; etiam si mihi adulteram, cui monerem, delegaverit, solvam; et, si nummos, quos accipiet, in sinum suum discinctus infundet, dabo. Reddendum enim mihi est, non servandum, cum reddidero, ac tuendum; beneficii accepti, non redditi, custodiam debeo. Dum apud me est, salvum sit; ceterum, licet accipientis manibus effluat, dandum est reposcenti. Reddam bono, cum expediet, malo, cum petet.

"You cannot," he says, "repay him such a benefit as you received; for you received from a wise man, you repay to a fool." No; I repay him such as he can now receive, nor is it through me that I repay worse what I received, but through him; to whom, if he returns to wisdom, I shall repay such as I received; while he is among the bad, I shall repay such as can be received from him.

" Tale," inquit, " illi beneficium, quale accepisti, non potes reddere; accepisti enim a sapiente, stulto reddis." Non; reddo illi, quale nunc potest recipere, nec per me fit, quod deterius id, quod accepi, reddam, sed per illum, cui, si ad sapientiam redierit, reddam, quale accepi; dum in malis est, reddam, quale ab illo potest accipi.

"What? if," he says, "he has become not only bad, but savage, but monstrous, like Apollodorus or Phalaris — will you repay even this man the benefit you had received?" So great a change nature does not suffer in a wise man. He does not lapse from the best into the worst; he must keep, even in evil, traces of the good; never is virtue so extinguished as not to imprint on the mind marks too sure for any change to erase.

" Quid? si," inquit, " non tantum malus factus est, sed ferus, sed immanis, qualis Apollodorus aut Phalaris,et huic beneficium,quod acceperas,reddes?" Mutationem sapientis tantam natura non patitur. Non in pessima ab optimis lapsus; necesse est etiam in malo vestigia boni teneat; numquam tantum virtus extinguitur, ut non certiores animo notas imprimat, quam ut illas eradat ulla mutatio.

Wild beasts reared among us, if they have broken out into the woods, retain something of their former tameness, and are as far from the most placid as from true wild beasts that have never suffered a human hand. No one falls into the height of wickedness who ever clung to wisdom; he is dyed too deep to be wholly washed out and to pass into the bad color.

Ferae inter nos educatae si in silvas eruperunt, aliquid mansuetudinis pristinae retinent tantumque a placidissimis absunt, quantum a veris feris et numquam humanam manum passis. Nemo in summam nequitiam incidit, qui umquam haesit sapientiae; altius infectus est, quam ut ex toto elui et transire in colorem malum possit.

Then I ask whether that man is savage only in mind, or whether he also runs out to the public ruin? For you proposed to me Phalaris and another tyrant. If the bad man has their nature within himself, why should I not repay him his benefit, that I may have no further right in common with him?

Deinde interrogo, utrum iste ferus sit animo tantum, an et in perniciem publicam excurrat? Proposuisti enim mihi Phalarim et alterum tyrannum, quorum si naturam habet intra se malus, quidni ego isti beneficium suum reddam, ne quid mihi cum illo iuris sit amplius?

But if he not only rejoices in human blood, but feeds on it, and exercises his insatiable cruelty in the torments of every age, and rages not from anger but from a certain greed of cruelty, if he butchers children in the sight of their parents, if, not content with simple death, he tortures, and not only burns those about to perish, but stews them, if his citadel is always wet with fresh gore — it is too little not to repay this man a benefit! Whatever there was by which he clung to me, the severed fellowship of human right has cut away.

Si vero sanguine humano non tantum gaudet, sed pascitur, sed et suppliciis omnium aetatium crudelitatem insatiabilem exercet nec ira sed aviditate quadam saeviendi furit, si in ore parentium liberos iugulat, si non contentus simplici morte distorquet nec urit solum perituros, sed excoquit, si arx eius cruore semper recenti madet, parum est huic beneficium non reddere! Quidquid erat, quo mihi cohaereret, intercisa iuris humani societas abscidit.

If indeed he had furnished me something, but were bringing arms against my country, he would have lost whatever he had earned, and to return him the favor would be held a crime. If he does not assail my country, but is grievous to his own and, set apart from my nation, harasses and tears his own, none the less so great a depravity of mind makes him, even if not my enemy, hateful to me, and prior and more weighty to me is the reckoning of that duty which I owe to the human race than that which I owe to one man.

Si praestitisset quidem aliquid mihi, sed arma patriae meae inferret, quidquid meruerat, perdidisset, et referre illi gratiam scelus haberetur. Si non patriam meam impugnat, sed suae gravis est et sepositus a mea gente suam exagitat, abscindit, nihilo minus illum tanta pravitas animi, etiam si non inimicum, invisum mihi efficit, priorque mihi ac potior eius officii ratio est, quod humano generi, quam quod uni homini debeo.

But although this is so, and from that time all things toward him are free to me, from the time at which, by his corrupting, he has made every divine law void, so that nothing against him is impious, I shall believe a certain measure to be kept by me: so that, if my benefit will neither give him greater forces toward the common destruction nor confirm those he has — but it will be such as can be repaid him without public ruin — I shall repay it. I shall save his infant son;

Sed quamvis hoc ita sit et ex eo tempore omnia mihi in illum libera sint, ex quo corrumpendo fas omne, ut nihil in eum nefas esset, effecerit, illum mihi servandum modum credam, ut, si beneficium illi meum neque vires maiores daturum est in exitium commune nec confirmaturum, quas habet, id autem erit, quod illi reddi sine pernicie publica possit, reddam. Servabo filium eius infantem;

what does this benefit harm any of those whom his cruelty mangles? I shall not supply money to keep a bodyguard on pay. If he desires marbles and garments, it will harm no one, that by which his luxury is equipped; soldiers and arms I shall not furnish.

quid hoc beneficium obest cuiquam eorum, quos crudelitas eius lacerat? Pecuniam, quae satellitem stipendio teneat, non subministrabo. Si marmora et vestes desideraverit, nihil oberit cuiquam id, quo luxuria eius instruitur; militem et arma non suggeram.

If he asks for a great gift — the artists of the stage and harlots and what may soften his ferocity — I shall gladly offer it. To one to whom I would not send triremes and bronze-beaked ships, I shall send pleasure-craft and cabined boats and the other playthings of kings wantoning at sea. And if his sanity is wholly despaired of, I shall give a benefit to all and repay it to him by the same hand; since for such natures death is the remedy, and it is best for one to depart who will never return to himself.

Si pro magno petet munere artifices scenae et scorta et quae feritatem eius emolliant, libens offeram. Cui triremes et aeratas non mitterem, lusorias et cubiculatas et alia ludibria regum in mari lascivientium mittam. Et si ex toto desperata eius sanitas fuerit, eadem manu beneficium omnibus dabo, illi reddam; quoniam ingeniis talibus exitus remedium est optimumque est abire ei, qui ad se numquam rediturus est.

But this wickedness is rare and always held in the place of a portent, like a gaping of the earth and an eruption of fires from the caverns of the sea; and so let us withdraw from it and speak of those vices which we detest without horror.

Sed haec rara nequitia est semper portenti loco habita, sicut hiatus terrae et e cavernis maris ignium eruptio; itaque ab illa recedamus, de iis loquamur vitiis, quae detestamur sine horrore.

To this bad man, whom I can find in any forum, whom individuals fear, I shall repay the benefit I received. It is not right that his wickedness profit me; what is not mine, let it return to its owner. Whether he be good or bad, what difference does it make? I should diligently sift that, if I were not repaying, but giving.

Huic homini malo, quem invenire in quolibet foro possum, quem singuli timent, reddam beneficium, quod accepi. Non oportet mihi nequitiam eius prodesse; quod meum non est, redeat ad dominum. Bonus sit an malus, quid differt? Diligenter istud excuterem, si non redderem, sed darem.

This place calls for a tale. A certain Pythagorean had bought shoes from a cobbler — a great matter — not with ready cash. After some days he came to the shop to repay, and, when he had long knocked at the closed door, there was one who said: "Why do you waste your effort? That cobbler whom you seek is carried out, burned; which is perhaps grievous to us, who lose our own forever, but not at all to you, who know that he will be reborn" — jesting at the Pythagorean. But our philosopher carried home the three or four denarii with a not-unwilling hand, shaking them now and then; then, when he had reproached this silent pleasure of his in not repaying, understanding that that little gain had smiled on him, he returned to the same shop and said: "He lives for you; repay what you owe." Then through the chink, where the joining had loosened, he inserted four denarii into the shop and pushed them in, exacting from himself a penalty for his base greed, lest he grow used to another’s property.

Hic locus fabulam poscit. Pythagoricus quidam emerat a sutore phaecasia, rem magnam, non praesentibus nummis. Post aliquot dies venit ad tabernam redditurus et, cum elusam diu pulsaret, fuit, qui diceret: " Quid perdis operam? Sutor ille, quem quaeris, elatus, combustus est; quod nobis fortasse molestum est, qui in aeternum nostros amittimus, tibi minime, qui scis futurum, ut renascatur," iocatus in Pythagoricum. At philosophus noster tres aut quattuor denarios non invita manu domum rettulit subinde concutiens; deinde, cum reprehendisset hanc suam non reddendi tacitam voluptatem, intellegens arrisisse illud lucellum sibi redit ad eandem tabernam et ait: " Ille tibi vivit; redde, quod debes." Deinde per clostrum, qua se commissura laxaverat, quattuor denarios in tabernam inseruit ac misit poenas a se exigens improbae cupiditatis, ne alieno adsuesceret.

Seek to whom you may repay what you owe, and, if no one demands it, summon yourself. Whether bad or good does not concern you; repay and accuse. You have forgotten how the duties are divided between you: oblivion is commanded to him, to remember we have charged you. Yet he errs who thinks that, when we say that he who gave a benefit ought to forget, we shake from him the memory of a thing especially most honorable; we prescribe certain things beyond measure, that they may return to the true and their own. When we say:

Quod debes, quaere, cui reddas, et, si nemo poscet, ipse te appella. Malus an bonus, ad te non pertinet; redde et accusa. Oblitus es, quemadmodum inter vos officia divisa sint: illi oblivio imperata est, tibi meminisse mandavimus. Errat tamen, si quis existimat, cum dicimus eum, qui beneficium dedit, oblivisci oportere, excutere nos illi memoriam rei praesertim honestissimae; quaedam praecipimus ultra modum, ut ad verum et suum redeant. Cum dicimus:

"He ought not to remember," we wish this understood: "He ought not to proclaim it, nor boast, nor be burdensome." For some narrate the benefit they have given in all circles; this they speak sober, this drunk they cannot contain, this they thrust on strangers, this they commit to friends; that this excessive and reproachful memory might subside, we bade him who gave forget, and, by commanding more than could be furnished, we counseled silence.

" Meminisse non debet," hoc volumus intellegi: " Praedicare non debet nec iactare nec gravis esse." Quidam enim beneficium, quod dederunt, omnibus circulis narrant; hoc sobrii locuntur, hoc ebrii non continent, hoc ignotis ingerunt, hoc amicis committunt; ut haec nimia et exprobratrix memoria subsideret, oblivisci eum, qui dedit, iussimus et plus imperando, quam praestari poterat, silentium suasimus.

As often as there is too little confidence in those whom you command, more must be exacted than is enough, that as much as is enough may be furnished. In this all hyperbole is stretched, that it may come to the truth by a falsehood. And so that poet, when he said "Who in whiteness would outstrip the snows, in racing the breezes," said what could not be, that it might be believed how very much it could be. And he who said "More immovable than these rocks, more violent than a river," did not think even this — that he would persuade anyone that anyone was as immovable as a rock.

Quotiens parum fiduciae est in iis, quibus imperes, amplius exigendum est, quam sat est, ut praestetur, quantum sat est. In hoc omnis hyperbole extenditur, ut ad verum mendacio veniat. Itaque ille, cum dixit: Qui candore nives anteirent, cursibus auras, quod non poterat fieri, dixit, ut crederetur, quantum plurimum posset. Et qui dixit: His inmobilior scopulis, violentior amne, ne hoc quidem se persuasurum putavit aliquem tam immobilem esse quam scopulum.

Never does hyperbole hope for as much as it dares, but affirms incredible things, that it may arrive at the credible. When we say, "Let him who gave a benefit forget," we say this: "Let him be like one who has forgotten; let the memory of it not appear nor obtrude." When we say a benefit ought not to be demanded back, we do not wholly remove the demanding back;

Numquam tantum sperat hyperbole, quantum audet, sed incredibilia adfirmat, ut ad credibilia perveniat. Cum dicimus: " Qui beneficium dedit, obliviscatur," hoc dicimus: " Similis sit oblito; memoria eius non appareat nec incurrat." Cum dicimus beneficium repeti non oportere, non ex toto repetitionem tollimus;

for often the bad need an exactor, even the good a reminder. What then? Shall I not point out the occasion to one who is ignorant? Shall I not disclose to him my necessities? Why should he either pretend or be sorry that he did not know? Let an admonition intervene sometimes, but a modest one, which neither demands nor summons to court.

saepe enim opus est malis exactore, etiam bonis admonitione. Quid ergo? Occasionem ignoranti non ostendam? Necessitates illi meas non detegam? Quare nescisse se aut mentiatur aut doleat? Interveniat aliquando admonitio, sed verecunda, quae non poscat nec in ius vocet.

Socrates, his friends hearing, said: "I would have bought a cloak, if I had the money." He asked no one, he reminded all. From whom he should receive was a matter of competition; why not? For how little it was that Socrates received! But it was much to have been one from whom Socrates received. Could he have chastised them more gently?

Socrates amicis audientibus: " Emissem," inquit, " pallium, si nummos haberem." Neminem poposcit, omnes admonuit. A quo acciperet, ambitus fuit; quidni esset? Quantulum enim erat, quod Socrates accipiebat! At multum erat eum fuisse, a quo Socrates acciperet. Num illos castigare mollius potuit?

"I would have bought a cloak," he said, "if I had the money." After this, whoever hastened, gave too late; already it was lacking to Socrates. On account of harsh exactors we forbid demanding back — not that it never be done, but that it be done sparingly.

" Emissem," inquit, " pallium, si nummos haberem." Post hoc quisquis properaverit, sero dat; iam Socrati defuit. Propter acerbos exactores repetere prohibemus, non, ut numquam fiat, sed ut parce.

Aristippus, once delighted by a perfume, said: "Ill befall those effeminates who have brought so fine a thing into ill repute!" Likewise it must be said: "Ill befall those wicked and importunate fourfold-extortioners of their own benefits, who have abolished so fine a thing — admonition among friends!" Yet I shall use this right of friendship and demand a benefit back from him from whom I would have asked it, who will receive it in the place of another benefit — that he was able to repay.

Aristippus aliquando delectatus unguento: " Male," inquit, " istis effeminatis eveniat, qui rem tam bellam infamaverunt." Item dicendum est: " Male istis improbis et importunis beneficiorum suorum quadriplatoribus eveniat, qui tam bellam rem, admonitionem inter amicos, sustulerunt! " Ego tamen utar hoc iure amicitiae et beneficium ab eo repetam, a quo petissem, qui alterius beneficii loco accepturus est potuisse reddere.

Never, not even complaining, shall I say: "Cast up on the shore, in want, I took him in and madly set him in a share of my kingdom." That is no admonition, it is abuse; this is to lead benefits into hatred, this is to bring it about that to be ungrateful is either permitted or pleases. It is enough and abundantly enough to recall the memory in lowered and familiar words: "If I have deserved well anything of you, if anything of mine was sweet to you." Let him in turn say: "Why should you not have deserved well? Cast up on the shore, in want, you took me in."

Numquam ne querens quidem dicam: eiectum litore, egentem excepi et regni demens in parte locavi. Non est ista admonitio, convicium est; hoc est in odium beneficia perducere, hoc est efficere, ut ingratum esse aut liceat aut iuvet. Satis abundeque est submissis et familiaribus verbis memoriam revocare: si bene quid de te merui, fuit aut tibi quicquam dulce meum. Ille in vicem dicat: " Quidni merueris? Eiectum litore, egentem excepisti."

"But we make no progress," he says; "he dissembles, he has forgotten: what ought I to do?" You ask a most necessary thing, and one in which it befits this material to be brought to completion — how the ungrateful are to be borne.

"Sed nihil," inquit, " proficimus; dissimulat, oblitus est: quid facere debeam? " Quaeris rem maxime necessariam et in qua hanc materiam consummati decet, quemadmodum ingrati ferendi sint.

With a placid mind, gentle, great. Never let one so inhuman and unmindful and ungrateful offend you so that it nevertheless not please you to have given; never let the injury drive you into these words: "I wish I had not done it." Let even the ill-success of your benefit please you; he will always repent of it, if you do not even now repent. There is no reason for you to be indignant, as though something new had happened; you ought rather to wonder, if it had not happened.

Placido animo, mansueto, magno. Numquam te tam inhumanus et immemor et ingratus offendat, ut non tamen dedisse delectet; numquam in has voces iniuria impellat: " Vellem, non fecissem." Beneficii tui tibi etiam infelicitas placeat; semper illum paenitebit, si te ne nunc quidem paenitet. Non est, quod indigneris, tamquam aliquid novi acciderit; magis mirari deberes, si non accidisset.

One is deterred by the labor, another by the expense, another by the danger, another by a base shame — lest, while he repays, he confess he received; another by ignorance of duty, another by laziness, another by occupation. Look how the immense desires of men ever gape and demand; you will not wonder that no one there repays, where no one has received enough.

Alium labor, alium impensa deterret, alium periculum, alium turpis verecundia, ne, dum reddit, fateatur accepisse, alium ignorantia officii, alium pigritia, alium occupatio. Adspice, quemadmodum immensae hominum cupiditates hient semper et poscant; non miraberis ibi neminem reddere, ubi nemo satis accepit.

Who of these is of so firm and solid a mind that you may safely deposit benefits with him? One is mad with lust, another serves his belly; another is wholly of gain, whose total, not whose ways, he regards; another labors with envy, another with blind ambition rushing onto swords. Add the torpor of the mind and dotage, and, the contrary of this, the agitation and perpetual tumults of a restless breast; add too high an estimate of oneself and a swelling, insolent for the very things for which he is to be despised. What shall I say of the obstinacy of those striving after perverse things, what of the fickleness ever leaping somewhere else?

Quis est istorum tam firmae mentis ac solidae, ut tuto apud eum beneficia deponas? Alius libidine insanit, alius abdomini servit; alius lucri totus est, cuius summam, non vias, spectat; alius invidia laborat, alius caeca ambitione et in gladios irruente. Adice torporem mentis ac senium et contraria huic inquieti pectoris agitationem tumultusque perpetuos; adice aestimationem sui nimiam et tumorem, ob quae contemnendus est, insolentem. Quid contumaciam dicam in perversa nitentium, quid levitatem semper aliquo transilientem?

Add to this headlong rashness and fear, never about to give faithful counsel, and the thousand errors by which we are rolled: the audacity of the most timid, the discord of the most intimate, and — the public evil — to trust the most uncertain things, to disdain things possessed which there was no hope of being able to attain. Among the most restless passions do you seek the most quiet thing, faith?

Hoc accedat temeritas praeceps et numquam fidele consilium daturus timor et mille errores, quibus volvimur: audacia timidissimorum, discordia familiarissimorum et, publicum malum, incertissimis fidere, fastidire possessa, quae consequi posse spes non fuit. Inter adfectus inquietissimos rem quietissimam, fidem, quaeris?

If a true image of our life occurs to you, you will seem to yourself to see the face of a city at the very moment of its capture, in which, the regard for modesty and right laid aside, force is in council, as though the signal had been given for confounding all things. Neither from fire nor from sword is there abstaining; crimes are loosed from laws; not even religion, which has sheltered suppliants amid hostile arms, is any hindrance to those rushing on the plunder.

Si tibi vitae nostrae vera imago succurret, videre1 videberis tibi captae cum maxime civitatis faciem, in qua omisso pudoris rectique respectu vires in concilio sunt velut signo ad permiscenda omnia dato. Non igni, non ferro abstinetur; soluta legibus scelera sunt; ne religio quidem, quae inter arma hostilia supplices texit, ullum impedimentum est ruentium in praedam.

This man snatches from the private, this from the public, this from the profane, this from the sacred; this breaks in, this leaps over; this, not content with a narrow path, overturns the very things by which he is barred and comes to gain by ruin; this plunders without slaughter, this carries spoils in a bloody hand; no one does not carry off something from another. In this greed of the human race, O, you have too much forgotten the common fortune, who seek, among the plunderers, one who returns!

Hic ex privato, hic ex publico, hic ex profano, hic ex sacro rapit; hic effringit, hic transilit; hic non contentus angusto itinere ipsa, quibus arcetur, evertit et in lucrum ruina venit; hic sine caede populatur, hic spolia cruenta manu gestat; nemo non fert aliquid ex altero. In hae aviditate generis humani o ne tu nimis fortunae communis oblitus es, qui quaeris inter rapientes referentem!

If you are indignant that men are ungrateful, be indignant that they are luxurious, be indignant that they are greedy, be indignant that they are shameless, be indignant that the sick are deformed, the old pale! It is a grave vice, this, it is intolerable and such as dissociates men, as rends and scatters the concord by which our weakness is propped; but it is so far common that not even he who complains of it has escaped it.

Si indignans ingratos esse, indignare luxuriosos, indignare avaros, indignare impudicos, indignare aegros deformes, senes pallidos! Est istuc grave vitium, est intolerabile et quod dissociet homines, quod concordiam, qua imbecillitas nostra fulcitur, scindat ac dissipet, sed usque eo vulgare est, ut illud ne qui queritur quidem effugerit.

Consider with yourself whether you have returned the favor to all to whom you owed it, whether no duty ever perished with you, whether the memory of all benefits accompanies you. You will see that the things given you as a boy slipped away before adolescence, that the things conferred on you as a youth did not endure into old age. Some we have lost, some we have thrown away, some have gradually gone from our sight, from some we have turned away our eyes.

Cogita tecum, an, quibuscumque debuisti, gratiam rettuleris, an nullum umquam apud te perierit officium, an omnium te beneficiorum memoria comitetur. Videbis, quae puero data sunt, ante adulescentiam elapsa, quae in iuvenem conlata sunt, non perdurasse in senectutem. Quaedam perdidimus, quaedam proiecimus, quaedam e conspectu nostro paulatim exierunt, a quibusdam oculos avertimus.

That I may excuse to you your weakness: memory is, above all, a fragile vessel, and does not suffice for a throng of things; it must needs let out as much as it takes in, and bury the oldest under the newest. So it has come about that your nurse’s authority with you is least, because the age that followed set her benefit farther off; so it has come about that you have no reverence for your teacher; so it has fallen out that, occupied with consular matters or a candidate for priesthoods, the canvasser for your quaestorship has dropped from your mind. Perhaps the vice of which you complain, if you sift yourself diligently, you will find in your own bosom. Unfairly you are angry at a public crime, foolishly at your own; that you may be acquitted, pardon.

Ut excusem tibi imbecillitatem, imprimis vas fragile est memoria et rerum turbae non sufficit; necesse est, quantum recipit, emittat et antiquissima recentissimis obruat. Sic factum est, ut minima apud te nutricis esset auctoritas, quia beneficium eius longius aetas sequens posuit; sic factum est, ut praeceptoris tibi non esset ulla veneratio; sic evenit, ut circa consularia occupato comitia aut sacerdotiorum candidato quaesturae suffragator excideret. Fortasse vitium, de quo querens, si te diligenter excusseris, in sinu invenies. Inique publico crimini irasceris, stulte tuo; ut absolvaris, ignosce.

You will make him better by bearing with him, at any rate worse by reproaching him. There is no reason for you to harden his brow; suffer him, if there is any shame left, to keep it. Often a louder voice of one reviling has broken a wavering modesty. No one fears to be what he already seems; shame is taken from one caught out.

Meliorem illum facies ferendo, utique peiorem exprobrando. Non est, quod frontem eius indures; sine, si quid est pudoris residui, servet. Saepe dubiam verecundiam vox conviciantis clarior rupit. Nemo id esse, quod iam videtur, timet; deprenso pudor demitur.

"I have lost a benefit." Do we say we have lost the things we have consecrated? Among things consecrated is a benefit, even if it has answered ill, well conferred. He is not such as we hoped; let us be such as we were, unlike him. The loss was not made then: it appeared. The ingrate is not dragged forth without our shame, since indeed the complaint of a lost benefit is the sign of one not well given.

" Perdidi beneficium." Numquid, quae consecravimus, perdidisse nos dicimus? Inter consecrata beneficium est, etiam si male respondit, bene conlatum. Non est ille, qualem speravimus; simus nos, quales fuimus, ei dissimiles. Damnum non tunc factum: apparuit. Ingratus non sine nostro pudore protrahitur, quoniam quidem querella amissi beneficti non bene dati signum est.

As far as we can, let us plead his cause with ourselves: "Perhaps he could not, perhaps he did not know, perhaps he will do it." A slow and wise creditor has made certain debts good, who held on and fostered them by delay. The same must be done by us; let us nourish a languid good faith.

Quantum possumus, causam eius apud nos agamus: " Fortasse non potuit, fortasse ignoravit, fortasse facturus est." Quaedam nomina bona lentus et sapiens creditor fecit, qui sustinuit ac mora fovit. Idem nobis faciundum est; nutriamus fidem languidam.

"I have lost a benefit." Fool, you do not know the times of your loss! You lost it, but when you gave; now it has been made manifest. Even in these things which seem among the lost, moderation has profited most; as the vices of bodies, so of minds are to be handled gently. Often what could have been disentangled has been broken off by the violence of one pulling. What need is there of revilings? Of complaints? Of harrying? Why do you release him? Why do you dismiss him? If he is ungrateful, he now owes nothing.

" Perdidi beneficium." Stulte non nosti detrimenti tui tempora! Perdidisti, sed cum dares; nunc palam factum est. Etiam in his, quae videntur in perdito, moderatio plurimum profuit, ut corporum ita animorum molliter vitia tractanda sunt. Saepe, quod explicari pertinacia potuit, violentia trahentis abruptum est. Quid opus est maledictis? Quid querellis? Quid insectatione? Quare illum liberas? Quare dimittis? Si ingratus est, iam nihil debet.

What reason is there to exasperate one on whom you have conferred great things, so that from a doubtful friend he becomes an undoubted enemy and seeks a defense for himself in our ill-repute, nor lacks the voice: "I know not what it is that he could not bear the man to whom he owed so much; something lies beneath"? No one but, by complaining, has aspersed a superior’s dignity, even if he has not stained it; nor is anyone content to feign trifles, when by the greatness of the lie he seeks credit.

Quae ratio est exacerbare eum, in quem magna contuleris, ut ex amico dubio fiat non dubius inimicus et patrocinium sibi nostra infamia quaerat, nec desit vox: " Nescio quid est, quod eum, cui tantum debuit, ferre non potuit; subest aliquid "? Nemo non superioris dignitatem querendo, etiam si non inquinavit, adspersit; nec quisquam fingere contentus est levia, cum magnitudine mendacii fidem quaerat.

How much better is that way, by which the appearance of friendship is preserved for him and, if he wishes to return to sanity, even his friendship! Persistent goodness conquers the bad, nor is anyone of so hard and hostile a mind toward things to be loved as not to love the good even in injury, to whom he has begun to owe this too — that he does not pay with impunity. Toward this, then, bend your thoughts:

Quanto illa melior via, qua servatur illi species amicitiae et, si reverti ad sanitatem velit, etiam amicitia! Vincit malos pertinax bonitas, nec quisquam tam duri infestique adversus diligenda animi est, ut etiam in iniuria bonos non amet, quibus hoc quoque coepit debere, quod impune non solvit. Ad illa itaque cogitationes tuas flecte:

"The favor has not been returned to me; what shall I do? What the gods do, those best authors of all things, who begin to give benefits to one ignorant and persevere with the ungrateful.

“Non est relata mihi gratia; quid faciam? Quod di, omnium rerum optimi auctores, qui beneficia ignoranti dare incipiunt, ingratis perseverant.

One reproaches them with neglect of us, another with injustice; another casts them outside their world and abandons them, sluggish and dull, without light, without any work; another calls the sun — to which we owe that we have divided the time between labor and rest, that, not plunged in darkness, we escape the confusion of eternal night; which tempers the year by its course and nourishes bodies, calls forth the crops, ripens the fruits — some rock, or a ball of chance fires, and anything rather than a god.

Alius illis obicit neclegentiam nostri, alius iniquitatem; alius illos extra mundum suum proicit et ignavos hebetesque sine luce, sine ullo opere destituit; alius solem, cui debemus, quod inter laborem quietemque tempus divisimus, quod non tenebris mersi confusionem aeternae noctis effugimus, qui annum cursu suo temperat et corpora alit, sata evocat, percoquit fructus, saxum aliquod aut fortuitorum ignium globum et quidvis potius quam deum appellat.

None the less, after the manner of the best parents, who smile at the revilings of their infants, the gods do not cease to heap benefits on those doubting of the author of benefits, but with even tenor distribute their goods through nations and peoples; allotted the one power, to profit, they sprinkle the lands with seasonable rains, move the seas with their breath, mark the seasons by the course of the stars, soften winters and summers by the intervention of a gentler breath, and, placid and propitious, bear the error of straying souls. Let us imitate them;

Nihilo minus tamen more optimorum parentium, qui maledictis suorum infantium arrident, non cessant di beneficia congerere de beneficiorum auctore dubitantibus, sed aequali tenore bona sua per gentes populosque distribuunt; unam potentiam, prodesse, sortiti spargunt opportunis imbribus terras, maria flatu movent, siderum cursu notant tempora, hiemes aestatesque interventu lenioris spiritus molliunt, errorem labentium animarum placidi ac propitii ferunt. Imitemur illos;

let us give, even if many things have been given in vain; let us give none the less to others, let us give to the very men with whom a loss has been made. No one has been deterred by ruin from raising houses again, and, when fire has consumed our household gods, we set foundations on the still-warm ground, and cities swallowed up we entrust again, more than once, to the same soil; so persistent is the mind toward good hopes. On land and sea human works would cease, unless it pleased men to re-attempt what was ill-attempted.

demus, etiam si multa in irritum data sunt; demus nihilo minus aliis, demus ipsis, apud quos facta iactura est. Neminem ad excitandas domos ruina deterruit, et, eum penates ignis absumpsit, fundamenta tepente adhuc area ponimus et urbes haustas saepius eidem solo credimus; adeo ad bonas spes pertinax animus est. Terra marique humana opera cessarent, nisi male temptata retemptare libuisset.

He is ungrateful: he has done an injury not to me, but to himself; I, with my benefit, when I gave it, made my use of it. Nor for that reason shall I give more grudgingly — but more carefully; what I lost in this man, I shall recover from others. But to this very man I shall give a benefit again, and, like a good farmer, by care and cultivation I shall conquer the barrenness of the soil; a benefit perishes for me, that man for mankind. It is not the mark of a great mind to give a benefit and lose it; this is the mark of a great mind — to lose and to give.

Ingratus est: non mihi fecit iniuriam, sed sibi; ego beneficio meo, cum darem, usus sum. Nec ideo pignus dabo, sed diligentius; quod in hoc perdidi, ab aliis recipiam. Sed huic ipsi beneficium dabo iterum et tamquam bonus agricola cura cultuque sterilitatem soli vincam; perit mihi beneficium, iste hominibus. Non est magni animi beneficium dare et perdere; hoc est magni animi perdere et dare.”

S eneca Entire

On Benefits

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