On Leisure
De Otio
Headnote
On Leisure is the shortest and most damaged of Seneca’s dialogues, surviving only as a fragment: the single manuscript tradition derives it by mistake from the middle of On the Happy Life, so that it opens in mid-sentence and breaks off in mid-sentence, and even its addressee and date are inferred rather than given. That addressee is almost certainly Annaeus Serenus, the younger friend and kinsman to whom On the Constancy of the Wise Man and On Tranquillity of Mind are also dedicated; the work is usually placed around AD 62, near the time Seneca was withdrawing from public life and from his role as Nero’s minister. Read against that biography, the dialogue is a Stoic’s apology for his own retirement: a defense of the contemplative life mounted from inside a school that had always insisted the wise man owes the commonwealth his active service.
The argument turns on a tension within Stoicism itself. The imagined objector throws Seneca’s own school back at him — the Stoics are the men who stay “in action right up to the last end of life” and “press the helmet down upon grey hairs” (a half-line of Virgil, Aeneid 9.612) — and accuses him of smuggling Epicurus’s quietism into Zeno’s camp. Seneca answers by distinguishing the two schools’ routes to leisure: Epicurus grants withdrawal on principle (“unless something intervenes”), Zeno only for cause (“unless something hinders”), but the Stoic cause is so wide — a corrupt state, a wise man without standing, ill health — that it covers almost any case. He then enlarges the frame with the dialogue’s central and most influential idea: there are two commonwealths, the small one of our birth (Athens, Carthage, Rome) and the “great and truly common” one “in which gods and men are contained,” whose bounds are measured by the sun. The contemplative who studies nature, divinity, and the cosmos is no idler; he serves the greater commonwealth, and serves it better in leisure than in office, so that the works of god “should not be left without a witness.”
The final movement collapses the famous division of the three lives — pleasure, contemplation, action — by showing that none exists without the others, and closes on the practical case for withdrawal: every actual state, reviewed one by one, would either reject the wise man or be unfit for him, so the ideal commonwealth being nowhere to be found, leisure “begins to be necessary for all.” The image that lands the point — a man who praises sailing yet forbids putting to sea in a storm-wracked strait — is left hanging where the text fails. Throughout, the translation keeps the Stoic technical vocabulary steady (virtus, ratio, sapiens, summum bonum, otium glossed at first occurrence) and preserves the live diatribe voice of the objector (marked by “inquit,” “you say”) against Seneca’s reply, since the whole essay is built as that exchange; the two closing sententiae — “a station, not a harbor,” “too mortal for the knowledge of things immortal” — are set to land on their point as they do in the Latin.
they commend vices to us by their broad agreement. Even if we attempt nothing else that is wholesome, it will still profit us, in itself, to withdraw: we shall be better men in isolation. And consider too that we are free to withdraw to the company of the best men and to choose some pattern by which to set the course of our life. This happens only in leisure (otium): there what once pleased us can be held fast, where no one breaks in to wrench a still-feeble judgment off its course with the crowd to help him; there life can advance on an even and unbroken tenor — that life which we tear apart by our wildly conflicting aims. For among our other evils the worst is this, that we keep changing our very vices. So we are not even granted the one consistency of staying in a fault already familiar. One thing pleases after another, and we are vexed too by this, that our judgments are not merely warped but fickle: we toss to and fro and grasp now this, now that; we abandon what we sought and seek again what we abandoned; our life swings by turns between desire and regret. For we hang wholly on the judgments of others, and that seems best to us which has many to seek and praise it, not that which deserves to be praised and sought; nor do we judge a road good or bad by itself, but by the throng of footprints on it — among which none belong to men coming back. You will say to me: "What are you saying, Seneca? Are you deserting your party? Surely your Stoics declare: ‘Right up to the last end of life we shall be in action; we shall not cease to work for the common good, to help each man, to bring aid even to our enemies with an aged hand. We are the ones who grant no exemption for any years, and who, as that most eloquent man puts it, press the helmet down upon our grey hairs; we are the ones with whom nothing before death is so far at leisure that, if circumstance allows, death itself is not at leisure either.’ Why do you preach the precepts of Epicurus to us in the very headquarters of Zeno? If you are sick of the party, why not desert outright, like a man of spirit, rather than betray it?" For the present I will give you this answer: "Do you want anything more than that I show myself like my own commanders? Then here it is: I will go not where they send me, but where they lead me."
nobis magno consensu uitia commendant. Licet nihil aliud quod sit salutare temptemus, proderit tamen per se ipsum secedere: meliores erimus singuli. Quid quod secedere ad optimos uiros et aliquod exemplum eligere ad quod uitam derigamus licet? Quod nisi in otio non fit: tunc potest optineri quod semel placuit, ubi nemo interuenit qui iudicium adhuc inbecillum populo adiutore detorqueat; tunc potest uita aequali et uno tenore procedere, quam propositis diuersissimis scindimus. 2. Nam inter cetera mala illud pessimum est, quod uitia ipsa mutamus. Sic ne hoc quidem nobis contingit, permanere in malo iam familiari. Aliud ex alio placet uexatque nos hoc quoque, quod iudicia nostra non tantum praua sed etiam leuia sunt: fluctuamur aliudque ex alio comprendimus, petita relinquimus, relicta repetimus, alternae inter cupiditatem nostram et paenitentiam uices sunt. 3. Pendemus enim toti ex alienis iudiciis et id optimum nobis uidetur quod petitores laudatoresque multos habet, non id quod laudandum petendumque est, nec uiam bonam ac malam per se aestimamus sed turba uestigiorum, in quibus nulla sunt redeuntium. Dices mihi: ’quid ais, Seneca? deseris partes? Certe Stoici uestri dicunt: "usque ad ultimum uitae finem in actu erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, adiuuare singulos, opem ferre etiam inimicis senili manu. Nos sumus qui nullis annis uacationem damus et, quod ait ille uir disertissimus, canitiem galea premimus; nos sumus apud quos usque eo nihil ante mortem otiosum est ut, si res patitur, non sit ipsa mors otiosa." Quid nobis Epicuri praecepta in ipsis Zenonis principiis loqueris? Quin tu bene gnauiter, si partium piget, transfugis potius quam prodis?’ 5. Hoc tibi in praesentia respondebo: ’numquid uis amplius quam ut me similem ducibus meis praestem? Quid ergo est? non quo miserint me illi, sed quo duxerint ibo.’
Now I will prove to you that I am not breaking away from the precepts of the Stoics — for not even they broke away from their own; and yet I would be wholly excused even if I followed not their precepts but their examples. What I am saying I will divide into two parts. First, that a man may, even from his earliest years, hand himself over entirely to the contemplation of truth, seek out a method of living, and practice it in seclusion; second, that a man may do this once his term of service is discharged, when his years are far spent, and with the best of right turn his mind to other tasks, after the manner of the Vestal Virgins, who, with their years parceled out among their duties, first learn to perform the rites and, once they have learned, teach them.
Nunc probabo tibi non desciscere me a praeceptis Stoicorum; nam ne ipsi quidem a suis desciuerunt, et tamen excusatissimus essem, etiam si non praecepta illorum sequerer sed exempla. Hoc quod dico in duas diuidam partes: primum, ut possit aliquis uel a prima aetate contemplationi ueritatis totum se tradere, rationem uiuendi quaerere atque exercere secreto; 2. deinde, ut possit hoc aliquis emeritis stipendiis, profligatae aetatis, iure optimo facere et ad alios actus animos referre, uirginum Vestalium more, quae annis inter officia diuisis discunt facere sacra et cum didicerunt docent.
That this too is approved by the Stoics I will show — not because I have laid down a law for myself to commit nothing against the word of Zeno or Chrysippus, but because the matter itself allows me to go over to their view; for if a man always follows one single authority, his place is not in the senate-house but in a faction. Would that all things were already grasped, that truth stood open and confessed, and that we changed nothing of our doctrines! As it is, we are still searching for truth alongside the very men who teach it. Two schools above all are at odds on this matter, the Epicureans and the Stoics, but each sends a man to leisure by a different road. Epicurus says: "The wise man will not approach public affairs unless something intervenes"; Zeno says: "He will approach public affairs unless something hinders him." The one seeks leisure on principle, the other for cause; and that cause stands wide open. If the commonwealth is too corrupt to be helped, if it is in the grip of evils, the wise man will not strain to no purpose nor spend himself when he will do no good; if he has too little authority or strength, and the commonwealth will not admit him, if his health hinders him, then — just as he would not launch a battered ship onto the sea, just as a cripple would not enroll himself for military service — so he will not set out on a course he knows to be unfit for him. And so even the man for whom all things are still untouched, before he has met any storms, may take his stand in safety and at once devote himself to the good arts and live out an unbroken leisure, a cultivator of the virtues — which can be practiced even by men entirely at rest. This, surely, is what is required of a man: that he be of use to men — if it can be, to many; if not, to few; if not, to those nearest him; if not, to himself. For when he makes himself useful to others, he conducts a common business. Just as the man who makes himself worse harms not only himself but also all those whom, had he bettered himself, he might have helped, so whoever serves his own good well does others good by this very fact, that he is preparing one who will help them.
Hoc Stoicis quoque placere ostendam, non quia mihi legem dixerim nihil contra dictum Zenonis Chrysippiue committere, sed quia res ipsa patitur me ire in illorum sententiam, quoniam si quis semper unius sequitur, non in curia sed in factione est. Vtinam quidem iam tenerentur omnia et in aperto et confesso ueritas esset nihilque ex decretis mutaremus! nunc ueritatem cum eis ipsis qui docent quaerimus. Duae maxime et in hac re dissident sectae, Epicureorum et Stoicorum, sed utraque ad otium diuersa uia mittit. Epicurus ait: ’non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens, nisi si quid interuenerit’; Zenon ait: ’accedet ad rem publicam, nisi si quid inpedierit.’ 3. Alter otium ex proposito petit, alter ex causa; causa autem illa late patet. Si res publica corruptior est quam ut adiuuari possit, si occupata est malis, non nitetur sapiens in superuacuum nec se nihil profuturus inpendet; si parum habebit auctoritatis aut uirium nec illum erit admissura res publica, si ualetudo illum inpediet, quomodo nauem quassam non deduceret in mare, quomodo nomen in militiam non daret debilis, sic ad iter quod inhabile sciet non accedet. 4. Potest ergo et ille cui omnia adhuc in integro sunt, antequam ullas experiatur tempestates, in tuto subsistere et protinus commendare se bonis artibus et inlibatum otium exigere, uirtutium cultor, quae exerceri etiam quietissimis possunt. 5. Hoc nempe ab homine exigitur, ut prosit hominibus, si fieri potest, multis, si minus, paucis, si minus, proximis, si minus, sibi. Nam cum se utilem ceteris efficit, commune agit negotium. Quomodo qui se deteriorem facit non sibi tantummodo nocet sed etiam omnibus eis quibus melior factus prodesse potuisset, sic quisquis bene de se meretur hoc ipso aliis prodest quod illis profuturum parat.
Let us grasp in our minds two commonwealths: one great and truly common, in which gods and men are contained, in which we look not to this corner or that but measure the bounds of our state by the sun; the other, the one to which the accident of our birth has assigned us — this will be the commonwealth of the Athenians or the Carthaginians or some other city that belongs not to all men but to a certain few. Some give their service to both commonwealths at once, the greater and the lesser; some only to the lesser; some only to the greater. This greater commonwealth we can serve even in leisure — indeed, I rather think we serve it better in leisure: by asking what virtue is, whether it is one or many; whether nature or training makes men good; whether this single thing that embraces the seas and lands and all that is set within sea and land is one, or whether god has scattered many bodies of this kind; whether the matter from which all things are generated is continuous and full throughout, or broken up, with void mingled among the solids; what the seat of god is, whether he looks on at his own work or handles it, whether he is poured around it from without or set within the whole; whether the universe is immortal, or to be counted among the things that perish and are born for a time. And the man who contemplates these things — what does he render to god? That such great works of his should not be left without a witness.
Duas res publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et uere publicam qua di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum sed terminos ciuitatis nostrae cum sole metimur, alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi; haec aut Atheniensium erit aut Carthaginiensium aut alterius alicuius urbis quae non ad omnis pertineat homines sed ad certos. Quidam eodem tempore utrique rei publicae dant operam, maiori minorique, quidam tantum minori, quidam tantum maiori. 2. Huic maiori rei publicae et in otio deseruire possumus, immo uero nescio an in otio melius, ut quaeramus quid sit uirtus, una pluresne sint, natura an ars bonos uiros faciat; unum sit hoc quod maria terrasque et mari ac terris inserta complectitur, an multa eiusmodi corpora deus sparserit; continua sit omnis et plena materia ex qua cuncta gignuntur, an diducta et solidis inane permixtum; quae sit dei sedes, opus suum spectet an tractet, utrumne extrinsecus illi circumfusus sit an toti inditus; inmortalis sit mundus an inter caduca et ad tempus nata numerandus. Haec qui contemplatur, quid deo praestat? ne tanta eius opera sine teste sint.
We are accustomed to say that the highest good is to live in accordance with nature: nature begot us for both — for the contemplation of things and for action. Now let us prove what we said before. And further: will this not be proven if each man consults himself as to how great a longing he has to know the unknown, how he is roused by every tale? Some men set sail and endure the toils of the longest journey for the one reward of coming to know something hidden and far off. This is what draws whole peoples together to spectacles, this is what compels them to pry into what is shut away, to search out things more secret, to unroll antiquities, to hear of the customs of barbarian nations. Nature gave us an inquisitive mind, and, conscious of her own art and beauty, she begot us as spectators of such great spectacles of things — meaning to lose the fruit of herself if works so vast, so bright, so finely drawn, so polished and beautiful in more than one kind, were displayed to a wilderness. That you may know she wished to be gazed upon, not merely glanced at, see what place she gave us: she set us in the middle of herself and gave us a view all around; and she not only raised man upright but, meaning to make him fit for contemplation — so that he could follow the stars gliding from their rising to their setting and carry his face round with the whole — she made his head lofty and set it on a supple neck; then, leading forth six constellations by day and six by night, she unfolded every part of herself, so that through these things she had presented to his eyes she might make him crave the rest as well. For we see neither all things nor things as great as they are, but our gaze opens for itself a road of inquiry and lays foundations for the truth, so that the search may pass from the open into the hidden and find something older than the universe itself: where those stars came from; what the condition of the whole was before the separate things parted into their portions; what reason drew apart what lay sunk and confused; who assigned places to things — whether heavy bodies sank and light ones flew up by their own nature, or whether, beyond the thrust and weight of bodies, some higher force laid down a law for each; whether that is true by which it is best proved that men are of a divine breath — that a part, and as it were certain sparks of the stars, leapt down to earth and lodged in a place not their own. Our thought breaks through the ramparts of heaven and is not content to know what is shown to it: "That," it says, "I examine, which lies beyond the universe — whether it is a deep waste, or whether this too is shut in by its own bounds; what condition the things shut out are in, whether they are shapeless and confused, holding the same amount of space in every direction, or whether they too are laid out in some order; whether they cohere with this universe, or have withdrawn far from it, so that it rolls here in the void; whether the things by which everything that has been born and will be born is built up are indivisible, or whether their matter is continuous and changeable throughout; whether the elements are contrary to one another, or do not war but conspire across their differences." Born to seek out these things, reckon how little time he has received — even if he claims it all for himself. Though he let nothing be snatched away by easy-going weakness, nothing slip through neglect, though he guard his hours with the utmost miserliness and advance to the very last boundary of human life, and fortune shake nothing loose of what nature has appointed him, still man, for the knowledge of things immortal, is too mortal. Therefore I live in accordance with nature if I have given myself wholly to her, if I am her admirer and her worshipper. And nature willed me to do both — to act and to have leisure for contemplation: I do both, since not even contemplation is without action.
Solemus dicere summum bonum esse secundum naturam uiuere: natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationi rerum et actioni. Nunc id probemus quod prius diximus. Quid porro? hoc non erit probatum, si se unusquisque consuluerit quantam cupidinem habeat ignota noscendi, quam ad omnis fabulas excitetur? 2. Nauigant quidam et labores peregrinationis longissimae una mercede perpetiuntur cognoscendi aliquid abditum remotumque. Haec res ad spectacula populos contrahit, haec cogit praeclusa rimari, secretiora exquirere, antiquitates euoluere, mores barbararum audire gentium. 3. Curiosum nobis natura ingenium dedit et artis sibi ac pulchritudinis suae conscia spectatores nos tantis rerum spectaculis genuit, perditura fructum sui, si tam magna, tam clara, tam subtiliter ducta, tam nitida et non uno genere formosa solitudini ostenderet. 4. Vt scias illam spectari uoluisse, non tantum aspici, uide quem nobis locum dederit: in media nos sui parte constituit et circumspectum omnium nobis dedit; nec erexit tantummodo hominem, sed etiam habilem contemplationis factura, ut ab ortu sidera in occasum labentia prosequi posset et uultum suum circumferre cum toto, sublime fecit illi caput et collo flexili inposuit; deinde sena per diem, sena per noctem signa producens nullam non partem sui explicuit, ut per haec quae optulerat oculis eius cupiditatem faceret etiam ceterorum. 5. Nec enim omnia nec tanta uisimus quanta sunt, sed acies nostra aperit sibi inuestigandi uiam et fundamenta uero iacit, ut inquisitio transeat ex apertis in obscura et aliquid ipso mundo inueniat antiquius: unde ista sidera exierint; quis fuerit uniuersi status, antequam singula in partes discederent; quae ratio mersa et confusa diduxerit; quis loca rebus adsignauerit, suapte natura grauia descenderint, euolauerint leuia, an praeter nisum pondusque corporum altior aliqua uis legem singulis dixerit; an illud uerum sit quo maxime probatur homines diuini esse spiritus, partem ac ueluti scintillas quasdam astrorum in terram desiluisse atque alieno loco haesisse. 6. Cogitatio nostra caeli munimenta perrumpit nec contenta est id quod ostenditur scire: ’illud’ inquit ’scrutor quod ultra mundum iacet, utrumne profunda uastitas sit an et hoc ipsum terminis suis cludatur; qualis sit habitus exclusis, informia et confusa sint, an in omnem partem tantundem loci optinentia, an et illa in aliquem cultum discripta sint; huic cohaereant mundo, an longe ab hoc secesserint et hic in uacuo uolutetur; indiuidua sint per quae struitur omne quod natum futurumque est, an continua eorum materia sit et per totum mutabilis; utrum contraria inter se elementa sint, an non pugnent sed per diuersa conspirent.’ 7. Ad haec quaerenda natus, aestima quam non multum acceperit temporis, etiam si illud totum sibi uindicat. Qui licet nihil facilitate eripi, nihil neglegentia patiatur excidere, licet horas suas auarissime seruet et usque in ultimum aetatis humanae terminum procedat nec quicquam illi ex eo quod natura constituit fortuna concutiat, tamen homo ad inmortalium cognitionem nimis mortalis est. 8. Ergo secundum naturam uiuo si totum me illi dedi, si illius admirator cultorque sum. Natura autem utrumque facere me uoluit, et agere et contemplationi uacare: utrumque facio, quoniam ne contemplatio quidem sine actione est.
"But it matters," you say, "whether you have come to contemplation for the sake of pleasure, seeking nothing from it but unbroken contemplation without an outcome; for it is sweet and has its own allurements." To this I answer you: it matters equally in what spirit you live the civic life — whether you are forever restless and never take for yourself any time in which to look away from human things to the divine. Just as to pursue affairs with no love of the virtues and no cultivation of the mind, and to put forth bare deeds, is in no way to be approved — for these things ought to be mixed and woven together — so virtue flung into a leisure without action, never displaying what it has learned, is an imperfect and listless good. Who denies that virtue ought to test her progress in work, and not only think what is to be done but also at times exercise her hand and carry through to reality the things she has rehearsed? But if the delay is not the wise man’s own — if it is not the doer who is lacking but the things to be done — will you not allow him to be with himself? In what spirit does the wise man withdraw into leisure? Knowing that even then he will be doing things by which he will benefit those who come after. We, at any rate, are the ones who say that both Zeno and Chrysippus did greater things than if they had led armies, held offices, passed laws — laws which they passed not for one state but for the whole human race. To sum up, I ask whether Cleanthes and Chrysippus and Zeno lived by their own precepts. Without doubt you will answer that they lived just as they had said one ought to live: and yet none of them administered the commonwealth. "They had not," you say, "either the fortune or the rank that is usually required for admission to the handling of public affairs." But these same men nonetheless led no idle life: they found out how their own repose might do men more good than the running-about and the sweat of others. And so these men were seen, nonetheless, to have done much, though they did nothing in public.
’Sed refert’ inquis ’an ad illam uoluptatis causa accesseris, nihil aliud ex illa petens quam adsiduam contemplationem sine exitu; est enim dulcis et habet inlecebras suas.’ Aduersus hoc tibi respondeo: aeque refert quo animo ciuilem agas uitam, an semper inquietus sis nec tibi umquam sumas ullum tempus quo ab humanis ad diuina respicias. 2. Quomodo res adpetere sine ullo uirtutum amore et sine cultu ingeni ac nudas edere operas minime probabile est (misceri enim ista inter se et conseri debent), sic inperfectum ac languidum bonum est in otium sine actu proiecta uirtus, numquam id quod didicit ostendens. 3. Quis negat illam debere profectus suos in opere temptare, nec tantum quid faciendum sit cogitare sed etiam aliquando manum exercere et ea quae meditata est ad uerum perducere? Quodsi per ipsum sapientem non est mora, si non actor deest sed agenda desunt, ecquid illi secum esse permittes? 4. Quo animo ad otium sapiens secedit? ut sciat se tum quoque ea acturum per quae posteris prosit. Nos certe sumus qui dicimus et Zenonem et Chrysippum maiora egisse quam si duxissent exercitus, gessissent honores, leges tulissent; quas non uni ciuitati, sed toti humano generi tulerunt. Quid est ergo quare tale otium non conueniat uiro bono, per quod futura saecula ordinet nec apud paucos contionetur sed apud omnis omnium gentium homines, quique sunt quique erunt? 5. Ad summam, quaero an ex praeceptis suis uixerint Cleanthes et Chrysippus et Zenon. Non dubie respondebis sic illos uixisse quemadmodum dixerant esse uiuendum: atqui nemo illorum rem publicam administrauit. ’Non fuit’ inquis ’illis aut ea fortuna aut ea dignitas quae admitti ad publicarum rerum tractationem solet.’ Sed idem nihilominus non segnem egere uitam: inuenerunt quemadmodum plus quies ipsorum hominibus prodesset quam aliorum discursus et sudor. Ergo nihilominus hi multum egisse uisi sunt, quamuis nihil publice agerent.
Besides, there are three kinds of life, and the question is regularly asked which of them is best: one is free for pleasure, the second for contemplation, the third for action. First, laying aside the contention and laying aside the implacable hatred we have declared against those who pursue what is different from us, let us see how all these come round to the same end under one title or another: the man who approves of pleasure is not without contemplation, nor is the man who devotes himself to contemplation without pleasure, nor is the man whose life is set apart for action without contemplation. "There is the greatest difference," you say, "between whether a thing is one’s aim or the appendage to another aim." Granted that the difference is great, still the one is not without the other: the first man does not contemplate without action, nor does this second act without contemplation, nor does that third — of whom we agreed to think ill — approve an idle pleasure, but the pleasure he makes steadfast for himself by reason; so this very pleasure-school too is engaged in action. And why should it not be engaged in action, when Epicurus himself says that at times he will withdraw from pleasure, and will even pursue pain, if either regret threatens the pleasure, or a lesser pain is to be taken on in place of a heavier one? To what end do I say this? That it may appear that contemplation pleases all: others seek it as their goal; to us it is a station, not a harbor.
Praeterea tria genera sunt uitae, inter quae quod sit optimum quaeri solet: unum uoluptati uacat, alterum contemplationi, tertium actioni. Primum deposita contentione depositoque odio quod inplacabile diuersa sequentibus indiximus, uideamus ut haec omnia ad idem sub alio atque alio titulo perueniant: nec ille qui uoluptatem probat sine contemplatione est, nec ille qui contemplationi inseruit sine uoluptate est, nec ille cuius uita actionibus destinata est sine contemplatione est. 2. ’Plurimum’ inquis ’discriminis est utrum aliqua res propositum sit an propositi alterius accessio.’ Sit sane grande discrimen, tamen alterum sine altero non est: nec ille sine actione contemplatur, nec hic sine contemplatione agit, nec ille tertius, de quo male existimare consensimus, uoluptatem inertem probat sed eam quam ratione efficit firmam sibi; ita et haec ipsa uoluptaria secta in actu est. 3. Quidni in actu sit, cum ipse dicat Epicurus aliquando se recessurum a uoluptate, dolorem etiam adpetiturum, si aut uoluptati imminebit paenitentia aut dolor minor pro grauiore sumetur? 4. Quo pertinet haec dicere? ut appareat contemplationem placere omnibus; alii petunt illam, nobis haec statio, non portus est.
Add now that by the law of Chrysippus a man is permitted to live at leisure — I do not mean merely to endure leisure, but to choose it. Our school denies that the wise man will approach just any commonwealth; but what does it matter how the wise man comes to leisure, whether because the commonwealth is wanting to him or because he is wanting to the commonwealth, if the commonwealth is going to be wanting to all? And it will always be wanting to those who seek it fastidiously. I ask which commonwealth the wise man is to approach. That of the Athenians, in which Socrates is condemned, from which Aristotle fled lest he be condemned, in which envy crushes the virtues? You will tell me the wise man will not approach this commonwealth. Will he approach, then, the commonwealth of the Carthaginians, in which there is endless sedition, and liberty hostile to every best man, in which there is the utmost cheapness of justice and goodness, an inhuman cruelty toward enemies, and a hostility even toward their own? This one too he will flee. If I should choose to review them one by one, I will find none that could endure the wise man, or that the wise man could endure. But if the commonwealth we imagine for ourselves is nowhere to be found, leisure begins to be necessary for all, because the one thing that could have been preferred to leisure exists nowhere. If a man says it is best to sail, and then says one ought not to sail on a sea where shipwrecks are wont to happen and where there are frequent sudden storms that sweep the helmsman off his course, I take it he is forbidding me to loose my ship, even while he praises sailing.
Adice nunc quod e lege Chrysippi uiuere otioso licet: non dico ut otium patiatur, sed ut eligat. Negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rem publicam accessurum; quid autem interest quomodo sapiens ad otium ueniat, utrum quia res publica illi deest an quia ipse rei publicae, si omnibus defutura res publica est? Semper autem deerit fastidiose quaerentibus. Interrogo ad quam rem publicam sapiens sit accessurus. Ad Atheniensium, in qua Socrates damnatur, Aristoteles ne damnetur fugit? in qua opprimit inuidia uirtutes? Negabis mihi accessurum ad hanc rem publicam sapientem. Ad Carthaginiensium ergo rem publicam sapiens accedet, in qua adsidua seditio et optimo cuique infesta libertas est, summa aequi ac boni uilitas, aduersus hostes inhumana crudelitas, etiam aduersus suos hostilis? Et hanc fugiet. Si percensere singulas uoluero, nullam inueniam quae sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit. Quodsi non inuenitur illa res publica quam nobis fingimus, incipit omnibus esse otium necessarium, quia quod unum praeferri poterat otio nusquam est. 4. Si quis dicit optimum esse nauigare, deinde negat nauigandum in eo mari in quo naufragia fieri soleant et frequenter subitae tempestates sint quae rectorem in contrarium rapiant, puto hic me uetat nauem soluere, quamquam laudet nauigationem. Seneca the Younger The Latin Library The Classics Page